Company Communications With Analysts and Fund Managers: A Study of the Investor Relations Activities of Large UK Quoted Companies by Marston, Claire Lesley
Company Communications with 
Analysts and Fund Managers.
A Study of the Investor Relations 
Activities of Large UK Quoted 
Companies.
Volume 1 of 2
Claire Lesley Marston
Ph.D. Thesis
University of Glasgow
Department of Accounting and Finance
December 1993
© Claire Lesley Marston 1993
ProQuest Number: 13818434
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 13818434
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
IGLASGOW | 
UNIVERSITY I 
LIBRARY I
Marston, C.L. 1993 2
Abstract
This thesis investigates the area of company investor re la tions with 
pa rticu la r emphasis on informal communications between company 
o f f ic ia ls  and analysts or fund managers. These communications take 
the form of meetings of various types, telephone conversations, 
feedback on analysts' research reports and mailing of information.
The major, ove ra ll, question tha t encapsulates th is  project seeks to 
establish the causes, nature and e ffec t of company communications with 
analysts. Given the extensive financ ia l reporting requirements in the 
UK and the information disclosure fa c i l i t ie s  provided by the London 
Stock Exchange, what causes companies to provide fu rthe r communication 
opportunities to analysts?
The overall research problem can be restated in terms of four general 
research questions:
How much does i t  cost companies, both in terms of money and 
organisational e f fo r t ,  to maintain a programme of communications with 
analysts?
What methods of communication are used by individual companies in 
getting th e ir  message across?
What information is communicated by companies to analysts?
What are the opinions of companies regarding the costs and benefits of 
communicating with analysts?
An investigation is made of the legal and regulatory framework 
governing company communications with analysts and fund managers. A 
review is made of the relevant lite ra tu re  on the ro le  of financ ia l 
analysts, investor re la tions as a management d isc ip lin e , and financ ia l 
public re la tions consultancy. Having established the se tting  w ith in  
which investor re la tions occurs, previous empirical and other evidence 
from the accounting and finance lite ra tu re  is reviewed fo r  information 
on company communications with analysts.
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This study views investor re la tions as a form of voluntary information 
disclosure akin to voluntary disclosure in financ ia l reports. As 
such, several hypotheses are proposed that seek to explain investor 
re la tions a c t iv ity  in terms of a selection of company specific  
dependent variables. This approach follows on from the work of 
several other researchers who have tested fo r an association between 
variables such as company size and level of information disclosure in 
accounts.
Nine hypotheses are put forward and ju s t if ie d  with reference to 
previous empirical research. The f i r s t  one is that there may be an 
association between company size and cost incurred, both in terms of 
money and organisational e f fo r t ,  in communications with analysts. The 
second is that there may be an association between the m arketab ility  
o f shares and the cost of company communications with analysts.
Number three is that there may be an association between stock market 
r is k  measures and the cost of analyst communications. The fourth 
hypothesis is that the cost of analyst communications may be 
associated with p ro f i ta b i l i ty .  The f i f t h  is that gearing may be 
associated with the cost of analyst communications. Hypothesis number 
s ix proposes that recent takeover a c t iv ity  may be associated with the 
cost of analyst communications. Hypotheses seven and eight are that 
the level of insider shareholdings and substantial shareholdings may 
be associated with the cost of the analyst communications programme. 
Hypothesis nine proposes that the industria l c la ss ifica tio n  of the 
company may be associated with the cost of analyst communications.
In formulating these hypotheses, cost is used in its  broadest terms, 
ind icating not only cash expended but also s ta ff  time and 
organisational e ffo r t generally.
The choice o f methodology, a postal questionnaire, is then discussed 
and the execution of the survey is described.
The results of the survey are then set out. This consists of detailed 
descriptive s ta t is t ic s  obtained from an analysis of the questionnaire 
responses. Many aspects of company communications with analysts and 
fund managers are covered. The nu ll versions of the hypotheses are
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tested using certain answers from the questionnaire data set as 
dependent variables. Univariate analysis and m u ltiva ria te  analysis is 
employed.
The results can be summarised in two sections. F irs t ly ,  the 
descriptive s ta tis tic s  which provide an insight into how investor 
re la tions are carried out and secondly the resu lts  of the hypothesis 
testing .
I t  was found that company chief executives and finance d irectors were 
usually involved in the investor re la tions e f fo r t .  The m ajority of 
companies held meetings fo r and talked on the telephone w ith , analysts 
and fund managers. The m ajority also commented on analysts' research 
reports and mailed information to analysts and fund managers. The 
organisational arrangements fo r carrying out the investor re la tions 
process were found to vary widely as did the costs incurred and the 
number of meetings held. In general the opinions of the respondent 
companies indicated that investor re la tions with analysts and fund 
managers is viewed as a valuable means of communication and that 
companies were sa tis fied  with th e ir re la tionsh ip  with the C ity.
Investor re la tions costs or e ffo rt was measured by extracting 21 
continuous and 7 ordinal variables from the questionnaire responses, 
each variable measured d iffe re n t aspects of the investor re la tions 
e ffo r t.  The univariate testing showed that company size was the 
variable most often s ig n ifica n tly  pos itive ly  associated with investor 
re la tions e ffo r t.  M arketability was also frequently an important 
explanatory variable. I t  was found that specific  r is k , insider 
shareholdings and substantial shareholdings were s ig n if ic a n tly  
negatively associated with investor re la tions e ffo r t .  The subsequent 
m ultivaria te  analysis confirmed these results fo r  company size and 
m arketability as measured by overseas lis t in g s . Substantial 
shareholdings and insider shareholdings were s t i l l  s ig n ifica n t but fo r 
a smaller number of the investor re lations variables. M arketab ility  
w ith in the UK appeared less important as did specific  r is k .
Following the analysis stage some overall conclusions are drawn and 
suggestions made fo r fu rther investigations.
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This study provides a uniquely detailed investigation of investor 
re la tions in the UK from the company perspective. As such, both the 
detailed descriptive information obtained and the hypothesis testing  
should be of value as an addition to the existing lite ra tu re  on 
financ ia l disclosure.
Marston, C.L.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 The research problem
The purpose of th is  thesis is to investigate the informal 
communication of information by companies to analysts and fund 
managers. This a c t iv ity  can be carried out via the investor re la tions 
or financ ia l public re la tions function w ith in  a company. I t  can be 
viewed as being part of the financ ia l reporting process, the annual 
report and accounts are the main conduit of information but companies 
add itiona lly  use more informal investor re la tions procedures.
The area was seen as being worthy of investigation because i t  was 
evident from the academic lite ra tu re  and the financ ia l press that 
analysts and fund managers were apparently receiving p referentia l 
treatment from companies. They were reportedly being invited to 
meetings with company management, ta lk ing  to company o f f ic ia ls  on the 
telephone and obtaining guidance on th e ir  research reports and p ro fits  
forecasts.
This apparent problem was by no means clear cut. I t  was not possible 
to say that p re fe ren tia l treatment fo r analysts and fund managers was 
necessarily a bad th ing. At the time of commencement of the project 
in 1988 there were laws and regulations supposedly preventing 
companies from giving too much information away to analysts and fund 
managers in a p re fe ren tia l manner lik e ly  to be detrimental to private 
or other shareholders or potentia l investors. Companies and analysts 
maintained pub lic ly  tha t information passed via informal investor 
re la tions processes was not price sensitive inside information, but 
merely information to enable analysts and fund managers to a rrive  at a 
better understanding. I t  was argued that investor re la tions was a 
good thing because i t  enabled the C ity be tte r to understand the 
companies in which i t  had, or intended to , invest. The problem was 
thus a grey area with the potentia l fo r  varying in terpre ta tions and 
opinions and subsequent government action.
I t  was decided to tre a t company communication with analysts and fund 
managers as being essentia lly  part of the financ ia l reporting process.
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The investor re la tions process is voluntary and as such lends i t s e l f  
to comparison with other studies of voluntary financ ia l disclosures.
1.2 Setting the scene
The f i r s t  task was to establish the legal and regulatory framework 
governing investor re la tions in general and communications with 
analysts and fund managers in p a rticu la r. Chapter two considers f i r s t  
of a ll the statute law in the UK that was applicable to investor 
re lations at the s ta rt of th is  study. The insider dealing 
le g is la tion , f i r s t  introduced in the Companies Act 1980 and 
subsequently incorporated in the Company Securities (Ins ider Dealing) 
Act 1985 was found to be of relevance and i t  was noted that several 
authors had speculated on the possible e ffec t on investor re la tions 
arising from the introduction of the le g is la tio n . These comments are 
reviewed in chapter two and the overall conclusion reached is that a 
lack of c la r ity  in the legal position means that investor re la tions is 
not prohibited but companies should exercise extreme caution, 
especially when dealing with favoured groups such as analysts and fund 
managers.
The Financial Services Act (1986) and the rules and regulations of the 
Securities and Investments Board (SIB) and the various s e lf regulatory 
organisations (SROs) were then investigated fo r  relevance to the area 
of company communications with analysts and fund managers. I t  was 
found that c lie n t protection was of paramount importance here and 
there was no e x p lic it  ru lin g  on the conduct of analysts in th e ir  
contact with companies.
The regulatory framework applicable to lis te d  companies was 
considered. Stock exchange regulations were relevant but somewhat 
unclear. The in teraction of the rules of the stock exchange l is t in g  
agreement, the company news service regulations and the opinion of the 
Listed Companies Advisory Committee on the d e s ira b il ity  o f investor 
re la tions appeared to support a careful programme of communication 
with analysts and fund managers.
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In 1989 the European Community issued a d irec tive  on insider dealing 
and th is  led to the Department of Trade and Industry issuing a 
discussion paper on the top ic . In 1992 a Criminal Justice B i l l  (House 
of Commons, 1992) was introduced in parliament. This contained d ra ft 
leg is la tion  on insider dealing intended to replace the provisions in 
the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act (Great B r ita in , 1985).
I t  was greeted with some alarm in the C ity as i t  was f e l t  that the 
proposals would severely re s tr ic t  company communications with analysts 
and fund managers and that th is  would be detrimental to the 
functioning of the cap ita l markets. A fte r several redraftings the 
b i l l  was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act (Great B r ita in , 1993).
The new law does not seem lik e ly  to cause great d isruption to existing 
established investor re la tions practices.
Chapter two continues with an outline  of le g is la tio n  and regulation in 
the United States. This is considered appropriate as the US cap ita l 
market is the world leader and both insider dealing le g is la tio n  and 
investor re la tions are more highly developed.
The relevant codes of conduct of professional organisations involved 
in investor re la tions were also studied. I t  was found tha t the 
Society of Investment Analysts (subsequently the In s titu te  of 
Investment Management and Research) had given careful thought to  the 
problem. The Investor Relations Society is the corresponding 
organisation fo r  company o f f ic ia ls  and investor re la tions consultancy 
s ta ff.  The society 's published princ ip les make i t  clear that analysts 
should not be favoured in granting access to  information. The 
In s titu te  of Directors takes a s im ila r lin e .
In the US the Financial Analysts Federation forb ids the use of 
material non-public information in its  standards of professional 
conduct.
The chapter deals with the recent issue by the London Stock Exchange 
(1993) of a consultative document on the dissemination of price 
sensitive information. This proposes certa in  changes to company 
conduct in dealing with analysts and fund managers. Comments are 
invited by 6th December 1993 and i f  the proposals as they stand are
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incorporated into the stock exchange l is t in g  rules then there w il l  be 
some changes in investor re la tions practice.
The overall conclusion aris ing from chapter two is that both law and 
regulation re s tr ic t  the communication of information from companies to 
analysts and fund managers. Companies must be careful not to favour 
th is  group over other groups also e n tit le d  to receive information.
1.3 Financial analysts and fund managers
The importance of the analyst in the investor re la tions process is 
clear and i t  was therefore decided to  carry out an investigation of 
the employment s itua tion  in the C ity of London. This is set out in 
chapter three. By examining a number of d irec to ries  the approximate 
number of analysts and fund managers operating in the C ity was 
established. Also the number of stockbroking firm s, the various types 
of financia l in s titu tio n s  and financ ia l public re la tions firms was 
discovered.
Chapter three also considers the ro le  of professional organisations 
such as the Society of Investment Analysts and the US equivalent 
organisation.
Previous empirical research studying financ ia l analysts is then 
reviewed to obtain fu rthe r insight into the type of organisation 
employing analysts and the p ro file s  of the analysts themselves.
F ina lly , the work of a financ ia l analyst is discussed in outline  along 
with the implications fo r  analysts of the e ff ic ie n t markets 
hypothesis.
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1.4 The investor re la tions function
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Chapter four attempts to draw together the ex is ting  lite ra tu re  on 
investor re la tions. Investor re la tions is a re la tiv e ly  new d isc ip line  
that has not yet achieved the status of a profession in i ts  own r ig h t 
and much of the lite ra tu re  consisted of advice fo r  managers on the 
importance of th is  new area. The material was usually w ritten  by 
investor re la tions p ractitioners and consisted of mainly p ractica l 
suggestions as to how to carry out a company investor re la tions 
programme.
P articu la rly  relevant to th is  project was that part of the lite ra tu re  
which referred sp e c ifica lly  to company communications with analysts. 
There seemed to be a trend fo r companies to by-pass brokers' analysts 
and speak more often with fund managers. Another theme tha t emerged 
was the awareness of the need to comply with legal and regulatory 
requirements.
In addition to the general lite ra tu re  id e n tif ie d , some empirical 
research was discovered. An early study in 1984 by Newman reports on 
a number of interviews with major companies. A more comprehensive 
survey was carried out in 1989 by an external consultancy firm  and the 
results are reported in de ta il in chapter four.
The chapter also reviews a report of a London Stock Exchange 
Conference on investor re la tions , describes the Investor Relations 
Society and outlines the s itua tion  in the USA.
The overall conclusion is that investor re la tions can be viewed as a 
response to the increasing sophistication of the world 's financ ia l 
markets. The ro le  of investor re la tions is to complement and improve 
existing information flows.
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As investor re la tions can be carried out both in-house and by external 
consultants i t  was necessary to investigate the lite ra tu re  on the 
financ ia l public re la tions consultancy sector. D irectories were 
consulted to establish the size and nature of the sector. Various 
sources were then reviewed to obtain an overview of the ro le  of the 
financia l public re la tions consultant.
The C ity and Financial Group of the In s titu te  of Public Relations was 
found to have carried out a study on the conduct of financ ia l 
communications by means of a working party recru ited from the investor 
re la tions industry. They considered a l l  the rules and regulations 
(summarised by th is  study in chapter 2) and decided not to add to the 
existing complex s itua tion  by promulgating more rules fo r  th e ir  
members. A committee and compendium of regulations was proposed 
instead.
1.6 Communications between companies and financ ia l analysts
Chapter six turns to the accounting lite ra tu re  to review evidence 
collected in previous surveys of the work of investment analysts.
Both Lee and Tweedie (1981) and Arnold and Moizer (1984) obtained 
substantial evidence that informal communications between companies 
and analysts do occur. They also measured the a c t iv ity  levels and the
importance of company v is its  and established the nature of the
discussions. Day (1986) also obtained additional evidence on company 
communications with analysts and H irs t (1988) measured hours of 
company contact by brokers as part of his study. The chapter reviews 
these findings in some de ta il because they are the f i r s t  serious 
attempts to quantify and describe the area under study in th is  thesis.
In fac t i t  was a fte r reading th is  work that the author decided to
pursue the study of investor re la tions in more depth.
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More recent research reviewed in the chapter includes an event study 
(Walmsley, Yadav & Rees, 1992) which concluded that price sensitive 
information was passed at company meetings with analysts.
Other relevant lite ra tu re  aimed at practis ing investment analysts was 
found to be of a descriptive and prescrip tive  nature. A rtic le s  in the 
accountancy and financ ia l press yielded some additional information.
1.7 Formulation of research questions and hypotheses
Chapter seven id e n tifie s  the research questions tha t emerged from the 
extensive review of the lite ra tu re  in chapters two to s ix . The major 
question that encapsulates the project is what is the cause, nature 
and e ffec t of company communications with analysts. The general 
research questions are:
How much does i t  cost companies, both in terms of money and 
organisational e f fo r t ,  to maintain a programme of communications with 
analysts?
What methods of communication are used by individual companies in 
getting th e ir  message across?
What information is communicated by companies to  analysts?
What are the opinions of companies regarding the costs and benefits of 
communicating with analysts?
Chapter seven discusses these questions in more de ta il and then 
formulates a number of specific  hypotheses. By viewing company 
communications with analysts as being a type of voluntary financ ia l 
reporting, several hypotheses that have been investigated in the past 
can be proposed.
Nine hypotheses are put forward and ju s t if ie d  with reference to 
previous empirical research. The f i r s t  one is that there may be an
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association between company size and the cost, both in terms of money 
and organisational e f fo r t ,  of communications with analysts. The 
second is that there may be an association between the m arketab ility  
of shares and the cost of company communications with analysts.
Number three is that there may be an association between stock market 
r is k  measures and the cost of analyst communications. The fourth 
hypothesis is that the cost of analyst communications may be 
associated with p ro f i ta b i l i ty .  The f i f t h  is that gearing may be 
associated with the cost of analyst communications. Hypothesis number 
six proposes that recent takeover a c t iv ity  may be associated with the 
cost of analyst communications. Hypotheses seven and eight are that 
the level of insider shareholdings and substantial shareholdings may 
be associated with the cost of the analyst communications programme. 
Hypothesis nine proposes that the in dus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  of the 
company may be associated with the cost of analyst communications.
In formulating these hypotheses cost is used in its  broadest terms, 
indicating not only cash expended but also s ta ff  time and 
organisational e ffo r t  generally.
In addition to formulating the various hypotheses, chapter seven 
considers what data was obtained from the company respondents and 
other sources in order to carry out s ta t is t ic a l tes ts .
1.8 Design and execution of the research p ro ject.
Chapter eight discusses the choice of methodology and explains why a 
postal questionnaire was selected as the research instrument fo r  th is  
project. The design of the questionnaire and the selection of the 
population is described. The population consisted of 547 companies 
which were, or had recently been, in the top 500 of UK quoted 
companies by market ca p ita lisa tion .
The practica l arrangements fo r d is tr ib u tin g  the questionnaire are 
described and de ta ils  of the response rate are given. The overall 
response rate was 61.6% (337 companies).
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The choice and source of variables fo r  hypothesis testing  is then set 
out. I t  was considered appropriate to use several measures to 
represent a variable in some cases, fo r  example four measures of 
p ro f i ta b il i ty  and three of gearing were used. This ensured a more 
thorough analysis with less chance of a spurious re su lt leading to 
re jection of a nu ll hypothesis. In other cases, fo r example company 
size, only one value was used. This was e ithe r because one pa rticu la r 
measure of the variable was considered most appropriate or because no 
other was conveniently available.
Having chosen the independent variables and described the method of 
extraction, the chapter then sets out descriptive s ta t is t ic s  and 
deta ils  of transformations that were performed on some of the 
variables to achieve a more normal d is tr ib u tio n .
The results are set out in fiv e  chapters covering d iffe re n t aspects of 
the investor re la tions process.
1.9 Organisation of the investor re la tions function
Chapter nine de ta ils  the results obtained re la tin g  to the organisation 
of the investor re la tions function. I t  was considered important to 
ask questions about the organisational arrangements because much of 
the investor re la tions lite ra tu re  reviewed in chapters four and fiv e  
dealt in a prescrip tive  way with how things might be or ought to be 
organised. In view of the in te r-d is c ip lin a ry  nature of investor 
re la tions i t  was also considered to be of prime in te rest to discover 
whether the function was under the control of the company finance 
d irec to r, an accounting expert, or under the control of public 
re la tions or s im ila r departments whose s ta ff  may have l i t t l e  tra in ing  
in financ ia l reporting.
Company respondents were asked fo r detailed information about th e ir  
company's arrangements. A fte r presenting descriptive s ta t is t ic s  on 
d irector involvement in investor re la tions , organising and s ta ffin g  
the investor re la tions function, the investor re la tions budget and
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consultancy expenditure and investor re la tions po licy , the chapter 
then sets out the results of the hypothesis tes ting .
Five continuous variables measuring e ffo r t devoted to investor 
re lations were extracted from the questionnaire data and tested 
against the independent variables. Four ordinal measures were also 
iden tified  and used fo r hypothesis testing . Univariate analysis was 
employed f i r s t  and the results show that company size is the variable
that appears to be most strongly and consistently associated with the
investor re la tions e ffo r t.  In an attempt to control fo r  in teraction 
effects and to assess the marginal explanatory power of d iffe re n t 
variables, m ultip le regression was carried out fo r  four of the 
continuous dependent variables. This confirms that company size was 
the most important factor in determining the level of e ffo r t  devoted
to investor re la tions at the time of the survey.
1.10 Assessment of and execution of the investor re la tions programme
This chapter f i r s t  presents descriptive results on the number of 
surveys of C ity opinion commissioned by the respondent companies.
There are several consultancies o ffering C ity opinion surveys and i f  
investor re la tions is taken seriously by companies such surveys are 
one method of measuring the success of the programme of communications 
with analysts and fund managers. I t  was f e l t  tha t i t  would be 
interesting to find  out which companies had used these services and 
how often.
The chapter then gives deta ils  of methods used by companies to 
communicate with analysts and fund managers and the re la tive  
importance of these methods. The main methods specified in the 
questionnaire were general meetings, special or ind iv idual meetings, 
telephone conversations, feedback on analysts' reports and mailing of 
information. I t  was f e l t  that i t  was important to  establish the facts 
here since no previous empirical evidence existed on how many 
companies engage in these a c tiv it ie s . In fac t the vast m ajority of 
respondents stated that they carried out a l l  f iv e  a c t iv it ie s  with
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individual meetings and telephone conversations being viewed as most 
important.
Four continuous measures of e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions were 
obtained from the questionnaire data and used fo r  hypothesis tes ting . 
These were the number of surveys conducted recently, less recently and 
in to ta l and an index of investor re la tions a c t iv ity .  A dd itiona lly  
there was one categorical variable, whether or not the company had 
commissioned any surveys. Univariate testing  was carried out and i t  
was found that company size and number of overseas lis t in g s  were 
s ig n ific a n tly  p o s itive ly  associated with four out of f iv e  of the 
dependent variables. M ultivaria te  analysis gave co n flic tin g  resu lts , 
size was not important although the number of overseas lis t in g s  
remained s ig n ifica n t.
The rank importances of the various investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  were 
also investigated to see i f  there was any association between these 
and the independent variables.
1.11 Company meetings with analysts and fund managers
Chapter eleven presents the results  of the questionnaire survey 
re la ting  to company meetings with analysts and fund managers. I t  was 
considered to be important to fin d  out exactly how many meetings are 
held by companies and how many analysts and fund managers from various 
organisations are inv ited  and attend. There was no extant empirical 
evidence available on th is  point. A dd itiona lly  there was l i t t l e  
previous evidence on the exact content of information passed at 
meetings. This made fu rthe r investigation a worthwhile and 
in teresting objective.
Descriptive data covering the organisation of meetings, the number of 
meetings held and attendance levels, and the actual information 
discussed is set out. Twenty seven relevant items were lis te d  fo r 
respondents who were able to state whether they were discussed or not
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and the re la tive  importance of the topics. This data gave a good 
overall impression of the information content of meetings.
Hypothesis testing was then carried out using eight continuous 
measures of e ffo r t  devoted to investor re la tions extracted from the 
meetings data. There were many s ig n ifica n t resu lts  here. In 
p a rticu la r, large companies with more marketable shares (in  terms of 
trading frequency and overseas lis t in g s )  held more meetings and had a 
larger analyst fo llow ing. The subsequent m u ltiva ria te  analysis using 
regression confirmed the importance of company size and the number of 
overseas lis t in g s .
1.12 Telephone conversations, company feedback and mailing of 
information
Chapter twelve discusses the resu lts  re la ting  to company telephone 
conversations with analysts and fund managers, feedback offered on 
analysts' research reports and the mailing of information. Both 
telephone conversations and analyst feedback are p a rtic u la r ly  
sensitive areas tha t may be subject to accusations of unfairness from 
observers and regulators. I t  was most in te resting  to investigate 
these a c tiv it ie s  in more d e ta il since there was no comprehensive 
empirical evidence describing the s itua tion  among UK companies.
Hypothesis testing was carried out by extracting f iv e  continuous 
measures of e ffo r t  devoted to investor re la tions from the 
questionnaire data. These included the amount of analysis produced on 
a company and the size of mailing l is ts .  No information on telephone 
ca lls  was obtained in a form suitable fo r  hypothesis tes ting .
Larger companies with more marketable shares had larger mailing l is ts  
and were more heavily researched. The subsequent m u ltiva ria te  testing  
was broadly in agreement.
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter 1 33
1.13 Company close seasons and opinions on re lationships with
analysts and fund managers
The f in a l results  chapter sets out the data obtained on close seasons 
when companies p roh ib it or re s tr ic t  communications with analysts and 
fund managers. There are no specific  rules governing close seasons 
and there was no existing  comprehensive evidence regarding UK company 
practices. I t  was therefore worth investigating close seasons to 
obtain a detailed understanding of the s itua tion .
The chapter also presents the results  of the opinions section of the 
questionnaire which allowed respondents to express th e ir  opinion on 
analysts and the value of the investor re la tions function. There was 
some evidence in the lite ra tu re  that companies were unsatisfied with 
research carried out by analysts. I t  was in teresting  to discover that 
respondents to th is  survey seemed broadly sa tis fie d  with the work of 
analysts. The overall results  regarding opinions on the various 
investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  were that companies seemed to consider 
investor re la tions to be valuable. A desire to re ta in  the status quo 
as reflected in the responses seems to indicate tha t the investor 
re la tions industry has grown up to sa tis fy  a demand fo r  information in 
the capita l market place and has succeeded in sa tis fy ing  tha t demand.
An attempt was made to explain the observed differences in responses 
by making use of the explanatory variables used previously in testing 
the specific  hypotheses regarding investor re la tions cost or e ffo r t .  
There were three categorical variables re la ting  to the existence of 
close seasons and two continuous variables measuring the length of 
close seasons.
The nineteen opinions on the qua lity  of research and the value of 
investor re la tions were also investigated to see i f  there was any 
association between them and the independent variables.
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1.14 Conclusions
The f in a l chapter of the thesis discusses the achievements of the 
project both in terms of the answers provided to the general research 
questions and the success of the explanatory model based on the 
specific  hypotheses. The lim ita tions  of the project are discussed and 
a number of suggestions are made fo r  fu rthe r research and 
investigation.
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Chapter 2 The Legal and Regulatory Framework Governing Communications 
between Listed Companies and Investment Analysts
2.1 Introduction
The aim of th is  chapter is to ou tline  the legal and regulatory 
framework that applies to the communication of information by lis te d  
companies to investment analysts.
Companies are required to disclose information in w ritten  form to the 
public at large. The publication of the annual report is required by 
statute law and certa in additional information is required by the 
stock exchange. Apart from the annual report other w ritten  reports 
such as interim  and quarterly reports, documents issued in takeover 
s itua tions, announcements to the stock exchange, company brochures, 
employee reports and press releases provide information fo r  the 
investment analyst. However, evidence that w i l l  be referred to in 
th is  study indicates tha t analysts re ly  on personal contacts with 
companies to supplement the information they receive through normal 
channels. They may attend company presentations, often known as 
brokers' lunches, or v is i t  company premises, or speak on the telephone 
to company representatives in th e ir  quest fo r information on the 
companies they are analysing. These informal communications are the 
subject of th is  study and a consideration of the law and regulations 
surrounding these a c t iv it ie s  is therefore relevant.
2.2 Statute Law
Statute law intended to curb the practice of insider dealing is of 
relevance in th is  context.
The Companies Act 1980 (Great B r ita in , 1980) sections 68 to 73 
introduced proh ib itions on insider dealing. Amendments to these 
provisions were introduced in the Companies Act 1981 (Great B rita in , 
1981) in re la tion  to section 71 of the 1980 Act. The basic aim of 
section 71 and its  amendment is to exclude things done in connection
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with in ternational bonds from proh ib ition on insider dealing. The 
relevant sections of the Companies Acts 1980 and 1981 were 
subsequently incorporated in the Company Securities (Ins ider Dealing) 
Act 1985 (Great B rita in , 1985).
Insider dealing occurs when directors or others with priv ileged access 
to 'ins ide  information' abuse th e ir position by dealing in th e ir  
company's securities before th is  information becomes public knowledge.
Investment analysts come w ith in  the categories of individuals affected 
by the insider dealing ru les. 'An individual connected with a 
company' 'commits an offence' i f  he 'possesses unpublished price- 
sensitive ' information and 'engages in dealing in s e c u ritie s '. The 
terms in inverted commas are defined in d e ta il in the Act.
One example of an individual connected with a company is a person 
occupying a position tha t involves a professional or business 
re la tionsh ip  between the company and himself or his employer. In such 
circumstances he w i l l  be connected with the company i f  he is lik e ly  to 
have access to unpublished price sensitive information and i t  is 
reasonable to expect that someone in his position would not disclose 
that information except to enable him to do his job properly. Arden 
and Eccles (1980, p .89) make the follow ing comment
Some examples of individuals who w il l  be in appropriate positions 
are obvious. They include very senior employees, the company's 
accountants, the company's s o lic ito rs , and merchant bankers acting 
fo r the company. Rather less obviously, however, trade union 
o f f ic ia ls  may, i t  seems, by v irtue  of th e ir  position , have access 
to unpublished price-sensitive  information and thus be connected 
with the company fo r  the purposes of the provisions of the Act 
that re la te  to insider dealing. Another example is an insurance 
broker who v is its  the company and is given a management forecast 
that reveals price-sensitive  information in connection with a 
proposal to e ffec t cover against in te rrup tion  of business p ro fits .
Unpublished price sensitive information has three basic q u a litie s . I t  
must concern specific  matters that re la te  to  or concern the company
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and information of a general nature is excluded. I t  must not be known 
to the persons who are accustomed to , or are l ik e ly  to , deal in the 
securities and i t  must be such tha t, i f  i t  were generally known, i t  
would be lik e ly  m ateria lly  to a ffe c t the price of the securities. The 
question that now arises is whether information given to investment 
analysts by companies is lik e ly  to come in to  the category of price 
sensitive information.
Arden and Eccles (1980, p .90) give two examples, knowledge of an 
imminent take-over bid and knowledge of an o i l  s tr ike  by an o il 
company. They make the follow ing comment (p .99):
Some concern was expressed tha t the new provisions might cause 
d if f ic u lt ie s  to stock market analysts. I t  was considered, 
however, tha t the kind of information given to analysts should not 
include price-sensitive  information of the sort concerned here and 
that analysts would accordingly f a l l  outside the provisions of the 
section (68 CA 1980).
I f  companies respond to analysts' requests fo r  information unpublished 
price sensitive information, as defined in the act, should be 
excluded. Boyle, Birds and Penn (1987, p .239) c r it ic is e  the 
d e fin itio n . They state that i t  is not e n tire ly  clear whether the 
requirement of s p e c if ic ity  re lates to the item of information i ts e l f  
or its  relevance in regard to a pa rticu la r corporate issuer. The 
requirement that the information must not be known by those persons 
who would be accustomed or l ik e ly  to deal in shares requires 
c la r if ic a t io n . They make the fo llow ing comment :
I t  is not enough fo r  an insider to prove tha t the information was 
available on request, i f  in fa c t i t  was not ac tua lly  known. Of 
course, i t  might be a fa i r  assumption tha t any information which 
was available to investors and professional advisers on request 
would be known by such. I t  is not s u ff ic ie n t fo r  the insider to 
claim that the information was known by some actual or potentia l 
investors or professional advisers i f  i t  was not generally known 
to th is  class of persons.
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Obviously i t  would be possible fo r an investment analyst to commit an 
offence i f  he received unpublished price sensitive information from 
the company and proceeded to deal in securities . I f  he passed the 
information on to one of his c lie n ts  and the c lie n t dealt using the 
information the c lie n t could also be committing an offence. Secondary 
insider dealing occurs when a 'tippee ' obtains information from a 
primary insider.
Gibbs and Seward (Westwick, 1983, p .141) make the fo llow ing comment 
regarding meetings between analysts and senior company management :
I t  should be noted, however, tha t both sides are careful not to 
request (or to divulge) information which is not, or could not be 
made, generally available to shareholders. The Companies Act 1980 
has made i t  a crim inal offence to deal, or advise someone else to 
deal, on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive  information.
Lee and Tweedie (1981, p .115) make the fo llow ing comment on company 
v is its  by investment analysts :
The Companies Act 1980 may well curb the practice of seeking 
information on the fu ture prospects of a company during v is its  to 
companies - information which obviously can be of a price- 
sensitive nature. The Act p roh ib its  an insider knowingly in 
possession of unpublished price-sensitive  information from dealing 
or consulting another person to deal in the company's securities 
or even communicating that information to another person i f  he has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person would make use of that 
information.
In th e ir  f in a l recommendations the above authors state the fo llow ing 
(p .144):
Company v is its  by in s titu tio n a l investors and stockbrokers are 
obviously of importance to them (especia lly the la t te r )  in the 
process of investment decision making. (This is obviously a 
sensitive matter because of the issue of 'in s id e r ' information and 
we were not unduly surprised at the re la tiv e ly  muted enthusiasm
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fo r th is  source of information apparent in some respondents7 
answers). We would, therefore, recommend that the investment 
community investigate th is  area with a view to estab lish ing, more 
c learly  than was possible in th is  study, the nature and purpose of 
such v is its .  In pa rticu la r, i t  would appear to us to be an area 
which deserves some o f f ic ia l  a ttention, especially in view of the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1980, with a view to providing 
in s titu tio n a l investors and stockbrokers with accepted guide-lines 
fo r such v is its  - that is , a recognised and agreed code of 
practice to prevent certa in financia l experts benefiting from 
reserved knowledge at the expense of other investors.
In conclusion i t  can be said that the statute law designed to prevent 
insider dealing is relevant to the s itua tion  when a company responds 
to the enquiries of the investment analyst. The va rie ty  of comments 
on th is  topic indicate a certain lack of c la r ity  in the legal 
position. Companies and investment analysts therefore need to 
exercise extreme caution in th is  area of concern.
The Financial Services Act 1986 (Great B rita in , 1986) established a 
new framework fo r investor protection. The Securities and 
Investments Board (SIB) was established as the agency exercising 
powers under the Act. The SIB has constructed a detailed ru le  book 
putting the princip les of investor protection into practice. The SIB 
can authorise investment businesses d ire c tly  or i t  can recognise Self- 
Regulating Organisations (SROs). The SRO rules can be iden tica l to 
those of the SIB but as long as the rules provide equivalent 
protection they do not have to be exactly the same.
The Securities and Investments Board has published conduct o f business 
rules (1987 and 1990) which deal in te r a lia  with research 
recommendations. Rule 5.20 seeks to ensure that firms which publish 
research recommendations to th e ir  customers do not take un fa ir 
advantage by dealing before th e ir  customers have the information. Rule 
5.21 prohib its dealing by a firm  where an o ff ic e r  or employee of a 
firm  is prohibited by the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 
1985 from effecting a transaction. I t  also states tha t a firm  shall 
use its  best endeavours to ensure that no o ff ic e r  or employee of the
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firm  effects a transaction on behalf of the firm  with or fo r any 
person i f  that o ff ic e r  or employee has reason to believe that the 
e ffecting  of that transaction by the person is prohibited by the 
Company Securities (Ins ider Dealing) Act 1985.
Rules 8.01 to 8.10 deal with published recommendations such as 
journals, tip-sheets, broker's c ircu la rs  and broadcasts. In 
pa rticu la r, ru le  8.05 states that no matter shall be included in a 
relevant publication in re la tion  to any recommendation included in i t  
which states or implies that the recommendation is based on the 
evidence of research or analysis unless such research or analysis has 
been carried out and the firm  is in possession of tha t evidence and i t  
is adequate to support the recommendation.
Rule 16.09 requires firms to make a record of the recommendations 
included in any publication subject to rules 8.01 to 8.10. I t  must 
also make a record of the statements accompanying the recommendations. 
I f  the recommendations are stated to be based on research and analysis 
the evidence must also be recorded. A ll the records shall be kept 
together at a branch or o ffice  of the firm  designated fo r  the purpose. 
A record must be kept fo r  at least one year a fte r the issue of the 
publication.
To summarise the above rules the SIB recognises that fac t that firms 
may obtain valuable information as a re su lt of carrying out research 
and analysis. The conduct of business rules seek to ensure the 
protection of the c lie n ts , they do not seek to regulate the means by 
which research is carried out. They have nothing to say regarding the 
conduct of financ ia l analysts' private contacts with companies.
The se lf-regu la ting  organisations (SROs) have developed th e ir  own 
conduct of business ru les. Accordingly the Association of Futures 
Brokers and Dealers (AFBD), the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and 
Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA), the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), the L ife  Assurance and Unit Trust 
Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO) and the Securities Association (TSA) 
have set out rules re la tin g  to research recommendations s im ila r in 
content to those of the SIB. They do not have any conduct of business
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rules re la ting  sp e c ifica lly  to the conduct of members contacting 
companies fo r information. (The AFBD and TSA have now merged to form 
the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA).)
According to Moir (1989) reporting in the Observer, the Bank of 
England is showing increasing concern that confidentia l b rie fings by 
quoted companies have e ffe c tive ly  created two classes of investor: 
the priv ileged and the unprivileged. Moir notes tha t in s titu t io n a l 
investors obtain news ahead of the market when th e ir  analysts or 
stockbrokers are p riva te ly  briefed. Although the legal requirements 
of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 should prevent 
abuse of inside information by 'f ro n t running', that is using the 
information to deal ahead of the f irm 's  c lie n ts , worries s t i l l  
pers is t. In addition to the le g is la tio n , the Stock Exchange's Listed 
Companies Advisory Committee issued a special 'Guide fo r D irectors on 
Investor Relations' in November 1988 (Listed Companies Advisory 
Committee, 1988).
Moir states that there is no doubt that private investors hear company 
news well a fte r the professionals. The Securities Association forb ids 
firms to deal ahead of th e ir  c lie n ts  (Rule 380.01 TSA Rule Book 
(1987), subsequently ru le  5-37 SFA Rule Book (1992)) but two important 
exceptions undermine th is  ru le . Firms may fro n t run i f  they have 
formally to ld  th e ir  c lie n ts  in advance that they may do so. Also i f  
the firm  reasonably believes tha t, a fte r a research recommendation is 
published, i t  w i l l  be d i f f ic u l t  fo r  i t  to execute the resu lting  orders 
from customers without causing the price to move adversely against the 
customers by a material amount, then i t  may deal in the same way as 
the research recommendation before i t  is published. The extent of the 
dealing should be what the firm  reasonably believes w i l l  correspond to 
the lik e ly  orders from customers and the dealing should not cause the 
price of the investment to move adversely against the customers by a 
material amount. Moir comments tha t i f  analysts switch 
recommendations a fte r a private b rie fin g , leaving the market makers 
short of stock, a firm  may go on a buying spree so long as i t  is 
d iscreetly  handled and does not move the market price m ate ria lly .
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Moir presents the views of John Kerridge, chairman of Fisons and fo r 
three years a founding d irec to r of the Securities and Investments 
Board. Kerridge believes that s t r ic t  rules should apply to the 
analysts who receive information ju s t as Company Law and the Stock 
Exchange L is ting  Agreement control what information companies provide 
and how they provide i t .  The in it ia t iv e  must come from the Stock 
Exchange and the Securities Association since i t  is th e ir  members who 
struggle to obtain exclusive information. Kerridge believes that 
private investors need to fee l confident of receiving equivalent 
treatment to fund managers.
Colin Condren the d irec to r of compliance fo r  Barclays de Zoete Wedd is 
quoted as saying:
The new regime has helped by safeguarding c lie n ts  from being 
ripped o ff  and le ve llin g  the playing f ie ld  between fund managers 
and unsophisticated private investors. But, as fo r  news that is
in the market place i t  is a fa c t of l i f e  tha t i f  you are big, and
close to the market, you w il l  hear things f i r s t .  What Aunt Agatha 
needs is a un it tru s t with a fund manager who can get in while the 
news is on the screen and the ju icy  lines of stock are around.
Condren believes the answer lie s  in market forces.
We are there to send our c lie n ts  f i r s t  class information which has 
not been worn out by the actions of our market-makers (or favoured 
in s titu t io n s ). Otherwise our c lie n ts  w i l l  go down the road.
In conclusion i t  can be said tha t the Financial Services Act 1985 does
not appear to have produced regulation regarding the way in which
financ ia l analysts approach companies fo r  information. What i t  has 
done is regulate the way the resu lts  of research and analysis are 
used.
This section has summarised the legal s itua tion  at the time of 
s ta rting  the p ro ject. Subsequent to the data gathering carried out in 
1991 (see chapter 8) there was a change in the insider dealing 
le g is la tion . The Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 is
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soon to be repealed and replaced by certa in  provisions contained in 
the Criminal Justice Act 1993. This w i l l  be discussed la te r in the 
chapter (see 2.5)
2.3 Stock exchange regulation
The London Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland Limited operates markets in UK government securities , UK and 
foreign equities and traded options. The Council of the Stock Exchange 
is the competent au thority  to issue rules governing the admission of 
securities to l is t in g ,  the contents of l is t in g  particu la rs  and the 
continuing obligations of lis te d  companies.
In the case of meetings with investment analysts, telephone enquiries 
from analysts and company v is its  there are no specific  regulations.
The follow ing information was obtained from the Information O ffice r 
(Corporate Marketing) by le t te r  in 1989:
The Stock Exchange does not have any information regarding 
meetings that may take place between lis te d  companies and members 
of the financ ia l community -----
There are no codes of practice dictated by the Stock Exchange on 
how lis te d  companies should respond to telephone ca lls  from 
investment analysts. Obviously, as part of th e ir  continuing 
obligations lis te d  companies must report any price sensitive 
information to the Exchange f i r s t ,  and they cannot divulge 
information to investment analysts i f  the information is lik e ly  to 
have an e ffec t on share prices. Individual companies might have 
th e ir  own gu ide-lines___
The basic p rinc ip le  is tha t a l l  user groups have equal status in terms 
of the lis t in g  agreement with the Stock Exchange and that identica l 
information should be available and given simultaneously to a l l  users.
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The Stock Exchange's 'Admission of Securities to L is tin g '
(In ternational Stock Exchange, 1989) provides tha t companies must 
n o tify  the Quotations Department of: 'any information necessary to
enable the holders of the company's lis te d  securities and the public 
to appraise the position of the company and to avoid the establishment 
of a fa lse market in its  lis te d  secu rities ' (Section 5, Chapter 2, 
p a ra .l). This requirement operates according to the 'guiding 
p rin c ip le ' tha t: 'inform ation which is expected to be price sensitive
should be released immediately i t  is the subject of a decision. U ntil 
that point is reached i t  is imperative that the s tr ic te s t security  
w ith in the issuer is observed' (Section 5, Chapter 1). Expanding on 
th is  guiding p rinc ip le  the Stock Exchange specifies that information 
should not be: 'released in such a way that Stock Exchange
transactions may be entered into at prices which do not re fle c t the 
la test available information' nor 'divulged outside the company and 
its  advisers in such a way as to place in a priv ileged dealing 
position any person or class or category of persons' (Section 5, 
Chapter 2, Note 1.1)
The Stock Exchange l is t in g  agreement makes specific  provision fo r  the 
disclosure of information re la ting  to major new developments and the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 
1985) sets out additional disclosure rules to apply during takeover 
situations (see O'Brien, 1992). There are detailed rules re la ting  to 
the timing of disclosures and the practica l matter of how the 
information is to be disseminated. The company announcements o ff ic e  
of the London Stock Exchange receives the information and releases i t  
via the company news service (CNS). The service is available to 
subscribers country-wide and selected points of information are 
available on the edited news service of TOPIC.
Hilton (1989) reported tha t only 40% of announcements on the company 
news service appeared on the ed it service of TOPIC. Also the time 
taken from receipt of information to publication on the screen is 
frequently so long that i t  proves a severe embarrassment to companies 
who have a busy schedule of analyst brie fings and press conferences 
lined up to coincide with publication. The London Stock Exchange 
subsequently introduced a regulatory news service (RNS) in December
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1990. Information is processed by the company announcements o ffice  
and released fo r publication through TOPIC and any news agencies 
w illin g  to pay fo r the service. Information d is tr ib u tio n  is therefore 
wider, quicker and more detailed than in the past.
The Listed Companies Advisory Committee is an independent body set up 
at the in it ia t iv e  of the London Stock Exchange. I t  issued a booklet 
e n title d  'Investor Relations A guide fo r  d ire c to rs ' in November 1988 
(Listed Companies Advisory Committee, 1988). These guide-lines were 
prepared at the suggestion of the Bank of England and include a 
section re la ting  to communications with analysts and fund managers.
The tex t is here reproduced in f u l l :
I t  is v ita l that no group of investors or market commentators be 
given priv ileged access to p rice-sensitive  information, However, 
i t  can often be helpfu l to provide background information to 
brokers' analysts who play a key ro le  in analysing published 
information given to the market, and to major investors or 
potential investors in the company. This might include both a 
restatement and elaboration of information already released and 
material on the company's products and processes which, while not 
price-sensitive , assists analysts or fund managers in th e ir  
understanding of the nature of a company's business.
I t  is important that such contacts are seen to be part of a steady 
flow of communication, otherwise there is  a danger of provoking 
market speculation that p rice-sensitive  information is to be or 
has been communicated. I f  a company is about to change its  po licy 
with regard to such communications i t  should take a l l  practicable 
steps to inform the market.
The announcement of f u l l  and ha lf-yea rly  results  provides regular 
opportunities to keep the investment community up to date with 
de ta ils  of performance and key developments. Companies may wish 
to give managers, analysts and the media the opportunity to 
discuss these resu lts . Care must be taken, however, to  ensure 
that general release to the market has taken place before making 
price-sensitive information available. In advance of such a
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meeting, the company may fin d  i t  he lpfu l to prepare a statement 
including answers to anticipated questions, and to pass a copy to 
the Exchange's Company Announcements O ffice fo r co-ordinated 
release.
Responsibility and d iscretion must be management's watchwords.
We believe i t  to be of primary importance that companies avoid 
being provoked into providing material information by speculative 
comment or deductions put forward by analysts or the media. I f  
the issues concerned are based on outside assessments, then we 
believe that the company should make i t  absolutely clear that i t  
cannot comment. I t  is the company's duty to keep the market 
informed, not to correct mistaken opinion.
Comments should be lim ited to matters of fa c t. I f  the market is 
misinformed, correction should be made pub lic ly , a fte r the company 
has consulted its  financ ia l advisers.
The guide-lines quoted above make i t  quite clear that d irectors should 
be very careful in th e ir  dealings with analysts. Failure to comply 
with the guide-lines could be interpreted as a breach of the London 
Stock Exchange's l is t in g  regulations.
This section has dealt with stock exchange regulation at the s ta rt of 
and during the execution of the research pro ject. The s itua tion  is 
currently under review as, subsequent to the publication of the 
Criminal Justice Act (Great B rita in , 1993), the Exchange has published 
a consultative document on the dissemination of price sensitive 
information (London Stock Exchange, 1993). These developments are 
discussed in sections 2.5 and 2.8.
2.4 European Community leg is la tion
The Council of the European Communities issued on 13th November 1989 a 
D irective co-ordinating regulations on insider dealing (European
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Community, 1989). The D irective is a minimum standards measure and 
implementation w i l l  require some changes to the existing  B ritish  law. 
The Department of Trade and Industry issued a commentary e n title d  'The 
Law on Insider Dealing. A consultative document' (Department of Trade 
and Industry, 1989). The government was considering at the time 
whether other changes to the law, besides those required by the 
D irective , would improve i t .  Although the D irective does not re fe r 
sp e c ifica lly  to company communications with analysts, the Department 
of Trade and Industry (1989, p .5) made the fo llow ing comment:
The Government attaches considerable importance to good 
communications between companies and the C ity , and believes that 
the practice of explaining the de ta ils  of company operations to 
analysts and fund managers has an important part to play in th is .
Nevertheless i t  is equally important to ensure that price 
sensitive information is not se lec tive ly  disclosed. Disclosure of 
price sensitive information in confidence poses p a rticu la r 
problems fo r a l l  concerned: the analyst to whom such information
has been disclosed could be in breach of the ex is ting  crim inal law 
i f  he were to use the information p rio r to publication.
Furthermore i t  is possible tha t, depending on the circumstances of 
the disclosure, the individual making the disclosure may himself 
be committing a crim inal offence. Therefore i f ,  on reviewing what 
has been said at a meeting, company representatives believe that 
they may have unw itting ly  revealed some unpublished price 
sensitive information, they should immediately disclose that 
information the Stock Exchange, fo r  publication to the whole 
market.
I t  appears therefore, that the issue of the European Community 
d irec tive  stimulated the B rit ish  government in to  th inking again about 
the scope of its  own insider dealing le g is la tio n  and to turn its  
attention d ire c tly  to the problem of re la tions between companies and 
analysts.
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2.5 The Criminal Justice B i l l  1992 and the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
The empirical work fo r th is  study was carried out in 1991 and the 
results must be viewed in the context of the regulation and 
leg is la tion  in place at that time. I t  should be noted, however, that 
the Criminal Justice B i l l  (House of Lords and House of Commons 1992) 
proposed a tightening up of the ex is ting  insider dealing le g is la tio n . 
The b i l l  was introduced in parliament in October 1992 p a rtly  in order 
to implement the above mentioned European Community D irective on 
insider dealing (1989). The d ra ft leg is la tio n  met with immediate 
opposition.
B F id le r, finance d irec to r of Christian Salvesen pic (Accountancy Age, 
1992), claimed that the Criminal Justice B i l l  would lead to a 
'considerably less informed marketplace' and stressed the need fo r 
companies to bu ild  strong long term re lationships with analysts. Tim 
Smith MP (1992) suggested that the widening of the d e fin it io n  of 
insider information proposed in the b i l l  could prevent in s titu t io n a l 
investors from dealing and stop analysts' meetings. He noted a 
pa rticu la r problem in that the wider d e fin it io n  in the d ra ft 
leg is la tion  included information a ffec ting  the company's business 
prospects. H ilton (1993) considered tha t the new rules would make i t  
impossible fo r  firms to raise new cap ita l on the stock exchange 
although he reported that the Treasury considered that the b i l l  would 
not render the legitim ate work of analysts il le g a l or erect barriers 
to the normal conduct of investment business.
The new provisions were considered by a House of Commons standing 
committee in the summer of 1993. P rior to th is  stage, Smith (1993) 
reported tha t the Home Secretary had explained in debate that nothing 
in the b i l l  would prevent the sort of contact between companies and 
investors that leg itim ate ly  takes place today. He also noted that 
since 1980, when insider dealing, became a crim inal offence there have 
been 28 prosecutions and 17 convictions. Smith reported that the CBI 
was concerned that companies would fin d  i t  impossible to continue 
discussions with analysts and fund managers. In conclusion, he 
considered that fu rthe r c la r if ic a t io n  of the b i l l  might resu lt instead
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in obfuscation. At the same time Rodgers (1993) made the fo llow ing 
comment:
The clauses have been redrafted by the Treasury and are an 
improvement on the f i r s t  d ra ft. But they s t i l l  d isplay a to ta l 
lack of c la r ity  where they deal with market makers and the use of
"specific  or precise" as part of the d e fin it io n  of what
constitutes inside information remains so vague that only the 
courts can give meaning to i t
On examining the eventual leg is la tion  in the Criminal Justice Act 
(Great B rita in , 1993) and comparing i t  with the Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act (Great B rita in , 1985) i t  appears that l i t t l e  
progress has been made in governing more s t r ic t ly  the re la tionsh ip  
between analysts, fund managers and companies. There is no specific  
mention of analyst meetings, fund manager meetings, telephone ca lls  or 
the o ffering of feedback on analysts reports. This indicates tha t the 
government has not thought i t  desirable to fo rb id  s p e c ific a lly  these 
well established investor re la tions procedures. The d e fin it io n  of
'ins ide  information' in the new act (section 56) is not g reatly
d iffe re n t from the d e fin itio n  of 'unpublished price sensitive 
information' in the old act (section 10). A person 'connected with a 
company' defined in section 9 of the 1985 Act is broadly s im ila r to an 
'in s id e r ' defined in section 57 of the 1993 Act.
In support of the view that the new leg is la tio n  has not g rea tly  
changed or c la r if ie d  the s itua tion , i t  was reported on the Money 
Programme (BBC2, 1993) that the government has le t s lip  an opportunity 
to clamp down on insider dealing, the new le g is la tio n  w i l l  have l i t t l e  
e ffec t p a rticu la rly  as the system of enforcement is the same as 
before. The London Stock Exchange has recently stepped in to  the 
debate with a consultative document on the dissemination of price 
sensitive information (London Stock Exchange, 1993). This w i l l  be 
discussed in section 2.8.
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2.6 United States leg is la tion  and regulation
Jack Lavery, a senior vice-president with M e rr ill Lynch provided the 
fo llow ing summary of the s itua tion  in the United States in a speech at 
the International Stock Exchange Conference fo r  Industry in October 
1988 (In ternationa l Stock Exchange, 1989):
The release of information by a company to the investing community 
is a very structured and s t r ic t ly  contro lled process. In the 
United States, s t r ic t  ru les, enforced by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) control the type of information and the 
manner in which i t  is released. Princip les of fairness underlie 
the regulatory philosophy tha t has been responsible fo r  the rules 
concerning disclosure of information.
There are several broad classes of regulations which concern the 
type of information disclosed and the way in which i t  is 
disseminated. Policies related to material standards regulate the 
type of information that must be disclosed e ithe r through public 
findings with the SEC or through press releases to the news media. 
Information that would have 'm a te ria l' e ffe c t on the company or 
its  stock price must be disclosed in th is  fashion. Policies 
related to 'd if fe re n t ia l d isclosure' ensure that company o f f ic ia ls  
do not release information to one analyst that they are not 
w illin g  to make generally available to the public. Companies are 
required to disclose th e ir  financ ia l resu lts  through 'lOKs' and 
'lOQs' and other pub lic ly  available documents that are useful to 
the analyst in reviewing the company.
There are also s t r ic t  rules concerning analysts' communication 
with investors. Before an analyst's report can be disseminated 
pub lic ly , i t  must be reviewed by a brokerage firm 's  supervisory 
o ff ic e r  to make sure that i t  conforms to regulatory and in ternal 
standards.
Despite the s t r ic t  regulatory environment imposed by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission a c o n flic t does ex is t between companies' 
desires to communicate with the financ ia l community and insider
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trading le g is la tio n . Suter (1989, p .283) provides a quotation from a 
former chairman of the SEC as fo llows:
The process of private meetings and discussions between corporate 
o ffice rs  and analysts is substan tia lly  r is k  free as long as i t  
consists of providing links in a chain of ana lytica l information, 
and public disclosure is made of anything of sharp and immediate 
significance which is communicated.
Suter comments that i t  is doubtful whether many investment analysts 
could in practice forego seeking to e l ic i t  inside information before 
its  public disclosure and i t  may also be that some would regard 
meetings between company o ffice rs  and investment groups as a waste of 
time i f  they merely e l ic i t  pub lic ly  available information.
A case of relevance to analysts and insider dealing occurred at the 
time of the Equity Funding Corporation scandal. Suter (1989, p .44) 
reports that Dirks, an investment adviser, took advantage of inside 
information obtained from a former employee. He investigated the 
company, tr ie d  to inform the SEC and to ld  his c lie n ts  who sold th e ir  
shares. Subsequently a massive fraud was exposed and trading of 
shares was suspended and the company f i le d  a p e titio n  fo r 
reorganisation. The SEC censured Dirks and th is  was upheld by the 
Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court decided tha t the SEC had been 
wrong. G ill is (1988, p .1788) provides the fo llow ing quotation from 
the opinion il lu s tra t in g  the Court's concern with the impact of the 
existing rules on analysts:
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain so le ly because a person 
knowingly receives material non-public information from an insider 
and trades on i t  could have an in h ib itin g  influence on the ro le  of 
market analysts, which the SEC i t s e l f  recognizes is necessary to 
the preservation of a healthy market. I t  is commonplace fo r 
analysts to 'fe r re t  out and analyse in form ation,' and th is  is 
often done by meeting with and questioning corporate o ffice rs  and 
others who are insiders. And information tha t the analysts obtain 
normally may be the basis fo r  judgements as to the market worth of 
a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgement in th is
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respect is made available in market le tte rs  or otherwise to 
c lien ts  of the firm . I t  is the nature of th is  type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cannot be made simultaneously available to a l l  of the 
corporation's stockholders or the public generally.
G ill is states that the Court, in several footnotes, elaborated on the 
importance of the analyst's function and the need fo r  c la r ity  
regarding permissible conduct.
The SEC expressly recognized tha t the value to the en tire  market 
of (ana lysts ') e ffo rts  cannot be gainsaid; market e ffic iency  in 
pric ing is s ig n if ic a n tly  enhanced by ( th e ir )  in it ia t iv e s  to fe rre t 
out and analyze information, and thus the analyst's work redounds 
to the benefit of a l l  investors.
The SEC asserts tha t analysts remain free to obtain from 
management corporate information fo r purposes of f i l l i n g  in the 
'in te rs tice s  in ana lys is .' But th is  ru le  is inherently imprecise, 
and imprecision prevents parties from ordering th e ir  actions in 
accord with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some 
guidance as to where the line  is between permissible and 
impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor 
analysts can be sure when the line  is crossed. The SEC's ru le , i f  
applicable without regard to any breach by an insider could have 
serious ram ifications on reporting by analysts of investment 
views.
Despite the unusualness of D irks ' f in d , the central ro le  that he 
played in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that 
analysts in general can play in revealing information that 
corporations may have reason to withhold from the pub lic , is an 
important one. D irk 's  careful investigation brought to lig h t a 
massive fraud at the corporation. And u n t il the Equity Funding 
fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. But fo r  D irks ' e ffo rts , the fraud might well 
have gone undetected longer.
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Although the Dirks case is somewhat unusual the comments of the 
Supreme Court indicate the existence of c o n flic t and uncertainty in 
the United States s im ila r to the problem as experienced in the United 
Kingdom.
2.7 Professional organisations and codes of conduct.
The aim of the fo llow ing section is to id e n tify  relevant guide-lines 
and regulations promulgated by professional bodies concerned with 
investment analysis.
2.7.1 The Society of Investment Analysts
The Society of Investment Analysts has issued 'Guide-lines to members 
on insider dealing' (1981). References to statute in these guide­
lines are to the provisions against insider dealing as f i r s t  enacted 
in the Companies Act 1980.
Guideline 1
The enactment of the Companies Act 1980 does not and should not 
prevent communication between investors or analysts and companies.
In terpre tation:
I t  is proper fo r a company o ff ic e r  to address a group of fina n c ia l 
analysts, to appear at a private luncheon or dinner meeting, to 
appear before a group of analysts who are industry specia lis ts  or 
meet an individual investor or analyst and to speak with him on 
the telephone. Meetings between company o ffice rs  and investment 
groups improve the general level of information and thus reduce 
the p o s s ib ilit ie s  of Insider Dealing. The information disclosed 
in such meetings should not be price-sensitive  information.
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Company o ffice rs  should be encouraged to make a general release of 
the content of remarks made at such meetings.
The las t comment is  in teresting since i t  does not recommend the form 
of the general release. A press release might be deemed s u ffic ie n t 
but the individual shareholder might not have time to comb through a ll  
the financia l press on a da ily  basis. Indeed not a l l  press releases 
are lik e ly  to be incorporated in e d ito ria l so perhaps i t  would be 
better fo r the company concerned to pay fo r an announcement. 
Shareholders might well prefer to be circu lated on an individual 
basis. As fo r telephone conversations these could also be c la ss ifie d  
as meetings and th e ir  content subject to s im ila r p u b lic ity  
requirements.
Guideline I I
Price-sensitive information only fa l ls  w ith in  the scope of the Act 
i f  i t  is specific  unpublished information, which i f  generally 
known, would m ateria lly  a ffec t the price of the security.
In terpre tation:
For the information to f a l l  w ith in Section 73 (2) (a ), i t  must 
re la te  to specific  matters and not be simply of a general nature. 
Specific matters may be taken to include, by way of example, those 
items of company information which the Stock Exchange lis t in g  
agreement requires to be no tifie d  to the Quotations Department or 
which are treated as price-sensitive  in the Model Code fo r 
securities Transactions. Into th is  category f a l l  such matters as:
- Decisions to pay or to pass dividends or in te rest payments
- Preliminary announcement of p ro fits , whether 
annual, ha lf yearly or fo r any other period
- Proposed changes in cap ita l structure
- Acquisitions or disposals above a certain 
size
- Changes in d irectorate
I t  is perhaps ind ica tive  that a Class I I I  acqu is ition, that is
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where assets and p ro fits  acquired amount to less than 5% of those 
of the acquirer, while c lea rly  specific  is not considered by the 
Stock Exchange to be n o tif ia b le .
The same d is tin c tio n  exists in the USA and there information which 
would normally be regarded of a general nature has been defined to 
include:
- Industry circumstances: volume, pric ing  
costs
- Competitive patterns
- Product description, d ive rs ific a tio n
- Pricing trends
- Sales trends
- Mix of product sales between lease and ou trigh t sale
- Cost trends
- Break even analysis
- Accounting po lic ie s ; depreciation, stocks, 
research and development
- Analysis of e ffec tive  tax rate
- Financial position; cap ita l expenditure, 
cap ita l requirements
- Company organisation, structure and changes
- Management progression
- Financial policy
- Merger and acquisitions po licy
I t  should be stressed that th is  l i s t  is purely i l lu s t ra t iv e  and 
does not represent the outcome of case law in the United Kingdom.
The above guideline attempts to d istingu ish between specific  and 
general information. Companies disclosing general information to 
investment analysts should not f a l l  fou l of the law. However, the 
d iv id ing line  is not clear and subsequent case law may o ffe r fu rthe r 
guidance.
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Guideline I I I
The analyst who employs the mosaic method, co llec ting  and 
evaluating information, some part of which may be non-public but 
no individual element of which contravenes Section 73(2), is not 
acting i l le g a lly ,  even i f  the conclusion which he reaches had i t  
been communicated as information by a 68(i) ind ividual would have 
fa lle n  w ith in  Section 73(2).
In terp re ta tion :
I f  an analyst is able to construct a model from a number of pieces 
of non-material information and the conclusion which he reaches, 
having f i t te d  the pieces together himself, amounts to price- 
sensitive information, then he has not contravened the law.
This guideline appears to be fa ir  in that a hard working analyst who 
gleans non-public information from companies and f i t s  these pieces 
together commits no offence. However, an individual shareholder might 
argue that he too is e n title d  to receive these pieces of information 
so he can build  his own model and make decisions.
Guideline IV:
An individual is defined by Section 73(1) as being connected with 
a company and therefore a 68(1) individual not only i f  he is a 
d irec to r but also i f  he occupies a position e ithe r w ith in  the 
company or through a professional re la tionsh ip  which could be 
expected to give him access to unpublished price-sensitive  
information.
In terp re ta tion :
Should an investor decide to involve himself d ire c tly  in 
management decisions of a company, fo r  example to help in the 
solution of a pa rticu la r problem, then he w il l  have placed himself 
in a professional re la tionsh ip  and w i l l  therefore be connected 
personally. He w il l  thus be prohibited from dealing in the shares
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fo r a period of six months fo llow ing the ending of his special 
re la tionship.
This guideline provides an example of a professional re la tionsh ip  that 
may arise when an investment analyst becomes involved in management 
decisions. However, i t  could be argued tha t a professional 
re la tionship exists at a l l  times between the analyst and the company 
he is fo llow ing, not ju s t in the special circumstances outlined above.
Guideline V:
An analyst who finds himself in possession of price sensitive 
information as defined should recognise tha t the transmission both 
to him and by him of that information may in i t s e l f  constitu te  a 
contravention of the Act by the transm itting person in each case.
In terpre tation:
I f  information fa ll in g  w ith in  the Act is communicated to anyone 
who might be expected to deal on i t  or persuade someone else to 
deal, then the communication i t s e l f  is i l le g a l.  This provision is 
much s tr ic te r  than in the US where l ia b i l i t y  only exists when 
dealing takes place. There is thus a c r i t ic a l d is tin c tio n  to be 
made between the p rinc ip le  of Guideline I I I  and that o f Guideline 
V. Analysts should recognise tha t they may be better judges of 
the p rice -se n s itiv ity  of information than th e ir  informants.
This guideline urges re s tra in t on analysts who receive price sensitive 
information from a company. I f  a company fa i ls  to comply with the law 
th is  does not mean that the analyst can take advantage of the 
s itua tion  with impunity.
Guideline VI:
Information which does not f a l l  w ith in  Section 73(2) when received 
cannot do so re trospective ly.
In terpre tation:
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This guideline does not derive from the wording of the Act but is 
based on Current US practice and general legal p rinc ip le . 
Information which becomes price-sensitive  a fte r a period although 
i t  was not so when o r ig in a lly  received, cannot lay the analyst 
open to re troactive  penalty in respect of actions he has taken 
while the information was not price- sensitive. I f  i t  has not 
been published and becomes p rice -sens itive , then he becomes bound 
fo r the fu ture  by the provisions of the Act.
Guideline V II:
Information fa ll in g  w ith in  Section 73(2) is removed from that 
category immediately i t  has appeared in any generally available 
published form.
In te rp re ta tion :
This guideline seeks to put into the context of the ana lytica l 
profession the wording of the Act which defines "unpublished" as 
"not generally known to those persons lik e ly  to deal in those 
secu rities ". The Guideline is based on the b e lie f that 
information published in , fo r  instance, a trade journa l, a local 
newspaper or, indeed, the Stock Exchange notice board would not 
normally be found to have fa lle n  w ith in  such wording i f  tested at 
law.
I t  would seem to be fa i r  that a hard working analyst scanning a ll 
possible sources of information should not be penalised i f  the 
publication is re la tiv e ly  obscure. The ind ividual shareholder who 
does not have time fo r such a c t iv it ie s  might argue that i f  a company 
disseminates information via spec ia lis t or local publications then i t  
should at least keep a record of these communications at the 
registered o ffic e  fo r inspection by shareholders.
To summarise, the Society of Investment Analysts has recognised the 
problems that the insider dealing le g is la tio n  has created fo r 
investment analysts and th e ir  working practices. Attempting to e l ic i t  
extra information from companies has long been part of an analyst's
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a c tiv it ie s . This has been viewed with some d isquiet by other members 
of the investing community. The guide-lines address the problem and 
provide a framework w ith in  which analysts may operate leg a lly .
Events have not stood s t i l l  since the Society issued its  guide-lines 
on insider dealing in 1981. A revised document was issued in December 
1986 with references to the Company Securities (Ins ider Dealing) Act 
1985 although the actual guide-lines remained unchanged (Society of 
Investment Analysts, 1986).
The Report and Accounts of the Society of Investment Analysts fo r  the 
year ended 31st July 1989 (Society of Investment Analysts, 1989a) 
state that a seminar on 'Ins ide r Dealing and the Investment Analyst' 
was held and that th is  was followed by a discussion meeting e n title d  
'Compliance - Is your career in danger ? '. The regulation committee 
makes the follow ing report:
Insider dealing: The Council believes the Society should continue 
to take a strong position on the potentia l damage done by over- 
re s tr ic t iv e  regulation of insider dealing. I t  can create 
unfairness between partic ipants in the market and drive e l ic i t  
(s ic ) information underground. I t  can lead to market ine ffic iency  
through bad pric ing and bring regulation i t s e l f  in to disrepute.
EEC: The issues contained in the EEC proposals on Insider Dealing 
are of great importance. There is an irreconcilab le  difference 
between the p rinc ip le  of absolute fa irness, in which no market 
partic ipant has an information advantage, and the p rinc ip le  of 
market e ffic iency in which the acquisition of superior information 
is rewarded.
The Society changed its  name to the In s titu te  of Investment Management 
and Research in 1991. The Report and Accounts fo r the year ended 31st 
July 1992 contain the fo llow ing report from the regulation committee:
The most important component in the Regulation Committee's 
a c tiv it ie s  in 1991/92 related to insider dealing. The Stock 
Exchange Quotations Committee was concerned at the end of 1991 by
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what appeared to be numerous breaches of the continuing 
obligations of lis te d  companies in the private disclosure of price 
sensitive information.
The In s titu te  was asked whether i t  would consider issuing a code 
fo r its  members which could amplify the prescriptions published by 
the Stock Exchange's yellow book 'The Admission of Securities to 
L is t in g '.
A fte r consulting with heads of research departments who had 
expressed an in te rest in responding to the Stock Exchange's 
request, the In s titu te  declined to amend its  current code of 
conduct. Among the reasons fo r th is  decision was the b e lie f tha t: 
' i t  would not be reasonable to require analysts to apply standards 
that are more re s tr ic t iv e  than the law in th e ir  use of information 
because to do so would be to discrim inate against the persons who 
re ly  upon them fo r advice and to whom they own a duty of care '.
2.7.2 The Investor Relations Society
The Investor Relations Society has issued, as part of an undated 
advertising le a fle t, a statement e n title d  'P rinc ip les of Investor 
Relations' (Investor Relations Society) which is  highly relevant and 
is therefore reproduced in f u l l  below :
Investor re la tions provides the lin k  between a company and the 
financ ia l community in th is  country and overseas. Whatever is 
said or done by investor re la tions personnel is deemed, by those 
receiving the information, to carry the approval of the company. 
The board of d irectors cannot absolve i t s e l f  from resp o n s ib ility  
fo r investor re la tions and in the event of uncertainty, authority 
should be obtained to act on th e ir  behalf.
A company should speak with a single voice and convey a clear, 
unambiguous message. Idea lly , re sp o n s ib ility  fo r investor 
re la tions should therefore be vested in a single ind iv idua l.
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Where a number of people including the d irectors are involved, 
coordination is essential.
The purpose of investor re la tions is to help the financ ia l 
community and investing public to evaluate a company. I ts  ro le  is 
to provide comprehensive information fo r  independent assessment 
and not ac tive ly  to promote the purchase or sale of a company's 
shares.
No audience is priv ileged in investor re la tions . Employees, 
shareholders and potentia l investors have equal status in terms of 
the lis t in g  agreement with the Stock Exchange. Identica l 
information should therefore be available and given simultaneously 
to a l l  audiences, including employees, investments analysts and 
the media.
To avoid creating a fa lse market in the shares of a company i t  is 
important not to convey price sensitive information to an 
individual or group of ind iv idua ls, rather than to the market as a 
whole. The emergence of a global market in securities has made 
th is  ob ligation international as well as domestic.
Investor re la tions is not simply a process of making available and 
disseminating information. Close personal contact with the 
financ ia l community also provides the company with a clear ins igh t 
of how i t  is perceived by investors. At best, therefore, investor 
re la tions encourages a two way flow of awareness and should never 
be used as a ba rrie r between the company and its  audience.
The above princ ip les are aimed at executives responsible fo r  investor 
re la tions and make clear the fac t tha t the investment analyst group 
should not be favoured in any way in granting access to information.
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2.7.3 The Institute of Directors
The In s titu te  of Directors has issued a 'Guide to board room practice 
No 7 - Insider Dealing' (1985) which includes the follow ing comment 
(p .12) on the provisions of the Company Securities (Ins ider Dealing)
Act 1985 :
The second basic ru le : Anyone who knowingly receives inside
information from an insider may not use i t  to deal.
I t  could be thought that th is  provision would make a company's 
brokers (or, indeed any other brokers contacting a company fo r  the 
purposes of market analysis) unable to deal in the company's 
securities at a l l  and, therefore, unenthusiastic about having what 
should be regarded as a generally acceptable discussion with a 
d irec to r about his company. In fa c t, the Act should not a ffec t 
that position. No broker should be given information which goes 
beyond that available generally to shareholders although i t  is 
permissible and, indeed, often bene fic ia l, to expand upon known 
facts in order to explain properly the position of the company.
Although the above comment addresses the problem of company contacts 
with investment analysts its  conclusion is not e n tire ly  sa tis fac to ry .
I f  a company 'expands upon known fa c ts ' i t  may well be providing 
investment analysts with superior information than tha t generally 
available to shareholders.
2.7.4 The Financial Analysts Federation
The Financial Analysts Federation in the United States has issued a 
code of ethics and standards of professional conduct. These were 
amended on 14th May 1989 and apply to the FAF and the In s titu te  of 
Chartered Financial Analysts (Financial Analysts Federation, 1989).
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Standard of professional conduct I I  B p roh ib its  analysts from 
assisting in legal and eth ical v io la tions and standard I I  C is a 
proh ib ition  against the use of material non-public information:
The financ ia l analyst shall comply with a l l  laws and regulations 
re la ting  to the use and communication of material non-public 
information. The financia l analyst's duty is generally defined as 
to not trade while in possession o f, nor communicate, material 
non-public information in breach of a duty, or i f  the information 
is misappropriated.
Duties under the standard include the fo llow ing:
(1) I f  the analyst acquires such information as a resu lt of a 
special or confidentia l re la tionsh ip  with the issuer or others, he 
shall not communicate the information (other than w ith in  the 
re la tionsh ip ), or take investment action on the basis of such 
information, i f  i t  v io lates that re la tionsh ip .
(2) I f  the analyst is not in a special or confidentia l 
re la tionsh ip  with the issuer or others, he shall not communicate 
or act on material non-public information i f  he knows or should 
have known that such information
(a) was disclosed to him, or would re su lt, in breach of duty, or
(b) was misappropriated.
I f  such a breach of duty exists, the analyst shall make reasonable 
e ffo rts  to achieve public dissemination o f such information.
I t  can therefore be seen that in the United States the profession has 
addressed i t s e l f  to the c o n flic t between the analyst's need to 
research a company and the insider dealing le g is la tio n .
In conclusion, i t  can be said that the professional bodies mentioned 
in the above sections 2.7.1 to 2.7.4 have a l l  given thought to the 
problem of maintaining communication between companies and analysts
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w hilst remaining w ith in the le tte r  of the law. Whether or not members 
comply with the regulations and guide-lines provided by th e ir  
associations is a moot point that is addressed in the survey as part 
of th is  study.
2.8 Consultative document on the dissemination of price sensitive 
information
On 14th May 1993 the London Stock Exchange pub lic ly  censured London 
International Group fo r revealing important information to a group of 
analysts and in s titu tio n s  rather than to the market generally. At the 
same time the d ra ft leg is la tion  on insider dealing contained in the 
Criminal Justice B i l l  (House of Commons, 1992) was about to go before 
a House of Commons standing committee. Foster (1993) commented that 
the C ity reacted with unease to the stock exchange ru lin g :
C ity professionals said that the exchange's rebuke to LIG would 
force companies to review how they release price sensitive 
information. One observer said the case could resu lt in greater 
use of public announcements fo r releasing information, and fewer 
private brie fings fo r analysts.
In November 1993 a stock exchange working party on the dissemination 
of price sensitive information published a consultative document 
(London Stock Exchange, 1993). They invited comments to  be received 
by 6th December 1993. Examination of the document reveals proposals 
to tighten up considerably on the conduct of the investor re la tions 
a c tiv it ie s  researched in th is  pro ject.
In pa rticu la r, i t  is suggested that companies should decline to answer 
analysts' questions where ind iv idua lly  or cumulatively the answers 
would provide price sensitive information. They should not correct 
incorrect figures or assumptions in analysts' reports. Instead they 
should discuss in general terms whether the analysts' assumptions are 
sustainable with the aim of getting the analyst to reconsider his 
assumptions rather than spoon-feeding information. A company should
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not fee l obliged to make a formal announcement correcting any 
forecasts by analysts unless the market is being m ateria lly  misled. 
Companies should review procedures fo r the conduct of meetings with 
analysts. They should consider ensuring that more than one company 
representative is present and tha t accurate records of discussions are 
kept.
The Independent newspaper (1993) dismissed these guide-lines as mostly 
p la in common sense and stated that in e ffec t they are no more than a 
description of best practice. I t  suggested the l is t in g  rules should 
not be changed but that a l i s t  of p ractica l examples to be used as 
benchmarks would be useful.
I t  is lik e ly  that company communications with analysts and fund 
managers w i l l  now be subjected to a period of intense scrutiny with 
the enactment of the new insider dealing le g is la tio n  and with the 
p o s s ib ility  of fu rthe r stock exchange action.
2.9 Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to summarise the legal and regulatory 
framework relevant to communications between companies and investment 
analysts. Some disquiet has been voiced by e a rlie r  researchers on the 
subject, in that investment analysts may have had access to 
unpublished price sensitive information via company meetings, 
telephone ca lls  and company v is its .  In the UK in the 1980s 
leg is la tion  on insider dealing and the regulation of investment 
business has addressed the problem to a certa in extent and the ground 
rules appear to be more f irm ly  established than was the case 
previously. Professional codes of conduct have addressed the matter 
more d ire c tly  but have tended to support ex isting practice and defend 
i t  w ith reference to the new le g is la tio n .
Further developments in leg is la tio n  are now under way a ris ing  from 
European Community law d irectives and the in te rest of The Bank of 
England, the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry in th is
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pa rticu la r problem area. The chapter has outlined these developments 
and concluded that the new insider dealing le g is la tion  w il l  have 
l i t t l e  e ffec t although there is a p o s s ib ility  tha t s tr ic te r  stock 
exchange regulation may change the conduct of investor re la tions.
One solution would be to outlaw a l l  informal communications between 
companies and analysts. Analysts would then have to re ly  on 
announcements via the company news service of the London Stock 
Exchange. This does not appear to be the in tention of the leg is la tion  
passed by Parliament but the s itua tion  w i l l  ce rta in ly  be less f le x ib le  
in the fu ture.
This chapter has established the legal and regulatory res tra in ts  
a ffecting  company communications with analysts and fund managers. The 
next chapter w il l  review the role o f the financ ia l analyst by 
examining relevant lite ra tu re . This w i l l  establish more c lea rly  the 
setting w ith in which investor re la tions was being carried out at the 
time of the study.
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Chapter 3 Identification and Description of the Financial Analyst
Group
3.1 Introduction
The aim of th is  chapter is to provide a b r ie f overview of the 
financia l or investment analyst group. Since the overall aim of th is  
study is to examine the informal information disclosures that 
companies make to investment analysts i t  is appropriate to describe 
the ro le of analysts in the market place and to give an indication of 
the size of the population and th e ir  employing organisations.
Investment analysis has increased in importance over the past th ir ty  
years due to the large increase in professionally managed funds. The 
largest and most active investors in the United Kingdom are the 
professional fund managers of insurance companies, pension funds, 
merchant banks, investment and un it tru s ts . Lee and Tweedie (1981, 
pp.4-5) provide a review of the increasing importance of in s titu tio n a l 
investors over the years. Investment analysts are employed by these 
in s titu tio n s  and also by stockbrokers. Not a l l  firms of stockbrokers 
employ a research department and since the Stock Market crash of 
October 1987 there has been some reduction of personnel in a l l  areas 
of the financ ia l services sector. Around th ir ty  thousand job losses 
had been reported in the C ity between the crash and early 1990, 
although twenty f iv e  thousand of these were estimated to have found 
a lte rnative  employment in the same sector.
Analysts can be categorised into two broad categories: p o rtfo lio
managers and information intermediaries (Moizer and Arnold, 1984).
P o rtfo lio  managers are those investment analysts who themselves 
use the information gathered from th e ir  own appraisal of equity 
shares in the management of p o rtfo lio s . Information 
intermediaries are those investment analysts whose share appraisal 
information is used by th ird  parties but not by the analysts 
themselves.
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In order to describe the investment analyst group i t  is necessary to 
answer the follow ing questions. Who are they, who do they work fo r 
and what do they do? These questions can be answered by reference to 
several sources of information.
There are numerous d irectories which provide lis t in g s  of firm s and 
personnel, including investment analysts, in the financ ia l services 
sector. These d irectories also provide, by way of e d ito r ia l comment, 
up to date information about trends in the industry.
In general when a profession develops w ith in  society, professional 
organisations are formed to promote and regulate the profession. 
Financial analysis is no exception and the lite ra tu re  produced by its  
professional organisations is helpful in build ing up a description of 
the financia l analyst group.
Previous research into the a c tiv it ie s  of the financ ia l analyst group 
provides useful information about the composition of the group. A 
review of the lite ra tu re  reveals the information sources fo r  sample 
selection. Details can also be obtained regarding the employers of 
financ ia l analysts, the experience and qua lifica tions  of analysts and 
the a c tiv it ie s  carried out by analysts
3.2 D irectories as a source of information.
There are a number of d irecto ries that provide lis t in g s  of firms and 
personnel in the financ ia l services industry. The aim of th is  section 
is to review a number of these d irecto ries and to extract some 
information about the size of the investment analyst group and the 
numbers of employing organisations of d iffe re n t types. In addition, 
the d irectories are reviewed fo r relevant e d ito r ia l comment and other 
descriptive m aterial.
The London Stock Exchange publishes 'Firms and Members' the o f f ic ia l  
d irectory of London Stock Exchange member firms three times a year.
In 1988/89 there were 391 member firms and 5,202 ind iv idual members
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Table 3-1 Organisations employing analysts
■Facing page 69
Number lis ted
London member firms of the London 
Stock Exchange 271
Foreign stockbrokers in London 
Toronto and Montreal 
New York 
Japan
8
42
36
Investment tru s t companies 155
Unit tru s t managers 138
Major UK l i f e  insurance companies 121
B rit is h  insurance companies 455
London members o f the society of pension 
consultants 63
B rit is h  merchant banking and securities 
houses 63
Authorised in s titu tio n s  under the Banking 
Act 1987 534
Source: The C ity D irectory 1990
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(In ternationa l Stock Exchange, 1988). Many, although not a l l ,  firms 
of stockbrokers maintain research departments employing analysts. 
Another publication is the 'Stock Exchange Press D irectory of Unit 
Trust Management' (Matatko & Stafford, 1988), providing a 
comprehensive guide to un it trus ts  and the people who manage them.
The Directory is published annually and includes a d irectory of fund 
managers. The 1988 edition provides track records fo r over 600 fund 
managers and performance data fo r over 1000 funds managed by 155 
d iffe re n t companies. These in s titu tio n a l investors have th e ir  own in- 
house analysts but they also make use of research provided by firm s of 
stockbrokers.
The Hambro Company Guide is published quarterly and provides lis t in g s  
of financ ia l advisers and th e ir  c lie n ts , financ ia l public re la tions 
advisers and th e ir  c lie n ts , stockbrokers and th e ir  c lie n ts  and 
investment tru s t management groups. The guide fo r  the 1989 quarter 
November to January l is ts  117 firms of fina nc ia l advisers, 121 
financ ia l public re la tions advisers and 137 firms of stockbrokers 
(Hambro Company Guide, 1989).
The C ity D irectory published by D irector Books (C ity  D irectory, 1990) 
provides lis t in g s  of firms in the financ ia l services sector as 
fo llows: banking sector in s titu tio n s , the money market, the stock
market, funds, insurance, build ing socie ties, financ ia l and investment 
services, commodity and bu llion  markets, shipbrokers and airbrokers, 
professional services, property, advertising and public re la tion s , 
miscellaneous business services and the finan c ia l press. Within some 
of these major sections are subsections of the industry tha t employ 
financ ia l analysts. Table 3-1 provides a l is t in g  of the numbers of 
firms in those parts of the financ ia l services sector that are l ik e ly  
to employ equity analysts.
Crawford Publications, a d iv is ion  of The Economist Publications L td ., 
publishes three useful d irec to ries . 'Corporate Finance' provides 
in te r a lia  lis t in g s  of stockbrokers and fund managers (Crawford's, 
1986). The 'D irectory of C ity Connections' (Crawford's, 1989) 
provides lis t in g s  of investment tru s ts , pensions funds, stockbroking 
firm s, financ ia l advisers, financ ia l public re la tions consultants,
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Table 3-2 Investment research lis tin g s
•Facing page 70
Industry research analysts
S ta tis t ic a l service specia lists
In ternational market specia lists
UK research (53 firms lis ted )
Australian stockbroking firms in London (12)
Canadian stockbroking firms in London (12)
Japanese stockbroking firms in London (14)
US stockbroking firms in London (29)
Financial Public Relations Consultants (59)
Investor re la tions o ffice rs  in top 500 
companies by industry sector
Source: Crawford's Investment Research Index 1987-88
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pension fund consultants and an in s titu tio n a l investor index. The 
'Investment Research Index - The guide to UK investor re la tion s ' 
(Crawford's, 1987) is p a rticu la r ly  relevant to th is  research project 
since i t  provides a number of useful lis t in g s  as shown in table 3-2. 
(This d irectory was discontinued a fte r the 1987/88 e d itio n ).
The industry research analysts l is t in g  provides some in teresting 
information. I t  divides industry in to 97 d iffe re n t sectors and 
provides a l i s t  of the organisations covering each sector. In 
addition i t  names the ind iv idua l(s) w ith in  the organisation 
responsible fo r covering the sector. In the vast m ajority of cases 
only one individual is named however in some organisations there may 
be 2-4 named individuals. There are 2022 individual analysts lis te d  in 
to ta l although some of these are lis te d  under more than one industry 
sector. Some industries receive more coverage than others, a summary 
is provided in table 3-3. On average i t  appears that an indus tria l 
sector has around 21-30 analysts working on i t .
The 53 firms lis te d  in the UK research section consist mainly of 
stockbrokers, or the broking or research sections of financ ia l 
services firm s. However, one firm  offers the fo llow ing comment:
We are the C ity 's  only independently owned and managed spec ia lis t 
investment research house, providing o r ig in a l, thorough and 
im partial analysis on smaller and medium-sized lis te d  companies, 
to stockbrokers and in s titu tio n a l investors. We are not involved 
in market making, dealing or any other a c t iv ity  which could give 
r ise  to a c o n flic t of in te rest with our research c lie n ts .
The s ta t is t ic a l service specia lis ts  section provides l is t in g  of firms 
o ffe ring , in te r a lia , charts and technical analysis, economic reports 
and forecasting and fund management.
The in ternational markets specia lis ts section provides lis t in g s  of 
firms o ffe ring  advice on 24 d iffe re n t countries. The preface to  the 
1987/88 ed ition of th is  d irecto ry contains a number of in teresting 
points re la ting  to investment analysis:
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Table 3-3 Industria l sectors and analyst coverage
Number of in dus tria l sectors Number of analysts
17 1-10
29 11-20
36 21-30
12 31-40
3 41+
Total = 97
Source: Crawford's Investment Research Index 1987-88
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Before Big Bang there was much pessim istic speculation on the 
future of research in a commission-cutting world. So fa r ,  
however, strong research houses have benefited from the change. 
James Capel's top qua lity  research in a growing number o f sectors 
has been rewarded with an increase in its  share of business.
Though Big Bang has given many in s titu tio n s  the chance of dealing 
d ire c tly  with market makers free of commission, many continue to 
conduct most of th e ir  business on an agency basis to benefit from 
the research output of the stockbroker involved. Three out of 
four fund managers say they are more keen to see an improvement in 
research rather than a fu rthe r drop in commission rates.
Two other unsolved questions remain fo r  research departments and 
th e ir  c lie n ts . F irs t, how independent can the research analysts 
of the new financ ia l conglomerates hope to remain ? The issue was 
highlighted in early 1987, by the uncomfortable stra ins w ith in  
Barclays de Zoete Wedd, the securities house set up by Barclays 
Bank, when its  banking analysts advised c lie n ts  to se ll Barclays 
stock. BZW has since announced that i t  w i l l  not drop its  coverage 
of its  parent's shares. The a f fa ir  may have important 
repercussions fo r  the other investment banking houses stitched 
together fo r  Big Bang.
A second question is the s ta b il i ty  of research department 
s ta ffin g . The games of musical chairs played by analysts continue 
unabated. Many brokers are reporting weekly approaches to th e ir  
s ta ff from headhunters fo r foreign firm s___
Crawford's Investment Research Index is no longer in publication but a 
new d irectory, B riton 's  Index of Investment Research Analysts in the 
UK, has appeared. F irs t published in 1989 i t  is updated quarterly .
The September 1990 issue gives the names of over 2600 analyst 
personnel covering 110 UK industry sectors (B riton 's  Index, 1990).
Following the stock market crash of October 1987 there have been 
manpower reductions in a l l  areas of the financ ia l services sector 
including stockbroking and research departments. However, the
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Chairman of The Society of Investment Analysts in his statement fo r 
the year ended 31st July 1989 (Society of Investment Analysts, 1989a) 
reports tha t, although recruitment in to  the C ity is declin ing sharply, 
student admissions remain buoyant at well over 300 per annum.
In concluding th is  section an estimate of the number of UK equity 
analysts and the number of employing organisations can be given.
There appear to be in the order of two to three thousand equity 
analysts working fo r several hundred d iffe re n t employing 
organisations. This can be compared with the number of shares 
included in the Financial Times All-Share Index on 1 July 1990. This
index included 680 stocks of which around 160 are major (alpha) 
stocks. The number of analysts tha t any one company is l ik e ly  to deal 
with in i ts  investor re la tions programme w i l l ,  in most cases, be under 
50.
3.3 Professional organisations
The aim of th is  section is to provide an outline  of how the investment 
analyst profession is organised. This w i l l  be achieved by providing a 
b r ie f description of the professional bodies involved.
Although i t  is not necessary to have a professional q u a lifica tio n  to 
work as an investment analyst there are professional organisations 
o ffe ring  recognised qua lifica tion s . The Society of Investment 
Analysts was founded in 1955 and in 1989 there were 39 Fellows, 1806 
Associates and 834 students. I t  was renamed the In s titu te  of 
Investment Management and Research in 1992. Membership is drawn from 
the investment community and p a rtic u la r ly  from those whose work is 
concerned with ana lytica l techniques. Associate membership is by 
examination and there is a relevant experience requirement. Other 
relevant qua lifica tions  include the London Stock Exchange examinations 
and accountancy qu a lifica tion s . According to Freeborn (1988) around 
20% of analysts are accountants.
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Some w riters have expressed d issa tis faction  with the q u a lifica tio n s  
and ca libre of analysts. For example, Ryder and Regester (1989, p .52) 
make the follow ing comment:
The internal structure of the typ ica l broker w i l l  include a 
research department, la id  w a ll-to -w a ll w ith analysts usually 
covering one pa rticu la r sector or two or three smaller ones each. 
Each is equipped with a huge varie ty of information sources. They 
are often very young with backgrounds varying from degrees in 
economics, business or underwater basketweaving, to former trade 
jou rna lis ts . Some, though not many, w i l l  have come out of the 
sectors they are now covering and a few w i l l  s t i l l  be of the old 
guard. There is however, a noticeable trend towards employing 
people s tra igh t from un ivers ity  with no experience of industry 
whatsoever.
The European Federation of Financial Analyst's Societies was formed in 
1962 and comprises twelve societies throughout Europe. The aims of 
the federation are (European Federation of Financial Analyst's 
Societies, 1989):
1. To raise the standards of financ ia l analysis.
2. To improve the qua lity  and quantity of information given to 
investors
3. The un ifica tion  of methods of analysis in d iffe re n t countries.
The s itua tion  in the USA is dominated by two related organisations, 
the In s titu te  of Chartered Financial Analysts (ICFA) and the Financial 
Analysts Federation (FAF).
The ICFA offers membership by examination combined with an experience 
requirement leading to chartered financia l analyst (CFA) status. A 
to ta l of 11,087 charters have been awarded over the twenty-six years 
(1963-1988) of the CFA candidate programme and in 1988, 7091 
candidates sat fo r examinations. The research foundation of the ICFA 
sponsors research of p ractica l value to , and fo r use by, investment
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practitioners . The ICFA was founded by the FAF in 1959 and the two 
bodies have recently merged and become subsidiaries of the Association 
fo r Investment Management and Research (AIMR).
The FAF was established in 1947 and serves over 17,000 members in 62 
societies and chapters in the United States, Canada and abroad. A 
broad base of investment p ractitioners are represented in the 
Federation's membership. These include research analysts, investment 
counsellors, p o rtfo lio  and pension managers, economists, financ ia l 
analysts and others. The FAF has a two fo ld  mission. F irs t ly ,  to 
create and disseminate knowledge and provide services of d irec t 
benefit to its  members and secondly, to develop and enhance the 
e th ical and professional standards of i ts  members and other in the 
investment community.
The International Society of Financial Analysts (ISFA) was formed as a 
constituent society of the FAF in 1985. The specific  missions and 
objectives of the ISFA are (In ternationa l Society of Financial 
Analysts, 1989):
To encourage and contribute to closer cooperation and coordination 
between and among world-wide professional investment organisations 
and th e ir  members, including the European Federation of Financial 
Analysts Societies, The Asian Securities Analysts Council, the 
In s titu te  of Chartered Financial Analysts, and the Financial 
Analysts Federation.
To provide an organizational e n tity  with which q ua lified  
investment professionals can id e n tify  fo r  the purpose of sharing 
international experiences and benefit from educational and other 
programs, as well as services applicable to the investment 
decision making process including already accumulated technical 
knowledge in these areas.
To encourage and to provide the necessary support to members of 
ISFA and its  a f f i l ia te s ,  to contribute to and otherwise enhance 
the body of knowledge applicable to the world-wide investment
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decision making process through appropriate programs, 
publications, and other forms of communication.
To work toward world-wide regulatory and e th ica l standards, and to 
encourage a professional practice environment that recognizes the 
best interests of national government po licy , the professional 
constituency, investors, and the public.
The ISFA currently has two a f f i l ia te d  groups of professional 
p ractitioners , in Bermuda and Singapore. These are independent 
organisations incorporated under the laws of the country in which they 
are formed.
In concluding th is  section, i t  appears tha t the US branch of the 
profession is more developed than in Europe. This is not surprising 
since the US stock market is the largest and most highly developed in 
the world apart from Japan. In the UK, companies w i l l  be dealing with 
analysts from a va rie ty  of d iffe re n t backgrounds. They may be well 
q ua lified , e ither by experience or by holding relevant professional 
qua lifica tions or they may be lacking in experience with no relevant 
educational background.
3.4 Previous research as a source of information describing the 
financ ia l analyst group.
The next section of th is  chapter w i l l  summarise the populations of 
investment analysts used in previous research projects. This w i l l  
provide additional insights into the types of organisations that 
employ analysts and the p ro file s  of the analysts themselves.
Lee and Tweedie (1981) in 'The In s titu tio n a l Investor and Financial 
Information' surveyed 225 respondents. I n i t ia l ly  i t  was intended to 
concentrate on major financ ia l in s titu tio n s  but i t  was decided to 
include stockbroking firm s w ith in  the survey. Financial in s titu tio n s  
were sub-divided into insurance companies, pension funds, investment 
and un it trus ts  and merchant banks. Each of the financ ia l
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in s titu tio n s  and stockbroking firms sampled were asked to allow two of 
th e ir senior employees to be interviewed independently. In the 
in s titu tio n s  preferably a senior investment manager and a senior 
investment analyst and in the stockbroking firm s, two senior analysts 
or partners. I t  was intended that interviewees should be concerned 
prim arily  e ither with p o rtfo lio  selection or with the analysis of the 
financ ia l position and progress of ind iv idual enterprises. Major 
financ ia l in s titu tio n s  w ith in  a reasonable tra v e llin g  distance of 
London and Edinburgh were selected from the l i s t  of in s titu tio n s  given
in the 1975-1976 Times 1000. The Stock Exchange O ff ic ia l Year Book
was then used to increase the sample of insurance companies. The
sample frame fo r stockbroking firms was drawn from the yellow pages of
the Post Office telephone d irec to ries .
In to ta l 140 organisations were v is ite d  and 231 interviews were 
carried out. In order to construct an aggregate p ro file  of the 
respondents a number of background factors were sought: the
respondent's sex, number of shareholdings in , and market value of the 
p o rtfo lio (s ) to which the respondents work re la ted, whether the 
respondent had the f in a l say in investment decisions, the number of 
years' experience of investment in a financ ia l in s titu t io n  or 
stockbroking firm , the respondent's experience of using accounting 
information and the respondent's accounting knowledge and related 
experience. In summary, the typ ica l in s titu t io n a l investor was male, 
lik e ly  to be involved in investment decisions, to have had 6 to 20 
years experience in the investment community and of handling 
accounting information, to have had l i t t l e  or no formal tra in ing  in 
accounting, to have been involved with p o rtfo lio s  containing 500 or 
fewer shareholdings with a l ik e ly  value range from £1 m illio n  to 
£1,000 m illio n . The typ ica l stockbroker was l ik e ly  to have s im ila r 
personal characteristics but was un like ly  to re la te  his work to any 
particu la r po rtfo lios  or to be involved in investment decision making.
Arnold and Moizer (1984) in 'A Survey of the Methods Used by UK 
Investment Analysts to Appraise Investments in Ordinary Shares' and 
Arnold, Moizer and Noreen (1984) in 'Investment Appraisal Methods of 
Financial Analysts : A Comparative Study of U.S. and U.K. Practices' 
surveyed a random selection of 465 members of the Society of
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Investment Analysts. They were selected from the UK section of the 
'Member Societies Year-book' of the European Federation of Financial 
Analysts' Societies. The sample was found to be randomly d is tribu ted  
between in s titu tio n a l and stockbroking analysts. A fu rthe r sample of 
40 non-members of the society was selected from a survey of UK 
investment managers published by Continental I l in o is  Ltd e n title d  
'Ranking of UK Investment Analysts - Seventh Annual Survey ' (1980). 
These non-members were a l l  employed by the large UK stockbroking firms 
and tended to specialise in a pa rticu la r market sector. The US 
version of the questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 400 
members of the Financial Analysts Federation. The fo llow ing 
characteristics of the sample population were found :
The UK respondents included individuals who analysed the ordinary 
shares of companies quoted on the UK Stock Exchange. The remaining 
analysts analysed other UK securities such as g i l t s ,  properties e tc ., 
and analysed overseas opportunities. These rep lies were ignored as 
the paper was only concerned with UK equity analysts.
Most of the sample worked fo r stockbrokers (53.5%). Others worked fo r  
insurance companies (14.3%), banks (9.9%), pension funds (8.4%) and 
investment management companies (6.9%). Smaller numbers worked fo r 
stockjobbers, investment tru s ts , industria l companies and others.
As part of the analysis the authors established p ro file s  fo r the 
average analyst in the UK and the USA. They found tha t:
 the 'average' analyst in both countries works fo r  an
organisation which employs ju s t over ten analysts. He or she 
spends approximately 60 per cent of the work week evaluating the 
common stock of pub lic ly  traded companies and analyses 
approximately fo r ty  companies on a regular basis and an additional 
twenty-six on an irregu la r basis. US analysts are s ig n if ic a n tly  
more experienced than th e ir  UK counterparts; they have been 
engaged in financ ia l analysis fo r an average of ju s t under sixteen 
years, compared to twelve or th irteen  years fo r UK analysts. 
Approximately 50 per cent of both UK and US analysts specialize in 
a pa rticu la r market sector, and a s im ila r percentage of both types
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of analyst themselves use the information they generate fo r  the 
purposes of p o rtfo lio  management (Arnold, Moizer and Noreen, 1984, 
p .3).
Moizer and Arnold (1984) in 'Share Appraisal by Investment Analysts - 
P o rtfo lio  vs. Non-Portfolio Managers' carried out fu rthe r analysis on 
th e ir  previously established sample of UK equity analysts. They 
categorised analysts e ither as p o rtfo lio  managers or as information 
intermediaries. They defined p o rtfo lio  managers as those investment 
analysts who themselves use the information gathered from th e ir  own 
appraisal of equity shares in the management of p o rtfo lio s .
Information intermediaries were defined as those investment analysts 
whose share appraisal information is used by th ird  parties but not by 
the analysts themselves. They then compared and contrasted the equity 
share analysis procedures of the two categories of investment 
analysts.
They found that in general the information intermediaries tended to 
work in stockbroking firms w hils t the p o rtfo lio  managers tended to 
work in firms of in s titu tio n a l investors. I t  was found that some 
analysts acted both as p o rtfo lio  managers and as information 
intermediaries. They found that p o rtfo lio  managers spent on average 
much less time w ith in  the working week appraising UK equities than 
information intermediaries (49% compared to 72%). They also found 
that p o rtfo lio  managers generally analysed more companies on a regular 
basis than information intermediaries (An average of 49 companies 
compared to 34 companies). These findings suggested that p o rtfo lio  
managers performed a less detailed analysis than did information 
intermediaries. They found three other s ig n ifica n t background 
differences between the two groups of analysts. P o rtfo lio  managers 
tended to work fo r organisations which employed fewer analysts than 
the firms employing information intermediaries (an average of 8.6 
analysts compared to 13.0). P o rtfo lio  managers had more experience of 
investment analysis than did information intermediaries with 62.9% 
having over ten years experience compared to 48.2%.
Day (1986) in 'The Use of Annual Reports by UK Investment Analysts' 
contacted eighteen firms of stockbrokers including most of the large
Marston, C.L. 1993 Chapter 3 79
City firm s, plus some smaller ones and one Birmingham based firm . Due 
to the small sample no claim could be made fo r those seen to be 
representative of a l l  firms or a ll investment analysts. The f ifte e n  
firms w illin g  to cooperate nominated a senior analyst or partner to 
partic ipa te  in the study.
H irst (1988) in 'Stockbrokers' research in the UK - Determinants and 
e ffec ts ' obtained the cooperation of 31 stockbroking firm s. They 
included a l l  the leading in s titu tio n a l stockbrokers with one 
exception. There were more than 200 firm s operating in the London 
stock market at the time of the survey but the great m ajority of these 
were small firms specia lis ing in private c lie n t business. The 
research partner of each stockbroking firm  id e n tifie d  the securities 
which his firm  followed and th is  was followed by a questionnaire to 
the individual analyst. 1098 research links were found between 31 
brokers and 146 securities.
This section has given an overview of how previous researchers have 
iden tified  populations of investment analysts p r io r to carrying out 
th e ir specific  research objectives. I t  has also provided some 
descriptive information about analysts in terms of who they work fo r , 
what th e ir  experience and qua lifica tions  are, and what they do.
3.5 The work of a financ ia l analyst
The aim of th is  research project is to study the communication of 
information by companies to investment analysts with p a rticu la r 
reference to meetings w ith analysts, responses to telephone ca lls  and 
company v is its .  In order to place these a c t iv it ie s  in context the 
next section of th is  chapter w i l l  give a b r ie f overview of the 
complete range of a c t iv it ie s  carried out by investment analysts.
A useful introduction is contained in a promotional le a fle t issued by 
the Society of Investment Analysts e n tit le d  'Investment analysis as a 
career':
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Type of work
In s titu tio n a l funds may place large sums of money running into 
hundreds of thousands or indeed m illions  of pound in the equity of 
a single in d u s tria l, commercial or fin a nc ia l company. Not 
unnaturally they look fo r detailed assessments of the prospects of 
individual companies and the industries w ith in  which they operate. 
They also look fo r judgement on the a b i l i t y  o f the company 
fin a n c ia lly , techn ica lly  and managerially to f u l f i l  the prospects 
which the circumstances of i ts  industry o ffe r.
The job of investment analyst whether he is employed by a 
stockbroker or by an investing fund is  to be able to make such 
detailed assessment. The means open to him include a number of 
quite d iffe re n t avenues, of which the f i r s t  to be mentioned must 
be the published financ ia l statements of the company i ts e lf .  I t  
is a fa i r ly  natural progression to compare resu lts  and performance 
of one company with those of others in the industry. These 
comparisons w i l l  show rates of p r o f i ta b i l i t y  in terms of assets 
employed and turnover.
On a more general s ta t is t ic a l leve l, the fortunes of every company 
are in the las t resort affected to a greater or lesser degree by 
a l l  types of events throughout the world, soc ia l, economic and so 
on. B ritish  industry is affected by such diverse events as the 
price of o i l ,  the weather, the resu lts  of General Elections in 
th is  country, the level of wage settlements not only in th is  
country but throughout Europe and the vic iss itudes of currencies. 
On a more factual plane, s ta t is t ic s  are regu la rly  published on 
exports and imports, levels of output of a wide va rie ty  of 
industry, so that i t  is possible fo r instance, to  check the level 
of r e ta il trade and the share of tha t trade being taken by the 
d iffe re n t types of shop. I t  is also possible to check the volume 
and value of exports of fo r instance china clay from th is  country 
month by month. Another relevant aspect is technological change 
which might well profoundly a ffe c t the business of a company, 
p a rticu la r ly  one dependent upon a single product or group of 
products.
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When an analyst has acquired s u ffic ie n t knowledge and experience 
of an industry he may well have the opportunity of v is it in g  
management and of inspecting p lant. The experienced analyst w i l l  
be able to make a judgement upon the a b i l i t y  of the men he meets 
to f u l f i l  the objectives which they have set themselves, the depth 
of management, the qua lity  of financ ia l contro l, and the general 
structure of the company, as well as i ts  technological position in 
re la tion  to fu ture development.
Having gathered together the information and made his assessment 
the analyst now has to convey th is  to e ithe r the c lie n t or his own 
fund manager. He has, therefore to be able to w rite  in an 
acceptable and d igestib le  form the g is t of his conclusions about 
the finances, the management, and the operation of the company 
concerned. In his assessment he w il l  almost ce rta in ly  nowadays be 
required to make an estimate of the fu ture  trends of the company's 
p ro fits  and earnings per share.
So fa r, nothing has been said about an important side of work
which may well f a l l  on the shoulders of the investment analyst. 
This is share price evaluation. However good an assessment of a 
company, its  past, i ts  present, and its  prospects, the analyst's 
work can only be of value i f  he compares his assessment with that 
already being made by the current market price. He has, 
therefore, to be aware of each share price in re la tion  to the 
group in which i t  fa l ls ,  and to the market as a whole. He must
decide whether the share at the current price and in re la tion  to
the prospects which he sees fo r  the company are good or bad value. 
As a l l  equity share prices are moving a l l  the time both in 
re la tion  to each other and in re la tion  to prices abroad, to g i l t -  
edged prices e tc ., share price assessment is  a constant process 
and the analyst may well be asked from day to day fo r  his views.
Investment analysts nowadays specialise more because the body of 
published information about companies is growing and because 
demands by professional investors fo r  more and more accurate 
information is constantly increasing. A trainee analyst setting 
out may have the choice between becoming a spec ia lis t in a
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re la tiv e ly  small area of industry working in a large o ffic e  or 
being a much more general but more supe rfic ia l analyst having to 
cover wider areas at a lower level of knowledge in a smaller 
o ffice .
The extract from the Society's lite ra tu re  quoted above shows that 
basica lly analysts are involved in the decision to buy, se ll or hold 
an investment. They may act on th e ir  decisions i f  they are p o rtfo lio  
managers or they may pass th e ir  opinions on to th ird  parties i f  they 
are information intermediaries.
Many d iffe re n t techniques of varying degrees of sophistication are 
used by analysts in formulating th e ir  decisions. These include 
fundamental analysis of general business conditions, industry outlook, 
earnings, dividends, qua lity  of management e tc ., technical analysis of 
market based factors such as share price movements, charts e tc ., beta 
analysis of the responsiveness of the price of a p a rticu la r company's 
shares to changes in the value of some market average. P ro fit 
forecasts are often produced by investment analysts (Westwick, 1983, 
pp.134-147).
I t  is generally supposed that the work of the analyst leads to better 
investment decisions than would otherwise be taken. However the 
e ff ic ie n t market hypothesis presents a challenge to th is  view. The 
hypothesis states that i f  the market re fle c ts  a l l  public information 
the price of a share w il l  equal its  semi-strong worth. Investors w i l l  
achieve abnormal returns only by chance or by obtaining access to 
private or inside information. The e ff ic ie n t market hypothesis 
presents obvious problems i f  an analyst is being paid to produce 
results that are better than the average. Keane (1983, p .116) 
considers the position of analysts in an e ff ic ie n t market.
As fo r the ro le  of investment advisers, an e ff ic ie n t market can be 
assumed to depend heavily upon the a c t iv it ie s  of s k ille d  analysts 
and i t  can be argued tha t, even without the prospect of superior 
p ro fits , there is a strong incentive fo r  the major investment 
in s titu tio n s  to employ th e ir  services. In addition, ordinary 
investors w i l l  continue to need financ ia l advice when th e ir
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personal circumstances demand some ind ividual ta ilo r in g  of the 
theo re tica lly  optimal solution. Nonetheless, the conclusion is 
inescapable that the ro le of the analyst qua adviser is 
s ig n ifica n tly  modified, and in some respects s ig n if ic a n tly  
diminished by the market's e ffic iency. The notion that an 
investor can draw upon the analytica l services of his broker, or 
his banker, or the financia l press, to secure a l i s t  of mispriced 
securities from which he can reasonable expect to p ro f it ,  is 
irreconcilable both with the notion of e ffic ien cy  and with the 
accumulated evidence. The role of the investment adviser is best 
perceived as fundamentally to assist less informed investors, not 
to beat the market, but to adapt its  benefits to th e ir  personal 
circumstances. There is  much to be done in tha t sphere, and i t  
must u ltim ate ly serve advisers' own in terests i f  they help to 
dispel the popular concept of the security analyst and the notion 
that a harvest of superior p ro fits  is there to be reaped (Keane, 
1983, p .116).
The e ff ic ie n t market hypothesis therefore has fundamental implications 
regarding the a c tiv it ie s  and the role of financ ia l analysts. The 
paradox outlined by Keane above is un like ly  to be resolved in the near 
fu ture . Much research work has been done in an attempt to tes t the 
e ffic iency of the markets and to id e n tify  anomalies. A number of 
situations in which abnormal returns appear to re su lt have been 
iden tified  but on the whole the empirical research indicates that the 
US and UK markets are e ff ic ie n t at the semi-strong leve l. This has 
led to the emergence of market based funds whose aim is to hold a 
p o rtfo lio  approximating to the market as a whole rather than 
attempting to pick a p o rtfo lio  which, i t  is hoped, w i l l  outperform the 
market.
This section has presented an outline of the type of work carried out 
by the investment analyst. The e ff ic ie n t market hypothesis has been 
shown to be of relevance to the working practices of investment 
analysts. I f  analysts believe in the hypothesis they w i l l  be aware 
that they need inside information in order to beat the market. This 
may lead them to attempt to obtain inside information from companies
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by means of telephone enquiries and private meetings with company 
management.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has outlined the ro le  of the financ ia l analyst w ith in  the 
market and has described the ways in which analysts carry out th e ir  
work. I t  has also provided information about the composition of the 
group of analysts, who they work fo r ,  how many of them there are and 
what sort of people they are in terms of experience and 
q u a lifica tio ns . The chapter has served to set the scene fo r  the main 
thrust of the study, which is to examine in d e ta il one aspect of the 
work of analysts. That is , the informal communication channels tha t 
exist between companies lis te d  on the London Stock Exchange and 
analysts concerned with researching th e ir  equity shares.
The next chapter w i l l  review the lite ra tu re  on investor re la tions 
paying p a rticu la r a ttention to the analyst and fund manager audience.
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4.1 Introduction
In order to investigate a l l  types of lite ra tu re  concerning the 
investor re la tions function i t  is necessary to move away from the 
financ ia l reporting lite ra tu re  and to turn a tten tion  to the subjects 
of management, marketing and public re la tion s . I t  is clear from the 
lite ra tu re , which consists mainly of books and a rtic le s  advising 
management of the importance of th is  'new' area, that investor 
re la tions is a developing area of importance. To set the scene, two 
au thorita tive  opinions on the investor re la tions function w i l l  be 
presented in th is  introductory section.
The Listed Companies Advisory Committee (1988) of The London Stock 
Exchange has issued a booklet e n title d  'Investor Relations A guide fo r 
d ire c to rs '. They make the follow ing comments (p .7):
We believe firm ly  in the importance of developing an active and 
integrated approach to contacts with shareholders. Investor 
re la tions should be regarded as a professional d isc ip lin e , the 
purpose of which is to provide s u ffic ie n t information on the 
company to make informed investment decisions.
Senior management and the Board have an important part to play in 
th is . Personal contact with shareholders is at the heart of a 
successful investor re la tions programme.
An e ffec tive  programme of financ ia l communication complements the 
re spo n s ib ilitie s  of the Board fo r  the tim ely and general release 
of price sensitive-inform ation. I t  does not in any way release 
the Board from those formal re sp o n s ib ilitie s  or override them.
The programme may be delegated to an in-house communications group 
or to a financ ia l PR consultancy. In e ithe r case the individuals 
involved need to report at senior level and to be kept well 
informed of company po licy, resu lts  and strategy. Spokesmen share 
with d irectors the duty to ensure at a l l  times tha t th e ir  public 
statements do not mislead the investment community.
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Makinson (1989, p . ix ) ,  a former ed ito r of the Financial Times Lex 
column, makes the follow ing comment:
Investor re la tions is a young and immature industry even in the 
United States. In B rita in  i t  is in its  infancy. Long recognized 
- to the extent that i t  has been recognized at a l l  - as a minor 
branch of public re la tions, or a weekend pursuit fo r industrious 
finance d irecto rs, investor re la tions is f in a l ly  coming to be seen 
as one of the most central and time consuming functions of senior
corporate management But there is undoubtedly a greater
recognition on the part of the corporate sector that i t  needs to 
establish stronger and more regular re la tions with financia l 
audiences and, above a l l ,  w ith key investing in s titu tio n s . As i t  
enters its  tenth consecutive year of r is in g  p ro f its , the corporate 
sector is robust, a ffluen t and se lf-con fiden t. I t  has come to 
value good re la tions with its  owners and has recognized that 
developing those re la tions is a job which should be undertaken by 
the senior management of the business as well as by spokesmen, 
stockbrokers and advisers. The best investor re la tions advice 
that can be given to the boards of B r it is h  business is - do i t  and 
do i t  yourselves.
The term 'investo r re la tion s ' is treated by some authors as being 
synonymous with 'f in a n c ia l public re la tio n s '. Both terms are used to 
re fe r to in-house a c tiv it ie s  and the bought in services of 
consultants. Dark (1988), however attempts to d istingu ish the two 
terms:
According to most p rac titione rs , the fu ture  of financ ia l PR lie s  
with investor re la tions , otherwise known as IR. Some operators 
view the boom in the number of IR d iv is ions in consultancies as 
merely a repackaging of what financ ia l PR has always been about. 
Certainly i t  encompasses many a c t iv it ie s  well-established as 
'f in a n c ia l PR', such as annual report production, the use of 
video, TV tra in in g , corporate lite ra tu re  and id e n tity . With the 
recent growth in employee share schemes, IR also nudges employee 
re la tions . Consultants may have co n flic tin g  views of what IR 
actua lly  represents, but generally its  d e fin it io n  by consultancies
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seems to s h if t  from financia l press re la tions , and concentrated 
attention on analysts' perceptions of companies, to a wider 
programme that centres on in s titu tio n a l shareholders.
Preis and Berbers (1990, p .102) define investor re la tions as fo llow s:
Investor re la tions is the mechanism companies use to t e l l  the C ity 
about themselves - a corporate communications function aimed at 
positioning a company's shares as an a ttra c tive  investment 
vehicle.
They state that one of the primary objectives of an investor re la tions 
strategy is  to manage the performance and perception of a company's 
shares in order to benefit fu l ly  from the low cost of ra is ing  equity 
cap ita l. The investor re la tions p rac titione r must work to ensure a 
proper valuation of the company's shares by financ ia l analysts and 
market intermediaries. He must work to d ive rs ify  the shareholder base 
to include stable key shareholders rather than a series of 
opportunists. He must id e n tify  the technical and perceptual factors 
impacting on investor demand, that is , the number of shares available, 
share l iq u id ity ,  price v o la t i l i t y  and corporate image.
This chapter w i l l  concentrate on in-house investor re la tions (or 
financia l public re la tions) and a separate chapter w i l l  provide an 
overview of the use of external consultancies.
4.2 Establishment of an investor re la tions function w ith in  the 
company
The aim of th is  section is to examine the views of a number of authors 
regarding the establishment of investor re la tions as a management 
function.
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Gummer (1987, pp.39-40) places re sp o n s ib ility  fo r the financ ia l public 
re la tions policy in the hands of the ch ie f executive:
The chief executive, therefore, who is reviewing the firm 's  
current financ ia l PR advice or, more im portantly, is bringing 
financia l PR on board fo r the f i r s t  time, must be perfectly  clear 
about what the PR ro le  is to achieve fo r  the company and how i t  
w il l  interface with other advisers. There is only one 
sa tisfactory way into and through th is  problem. Chief executives 
(and 99 per cent of the time th is  ro le  cannot be delegated) must 
set down c le a rly  what they believe financ ia l PR can achieve in the 
normal course of events - p a rtic u la r ly  in handling the financ ia l 
calendar. This should be agreed with the other advisers - the 
merchant bankers, stockbrokers, etc. - and with the internal 
finance d irec to r, company secretary, and PR o ff ic e r . I t  is only 
when th is  has been agreed that the more h ig h -p ro file  roles in 
f lo ta tio n , take-overs, and mergers can be considered.
Ryder and Regester (1989, pp.172-173) also consider that 
respons ib ility  fo r investor re la tions lie s  u ltim a te ly  w ith the ch ie f 
executive. He must be closely involved in developing the objectives 
and strategy fo r the IR programme which re fle c t and support the 
company's long term business goals. They propose tha t other members 
of the IR team must include:
The finance d ire c to r, so that financ ia l data can be co lla ted, 
stra tegic messages b u il t  up fo r transmission to the investment 
community and an in te llig e n t reception given to any messages that 
come back.
The company secretary, whose ro le  i t  is to ensure tha t the share 
register is kept up to date and designed to provide information 
about shareholder demographics at great speed when needed to keep 
those on the IR team informed of any s ig n ifica n t changes on the 
register and to ensure that the IR process complies w ith a l l  the 
regulations tha t apply. The IR manager, whose job i t  is to design 
corporate messages which accurately re fle c t the overa ll business
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objectives of the company and to drive and co-ordinate the IR 
programme.
They proceed to discuss the q u a litie s  needed by the IR manager:
Appointment must be made at a senior level so tha t the IR manager 
is close enough to the people running the company (or be one of 
them) to be able to in te rp re t facts and events properly on the 
company's behalf. Financial, company and sector knowledge are 
essential pre-requisites but, most importantly, he must be a 
communicator with marketing s k i l ls .
Hayes (1989, pp.146-150) considers that the best practice in investor 
re la tions consists of establishing an in-house spec ia lis t and using 
outside help at three levels, s tra teg ic , sp ec ia lis t and fo r  special 
projects. He advocates the establishment of an investor re la tions 
committee chaired by a d irec to r. The secretary should be the in-house 
executive responsible fo r financ ia l PR and external consultants should 
s i t  on the committee. He recommends tha t investor re la tions should be 
integrated into corporate communication and the management decision 
making process.
This section has presented the views of a number of expert 
p ractitioners - and that view is  unanimous in seeing investor 
re la tions as a high level management function.
4.3 Overview of the a c tiv it ie s  of the investor re la tions function
The aim of th is  section is to provide a summary of the views of 
various authors regarding the a c t iv it ie s  tha t should be carried out by 
the investor re la tions function. As a f i r s t  step the audience or key 
targets must be defined. Ryder and Regester (1989 pp, 173-174) 
provide the fo llow ing suggested audience lis t in g :
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Investors
in s titu tio n a l investors (pension fund managers, insurance
companies, un it tru s t groups and investment tru s ts )
government (as an investor)
charities (eg, the church commissioners)
banks
brokers (as fund managers) 
other companies 
overseas investors 
individual investors 
employees as investors
Advisers
brokers' analysts and sales teams 
financ ia l media
They recommend carrying out an analysis of the share reg is te r to see 
where the imbalances l ie .  This may require outside help from one of 
the spec ia lis t companies that o ffe r the service.
Once the target audience has been id e n tifie d  the programme can be 
executed. Ryder and Regester (1989, pp.174-175) summarise the 
procedures. I t  is necessary to :
design messages which re fle c t and support the company's objectives 
and lik e ly  performance; and communication programmes which reach 
defined audiences in a tim ely and e ffec tive  manner. The main 
channels of communication are:
annual report and accounts
interim  report
company fac t book
databases and d irecto ries
advertising
company announcements
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Table 4-1 Duties of financ ia l public re la tions function 
Financial calendar
Half-year resu lts /in te rim s
press release
d is tr ib u tio n
b r ie f company personnel on lik e ly  questions
fa c i l i ta te  access to chairman
Prelim inary resu lts
press release
d is tr ib u tio n
b r ie f company personnel on lik e ly  questions
b r ie f brokers early in the day
Annual report and accounts
involvement in design, layout and content
advice on chairman's statement
ensure fu lle s t  possible, up to date c ircu la tion  l i s t
Annual general meeting
establish time, date and location
establish format and timetable in discussion with company 
secretary
review in v ita tio n  l i s t
advise on proposed statements by chairman etc.
advise on attendance of employees and pensioners
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meetings and presentations 
AGMs and shareholder meetings
Gummer (1987, pp.40-52) suggests that the financ ia l PR programme 
should be constructed in conjunction with the company's financ ia l 
calendar accompanied by an ongoing financ ia l PR programme. An outline  
of his suggestions is presented in table 4-1.
In addition to normal or routine investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  there 
are special s ituations to be considered. Ryder and Regester (1989, 
pp.174-175) consider a number of these. The company should keep track 
of proposed leg is la tion  and be prepared to lobby against the 
introduction of new laws or to make provision to accept them and 
sometimes turn them to competitive advantage. There should be special 
contingency plans fo r dealing with proposed takeovers of the company. 
The IR function should not overlook the importance o f c re d it ra ting  
agencies due to the increasing importance of debt financing. The 
agencies should be briefed in order to prevent an undeserved s lide  in 
the ra tings. When new share issues are being made the investor 
re la tions function should prepare lite ra tu re  and make presentations to 
existing shareholders. F ina lly , Ryder and Regester present a number 
of reasons fo r carrying out in ternational IR and suggest how th is  
a c t iv ity  should be actioned.
I t  is clear from the above description of investor re la tions 
a c t iv it ie s  that a substantial amount of time and money is l ik e ly  to be 
involved. The company should therefore measure the effectiveness of 
the programme. Ryder and Regester (1989, p .175) suggest the fo llow ing 
procedure:
Measure progress against well-defined objectives, eg, maintaining 
the share price through a series of share issues or a ttra c tin g  
more acquisition approaches.
Through research, measure progress against 'common' IR objectives 
such as, corporate p ro file , share performance, investor support, 
changes in share ownership, investor a ttitudes
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Table 4-1 (continued) Duties of financ ia l public re la tions function
Ongoing financial PR programme
Communicating with the City
adhere to key p rinc ip les of openness and honesty
recognise the needs of the key targets 
establish lines of communication with the C ity
in s titu t io n a l communications
communicating with the private shareholder
Communicating with the Press
establish princ ip les 
awareness of media ro le
build ing on existing  contacts 
knowledge of jo u rn a lis ts ' timetables 
use of press conferences 
formulating financ ia l press releases
broadcasting
Communicating with the staff
establish princ ip les
tre a t as an ongoing process
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Ensure that the company's performance is measured against that of 
its  peer group
The measurement process can involve commissioning independent surveys. 
These w il l  be considered in d e ta il in a la te r  section of th is  chapter.
The growing importance of investor re la tions  has led Economist 
Publications Ltd. to launch a sp e c ia lis t, res tric te d  c ircu la tio n , 
journal e n title d  'Investor Relations'. This has appeared quarterly 
since 1988 and contains a rtic le s  of top ica l in te rest to investor 
re lations p rac titione rs .
In concluding th is  section i t  appears tha t a multitude of a c t iv it ie s  
come w ith in the rem it of the investor re la tions  function. Many of 
these a c tiv it ie s  would be carried out anyway without the establishment 
of a spec ia lis t function. However, the authors quoted are of the 
clear opinion that an established investor re la tions function is 
essential fo r companies competing fo r cap ita l in today's markets.
4.4 Investor re la tions and the analyst
The aim of th is  section is to summarise the main points in the 
lite ra tu re  that re fe r sp e c ifica lly  to the ro le  of the investor 
re lations function in its  communications with analysts. These 
channels of communication may take the form of presentations or C ity 
lunches, company v is its  and telephone conversations.
Newman (1984, p .246) a ttribu tes  the growth in importance and frequency 
of the C ity lunch to the increase in in s titu t io n a l investment. She 
reports that the largest B ritish  companies have as many as ten such 
lunches each year, arranged by th e ir  o f f ic ia l  stockbroker w ith a 
selection of fund managers. Ryder and Regester (1989, p .81) comment 
that increasingly in s titu tio n s  prefer meetings to be arranged by the 
company rather than i ts  broker. Smaller companies may only have two 
such lunches per year. Meetings can also be arranged fo r  analysts
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from competing firm s of stockbrokers, these can be termed brokers' 
lunches.
Ryder and Regester (1989, p .78) state that brokers' lunches have 
largely been discredited but that meetings w ith brokers remain 
important fo r  companies i f  they are to receive fa i r  coverage of th e ir 
a c t iv it ie s  in brokers' c ircu la rs . One possible reason fo r  the alleged 
d iscred iting  of brokers' lunches arises from the insider dealing 
leg is la tion  and the danger of inadvertently releasing price sensitive 
information. R. L is te r, a research analyst fo r  Barclays de Zoete Wedd 
held a seminar in November 1989 at Newcastle University. He commented 
that i f  an analyst has a 'good' question he may not want to ask i t  
pub lic ly  at a meeting since competing analysts w i l l  benefit. He also 
commented that the bigger the company the more bland the meeting 
tended to be.
Dignan (1989) reports that there is a widespread desire by companies 
to get between brokers and fund managers. Investor re la tions o ffice rs  
have established d ire c t communication channels and set up one-to-one 
lunches fo r fund managers with company senior management. Companies 
perceive fund manager analysts as being remarkably well informed.
Often they appear to be much better qu a lity  people than the bulk of 
se ll-s ide  analysts employed by brokers.
An unattributed 'Opinion' column in Professional Investor magazine fo r 
February 1990 comments on th is  current trend fo r the investor 
re la tions function to by-pass the company broker:
D irect communication between companies and shareholders may be 
increasing to the cost of the stockbroking intermediary. Shrewd 
companies, aided and abetted by increasingly sophisticated 
investor re la tions consultants are devoting more time to 
iden tify ing  and ta lk ing  to important shareholders - actual and 
p o te n tia l.
Such companies ask why they should re ly  on the analyst's report 
and the stockbroking lunch fo r th e ir  main means of communication 
with th e ir  shareholders. The huge growth in the number of
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analysts fo llow ing the major companies has made investor re la tions 
a more irksome process. Far better then to devote more time to 
ta lk ing  d ire c tly  to fund managers, p a rtic u la r ly  as i t  means they
w il l  receive the 'r ig h t ' corporate message___
 the stockbrokers' ro le  is slowly being diminished, perhaps to
the benefit of the investor re la tions consultant.
Apart from formal presentations to selected groups of fund managers or 
analysts, one-to-one meetings are also an accepted practice. Ryder and 
Regester (1989, p .78) comment:
I f  practicable, each analyst covering the company's sector should 
also be seen ind iv idu a lly  at least once a year, before the IR
manager sees the figures, in order to help them put together
brokers' reports to predict the f u l l  and half-year resu lts . 
Preferential treatment in terms of the number of meetings and 
opportunities to meet operational and other senior management 
should be given only to those analysts who re a lly  demonstrate an 
in terest in fo llow ing the a ffa irs  of the company and in try ing  to 
understand i t ,  and who have true influence on the company's 
shares___
The IR manager must also exercise caution in volunteering 
information. He ce rta in ly  needn't volunteer any information at 
a l l  i f  i t  is thought that the analyst is going to tre a t i t  
su p e rfic ia lly : the manager can re s tr ic t  himself simply to 
answering questions. But caution is paramount i f  there appears to 
be a danger of volunteering price-sensitive  information. Even an 
occasional 'nod and a wink' to indicate to the analyst that he is 
on the r ig h t track runs the r is k  of making the analyst an 
involuntary 'in s id e r dea ler'.
In addition to routine meetings companies often arrange v is its  to 
company fa c i l i t ie s  so that analysts can meet line  managers. These 
often involve complicated organisational arrangements and line  
managers must be briefed beforehand.
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Telephone conversations with analysts are an accepted part o f the 
investor re la tions programme. They may also be fraught with greater 
danger from the point of view of the insider dealing le g is la tio n . R 
L is te r, the analyst mentioned above, claimed at his seminar tha t price 
sensitive information is obtained from telephone ca lls . The advantage 
of th is  method of communication from the analyst's point of view is 
that competitors are not able to share the information. In general, 
the release of interim  and prelim inary results is l ik e ly  to stimulate 
a number of telephone ca lls  to the company from analysts. Gummer 
(1987, p .41) stipu lates that the investor re la tions manager should 
b r ie f company personnel on lik e ly  questions and answers. Companies 
can also use a telephone enquiry line  service - e ithe r broadcasting a 
pre-recorded message or allowing two-way communication with enquirers. 
Apart from routine investor re la tions practice, contacts with analysts 
can occur in special s ituations such as a takeover bid. The C ity 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers allows co lle c tive  b rie fings of 
in s titu tio n a l investors provided the company's merchant banker is 
present. Ryder and Regester (1989, pp.88-89) consider that the 
investor re la tions o ff ic e r  plays a crucia l ro le  in these s itua tions:
The Takeover Panel w i l l  be watching every move made by the 
companies on e ither side. Part of the ro le  of the IR manager, 
therefore, is to take the offensive at in terna l meetings and 
question each ta c tic  being considered during the b a ttle . W ill the 
moves under consideration be adjudged to be in the best in te rest 
of shareholders? Could there be a DTI inquiry a fte r the ba ttle  is 
over, even i f  i t  has been successful? W ill the company's actions 
be defensible as well as credible when being explained to analysts 
and the media?
To a large extent the IR manager's neck w i l l  be on the public and 
private chopping block i f  he fa i ls  to provide management with the 
best advice from an outsider's perspective. Part of his ro le , as 
we have already discussed, is to act as the company's antennae 
amongst the investment community as well as one of the company's 
princ ipa l mouthpieces to i t .
Marston, C.L. 1993 Chapter 4 96
The IR manager needs to be present at a l l  investor meetings, 
whether large or small, because he can 't take the r is k  of the CEO 
or CFO making statements which a ren 't being made to other 
investors. As well as that of protagonist, the IR manager must 
also be the co-ordinator of messages ensuring tha t no-one speaks 
with forked tongue, however inadvertently.
I t  is clear from the lite ra tu re  summarised in th is  section tha t the 
authors recognise and condone the practice of holding analysts' 
meetings and responding to telephone enquiries. The ro le  of the 
investor re la tions function is to supervise and control these 
a c t iv it ie s . The IR manager is required to maintain good re la tions 
with analysts w h ils t at the same time ensuring that they are not able 
to obtain price sensitive information that has not been generally 
released.
4.5 Id e n tifica tio n  of the population of investor re la tions personnel.
Crawford's Investment Research Index 1987/88 (Crawford's, 1987) 
published a l i s t  of investor re la tions o ffice rs  in the top 500 
companies by industry sector. The o f f ic ia l  responsible was named with 
his job t i t l e .  These job t i t le s  include finance d irec to r, corporate 
a ffa irs  d irec to r, financ ia l d irec to r, corporate executive public 
a ffa irs , group public re la tions executive, group ch ie f accountant, 
economic adviser, company secretary, chairman and managing d irec to r. 
From the job t i t le s  i t  would appear that investor re la tions is not a 
f u l l  time commitment fo r many of the executives concerned.
This d irectory ceased publication a fte r the 1987/88 ed ition  but the 
most of the information is s t i l l  available in Crawford's D irectory of 
C ity Connections.
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4.6 Surveys of investor re la tions
The aim of th is  section is to review existing survey work on the 
subject of investor re la tions. There are two aspects to consider 
here, empirical studies carried out by academic researchers and 
surveys commissioned by companies to evaluate th e ir  own investor 
re lations programmes.
Newman (1984, pp.238-240) carried out a company survey on the ro le  and 
benefits of financ ia l public re la tions. She carried out interviews 
with an unspecified number of major companies in 1982 and 1983. Her 
results are presented as a selection of th irteen  d iffe re n t views on 
the nature of financ ia l public re la tions. One example is as fo llows:
I t  helps create an accurate analysis of what the group is doing.
I t  helps maintain goodwill in the investing communities. I t  
possibly smooths share price fluctuations which arise from 
speculation and rumour. I t  may make i t  cheaper to ra ise money i f  
people have confidence in the share price.
She then presents a selection of eight reported reasons fo r  adopting 
financia l PR. An example is as follows:
In the early 1970s we discovered we had a fuddy-duddy image in the
C ity. For our development and d ive rs ifica tio n  i t  became important
to create the r ig h t image. We needed the help of the financ ia l
community to achieve our objectives in acquisitions and finance to 
support our expansion.
A more comprehensive survey was carried out by Taylor Nelson Research 
Ltd. (1989) fo r Equity International Magazine. This investigated 
attitudes to the investor re la tions industry. I t  claims to  be the 
f i r s t  research project in th is  pa rticu la r f ie ld  and seeks to provide 
an overview of investment managers' current a ttitudes towards investor 
re la tions o ffice rs  and th e ir  work.
250 investment/fund managers were sent a questionnaire and 60 
responses were achieved. The authors consider that the response rate
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Table 4-2 Importance of information providers
1st 2nd 3rd
% % %
Senior Corporate O fficers 60 38 2
Stockbrokers' Analysts 38 57 5
Investor Relations O fficers 2 5 93
NOTE: There were 60 respondents out of 250 investment/fund managers 
c ircu la ted
Source: Taylor Nelson Research Ltd. (1989, p .6)
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of 24% provides a large enough sample on which to base conclusions. 
They point out that the results  are UK oriented since only two 
overseas fund managers responded.
The findings of the survey are very in teresting due to the pioneering 
nature of the study. They w il l  therefore be summarised in some de ta il 
in the fo llow ing paragraphs.
Four-fifths  of fund managers agreed with the statement that the 
appointment of an investor re la tions o ff ic e r  (IRO) sometimes improves 
contact with the company in question. 8% thought that i t  always did 
whereas 10% thought that i t  never did.
78% of respondents held the view that IROs sometimes provide 
information that is new or otherwise useful and the remaining 22% 
thought that IROs never provide such information. 60% of respondents 
fe l t  that IROs never o ffe r a good a lte rna tive  to contact with finance 
directors or chief executive o ffice rs . 40% thought that IROs are 
sometimes a good a lte rna tive  contact. 85% of respondents considered 
that IROs are not the primary contact fo r fund managers whereas only 
15% thought tha t they were. I t  is evident that fund managers regard 
the Finance D irector or Chief Executive O ffice r as being a more 
important contact than the IRO.
Only 33% of respondents f e l t  that IROs are moderately important in 
determining th e ir  investment decisions. The remaining 67% regarded 
them as not at a l l  important.
40% of respondents held the view that the appointment of an IRO 
sometimes a ffects the long term stock price. 3% f e l t  that i t  always 
affects the price and 57% that i t  never a ffects the price.
Respondents were asked to rank d iffe re n t information providers. The 
results are shown in table 4-2. I t  can be seen that nearly a l l  
respondents put IROs th ird  position behind the other two information 
providers, senior corporate o ffice rs  and brokers' analysts.
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Table 4-3 Type of meeting preferred with companies
Domestic Foreign
% %
Individual meetings 58 37
Small meetings 42 42
Roadshows 0 10
Not stated - 12
NOTE: There were 60 respondents out of 250 investment/fund managers 
circulated
Source: Taylor Nelson Research Ltd. (1989, p .8)
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Opinions were divided over whether more companies should appoint 
designated IROs. 55% thought not, whereas 40% thought that more 
companies should appoint IROs and 5% were undecided.
Fund managers were then asked who should sponsor company 
presentations. 68% preferred company stockbrokers. Independent 
agencies and industry groups were the next most popular sponsors with 
8% in favour of each. F ina lly  the company banker, the company PR 
agency and the company i t s e l f  were each favoured by 3% of respondents.
63% of respondents were of the view that presentations are expected 
p rim arily  to shed new lig h t on published information. However, 32% 
expected presentations to give access to new information.
Fund managers were then asked fo r  th e ir  preferred form of meeting with 
domestic and foreign companies. The results are shown in table 4-3.
65% of respondents found roadshows moderately valuable in making 
investment decisions, 28% found them not at a l l  valuable and only 3% 
found them very valuable. I t  was found that the average number of 
roadshows attended in 1988 was 98, about ha lf of these being fo r 
foreign companies. A s ig n ifica n t number of fund managers were using 
roadshows extensively as part of th e ir  decision making process; 
however, the m ajority did not seem to be keen roadshow attendees.
Only 7% of respondents accepted a l l  th e ir  roadshow inv ita tions  with 
25% accepting more than ha lf and 28% less than h a lf. 37% accepted 
very few inv ita tio n s .
Respondents were asked to summarise in th e ir  own words the impact IROs 
have on investors' perceptions and assessments of company prospects.
18% of respondents f e l t  they had very l i t t l e  impact on assessment of 
company prospects. 12% f e l t  that a well informed IRO can have a very 
positive impact. 10% f e l t  that IROs leave investors remote from 
management. No other areas received 10% or more mentions.
Taylor Nelson Ltd. (1989) came to the fo llow ing conclusions:
I t  is evident tha t designated Investor Relations O fficers have yet 
to make a s ig n ifica n t impact on the re lationships companies have
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with in s titu tio n a l investors. Fund managers s t i l l  regard Finance 
Directors and Chief Executive O fficers as th e ir  primary contacts 
at a company, although an increasing number do concede that good 
IROs can have a very positive  impact on investors' perceptions and 
assessments of a company's prospects.
The survey described above is of general in te rest to companies 
considering the effectiveness of an investor re la tions function. They 
may however wish to commission th e ir  own personal survey and a number 
of organisations o ffe r th is  service.
Taylor Nelson Research Ltd. has a service called 'C ity  Panel'.
Companies can use th is  to evaluate th e ir  image and standing among key 
investment personnel. A typ ica l C ity Panel survey consists of 100-200 
interviews, usually carried out by telephone, lasting  up to 15 
minutes. The C ity Panel has an established membership of fund and 
investment managers and in addition Taylor Nelson uses a comprehensive 
sampling frame to target key sector analysts w ith in  stockbroking 
firm s. Respondents also include C ity editors of national newspapers 
and finance directors of major companies. Obviously ind ividual c lie n t 
surveys are confidentia l although individual market sector surveys are 
available on a m u lti-c lie n t basis.
Market Opinion and Research International (MORI) has been conducting 
research among in s titu tio n a l investors and investment analysts since 
1970. Co-operative studies have been offered to c lie n ts  fo r  nine 
years. MORI has conducted two C ity surveys each year since 1986. On 
behalf of a wide range of companies MORI monitors the C ity 's  views in 
such areas as:
how well is your company known?
are opinions of your company favourable?
how are your communications w ith the C ity rated?
how well is your annual report regarded?
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what is the C ity 's  assessment of your top management?
to what extent is your current share price seen as re fle c tin g  the 
company's worth and/or performance?
The to ta l sample fo r the study includes a core of around 100 
in s titu tio n a l investors, with sub-groups fo r  each c lie n t of 15-20 
investment analysts covering its  sector. The basic cost of 
pa rtic ipa ting  in the survey in 1989 was £8500 with extra charges fo r 
specific  questions in addition to the core questions.
MORI's advertising brochure fo r th is  service l is ts  93 company c lie n ts  
who have participated in the 1982-1989 studies.
There are a number of organisations, such as Taylor Nelson Ltd. and 
MORI, that o ffe r various surveys of C ity opinion. Crawford's 
Investment Research Index 1987/88 l is ts  a to ta l of s ix  firm s o ffe ring  
investor re la tions studies.
In concluding th is  section i t  can be said that investor re la tions 
appears to be an area that has not been subjected to intensive 
research by the academic community. This is p a rtly  explained by the 
fac t that i t  is a fa i r ly  'new' area. Commercial research 
organisations have c lea rly  seen a market opportunity and can provide 
corporate c lien ts  with a measure of the success of th e ir  investor 
re la tions programme.
4.7 The London Stock Exchange Conference fo r  Industry 1988
In October 1988 the London Stock Exchange (known at the time as the 
International Stock Exchange) held a conference e n tit le d  'Working with 
Industry 1988'. This conference has two themes, 'Keeping the Market 
Informed' and 'Towards a Single European Market'. The f i r s t  theme is 
concerned with investor re la tions and the conference proceedings 
(International Stock Exchange, 1989) provide an in teresting  insight 
into the views of in d u s tr ia lis ts  and analysts. This section w il l
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summarise the main themes and opinions tha t arose. S ir Francis Tombs, 
the Chairman of Rolls-Royce pic and former chairman of Turner & Newall 
pic spoke f i r s t  on the subject of investor communications. He made a 
number of comments about his experiences at Rolls-Royce and continued 
with some general observations:
 companies share the general problem of reconciling the need
fo r adequate communication with the investment community with the 
general duty of the d irectors to avoid selective release of price- 
sensitive information.
I t  is a d i f f ic u l t  top ic , which some companies have met by 
v ir tu a lly  suspending communication. Such a view, in my mind, is 
not in the in terest of the company or of i ts  investors. The 
essential point to be borne in mind is tha t a l l  contact needs to 
be seen as a necessary part of communication and to be directed at 
a better understanding of the company's performance and 
objectives, in a way which is not i t s e l f  p rice -sens itive , but 
contributes to a fu l le r  understanding of the nature of the 
company's a c tiv it ie s  and its  prospects. Analysts form an 
important lin k  in the communication chain, as do fin a nc ia l 
jou rna lis ts , but companies have to recognise that both groups deal 
with a wide range of d iffe re n t companies, and th e ir  task of 
d iffe re n tia tin g  pa rticu la r issues re la ting  to one company is 
extremely d i f f ic u l t .  As a re su lt, generalised perceptions 
sometimes dominate in a way which is unhelpful and unwelcome to a 
pa rticu la r company-----
So, I believe that company managements must spend a great deal of 
time in communicating with analysts, investors and the financ ia l 
press. Fam ilia rity  with a company's problems and ambitions is a 
necessary requirement fo r informed comment and analysis, and w i l l  
not come about without determined and continuous e ffo r ts . The 
occasional spectacle of companies faced with a hos tile  bid seeking 
to remedy years of neglect in investor re la tions in a few hectic 
weeks is not an edifying one.
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Nor, in my view, is the use of public re la tions consultants 
adequate in i t s e l f .  Investors in a company, and those who 
influence them, are e n title d  to contact w ith the company's 
management at the highest leve l, and to continuous in te rp re ta tion  
of the company's performance and objectives. This is because 
there is re a lly  no substitute fo r the tru s t of each party in the 
other, the fa m ilia r ity  of analysts, investors and the press with a 
company and its  objectives, and the resu lting  confidence which 
makes such good re la tions a matter of course.
Although the speaker stresses the importance of investor re la tions he 
makes no comment on organising the function w ith in  the company, merely 
stating that i t  is the job of management.
The next speaker, S ir Trevor Holdsworth, President of the 
Confederation of B ritish  Industry spoke about the advantages and 
disadvantages of a company going public. He expressed a rather 
negative view of the investor re la tions a c t iv ity :
On the second issue - the costs of managing the market, o f keeping 
the market informed - I th ink that th is  may be getting beyond 
reasonableness. There may in the past, have been some 
ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r the general c r it ic ism  about communication from 
industry to the market, but I believe i t  is not now ju s t if ie d  and 
may have gone too fa r fo r the good of the management of business. 
I t  is ce rta in ly  very costly , both in money and time.
One is faced with a merry-go-round of presentations, discussions 
and lunches. As someone said to me recently, we seem to spend 
more time te ll in g  people what we are doing than actua lly  doing i t !  
We have to indulge in an embarrassing amount of market massaging. 
"Do not surprise the market," we are to ld , "or you w i l l  su ffe r the 
consequences." So there is  a continuous drip-feed of coded 
information passed to the market.
A number of senior leaders are quite concerned about th is  - 
p a rticu la rly  having regard fo r the insider-dealing rules - and, of 
course, most of the time can be taken up ta lk in g , not to  actual
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shareholders, but to the middle men and the market makers. In
contrast, may I say, when you do focus on ta lk ing  d ire c tly  to your
owners, then i t  is very worthwhile indeed, and companies should 
re a lly  concentrate on tha t. Good communication, as has already 
been said, has to be two-way. I t  requires good lis te n ing . Quite
frank ly , I f in d  many in industry often th ink tha t they are 
spending th e ir  time having a dialogue with the deaf and dumb. 
Managers seem always to be on the defensive. One ra re ly  gets the 
fee ling that the market cares about the health and welfare of 
industry.
S ir Trevor Holdsworth's views about investor re la tions are somewhat 
less enthusiastic than those of the previous speaker, S ir Francis 
Tombs.
A view from the other side of the re la tionsh ip  was provided by the 
next speaker, Paddy Linaker, Chairman of M&G Investment Management 
Ltd. and an investment manager of 30 years standing. He c r it ic is e d  
the securities industry fo r continua lly try in g  to generate business 
and pressurising fund managers. He commented as fo llows:
But at M&G, especially these days, I lik e  to see a lo t of our 
investment managers out of the o ff ic e , v is it in g  companies and, 
therefore, away from the phone and the blandishments of brokers.
He also made a comment about the duties of the in s titu t io n a l investor 
as a shareholder:
Shareholders, as owners, have additional duties and 
re spo n s ib ilitie s . They should be ready to supply additional funds 
to finance investment, where th is  can be ju s t if ie d ,  fo r  future 
growth; they should be prepared to defend the company against 
unwelcome takeover bids; they need to assure themselves that the 
boards of d irectors are of suitable balance and q u a lity  and that 
the company has appropriate advisers fo r  consultation. They do 
not t e l l  management how to run th e ir  business. Nor do they seek 
short-term advantage through the acquis ition of price-sensitive  
information. Shareholders are interested in discussing with
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management subjects such as the objectives and philosophy of 
companies, whether growth is to be achieved by acqu is ition , the 
d e s ira b ility  or otherwise of d iv e rs ific a tio n , dividend po licy, the 
implications of Europe, etc. I t  is obviously a major 
respons ib ility  of the in s titu tio n a l investor to express any 
concerns or d issa tis fac tion  with management. Who else is to 
protect the in terests of the small shareholders, or indeed, the 
employees? The conventional response of many in s titu tio n s  is to 
se ll and walk away from the problem, and th is  cannot be in the 
general in te rest - the resu lt of th is  process is a l l  too often a 
takeover. I would prefer self-improvement to take place, without 
the expense and disruption of f ie rc e ly  fought takeover bids.
Paddy Linaker's view is in teresting in tha t he considers that 
ins titu tio n s  should take part in the investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  of 
companies by entering into discussions which w i l l  benefit other 
investors in the company. This apparently a lt r u is t ic  view is in 
co n flic t with the pressure on fund managers to  achieve high 
performance in the short term.
The fin a l speaker was Jack Lavery, Senior Vice President of M e rr ill 
Lynch, who gave a speech e n title d  'Corporate Communications with 
Analysts: USA experience'. This w i l l  be reviewed in the section 
dealing with investor re la tions in the USA.
The record of the discussion period that followed these speeches 
brought up the subject of the period before interim  and f in a l results 
are published. This is tra d it io n a lly  treated as a closed period fo r 
communicating with analysts due to the danger of releasing price 
sensitive information. Mr R J Gillum, Chairman of Blagden Industries 
pic asked the fo llow ing question:
Mr Lavery made some observations about tim ing of communications 
with analysts, and I would lik e  to ask the panel fo r th e ir  views 
on the s itua tion  where the ch ie f executive of a company has 
developed a good rapport with key analysts fo llow ing his company 
and who w rite  pieces about i t :  and a week or so before he is due
to publish his prelim inary figures, his chum from the analysts'
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rings up and says, "By the way B i l l ,  I am updating my piece on 
you, and I am going to put you down as having made £31 m illio n  
th is  year. You are ju s t about to report. What can you t e l l  me on
th is?" I do not mean to put th is  as a facetious po in t; I believe
th is  is absolutely d iabo lica l, and I would lik e  the panel, 
p a rtic u la r ly  the investment side, to comment as to whether or not 
there should be some declared understanding, w ith in  the framework 
of good re la tions via the analysts' section, that a company must 
be le f t  in peace in the run-up to publication of figures.
Mr Jack Lavery in response made the fo llow ing comment:
My reference was to the timeliness of communication between 
companies and analysts. I t  is ce rta in ly  important to get the 
message out upon the occurring of an event and not a fte r a
substantial lag, in the s p ir i t  of openness and candour, so tha t,
in tu rn , the analyst can do an e ffec tive  job evaluating that and 
servicing the investor audience. I th ink the danger tha t you 
advise in the question can e x is t, and I th ink the other side is 
the danger that i f  an analyst is surfacing with investment 
information, i t  would be grossly inaccurate or grossly 
misrepresent where a company is heading. I would never suggest 
any communication that revealed anything to an analyst tha t was 
not broadly disseminated. I agree that the concern you put in 
your question is a va lid  concern, and we t r y  to harness our 
analysts to ensure that th e ir  assessments are based on fundamental 
perceptions of public information and not based on any kind of 
advance indication of any sort at any time from any company.
The question and answer above underline the major problem concerning 
investor re la tions with analysts. That is , the need to engage in 
meaningful, informative communication w h ils t at the same time not 
revealing price sensitive information.
In concluding th is  section a number of observations can be made. The 
fac t that the London Stock Exchange saw f i t  to dedicate a conference 
to the subject of investor re la tions indicates the importance of th is  
a c t iv ity . The conference proceedings themselves provide some
Marston, C.L. 1993 Chapter 4 107
in te resting  q ua lita tive  data. This data complements the quantita tive  
findings of the Taylor Nelson survey discussed in the previous 
section. Reading the two in conjunction, i t  is clear th a t, lik e  most 
management problems, investor re la tions cannot be defined by a set of 
basic rules or p rinc ip les . There are a number of co n flic tin g  opinions 
and each organisation needs to formulate its  own po lic ies  and 
procedures.
4.8 The Investor Relations Society
The growing importance of investor re la tions was re flected in 1980 by 
the formation of the Investor Relations Society. Members comprise 
senior executives with management re sp o n s ib ilitie s  fo r investor 
re la tions , including specia lis ts  in public a ffa irs ,  finance d irectors 
and company secretaries. The objectives of the society are as 
fo llows:
to work fo r  better communications between companies and investors
to improve the techniques of investor re la tions
to encourage high e th ica l and professional standards in investor 
re la tions
to represent the views of members to Government, regulatory bodies 
and the investment community
to provide a forum fo r members to exchange views and share 
experiences
The a c t iv it ie s  of the society include informal discussion meetings, 
the provision of tra in ing  courses and an annual conference, social 
functions, publication of a newsletter and papers on current issues 
and techniques.
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Membership is open to companies with more than 100 ordinary 
shareholders although professional p ractitioners who cannot sa tis fy  
the conditions fo r corporate membership may be admitted at the 
discretion of the committee. In 1990 the membership stood at 250 
senior executives with management re spo n s ib ility  fo r  investor 
re la tions from 177 UK pub lic ly  lis te d  companies In 1986 the 
membership was only 80, the increase shows c le a rly  the growing 
importance of investor re la tions .
4.9 Investor Relations in the USA
Since the USA is widely considered to have the most h ighly developed 
stock markets in the world i t  is l ik e ly  that investor re la tions w il l  
also be in a fa ir ly  advanced state. The aim of th is  section is to 
provide a b r ie f ind ication of the state of the a rt in the USA, paying 
special attention to company communications with analysts.
Marcus (1983) has w ritten  a comprehensive tex t e n tit le d  'Competing fo r 
capita l in the '80s ' ,  th is  is an updating of an e a rlie r  work 
published in 1975. He provides comprehensive instructions (pp.40-54) 
on the mechanics of dealing with the financ ia l community under the 
follow ing headings:
Security analyst meetings
Meeting with or ta lk ing  to individual analysts
Brokerage meetings
Issuing a background report
Preparing and d is tr ib u tin g  printed m ateria l, including annual and 
quarterly reports, fo r  d is tr ib u tio n  to the financ ia l community
Regular and periodic mailing of information about the company to 
the financia l community, including copies of press releases
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The financia l press
Corporate advertising and other promotional devices
Handling unsolic ited enquiries.
Much of th is  text is devoted to p ractica l problems such as the tim ing 
of the cockta il period before the lunch and the presentation. However 
the author also tackles more serious problems, such as the danger of 
responding to analysts' requests fo r  earnings projections (pp.45-46):
There is one important point regarding a l l  analyst meetings, and, 
in fa c t, any form of financ ia l communication. Although i t  w i l l  be 
dealt with in greater de ta il in chapter four, the rules of 
disclosure of the SEC very c le a rly  apply here. Any statement made 
in an analyst meeting, whether i t  be before one or many analysts, 
that is s ig n ifica n t in judging the company and tha t has never been 
made before must be pub lic ly  released as quickly as possible. I f  
management intends to make such a statement at a meeting, whether 
i t  be an earnings projection or a merger announcement or a major 
d ive rs ifica tio n  plan, a release should be prepared well beforehand 
fo r public d is tr ib u tio n  at the time of the meeting. This is 
extremely important.
Marcus (1983, p .47) stresses that a properly run financ ia l re la tions 
programme, whether performed in te rn a lly , or with the aid of a 
financ ia l re la tions agency, must include a concerted e ffo r t  to hold 
and service a fo llow ing of analysts. One aim of such a programme is 
to generate analysts' research reports.
Telephone inquiries from individual shareholders are considered to  be 
as important as queries from analysts. Marcus (p .133) suggests that a 
w ritten  record of such communications should be kept to o ffse t any 
questions about inside information. Letters should also be answered 
p o lite ly  and promptly.
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The author devotes a complete chapter (pp.209-219) to the 
organisational aspects of setting up the investor re la tions programme 
by the means of using in ternal personnel or external consultants.
In e ffec t, there appear to be no s tr ik in g  differences between investor 
re lations in the USA and the UK. As was noted at the beginning of 
th is  chapter, much of the UK lite ra tu re  consists of books aimed at 
management advising them on how to run an investor re la tions 
programme. Points raised in the UK texts are very s im ila r to those 
covered by Marcus (1983).
A more recent view of the s itua tion  in the USA is provided by the 
proceedings of the London Stock Exchange Conference fo r  Industry 1988 
(International Stock Exchange, 1989). Jack Lavery, Senior Vice 
President of M e rr ill Lynch, gave a speech e n tit le d  'Corporate 
communications with analysts: USA experience'. A selection of his 
comments w il l  be reproduced below:
 clear and concise communication systems between companies and
analysts, as well as between analysts and investors, are 
increasingly important. Unless a message is d ire c t and 
understandable, i t  can be los t in today's noisy, complicated 
environment___
The analyst s trives to develop good re la tions w ith the key 
management of the companies he fo llow s, in an e ffo r t  to gain a 
better understanding of the firm , its  management, cu ltu re , 
organisation, goals and ob jectives___
Analysts need and want the company to  help them understand the 
nuts and bolts o f the industry. For newer analysts, tha t involves 
informing them about the factors that drive the business. In 
addition, analysts in the United States have found i t  useful to 
develop a wide network of industry contacts at a l l  leve ls, not 
only at the highest levels of the Chief Executive O ffice r and 
Chief Financial O ffice r. These contacts are c r i t ic a l ly  important 
sources of insight and general industry information.
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The speaker summarised the Securities and Exchange Commission rules 
regarding information disclosure to analysts. He also pointed out 
that there are also rules concerning analysts' communications with 
investors. Analysts' reports must be reviewed by a brokerage firm 's  
supervisory o ff ic e r  to ensure they conform to regulatory and in terna l 
standards.
He stressed that analysts now attend more road shows, c lie n t 
breakfasts, lunches, dinners and conferences than ever before. He 
considers tha t the focus of an analyst's work has changed in recent 
years:
Analysts of the 1970s who focused on producing accurate earnings 
estimates have been replaced by analysts of the 1980s and 1990s 
who calculate breakup values, examine off-balance sheet e n tit ie s  
which might a ttra c t corporate ra iders, and look fo r  ways to spin 
o ff  unwanted subsidiaries
The speaker is c le a rly  of the opinion tha t companies should 
communicate with analysts as part of th e ir  investor re la tions 
a c t iv ity . However, he makes no specific  references to the ro le  o f a 
designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r.
When a new profession develops i t  is normal fo r professional 
organisations to be set up by its  p rac titione rs . In the case of the 
USA there is a National Investor Relations In s titu te , based in 
Washington. This was founded in 1969 and had 2300 members by 1992. 
There are also a number of spec ia lis t journals dealing w ith the 
subject of investor re la tions . Marcus (1983, p .297) l is ts  s ix  such 
publications.
This section has provided a b r ie f overview of the practice o f investor 
re la tions in the USA. In conclusion, i t  can be said tha t the two 
countries show s im ila r it ie s  with the s itua tion  in the USA being 
somewhat ahead of that in the UK.
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4.10 Conclusions
This chapter has summarised the lite ra tu re  on investor re la tions . I t  
has focussed on investor re la tions with brokers' analysts and fund 
manager analysts. I t  is clear that the area under study is in a state 
of change and some confusion. Although many companies have appointed 
investor re la tions o ffice rs  to run th e ir  programmes the recip ients of 
the information do not a l l  view th is  as an improvement.
No matter how the investor re la tions programme is organised i t  is 
clear that companies cannot ignore the need to compete fo r  cap ita l in 
the market place. This means tha t communications w ith the C ity must 
be established and nurtured. Some companies view th is  as a positive 
a c t iv ity  whereas others resent the time and money involved.
The market research sector has responded to the increasing awareness 
of the importance of investor re la tions by o ffe ring  ta ilo re d  surveys 
to companies. Companies can therefore obtain some measure o f the 
effectiveness of th e ir  investor re la tions programme.
The emergence of investor re la tions as a separate management 
d isc ip line  has been accompanied by the establishment o f professional 
organisations and publications. In addition, ex is ting  organisations, 
such as the London Stock Exchange, have recognised the importance of 
the investor re la tions a c t iv ity .
In conclusion, the growth of investor re la tions can be viewed as a 
response to the continuing increase in sophistication of the world's 
financia l markets. In a complex financ ia l environment increasingly 
sophisticated information is needed in order to make investment 
decisions. The ro le  of investor re la tions is to complement and 
improve existing information flows.
This study has now investigated the legal and regulatory framework, 
the role of financ ia l analysts and the lite ra tu re  on investor 
re la tions. The next chapter w i l l  look at the fina n c ia l public 
re lations consultancy sector.
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Chapter 5 The Financial Public Relations Consultancy Sector
5.1 Introduction
In chapter four the ro le  of the investor re la tions function w ith in 
companies was investigated. I t  was established tha t companies can 
carry out th e ir po lic ies in-house or by purchasing the services of an 
external consultant. In many cases i t  seems that a mixture of 
internal and external expertise is employed. The aim of th is  chapter 
is to describe the ro le  of consultants in the investor re la tions 
process.
5.2 Id e n tifica tion  of the population of financ ia l public re la tions 
consultancies
The aim of th is  section is to establish the size of the population of 
investor re la tions consultants. This w i l l  be done by reviewing 
entries in a number of d irec to ries .
The City Directory 1990 l is ts  122 London members of the In s titu te  of 
Practitioners in Advertising who o ffe r a financ ia l advertising 
service. Financial advertising is not synonymous with financ ia l 
public re la tions. However, many of these agencies w i l l  o ffe r a 
financia l PR service. The d irectory also l is ts  62 members of the 
Public Relations Consultants' Association who o ffe r financ ia l PR 
services. The Hambro Company Guide (1989) provides a l is t in g  of 120 
financia l PR advisers and th e ir  c lie n ts . The number of c lie n ts  lis te d  
fo r each adviser ranges from 1 to 145.
Crawford's Investment Research Index 1987-88 (Crawford's, 1987) l is ts  
60 financia l public re la tions consultants with de ta ils  of sector 
specialisms, i f  any, and comments from the firms themselves on the 
services they o ffe r. An i l lu s tra t iv e  example is quoted below:
We are among the UK's largest independent financ ia l PR 
consultancies. We provide a f u l l  range of business communications
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Table 5-1 Services provided bv financia l PR agencies
Mechanical tasks
- d is tr ib u tio n  of press releases
- mailings to brokers
- arranging press conferences
- monitoring analysts' and jo u rn a lis ts ' specialisms
Additional tasks
- d ra fting  press releases
- antic ipate questions 
Miscellaneous
- commissioning research projects
- establish corporate communications objectives
- stra teg ic advisory and executive capacity
Marston, C.L. 1993 Chapter 5 114
services fo r quoted and unquoted companies to ensure tha t our 
c lien ts  are known and understood by shareholders, investment 
analysts, local communities and employees. Our services include: 
C ity, trade, technical, consumer and overseas press re la tions ; 
p o lit ic a l lobbying; advertising; corporate id e n tity  and design; 
market research; and screen and video communications. We have 
a f f i l ia te s  in New York and Tokyo.
The figures quoted above give some idea of the size of the financ ia l 
PR sector. Dark (1988) states that fee income from financ ia l PR rose 
from £25m in 1986 to £40m in 1987.
I t  is clear from the above section that companies have a great deal of 
choice in selecting an external financ ia l PR consultant.
5.3 Overview of the ro le of financ ia l public re la tions consultancies
The aim of th is  section is to provide an overview of the ro le  of 
external consultancies in execution of a company's investor re la tions 
programme.
In a h is to rica l review of the development of financ ia l advertising 
agencies Newman (1984, p .214) notes that these agencies began to set 
up financ ia l public re la tions agencies in the early 1960s. The agency 
provides the channel of communication from the company to C ity 
analysts, jou rna lis ts  and government departments. I t  also anticipates 
potentia l questions and th e ir  answers, coaches and grooms company 
representatives to display th e ir  best features (at press b rie fing s , 
seminars, conferences, radio and te lev is ion  interviews), and prepares 
them fo r meetings with in s titu tio n a l investors.
Newman also notes that the f i r s t  independent spec ia lis t financ ia l 
public re la tions agency was formed in 1960. She provides (1984, 
pp.248-250) a b r ie f description of the services provided by the 
financ ia l PR agency and consultancy. This information is summarised 
in table 5-1.
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter' 5 115
Dark (1988) states that in the s ix tie s  and early  seventies, financ ia l 
PR firms were mainly carrying out routine press re la tions and 
tombstone advertising. Over the next decade the business assumed a 
new ro le  as an arm of corporate finance, with a quasi-professional 
presence. There is currently  a trend to o ffe r a widening spread of 
services with increasing emphasis on investor re la tions as a wide 
programme centred on in s titu tio n a l shareholders.
He then provides a description of the type of person working in 
financ ia l PR. I n i t ia l ly  they were mainly ex-jou rna lis ts , followed by 
a wave of re c ru its  from the C ity. Recent entrants to the profession 
include highly qua lified  personnel from corporate finance, 
stockbroking and major C ity in s titu tio n s .
Essentia lly i t  appears that the financ ia l PR consultant o ffe rs  the 
same services as an in ternal investor re la tions function. One problem 
that can occur arises from the fac t that an external consultant may 
not have s u ffic ie n t access to company personnel. McLaughlin (1988) 
considers that PR consultants can be seriously handicapped by lack of 
management e ffo r t  or understanding on the c lie n t 's  part. She 
considers that companies need to take th e ir  PR consultants fu l ly  into 
th e ir confidence r ig h t from the f i r s t  b rie fing . Yet there are 
companies which pers ist in keeping th e ir  consultancies at arm's 
length, not giving them a l l  the facts they need. She considers that a 
consultancy needs ready access to senior management on a day to day 
basis. Contact with the in-house PR manager is not s u ff ic ie n t to 
provide a broad perspective on the firm .
Dewe (1985) considers that financ ia l PR agencies provide s ta ff  who are 
numerate, f in a n c ia lly  aware, l ite ra te  and well connected with the 
financ ia l community. This permits an agency to o ffe r a f u l l  range of 
corporate services in one package with the added bonus that the c lie n t 
is getting independent advice. He considers that fo r  th is  reason many 
major companies who have perfectly  competent in terna l PR departments 
use outside consultants fo r  advice as well as d is tr ib u tio n . Internal 
and external advisers usually work together quite happily without any 
c o n flic t, the reason fo r th is  being that there is plenty of work fo r  
them both.
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Marcus (1981, pp.212-213) provides a l i s t  o f the possible advantages 
of using an external consultant. These include the benefits of 
specia lisa tion , the organisational a b il i t ie s  of the consultancy firm , 
constant lia ison  with the financ ia l community, experience of serving 
many companies, o b je c tiv ity  and knowledge of a l l  relevant regulations. 
In addition i t  may be more economical to use an external consultant.
One possible disadvantage is that an external consultant may be 
serving the company's competitors. I f  investor re la tions can be 
fa i r ly  described as competing fo r cap ita l then there may be co n flic ts  
of in te rest a ris ing  fo r the external consultant.
Hayes (1989, p .149) considers tha t the combined resources of both the 
outside consultant and the in-house team are usually necessary to 
execute the investor re la tions function. He recommends tha t companies 
set up an investor re la tions committee. There may be tension between 
the in-house s ta ff  and the consultant i f  the consultant appears to 
lack day to day involvement and receives the more prestigious 
assignments.
This section has made i t  clear that companies have a choice in se tting  
up th e ir  investor re la tions programme. Services may easily  be bought 
in from external financ ia l PR consultants or provided in-house.
5.4 The external financ ia l PR consultant and the investment analyst
The preceding section noted that external fina nc ia l PR consultants may 
be involved in the company's communications with investment analysts. 
This section w i l l  consider whether th is  presents any special problems 
or provides any advantages when compared to purely in ternal investor 
re la tions programmes.
Dark (1988) outlines one p a rticu la r area of concern when he notes tha t 
financ ia l consultancies are not subject to any form of regulation, 
despite the often highly sensitive nature of the information they 
handle. However, he notes that i t  is not in the long term in terests
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of a consultancy to gain a reputation fo r  leaking price-sensitive  
information. He considers that leaks do happen and reports that 
a llegations of dubious practices have been made.
Companies could experience s im ila r problems emanating from th e ir  own 
in ternal investor re la tions personnel. In both cases the company can 
operate the sanction of dismissal i f  a breach of confidence in proven. 
There is also the deterrent e ffe c t of a possible crim inal prosecution 
under the provisions of the Company Securities (Ins ider Dealing) Act 
1985.
H o llis  (1989) considers the ro le  of financ ia l public re la tions 
advisers in the current regulatory environment. They should be aware 
of the laws, regulations and codes of conduct a ffecting  th e ir  
employers or c lie n ts  and be prepared to advise on th e ir  application.
In the financ ia l f ie ld  the public re la tions adviser's ro le  may be 
subsidiary to those of the legal and financ ia l advisers. In th is  
author's view then, both in terna l employees and external consultants 
bear a s im ila r burden in coping with the regulatory environment 
surrounding communications by the company.
One aspect of the adviser's ro le  is to represent the views of the 
outside world to  his p rin c ip a l. This involves monitoring and 
reporting back opinion. The adviser must be ready to stand up fo r 
what he knows to be r ig h t and be prepared to de live r an unpopular 
message. H o llis  considers that th is  is a ro le  which an external 
consultancy may be better f i t te d  to play than the in-house executive.
I t  is clear from th is  section that the roles of the external 
consultant and the in terna l investor re la tions s ta ff  in communicating 
with the financ ia l community are essen tia lly  s im ila r.
5.5 The In s titu te  of Public Relations - C itv and Financial Group
The C ity and Financial Group of the In s titu te  of Public Relations 
convened a working party on the conduct of financ ia l communications in
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February 1989. This section w i l l  review the findings of the interim  
report presented by the committee in A p ril 1990 ( In s t itu te  of Public 
Relations, 1990).
The working party comprised members of the C ity and Financial Group 
and representatives of the Public Relations Consultants' Association 
and the Investor Relations Society. Evidence was taken from, in te r 
a lia , representatives of the Bank of England, the Department of Trade 
and Industry, the In ternational Stock Exchange Quotations Department, 
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers and the In ternational Stock 
Exchange Listed Companies Advisory Committee.
The working party considered the d e s ira b il ity  of preparing a code of 
conduct governing the conduct of financ ia l communications. They 
decided tha t, in view of the existing  extensive framework o f s ta tu tory 
and regulatory provisions, any such code would merely be a compendium 
that would need regular revision as rules changed. A new fre e ­
standing code of conduct was not considered desirable. I t  was 
suggested tha t a compendium of regulations, regu la rly  updated, might 
be prepared as an aid to p rac titione rs .
They considered i t  essential tha t those who practice in the f ie ld  are 
fu l ly  fa m ilia r with a l l  the relevant regulations and persuade th e ir  
c lie n ts  or employers to observe them.
The working party was given very l i t t l e  evidence of consistent abuse 
by companies or th e ir  financ ia l communications advisers. The main 
problem seemed to be selective b rie fin g  of ind ividual jo u rna lis ts  in 
order to gain favourable media coverage. I t  was f e l t  that abuses 
should be pursued more vigorously by the DTI, the Takeover Panel and 
the Stock Exchange.
I t  was noted that members of the three main bodies represented on the 
working party have no monopoly of the practice of financ ia l 
communications, nor are they recognised as having any p a rticu la r 
status in the f ie ld .  Also there is  no legal requirement fo r  companies 
to employ financ ia l communications p rac titione rs . The job is often 
carried out by d irectors or senior executives.
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The working party reviewed the ex is ting  legal and regulatory framework 
concerning financ ia l communications and id e n tifie d  certa in areas where 
existing or impending regulations appeared to be unsatisfactory.
I t  was noted tha t no provision is made under the Financial Services 
Act (1985) or under the rules of the Securities and Investments Board 
or any Self Regulating Organisation to bring financ ia l public 
re la tions or investor re la tions p ractitioners  w ith in  the regulatory 
framework.
In the case of the Code of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Note 7 
to Rule 19 makes the financ ia l advisers responsible fo r  guiding th e ir  
c lien ts  and any relevant public re la tions advisers with regard to any 
information released to the media. This is the only reference in the 
Code to public re la tions advisers.
The Panel hold d irectors and th e ir  financ ia l advisers responsible fo r 
the accuracy and veracity of a l l  statements. The working party 
considers tha t the financ ia l public re la tions adviser must l im it  his 
ro le  to communicating o f f ic ia l  statements, arranging contacts with 
o f f ic ia l ly  recognised spokesmen and e ff ic ie n t planning and 
organisation of communication.
During takeovers public re la tions advisers w i l l  inev itab ly  become 
insiders, and abuse of th is  position fo r personal gain w i l l  render 
them lia b le  to crim inal prosecution fo r  insider trading.
The continuing obligations of lis te d  companies are contained in the 
Yellow Book published by the In ternational Stock Exchange. The 
company is responsible fo r compliance and external financ ia l re la tions 
advisers are in no way responsible to the Stock Exchange.
The Stock Exchange trea ts  the company as the f in a l a rb ite r as to what 
is p rice-sensitive  information although a non exhaustive l i s t  of 
specific  p rice-sensitive  items is  provided. The working party made 
the follow ing comment:
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Cases could arise where an item of news might not be regarded as 
in tr in s ic a lly  p rice-sensitive  but becomes so because of the very 
manner in which the company chooses to announce i t  by, fo r 
example, ca llin g  a formal analysts' meeting to explain i t .
In respect of regulations promulgated by professional organisations 
the working party presented a summary of relevant points. The 
In s titu te  of Public Relations has a code of conduct containing a 
relevant clause (14): a member shall when working in association with 
other professionals, respect the codes of those other professions and 
shall not knowingly be party to any breach of such codes.
There is , however, no code of conduct re la ting  to the special f ie ld  of 
financ ia l or investor re la tions to supplement the general code.
The Public Relations Consultants' Association has a s im ila r clause in 
its  code of conduct but in addition i t  imposes the ob ligation of 
iden tify ing  as well as respecting the codes of other professions.
The Investor Relations Society has no code of conduct but provides a 
manual of practice guide-lines which are more precisely directed 
towards the area of financ ia l communications than the codes of the 
other two bodies.
The working party considered that few of the statutes or regulations 
bore d ire c tly  on financ ia l communications p ractitioners  as such but 
that they did a ffe c t th e ir  a c t iv it ie s  by prescribing what may or may 
not be done by th e ir  employers, or in the name of those employers.
In the specific  case of financ ia l communications with analysts, the 
working party noted the fo llow ing:
I t  is commonplace to monitor publications by analysts commenting 
on a company's prospects and giving forecasts. The Stock Exchange 
deprecates, however, any attempt to give guidance to analysts, 
even obliquely, on a confidentia l basis except tha t i t  accepts 
that a company is e n title d  to ask fo r a correction of an error
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regarding any h is to r ic  information which has already been the 
subject of a public announcement.
In practice, companies fin d  that he ll has no fu ry  lik e  an analyst 
who has been shown to be seriously a d r if t  in his or her forecasts 
and that th is  is equally true whether they have been fo o lis h ly  
op tim is tic  or fo o lis h ly  pessim istic. Companies therefore fin d  i t  
desirable to avoid th is  s itua tion  aris ing  and guidance is 
frequently given, a lb e it in coded form.
This opinion about the real nature of company analyst communications 
corresponds with many other s im ila r opinions quoted elsewhere in th is  
study. On the subject of meetings with analysts the working party 
makes the fo llow ing comments:
Companies wishing to be known and understood in the market 
customarily hold b rie fings fo r  analysts and fo r  the financ ia l 
press when announcing resu lts , interim  or prelim inary. Sometimes 
these are used as an opportunity to in te rp re t the published 
figures by, fo r  example, g iving a sectoral breakdown of published 
p ro fits  when th is  is not available in the printed document.
In the Stock Exchange's view th is  practice is wrong. They do not
object to d irectors or other spokesmen setting the company's
figures in the economic context or that o f the general market fo r 
its  product but they consider tha t i f  an analysis by product or by 
geographical area is available fo r  discussion i t  should also be 
available fo r  publication.
This comment is rather surpris ing. I f  i t  is indeed true that 
companies provide additional segmental information at analysts' 
meetings they would appear to be in breach of the l is t in g  agreement. 
Most commentators would agree tha t segmental information is 
p o te n tia lly  price sensitive since empirical studies indicate tha t i t  
can provide superior forecasts to aggregated information. (Roberts and
Gray (1988b) provide a summary of th is  evidence.)
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The interim  report of the working party was followed up by a f in a l 
report in February 1991 ( In s titu te  of Public Relations, 1991).
The f in a l report re itera ted the main contents and conclusions of the 
interim  report w h ils t considering comments and fu rthe r research 
carried out in the intervening period. The working party recommended 
establishment of a permanent jo in t  committee fo r  financ ia l 
communications practice and the preparation of a compendium of 
regulations.
This section has summarised the views on financ ia l communications 
expressed by the professional bodies established by the public 
re la tions industry. These views include specific  comments on 
communications between companies and investment analysts. Such 
communications are frequently effected by an investor re la tions 
p rac titione r who may be an external consultant or an in-house 
employee.
The public re la tions profession is not alone in having a current 
in te rest in th is  area. Concern has been expressed by the Bank of 
England, the London Stock Exchange, the Department of Trade and 
Industry and other interested parties. Evidence of th is  widespread 
concern is presented elsewhere in the study.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that external financ ia l public re la tions 
consultants may be involved when companies communicate w ith investment 
analysts. The overall aim of th is  study is to investigate information 
flows between companies and analysts and to establish whether or not 
additional information is provided.
The existence of an external th ird  party adds an additional route fo r  
the flow of information. Information may flow d ire c t from company 
personnel to analysts or via the external consultant. Conversely,
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feedback and enquiries from analysts may be directed at in-house 
o f f ic ia ls  or to the external consultant.
The external consultant is un like ly  to be involved with the day to day 
a c tiv it ie s  of the company and hence his knowledge needs to be updated 
by periodic b rie fings . The company w i l l  need to communicate price- 
sensitive information to the external consultant from time to time and 
th is  can lead to a r is k  of inappropriate disclosure. Of course, 
companies regu larly  disclose information to th e ir  auditors and other 
professional advisers without fear of misuse. The problem in th is  
case is that financ ia l public re la tions is not a lega lly  regulated 
profession. The professional bodies tha t do ex is t have no monopoly 
over p ractitioners and th e ir  codes of conduct cannot be un iversa lly  
enforced.
This study has now considered the legal and regulatory framework, 
financ ia l analysts, investor re la tions and financ ia l public re la tions 
lite ra tu re . The next chapter w i l l  review the accounting and finance 
lite ra tu re  that is relevant to company communications with analysts 
and fund managers.
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Chapter 6 Review of Literature relevant to Communications between
Companies and Financial Analysts
6.1 Introduction
The aim of th is  chapter is to describe and review previous accounting 
and finance based lite ra tu re  and research work sp e c ific a lly  relevant 
to informal disclosures of information by companies to the investment 
analyst group. These informal contacts include company v is its ,  
answering telephone enquiries, meetings with a number of analysts and 
commenting on analysts' research reports p r io r to publication.
F irs t ly , the subject of information disclosure w i l l  be discussed 
b r ie f ly ,  introducing the economic perspective on the problem. Then a 
review w il l  be made of four surveys of the work of financ ia l analysts. 
These surveys are of d irec t relevance to the current study because 
they include data regarding company contacts with analysts.
Subsequently a review w il l  be made of other relevant lite ra tu re  that 
makes reference to the subject under investigation. F in a lly  some 
conclusions w il l  be drawn and the im plications fo r the current study 
considered.
6.2 Information disclosure in general and sp e c ifica lly  re lated to 
disclosures bv companies to analysts
Information is disclosed by companies as a re su lt of legal or
regulatory requirements or the disclosure can be voluntary. In 
general, there w il l  be costs and benefits attaching to a l l  information 
disclosures. The company its e lf  and the various user groups w i l l  bear 
the costs and reap the benefits in unequal proportions. As Gray and 
Roberts (1989) have pointed out, corporate perceptions of the costs 
and benefits can influence the extent of voluntary disclosure.
As a simple example consider the case of a company that arranges a
brokers' lunch to announce a re-organisation of its  management and
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operating d iv is ions. A simultaneous announcement o u tlin ing  the scheme 
is made to the stock exchange. The company incurs the costs of the 
meeting and also the disadvantage that competitors now know of its  
plans. The company benefits since the meeting helps in maintaining 
good relationships with the analysts. Also, the disclosure w i l l  
assist the market in correct valuation of its  shares and th is  may be 
considered desirable by the company. The market benefits because the 
new information can immediately be re flected in the share price. The 
analysts incur the time costs of attending the meeting but they may 
benefit from receiving more de ta il than that contained in the o f f ic ia l  
announcement. This extra de ta il could then be used to make superior 
predictions and enhance the analysts' reputations.
In practice there w il l  always be information asymmetry. I t  is not 
possible to convey to the market a l l  the information about a company.
I f  th is  were possible the market would exh ib it strong form e ffic iency  
which has been reported on by Keane (1983, p .10) as fo llow s:
The market is e ff ic ie n t in the strong sense i f  share prices fu l ly  
re fle c t not only published information but a l l  relevant 
information including data not yet pub lic ly  available. I f  the 
markets were strongly e ff ic ie n t,  therefore, even an insider would 
not be able to p ro f it  from his priv ileged position.
Analysis of the economics of information disclosure has led academics 
to study the market fo r company information.
Bromwich (1985) has spe c ifica lly  considered the case of analysts 
having access to inside information in the context of the market fo r 
information. He states (p .63):
Those with needs unsatisfied by conventional published statements 
which they are not w illin g  to back by money cannot expect to cause 
resources to be directed towards the provision o f th e ir  
information requirements. A number of people such as investment
analysts ........ claim to be able to obtain access to non-public
information. They also claim that they obtain additional insights 
from pub lic ly  available information because of th e ir  superior
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analytica l techniques. Such individuals contribute to economic 
e ffic iency insofar as these claims to have superior a b il i ty  are 
ju s t if ie d . However, where they do have access to non-public data 
such a provision may re fle c t th e ir  superior bargaining power 
re la tive  to the general user of accounting information. The 
e x p lic it  or im p lic it  price fo r accounting information which 
emerges from these a c t iv it ie s  may, therefore, neither re fle c t 
society's preferences fo r accounting information nor the 
opportunity cost of i ts  provision. Given the re la tiv e ly  small 
numbers of individuals who have access to such non-public 
information, i t  is l ik e ly  tha t they w i l l  have some monopoly power 
and, therefore, w i l l  not provide the information to a l l  those 
w illin g  to pay the incremental cost of th e ir  demands. Moreover, 
i t  is lik e ly  tha t any financ ia l data given by enterprises to 
favoured individuals such as investment analysts, w i l l  minimise 
that information which re fle c ts  badly on those in power in the 
enterprise. This suggests that the special information 
opportunities of 'c i t y  experts' cannot be re lie d  upon to sa tis fy  
a l l  demands fo r information. The question remains, therefore, why 
a more comprehensive market fo r accounting information has not 
appeared.
Bromwich makes no reference to the legal and regulatory framework that 
has been set in place to prevent investment analysts from obtaining 
and using inside information. His comments rather re fle c t the fa i r ly  
widespread view that analysts do have and use inside information.
In concluding th is  section, i t  can be said tha t the spec ific  problem 
of company disclosure to analysts can be considered in the context of 
the market fo r information. An information economics perspective on 
the problem would employ agency theory and game theory to construct a 
model including information asymmetry. However, i t  is not proposed in 
th is  study to continue along that lin e . The foregoing remarks merely 
serve to outline how positive  economic theory could be applied to the 
problem.
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6.3 Surveys of analysts' research a c t iv ity
Several surveys over the years have looked s p e c ific a lly  at company 
communications with analysts as part of a larger study of analysts' 
research a c t iv ity . The f i r s t ,  by Lee and Tweedie (1981) was followed 
by Arnold and Moizer (1984), Day (1986) and H irs t (1988).
A b rie f description of the overa ll aims and objectives of these 
surveys w il l  then be followed by a detailed discussion of the results  
obtained in investigating informal disclosures to analysts.
Lee and Tweedie (1981) carried out a research study e n tit le d  'The 
In s titu tio n a l Investor and Financial in form ation '. The main th rust of 
th is  study was to assess the use made of published financ ia l 
information and the analysts' understanding of th is  information. 
Respondents were selected from financ ia l in s titu tio n s  and stockbroking 
firm s. In most cases there were two respondents from each 
organisation. In the financ ia l in s titu tio n s , a senior investment 
manager and senior investment analyst and in the stockbroking firms 
two senior analysts or partners. I t  was intended that interviewees 
should be concerned p rim arily  e ithe r with p o rtfo lio  selection or with 
the analysis of the financ ia l position and progress of individual 
companies. Interviews were carried out in 1977 using a questionnaire 
as a basis fo r the interview.
Arnold and Moizer (1984) carried out a survey of the methods used by 
UK investment analysts to appraise investments in ordinary shares.
This work was o r ig in a lly  the basis of a master's degree by Moizer 
(1982). Moizer and Arnold (1984) then re-analysed th e ir  findings in 
order to compare the methods of p o rtfo lio  and non-portfo lio  managers. 
Their work was undertaken between 1978 and 1981. Unstructured 
interviews were held with between one and three investment analysts in 
six firm s. (Four stockbrokers, one insurance company and one clearing 
bank.) A postal questionnaire was then drafted, p ilo ted  and 
fina lised . The sample was selected from UK members of the Society of 
Investment Analysts and non-members working fo r  large UK stockbroking 
firms. Not a ll the selected sample were involved in analysis of UK
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter 6 -Facing page 128
Figure 6-1 Respondent's views on the extent to which v is its  are made
bv members of th e ir  organisation to companies in which i t  has invested 
(or intends to invest)
COMPANIES VISITED FREQUENCY OF VISITS %
Selected companies Infrequently 43
Selected companies Frequently 27
A ll companies Frequently 21
None 6
A ll companies Infrequently 3
100
n = 229
Source: Lee and Tweedie (1981, p .105)
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equities and a response from 202 su itab ly  employed analysts was 
obtained.
In addition to the United Kingdom survey, Arnold, Moizer and Noreen
(1984) carried out a comparative survey o f United States investment
analysts. 102 responses from US equity analysts were obtained.
The findings of these three surveys that are s p e c ifica lly  relevant to 
informal contacts between companies and investment analysts w i l l  now 
be considered.
Chapter ten of Lee and Tweedie's book deals sp e c ific a lly  with the
subject of company v is its .  They make the fo llow ing comment (p .104) :
This source of information is quite d is t in c t from the other 
sources. Any information obtained during a v is i t  to a company may 
well be unique in the sense tha t i t  may not be shared by other 
investors (both existing and p o te n tia l), whereas published sources 
provide knowledge fo r  a l l  users. Consequently, company v is its  
would seem at f i r s t  sight to be an extremely useful means of 
obtaining information in advance of other investors.
F irs t ly , Lee and Tweedie, established the frequency of company v is its  
by organisations. The question asked to what extent are v is its  made 
by your organisation to companies in which i t  has invested (or is 
about to invest). Respondents were required to indicate whether 
v is its  were made in every case, only in selected cases, or not at a l l .  
Where v is its  were made they were asked to specify whether they were 
frequent or infrequent. The results  are summarised in figu re  6-1.
The data was analysed in terms of the analysts' employing 
organisations and i t  was found that in s titu tio n s  v is ite d  companies 
re la tive ly  ra re ly  whereas stockbroking firm s v is ite d  more as a matter 
of course. The authors noted that fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  give a high 
rating to stockbrokers' reports as a source of information and these 
could be used as a substitute fo r company v is its .  This comment should 
be qua lified  by the fac t that the information in a broker's report 
w il l  not be as fresh as that obtained by a f i r s t  hand v is i t .
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Figure 6-2 How often a company's financ ia l performance was discussed 
with its  management
P o rtfo lio  
managers
Information
intermediaries
% %
Never 12.0 6.4
Less than once a year 28.3 7.3
Once a year 31.5 11.9
Twice a year 17.4 24.8
Three times a year 3.2 14.7
More than three times a year 7.6 34.9
n = 202 n = 92 n = 110
Source: Moizer and Arnold (1984, p.347)
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Arnold and Moizer (1984) obtained responses from 202 UK equity 
analysts working fo r stockbrokers and fin an c ia l in s titu tio n s . They 
found that most analysts discuss a company's financ ia l performance 
with management at least once or twice a year and over 20% have 
discussions more than three times a year. Moizer, Arnold and Noreen 
(1984) found that th is  resu lt also applied in the United States. When 
respondents were c lass ified  as information intermediaries or p o rtfo lio  
managers i t  was found that 53.3% of information intermediaries and 
only 9.0% of p o rtfo lio  managers always consulted company management 
when making an appraisal of a company. The overall findings are 
displayed in figure  6-2.
Lee and Tweedie's research refers s p e c if ic a lly  to company v is its  
whereas Arnold and Moizer's relates more generally to discussions with 
management which could occur over the telephone. Respondents were 
asked fo r th e ir  views on the reasons fo r  company v is its  by Lee and 
Tweedie. The main reason was found to be to assess the company's 
management. The results are shown in figu re  6-3.
Arnold and Moizer (1984) were more spec ific  in th e ir  question, asking 
what information was actua lly  provided by company management. The 
results are shown in figu re  6-4. In addition to the seven items of 
information in the table other items mentioned were data on costs and 
margins (6 respondents), the outlook of demand fo r  the company's 
products (5 respondents), the current labour s itua tion  (4 
respondents), the e ffects of the general economic climate (4 
respondents), plans fo r  fu ture cap ita l investment (3 respondents) and 
information on competitors (3 respondents).
Moizer and Arnold (1984) checked to see i f  there were any s ig n ifica n t 
differences between information intermediaries and p o rtfo lio  managers 
in respect of the seven items of information in figu re  6-4. The only 
s ign ifican t difference was found to be reasons fo r  balance sheet 
changes. 45.5% of information intermediaries almost always received 
th is  information whereas only 21.1% of p o rtfo lio  managers did.
Moizer, Arnold and Noreen (1984) checked to  see i f  there were any 
s ign ifican t differences between the US and the UK in respect of figu re
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Figure 6-3 Respondents7 views on the reasons fo r 
company v is its
%
To assess the company's management 56
To obtain background information 
about the company 48
To assess the company's 
fu ture prospects 35
To monitor the company's progress 19
To maintain good re la tions with the company 18
To learn about new projects in it ia te d  
by the company 12
To increase understanding of the company's 
products or markets 11
To discover the answer to a specific  
problem in assessing the company 7
n = 229
Source: Lee and Tweedie (1981, p .107)
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6-4. They found only one s ign ifica n t d ifference, in that management 
comments on analyst's own forecasts were provided more often in the 
US. (In  64.7% of cases compared to 49.2% of cases.)
Many respondents wrote comments on th is  section which was the most 
contentious part of Arnold and Moizer's questionnaire. Some of the 
analysts appeared to be fa ir ly  sceptical about management opinions.
The fo llow ing comments were made:
Management tend to have an in fla ted  view of th e ir  equity and do 
not understand the discounting mechanisms of the market. They are 
often good negative indicators of events!
Some managements, p a rtic u la r ly  at or near the year end are anxious 
to 's te e r' an analyst towards a consensus (usually 5-10% below the 
expected out tu rn ); others are quite in d iffe re n t to any possible 
random shocks in th e ir  share prices
Lee and Tweedie (1981) established the perceived importance of company 
v is its  compared to formal published accounting information and other 
information. They found that company v is its  were considered, as an 
overall source of information fo r investment decision making, to be of 
least influence, although the source was s t i l l  rated as being of 
considerable to moderate importance. The results are shown in figu re  
6-5.
When the results were analysed in terms of the respondents' employing 
organisations i t  was found that a greater emphasis was placed on 
company v is its  by those employed in stockbroking firm s. This re su lt 
is displayed in figu re  6-6.
Arnold and Moizer (1984) carried out a s im ila r assessment of the 
importance of various sources of information to analysts. They make 
the fo llow ing comment :
We became aware of the perceived influence of discussions with 
company personnel during the interview stage of the survey. Their
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Figure 6-4 Frequency of provision of information bv company 
management in discussions with analysts
%
Details of changes in product ranges 67.2
Details of research and development 
projects 56.8
Long term objectives and plans 78.4
Changes in key personnel 62.6
Reasons fo r past trading performance 87.8
Reasons fo r balance sheet changes 77.9
Management comment on analyst's own 
forecasts 49.2
n = 202
Source: Arnold and Moizer (1984, p.204)
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter- 6 131
high importance is p a rticu la rly  impressive because, as a source of 
information, they are less read ily  available and, in consequence, 
more costly than the annual accounts. Furthermore, the actual 
influence of the discussions may be higher than reported.
Respondents might have understated th e ir  importance fo r fear that 
disclosure of the true importance could re su lt in suspicions of 
'ins ide  information' being used with a consequent increase in the 
p robab ility  of such use being e ffe c tive ly  contro lled
Their overall findings are displayed in figure  6-7. These include a 
comparison of th e ir  results with Lee and Tweedie's find ings.
Moizer, Arnold and Noreen (1984) note that the mean response in the US 
is not s ig n ifica n tly  d iffe re n t from the UK in respect of the influence 
of company personnel as an information source although the ranking is 
6 in the US compared to 4 in the UK.
Lee and Tweedie recognised the fac t that information on a p a rticu la r 
topic can be obtained from a number of sources. Having established 
fiv e  items of information that appeared to be most frequently desired 
by the respondent's organisations they then established what sources 
were used to obtain th is  information. Their results  are displayed in 
figure 6-8.
I t  appears from figure 6-8 that no respondents thought that th e ir  
organisations sought information on p ro f i ta b i l i ty ,  financ ia l status or 
dividends during company v is its .  In the case of fu ture  prospects the 
m ajority of respondents said that th e ir  organisations used two sources 
of information w h ils t 16% of respondents stated tha t company v is its  
were the sole source of such information. In the case of general 
information about a company, 43% stated that company v is its  were the 
sole source of information.
Where more than one source of information is used i t  can lead to 
duplication of information received or to receipt of additional 
information. Information about future prospects of a company could 
consist of a vaguely op tim istic  statement in the Chairman's report or
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Figure 6-5 Survey respondents7 views on the degree of influence of 
the ma.ior sources of information about companies on th e ir  
organisation's investment decisions
SOURCE OF INFORMATION MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION
Formal published accounting 
information from companies 1.61 0.75
Other sources of information 
about companies and th e ir  
industries 1.89 0.76
Company v is its 2.17 1.19
n = 216
NOTE:
Ranking scale used, 1 = maximum influence, 2 = considerable influence, 
3 = moderate influence
Source: Lee and Tweedie (1981, p.108)
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detailed p ro f it  forecasts revealed to an analyst during a company 
v is i t .  General information about a company is contained in annual 
reports and yet respondents appeared not to use th is  source of 
information. The question then arises as to what sort of general 
information is gathered in company v is its .  Since respondents' most 
popular reasons fo r company v is its  were to assess management (56%) and 
to obtain background information (48%) i t  would appear that general 
information encompasses whatever analysts can persuade company 
management to divulge.
Lee and Tweedie comment tha t since p ro f i ta b i l i ty ,  financ ia l status and 
dividend information can be derived from s ta tu to r ily  prescribed public 
information i t  is reasonable to expect analysts to obtain i t  p rim arily  
from these sources. Future prospects and general information are not 
compulsory insertions in company accounts and analysts therefore seek 
elsewhere fo r th is  knowledge. At th is  point Lee and Tweedie (p .116) 
acknowledge the problem aris ing  from company v is its :
The Companies Act 1980 may well curb the practice of seeking 
information on the fu ture prospects of a company during v is its  to 
companies - information which can obviously be of a price 
sensitive nature. The Act prohib its an insider knowingly in 
possession of unpublished price-sensitive information from dealing 
or consulting another person to deal in the company's securities 
or even communicating that information to another person i f  he has 
reasonable cause to believe that he would make use of that 
information.
Day (1986) carried out a study of the use of annual reports by UK 
investment analysts. The main project was to assess the usefulness 
of current cost accounting information to investment analysts but 
additional data was collected of a more general nature. This 
encompassed the usefulness of a l l  information in the annual report, 
views about possible improvements and the forecasting process used by 
analysts.
A selection of analysts were asked to perform a review of accounts and 
to think aloud so that a tape recording could be made. This
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Figure 6-6 Influence of the maior sources of information on 
organisations' investment decisions about companies analysed bv type 
of employing organisation
SOURCE OF 
INFORMATION
STOCKBROKING
FIRMS
MEAN
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
MEAN
Formal published accounting 
information from companies 1.54 1.66
Company v is its 1.77 2.45
Other sources about 
companies and th e ir  
industries 1.99 1.82
n = 90 n = 126
NOTE:
Ranking scale used, 1 = maximum influence, 2 = considerable influence, 
3 = moderate influence
Source: Lee and Tweedie (1981, p.110)
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methodology is generally referred to as protocol analysis. At the end 
of the in i t ia l  analysis a questioning stage was in it ia te d  by the 
researcher to elaborate upon in teresting  points, clear up areas of 
doubt and ensure complete coverage of a l l  areas. The data was 
analysed using the technique of content analysis. Two medium-sized 
lis ted  companies were selected and th e ir  accounts were allocated to 
interviewees on a random basis. Eighteen firm s of stockbrokers were 
contacted covering most large C ity firm s, some small ones and one 
Birmingham based firm . Fifteen firms took part in the study. Within 
th is  sample i t  was discovered that 9 analysts were already fo llow ing 
the company selected whereas 6 were not. As a re su lt i t  was decided 
to s p lit  the results according to whether the analysts were 
specia lists or non-specialists in the company.
Day's espousal of a somewhat phenomenological approach to her research 
contrasts with Lee and Tweedie and Arnold and Moizer whose surveys 
made use of a p o s it iv is t methodology.
Day (1986) did not sp e c ific a lly  set out to  survey de ta ils  re la ting  to 
informal communications between companies and analysts although her 
research did reveal the existence of such communications. When the 
fifte e n  selected analysts were asked to perform th e ir  standard in i t ia l  
review of a set of accounts two non-specialists emphasised tha t th e ir  
main in i t ia l  purpose was to produce a review document, which would be 
sent to the company fo r the management's comments. Day does not reveal 
whether the analysts were expecting w ritten  comments from the company. 
Also, at the evaluation stage three analysts stated tha t company 
contact was a source of information fo r  forecasting. Following the 
evaluation stage, Day reports that at the questioning stage the 
importance of company contact as a source of information was 
emphasised. She omits to say whether the o rig in a l three analysts were 
repeating themselves here or whether more analysts from the sample 
concurred with th is  view a fte r questioning. With regard to the 
analysts Day comments:
They tended to fee l tha t there was no substitu te fo r  experience of 
a pa rticu la r company, especially the close contact with management 
that takes many years to bu ild  up.
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Figure 6-7 Influence of various information sources 
(5 point scale: 1 = v ita l influence to 5 = no influence)
Mean
Response
Standard
Error
Rank Lee and 
Tweedie 
Rank
Company's annual report
Chairman's statement 2.32 0.06 6 4
D irectors' report 2.63 0.07 8 9
Balance Sheet 1.68 0.05 2 1=
P ro fit and loss account 1.66 0.05 1 1=
Source and application 
of funds 2.20 0.07 5 7
Current cost data 2.88 0.08 10 10
Value added statement 3.40 0.08 15 -
Unqualified audit report 3.95 0.09 17 -
Qualified audit report 2.49 0.09 7 -
Quarterly and ha lf yearly 
results 1.91 0.06 3 3
Employee newsletters 3.90 0.06 16 11
Government Industry 
s ta tis tic s 3.23 0.07 13 -
S ta tis tic a l and informatior 
services 2.90 0.08 11 8
Financial press 2.81 0.06 9 6
Trade journals 3.26 0.07 14 -
Companies house 3.98 0.07 18 -
Company personnel 2.09 0.08 4 5
Other investment analysts 3.21 0.08 12 -
Source: Arnold and Moizer (1984, p .203)
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Day comments fu rthe r that s ta t is t ic a l ly  va lid  inferences cannot be 
drawn from the results due to the small size and non random nature of 
the sample. The study therefore provides only an indication o f the 
attitudes and requirements of investment analysts as a group.
H irst (1988) carried out an empirical study to investigate the 
re lationship between stockbrokers' research and share m arketab ility . 
Th irty  one stockbroking firm s were surveyed and these included 
v ir tu a lly  a l l  the leading in s titu t io n a l stockbrokers. There were 146 
equity shares in the survey and these were in companies with a market 
cap ita lisa tion  between £20 and £50 m illio n . This size band corresponds 
roughly to the lower l im it  fo r  in te rest by in s titu tio n a l shareholders 
at the time (1983).
In order to measure the amount of research carried out, analysts were 
asked in te r a lia  about contact between th e ir  firm  and the company in 
the form of telephone c a lls , outside v is its  to meet management, or 
v is its  by management to the brokers (usually fo r brokers' lunches). 
This gave a measure of research by hours of contact per year. Other 
measures of research calculated were the amount of time spent by the 
analyst on the company , the amount of w ritten  output and the number 
of analysts fo llow ing a p a rticu la r company. Analysts were also asked 
why they followed a p a rticu la r company and 20.4% gave as one possible 
explanation the existence of p a rtic u la r ly  close contact with 
management. They were also asked how they rated the company's 
a ttitude to investment analysts. Responses were on a f iv e  point scale 
from uncooperative (1) to enthusiastic and open (5). The mean score 
was 3.60 with a standard deviation of 1.10.
Regression analysis was carried out to see i f  the amount of research 
was explained by the co-operativeness of the company, the market 
cap ita lisa tion , the annual turnover in value terms (aggregate of 
bought and sold bargains) and the number of bargains. I t  was found 
that the explanatory power of the regression equations was low.
However i t  was noted that the inclusion o f the co-operativeness 
variable did raise the value of R-squared. The contact measure of 
research is the one best explained by the regression model. A 
company's co-operativeness score was not related to the number of
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Figure 6-8 Ma.ior sources of pa rticu la r items of information
INFORMATION SOURCE OF RESPONDENT'S ORGANISATION'S INFORMATION
Formal 
published 
information 
from
companies 
(annual 
& interim  
reports)
Other
sources of
information
about
companies
and th e ir
industries
Company
v is its
Information 
sought from 
at least 
one of the 
three 
sources
% % % %
P ro f ita b il i ty  or 
earnings of a 
company 55 27 _ 63
Future prospects 
of a company 
(including 
information 
on major 
new projects 
and devel­
opments 47 29 38 73
Financial 
status, 
solvency or 
1iq u id ity  
of a company 53 8 56
General 
information 
about a 
company 9 48 52
Dividend 
information 
about a 
company 7 4 - 10
n = 229
Source: Lee and Tweedie (1981, p .114)
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brokers follow ing i t .  I t  did not fo llow  tha t because a company co­
operated closely with one broker that i t  would o ffe r s im ila r co­
operation to others.
H irst (1988) attempts to explain why research resources did not appear 
to be allocated according to the a b i l i t y  to earn commissions. He 
comments as follows (p .10):
I t  may be a mistake to th ink of stockbroking firm s deciding to 
a llocate th e ir  research resources. I t  may be more accurate to 
think of them responding to opportunities provided by companies.
I t  was clear from discussions with analysts while completing the 
questionnaire that co-operation from companies is extremely useful 
when producing research reports. The f in a l w ritten  product is 
often cleared with the company concerned. I t  is a serious event 
i f  a company takes exception to something the broker w rites, says 
or does and withdraws co-operation as a re s u lt. Brokers may 
respond, promiscuously, to any companies w ill in g  to co-operate in 
the research process, and the confusing pattern of company-broker 
links may re fle c t th is .
The main hypothesis to be tested by the p ro ject was to see i f  
stockbrokers' research benefits m arke tab ility . I t  was found that the 
contact measure of research appears more s ig n ific a n t than the other 
measures of w ritten  output and resources employed. A s ig n ifica n t 
re lationship was found between analysts' contact with companies and 
average opening quotation size. I t  was also found that the shares of 
companies whose managements tend to be open and enthusiastic in 
ta lk ing  to companies (rather than unco-operative) tend to be more 
marketable.
H irst (1988) makes the fo llow ing comment in respect of th is  find ing
(p .20):
This may be a d irec t e ffec t in tha t open management w i l l  tend to 
reduce information d isp a ritie s . I t  may, however, re fle c t more 
than d iffe re n t management sty les. Companies in financ ia l 
d i f f ic u l ty  are lik e ly  to be subject to considerable information
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d isp a rities , and th e ir managements w i l l  be unable to speak fre e ly . 
In e ither case, the evidence seems to support the view that an 
open re la tionship between management and analysts supports 
m arketability.
H irs t's  work is of d irec t relevance to th is  study in that i t
establishes and quantifies the existence of informal contacts between
companies and investment analysts. I t  investigates the re la tionsh ip  
between companies and analysts and considers the importance of company 
co-operativeness. The paper however makes no reference to the 
problems of insider dealing leg is la tion  and does not attempt to 
investigate the content of information disclosures.
The aim of th is  section has been to select and comment on relevant
material from the results of several major surveys in to the work of 
investment analysts. In conclusion i t  can be said that informal 
company contacts with analysts do ex is t, they are viewed as important 
and the contents of the communications are useful to analysts. Some 
of the information is duplicated elsewhere in pub lic ly  available form 
but extra information is also obtained by analysts. Some of th is  
information is impressionistic and may have no price-sensitive  content 
in the s t r ic t  legal sense. I t  is clear from certa in find ings of the 
surveys and from comments of the researchers that there is a 
p o s s ib ility  that price-sensitive information is communicated to 
analysts by companies.
6.4 Other research findings
This section w il l  review a selection of research that has made 
reference to company contacts with analysts.
Gniewosz (1990) carried out a case study of the share investment 
decision process at an Australian in s titu tio n a l investor. Data was 
collected by d irec t observation of a c t iv it ie s  and other methods. He 
noted that analysts made company v is its  and telephone ca lls  to 
companies in th e ir  search fo r information. One function of the annual
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report was to act as a stimulus in iden tify in g  questions to ask the 
company. The questions might be a request fo r  more de ta il eg sources 
of to ta l revenue, reasons fo r p a rticu la r segment contributions. He 
concluded that a major source of 'a c tiv e ly  sought' information is the 
company i ts e lf .  Apart from open forum meetings, such as stockbrokers' 
luncheons, individual contacts with the company were used by analysts. 
Information which was considered to have a competitive investment 
advantage was sought by analysts in private meetings. Gniewosz points 
out that analysts were acutely aware o f the need not to f a l l  fou l of 
i ns ider- i nformat ion/trad i ng le g is la tio n .
He categorised information gathering company v is its  into three major 
types, the fa m ilia risa tio n  stage, update v is its  and those made to gain 
an understanding of a specific  problem. He noted that company v is its  
in the f i r s t  two categories tended to be scheduled fo r  the time of 
year when re la tiv e ly  few annual reports are received.
This piece of case study research confirms the p icture obtained from 
the survey work as reviewed in the previous section.
At the other end of the methodological spectrum, Walmsley, Yadav and 
Rees (1992) carried out an event study to examine the information 
content of the company meeting programme of the Society of Investment 
Analysts fo r 1985 to 1990. They concluded tha t information is 
impounded into the share price. They consider that generation of 
information in th is  manner is p o te n tia lly  un fa ir and could be il le g a l.
Econometric modelling has been applied by Bhushan (1989b) to the 
re lationship between analysts and companies in the Unites States. He 
proposed a model of analyst fo llow ing and suggested several firm  
characteristics that are l ik e ly  to influence the extent of a firm 's  
analyst fo llow ing. These were, ownership structure, firm  size, return 
v a r ia b ility ,  number of lines of business and corre la tion  between firm  
return and market re turn. Using regression analysis he found that 
most of these variables were strongly s ig n ifica n t in explaining the 
number of analysts fo llow ing a firm . Analyst fo llow ing was defined as 
the number of analysts fo llow ing a firm  as lis te d  in Nelson's
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Directory of Wall Street Research (1986). The paper did not use any 
data on analyst meetings or other informal contacts.
O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) then examined analysts' decisions to fo llow  
firms along with in s titu t io n a l investors' decisions to hold these 
firms in th e ir p o rtfo lio s . They developed a simultaneous s ta t is t ic a l 
model of jo in t  behaviour and investigated firm  and industry 
characteristics as determinants of analyst fo llow ing and in s titu t io n a l 
ownership. They found that analyst fo llow ing increases more in firms 
with small p rio r analyst fo llow ing and in firm s whose return 
v o la t i l i t y  has declined and that analyst fo llow ing increases more in 
industries with regulated disclosure and with increasing number of 
firm s. In s titu tio n a l ownership increases with firm  size and with 
increased market r is k .
6.5 Other relevant lite ra tu re
In reviewing the lite ra tu re  re la ting  to communications between 
analysts and companies i t  should be noted that in the 1980s changes in 
the legal and regulatory framework have occurred. The s itua tion  is 
more s t r ic t ly  regulated than was the case previously so that older 
lite ra tu re  has re s tric ted  relevance in the context of the current 
study.
There are numerous textbooks and handbooks that deal with the 
a c tiv it ie s  of investment analysts. Many of these include descriptive 
material relevant to informal contacts between analysts and companies. 
A review of a selection of th is  lite ra tu re  w i l l  now be presented.
Bellemore, P h illip s  and R itchie (1979) are the authors of a textbook 
e n titled  'Investment Analysis and P o rtfo lio  Se lection '. This provides 
a l i s t  of the types of questions analysts ask when v is it in g  companies 
(p .323-326). There are twelve questions on sales, s ix  on se llin g  and 
d is tr ib u tio n , eight on competition, two on patent aspects, seven on 
production, four on raw materials, seven on expansion, f iv e  on 
research, five  on management, f iv e  on employee re la tions , six
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financ ia l questions, four on dividend po lic ies  and prospects, eight on 
earnings and five  on miscellaneous top ics. On reviewing the d e ta il of 
the questions in the lig h t of present day reporting requirements and 
insider dealing leg is la tion  i t  is clear that much of the information 
requested would now be in the accounts anyway and many of the 
questions would not be lega lly  permissible. For example, one question 
suggested is 'any new acquisitions in mind?' w h ils t another asks about 
'new products on the f i r e  and th e ir  prospects'. Any company today 
disclosing such information would be required by the stock exchange 
and legal requirements to make a public announcement before disclosing 
such items to an individual analyst. Other suggested questions of a 
more general nature could s t i l l  be asked by analysts. For example 
'what concerns are viewed as ch ie f competitors?' or 'does management 
show continu ity  or frequent changes?'.
Gibbs and Seward (1983) contributed a chapter e n title d  'How an 
investment analyst uses a p ro f it  forecast and makes his own' in a book 
by Westwick (1983). They provide a relevant comment as follows 
(p .141):
In most cases, the analyst w i l l  t r y  to arrange a meeting with 
senior management of the company concerned in order to fin d  out 
more about the group's a c t iv it ie s  and its  place in the industry.
A s im ila r purpose is served by the regular meetings organised by 
the Society of Investment Analysts between company representatives 
and investment analysts. Such meetings are usually welcomed by 
both sides, since mutual understanding between investors and the 
company can only be bene fic ia l. I t  should be noted, however, that 
both sides are careful not to request (or to  divulge) information 
which is not, or could not be made, generally available to 
shareholders.
The Companies Act 1980 has made i t  a crim inal offence to deal, or 
advise someone else to deal, on the basis o f unpublished price- 
sensitive information.
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The authors quoted here are w riting  as representatives of Ph ilips and 
Drew, a large firm  of London stockbrokers. Their comments are based 
on many years of experience as investment analysts.
The Financial Analysts Handbook edited by Levine (1988) contains 
several chapters that have relevant comments on informal contacts 
between companies and analysts. Porter (1988, pp.375-388) provides a 
chapter on how to conduct an industry analysis as opposed to a 
specific  company analysis. He stresses the importance of sources of 
f ie ld  data w ith in  the companies in the industry. Field interviews 
should be carried out and a number of hints are provided:
Much interesting information often comes a fte r the formal 
interview is over. For example, i f  the researcher can get a plant 
tour, the interviewee may become much more open as the setting 
becomes removed from the more formal setting of the o f f ic e ___
I t  w il l  generally be most productive to s ta rt an interview with 
non-threatening general questions rather than asking fo r  specific  
numbers or other po ten tia lly  sensitive data. In s ituations in 
which concern over sensitive data may be l ik e ly ,  i t  is usually 
best to state e x p lic it ly  at the beginning of an interview that the 
researcher is not asking fo r proprietary data but rather 
impressions about the industry. Often individuals w i l l  be w ill in g  
to provide data in the form of ranges, "ba ll park" figures, or 
"round numbers" that can be extremely useful to the interviewer.
Rudd (1988, pp.452-455) provides a chapter on s ite  v is its  fo r  the 
analyst preparing a report on a pa rticu la r company. He states that a 
s ite  v is i t  enables an analyst to round out his knowledge and 
understanding of a company in several ways but makes the fo llow ing 
provision:
At a l l  times during his investigation, and p a rtic u la r ly  at the 
s ite  v is i t ,  the analyst must be constantly aware of his 
ob ligation, under the regulations governing transactions in 
securities, to avoid obtaining any information of a material 
nature which might be considered "inside information". I f ,  as
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might happen, any ink ling  is given at any time to what seems to be 
s ign ifica n t new information about the subject company (or 
another), management should be so informed, with the suggestion 
that the information be made public. U n til the la tte r  has been 
done, the analyst is obligated not to use such information, 
d ire c tly  or by im plication, e ithe r p r iva te ly  or pub lic ly .
Apart from books sp e c ifica lly  about investment analysis there are many 
books w ritten  fo r the non-specialist which describe the workings of 
the stock exchange and the financ ia l services industry. These may 
serve to perpetuate the general b e lie f that analysts are in a 
priv ileged position compared to ordinary investors. As an example, 
Chapman (1987) provides his view of 'the stock exchange grapevine' 
including a description of analysts' a c t iv it ie s  (pp.135-136):
An analyst w i l l  also spend a lo t of time on the telephone asking 
questions, as well as attending b rie fings and seminars. In recent 
years i t  has become customary fo r  companies, p a rtic u la r ly  large 
companies, to make l i f e  as comfortable as possible fo r  analysts, 
transporting them en bloc or in d iv id u a lly  to expensive country 
hotels, where i t  is possible fo r them to socia lize  with d irectors 
and senior management as well as ta lk  shop. A thorough b rie fing  
of analysts ju s t before a company's resu lts  are published can be
crucia l in getting a good press Expectations can be lowered,
i f  p ro fits  are going to be bad, and vice versa.
Recent a rtic le s  in the financ ia l press have highlighted the existence 
of brokers' lunches in re la tion  to the new le g is la tio n  and regulation 
a ffecting these a c t iv it ie s . The headline in 'Accountancy Age' on 18th 
January 1990 was e n title d  'Brokers' lunches come under serious 
sc ru tiny '. The a r t ic le  made the fo llow ing claim:
Brokers' lunches, long the conduit of 'c o n fid e n tia l' information 
between lis te d  company finance d irectors and c ity  analysts and 
investors, have become the la tes t ta rget of the government's 
campaign to clean up the investment industry.
Marston, C.L. 1993 Chapter 6 142
Finance directors revealing information about th e ir  business, in 
good fa ith , but se lective ly , to C ity investors and brokers could, 
as a re su lt, be sucked into the forthcoming wave of insider 
dealing prosecutions.
A confidentia l probe, currently underway, is looking at ways to 
stamp out what the Department of Trade and Industry sees as 
potentia l sources of insider information.
In a fo llow  up a r t ic le ,  Luther (1990) considers the conundrum that i f  
no price sensitive information is transferred then why are the 
meetings held? In p a rticu la r, he then considers the common occurrence 
of offeree d irectors in a take-over s itua tion  holding special meetings 
fo r fund managers. These meetings are allowed by the C ity Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers provided 'no material new information is 
forthcoming and no s ig n ifica n t new opinions are expressed'. Luther 
considers tha t, in view of the popularity of such meetings, new and 
relevant information is being provided in contravention of ru le  19 of 
the C ity Code on Takeovers and Mergers.
The Society of Investment Analysts held a one day seminar on 'Ins ide r 
Dealing and the Investment Analyst' on 18th A p ril 1989 (Society of 
Investment Analysts, 1989a). This included a speech by C Tracey, a 
d irector on the fund management side of Robert Fleming Asset 
management. The tra n sc rip t of his speech provides a view of the 
problems involved in company meetings with analysts at the time:
Most in s titu tio n s , although not a l l ,  regu la rly  meet company 
managements e ither with other in s titu tio n s  - ty p ic a lly  th is  might 
be a lunch in the C ity - or as a one on one meeting. The 
immediate consequence of the 1985 Companies Act was tha t some 
companies refused to have any meetings with small groups fo r fear 
that they might be inveigled into giving information which was 
subsequently interpreted as being price sensitive . The problem 
was not then, and is not now, any lack of c la r ity  as to what I 
would ca ll 'hard-core' price sensitive information - p ro fits , 
dividends, takeover targets et al - but tha t vast grey area of 
information which persuades somebody to deal fo r  reasons which
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company management would be to ta l ly  bemused by. M erc ifu lly  those 
companies have mostly overcome th e ir  in i t ia l  paranoia and company 
v is its  and meetings are generally undertaken in a s p ir i t  of common 
sense.
The foregoing comment by a p rac titio ne r is in te resting  in tha t i t  
c lea rly  acknowledges the fac t that changes in le g is la tio n  did cause a 
disruption to the normal channels of communication between companies 
and analysts.
In concluding th is  section i t  is clear that informal contacts between 
analysts and companies have long been the norm. The lite ra tu re  
c lea rly  indicates that such meetings were viewed with approval as an 
essential part of a company's financ ia l public re la tions exercise.
More recently doubts have been cast on the le g a lity  of established 
practices. This has implications fo r  the author's survey which was 
carried out at a time when various groups outside the C ity were 
focussing th e ir  attention on the subject under investigation.
Subsequent to the completion of the survey there has been renewed 
c r it ic is m  of company brie fings of analysts in the press and new 
leg is la tion  has been introduced that may well lead to curbing of the 
investor re la tions process (see chapter 2.5).
6.6 Conclusions
In concluding th is  chapter a number of main themes and points that 
have emerged can be summarised. I t  is c lear that maintaining company 
contacts is an important and time consuming part of the normal working 
practices of investment analysts. What is not so clear is the content 
of the information tha t flows from the company during such contacts.
Analysts seem to be fu l ly  aware of the legal problems tha t can arise 
i f  price sensitive information is obtained from company contacts. On 
the other hand, the flow of information is seen as benefic ia l in 
building up a re la tionship of mutual understanding between companies
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and analysts. Outsiders, however, do not necessarily approve of the 
special re la tionsh ip  that appears to ex is t between companies and 
analysts. During the carrying out of th is  study and survey the topic 
of investigation has come under increasing scrutiny from commentators, 
leg is la to rs  and regulators.
The review of the lite ra tu re  indicates that th is  area is worthy of 
fu rthe r detailed investigation. The existing  research concentrates on 
the analyst's perception of company contacts. In the current study 
the a c tiv it ie s  and views of the companies involved in investor 
re la tions with analysts are investigated.
The lite ra tu re  concerning company communications with analysts and 
fund managers has now been reviewed in chapters two to s ix . The next 
chapter w i l l  set out the research questions and hypotheses aris ing 
from the lite ra tu re  review.
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Chapter 7 Research Questions and Hypotheses
7.1 Introduction
The aim of th is  chapter is to id e n tify  the research questions that 
have emerged from the body of lite ra tu re  reviewed in chapters two to 
s ix . These questions w i l l  be categorised into two broad classes. 
F irs t ly ,  general questions about the communications between companies 
and analysts w i l l  be set out and secondly, a number of specific  
hypotheses w i l l  be proposed. Evidence from the lite ra tu re  review 
chapters w i l l  be considered in formulating these hypotheses.
Once the research questions have been determined the research methods 
used in attempting to answer them w i l l  be outlined.
7.2 The general research Questions aris ing  from the lite ra tu re
This section w i l l  set out the general questions that have arisen from 
the detailed study of lite ra tu re  relevant to the research area. The 
research problem under consideration is the disclosure of information 
by companies to analysts. In p a rticu la r, th is  pro ject is concerned 
with the superior access to company personnel tha t analysts appear to 
enjoy. A ll users have access to published information such as the 
annual report. Analysts, however, maintain informal contacts with 
companies which may serve as a route fo r  additional information 
disclosure.
The major, ove ra ll, question that encapsulates the current project 
seeks to establish the causes, nature and e ffe c t of company 
communications with analysts.
The general research questions that present themselves can be stated 
as fo llows:
Marston, C.L. 1993 Chapter 7 146
How much does i t  cost companies, both in terms of money spent and 
organisational e f fo r t ,  to maintain a programme of communications with 
analysts?
What methods of communication are used by ind ividual companies in 
getting th e ir  message across?
What information is communicated by companies to analysts?
What are the opinions of the companies regarding the costs and 
benefits of communicating with analysts?
I t  was decided to attempt to answer the general research questions by 
means of a postal questionnaire (see chapter 8). Questions were 
formulated accordingly, taking into account the findings of the 
lite ra tu re  review.
The f i r s t  question that was considered in d e ta il was the cost to 
companies, both in terms of money spent and organisational e f fo r t ,  of 
maintaining a programme of communication with investment analysts.
A ll information disclosure costs money and any disclosures in excess 
of legal and regulatory requirements should be evaluated in terms of 
the lik e ly  costs and benefits. Communicating with analysts is a 
voluntary a c t iv ity  when considered in terms of legal and regulatory 
requirements. However, companies may fee l that cap ita l market forces 
demand a programme of communication with analysts. I t  was therefore 
valuable to establish the costs incurred by companies and th e ir  
a ttitudes towards the value of the various a c t iv it ie s  carried out as 
part o f the programme of communicating with analysts.
I t  was f e l t  tha t investor re la tions with analysts was un like ly  to be 
costed separately by most companies. The lite ra tu re  indicated that 
although some companies maintain investor re la tions departments these 
are not so le ly concerned with communicating with analysts. In some 
cases investor re la tions is carried out by the public re la tions 
department or indeed there may be no department with spec ific  
re spo n s ib ility . The lite ra tu re  indicated tha t top level executives
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may devote some of th e ir  time to communicating with analysts. In 
e ffe c t, the costs are lik e ly  to be spread w ith in  the organisation.
One aspect of the to ta l costs expended by the company is the amount of 
s ta ff time taken up with communicating with analysts. Obviously s ta ff 
at d iffe re n t levels w ith in  the organisation are involved and i t  was 
therefore considered appropriate to investigate th is  aspect in stages. 
S tarting at board leve l, companies were asked to provide an estimate 
of the number of working days per year expended by d irectors on 
communicating with analysts. Even i f  th is  information was not 
available some information was obtained by establishing which 
d irectors were involved to any extent in the a c t iv ity .  The degree of 
involvement by each board member was established since i t  was f e l t  to 
be l ik e ly  tha t d iffe re n t d irectors would devote varying amounts of 
time and e ffo r t  to analyst communications.
I t  was decided to ask the respondent company whether i t  had an 
investor re la tions or financ ia l public re la tions o ff ic e r . This is 
evidence of a cost incurred p a rtly  to service the analyst group. The 
company was then asked to provide salary de ta ils  and de ta ils  of the 
number o f support s ta ff .  At th is  stage the questionnaire attempted to 
establish the budget a llocation  fo r  the department excluding s ta ff  
costs. Budgets could include the costs of organising functions fo r 
analysts, such as brokers' lunches. On re fle c tio n , i t  is un like ly  
that any departmental budget a lloca tion  w i l l  be d ire c tly  comparable 
between companies since there are complications such as the method of 
a lloca tion  of fixed costs. Despite th is  d i f f ic u l t y  an attempt was 
made to e l ic i t  th is  information.
Another type of cost tha t can be incurred is  the retention of an 
external financ ia l public re la tions consultant. This information was 
e lic ite d  from companies and they were asked to disclose the annual 
cost incurred. Such a consultant may be involved with the analyst 
communication programme and one question attempted to establish the 
proportion of the fees re la tin g  to th is  aspect of the financ ia l public 
re la tions services.
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I f  a company incurs substantial costs in carrying out an investor 
re la tions programme i t  is lik e ly  that i t  may t ry  to assess its  
success. This can be done by employing a market research organisation 
to carry out a survey of C ity opinion. Companies were asked whether 
they had used th is  type o f service, how many times and what i t  had 
cost.
Once questions regarding the costs of the programme of communication 
w ith analysts had been drafted the next general research question was 
to establish what a c t iv it ie s  are contained w ith in  the programme. The 
lite ra tu re  reviewed in chapters two to s ix  indicates that 
communication is carried out under three broad categories, w ritten  
communications, telephone conversations and meetings. The 
questionnaire aimed to establish what methods are used by companies 
and also to obtain the companies' views as to the re la tive  importance 
of the d iffe re n t methods.
In order to establish in more d e ta il exactly what occurs a number of 
spec ific  questions were asked. I t  appears to be the case that 
meetings with analysts can be categorised into two broad groups.
These can be termed 'general meetings' which are attended by analysts 
from a number of d iffe re n t organisations such as firms of stockbrokers 
and investment funds and 'special meetings' which are set up fo r  one 
or more representative analysts from a p a rticu la r organisation. From 
the point of view of the company a 'general meeting' is  l ik e ly  to be 
more cost e ffec tive  due to economies of scale in b rie fin g  a large 
number o f analysts at once. However, the lite ra tu re  indicates that 
analysts demand and receive individual a ttention in addition to group 
b rie fings . Dignan (1989), fo r example, comments on the trend fo r 
holding one-to-one lunches fo r fund managers (see 4 .4). Analysts are 
looking fo r superior information that supplements published data and 
they can only use th is  information to make superior forecasts i f  the 
information is not released to the market. I t  appears from the 
lite ra tu re  tha t analysts also demand access to top level management in 
preference to investor re la tions o ffic e rs . Taylor Nelson's (1989) 
findings were that fund managers generally prefer d ire c t contact with 
finance d irectors or ch ie f executive o ffice rs  rather than the investor 
re la tions o ff ic e r  (see 4.6).
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In order to assess the extent to which companies respond to analysts' 
demands, the pa rtic ipa tion  of company management in general meetings 
and special or ind ividual meetings was established. Companies were 
also asked whether they keep a record of the proceedings of these 
meetings. I f  a record is  kept i t  indicates concern by the company 
that meetings comply with legal and regulatory requirements.
The level of a c t iv ity  is of in te rest and the number of meetings was 
e lic ite d  from the company. I t  was expected that there would be some 
varia tion  in the numbers of meetings of each type held by companies. 
Since meetings cost money in terms of s ta ff  time and other d ire c t 
costs th is  data is also of relevance in the context of establishing 
the cost, in terms of organisational e f fo r t ,  of communicating with 
analysts.
The investor re la tions lite ra tu re  indicates that maintenance of an up 
to date l i s t  of interested analysts is an important part o f the 
investor re la tions function. Companies were asked to provide data 
regarding the number of analysts and employing organisations who were 
on the l i s t  fo r in v ita tio n  to meetings. This question provided data 
regarding the size of the target audience fo r  the programme of 
analysts' meetings. Since not a l l  analysts attend meetings when 
inv ited , companies were also asked to estimate the number of
individuals who had actua lly  attended meetings.
I t  appears that a great deal of time and e ffo r t  is  spent by companies
and analysts on setting up and attending meetings, i t  was therefore
log ica l to investigate the information content of these meetings. 
Meetings are essentia lly  a form of communication and i t  is to be 
expected that valuable information passes at these meetings. Analysts 
have access to a l l  published information, such as the annual report 
and the London Stock Exchange Company News Service announcements. 
Although analysts do not admit e x p lic it ly  that they are seeking price 
sensitive inside information the lite ra tu re  indicates tha t they expect 
to receive some extra information from company o f f ic ia ls  at meetings. 
I t  is d i f f ic u l t  to draw a d iv id ing line  between price sensitive 
information as defined by the le g is la tio n  and other information which
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may be price sensitive but which does not f a l l  fou l o f the Company 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act (1985).
Companies were asked to indicate the subject areas tha t are discussed 
at analysts' meetings. In addition they were asked to indicate which 
topics are viewed as being more important and which as being of lesser 
importance.
Telephone conversations between analysts and company personnel are a 
more immediate and less formal method of communicating information. 
Companies were asked to id e n tify  those personnel who answer telephone 
ca lls  from analysts. As mentioned e a rlie r , the lite ra tu re  indicates 
that analysts may prefer to ta lk  to top level management rather than 
the designated investor re la tions o f f ic ia l .  The number and rank of 
company personnel who ta lk  to analysts was established to provide some 
measure both of the importance of th is  form of communication and the 
cost in terms of s ta ff  time. Companies were asked i f  a tape recorded 
or w ritten  record is kept of these telephone conversations and th is  is 
evidence of a company's concern to comply with legal and regulatory 
requirements.
Company communications with analysts are part of a process that 
eventually leads to the production of some form of w ritten  report.
The broker's analyst provides a report fo r c lie n ts  which may generate 
business fo r  the firm . The analyst working fo r  a fund manager w i l l  
produce a report to advise on a pa rticu la r course of investment or 
disinvestment. The analyst is l ik e ly  to be judged on the q u a lity  of 
his reports and there are publications providing a ranking of 
analysts. For example, by 1991 Extel had published eighteen editions 
of its  annual survey ranking UK investment analysts (Extel F inancial, 
1991). There is a clear incentive fo r  analysts to attempt to obtain 
company feedback on th e ir  reports p r io r to pub lica tion. This a c t iv ity  
is therefore an in tegra l part of the company programme of 
communications with analysts and worthy of investigation.
Companies were asked to provide an estimate of the number of analysts' 
reports that had been produced in the past twelve months. They were 
also asked how many reports had been passed to them with a request fo r
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comments. There is no legal or regulatory ob ligation fo r companies to 
make comments. In fa c t, i t  would probably be safer fo r  them not to do 
so. However, considering the competition fo r  cap ita l in the market 
place there is an incentive to cooperate with analysts and comply with 
th e ir  requests. The level of feedback provided by companies was 
investigated. In p a rticu la r, the extent to which guidance was 
provided regarding the accuracy of analysts' p ro f it  forecasts was 
determined.
In addition to the communication a c t iv it ie s  outlined above, many 
companies maintain a programme of mailing information to analysts.
The number of analysts on the mailing l i s t  provided a measure of the 
extent of th is  a c t iv ity  and an ind ication of i ts  cost. Companies were 
asked what information is mailed to analysts, ranging from generally 
available published information to specia lly  designed documentation. 
Analysts may fin d  i t  convenient to receive a l l  generally published 
information d ire c t from the company without having to obtain i t  from 
other sources or make a special request to the company. The costs to 
the company are l ik e ly  to be fa i r ly  minimal in comparison with other 
parts of the communication programme. I f  the documents are already 
available, there w i l l  be extra p rin ting  and postage costs plus the 
s ta ff costs of maintaining the mailing l i s t .  However, i f  companies 
design documents specia lly  fo r analysts, e ithe r to be mailed 
separately or to be sent out as part of an information pack, there 
w il l  be extra costs. The lite ra tu re  indicates that some companies do 
th is  although the information contained therein may be no more than a 
restatement or summarisation of ex isting publications. These 
documents, i f  they e x is t, indicate a desire by the company to be 
especially helpfu l to analysts.
Although i t  is generally accepted in the lite ra tu re  tha t company 
communications w ith analysts do occur there is evidence to suggest 
that most companies do maintain close seasons, p r io r to important 
announcements, when they w i l l  not communicate with analysts. Such a 
policy is c le a rly  intended to prevent accusations o f passing inside 
information and i t  serves to protect both the company and the 
analysts. Companies were asked to specify th e ir  po licy and to 
quantify the length of time involved.
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Having asked questions relevant to the f i r s t  three general research 
questions, the fourth area was addressed. Factual data regarding the 
cost of the communications programme and describing how i t  is carried 
out was supplemented by an opinion survey. Companies may fee l forced 
to comply with analysts' demands fo r  information without having any 
desire to communicate. I f  every company in a competitive market fo r 
cap ita l is meeting the information needs of analysts then a company 
fa il in g  to do so may be ignored and su ffe r a f a l l  in demand fo r its  
c a p ita l.
Companies were asked fo r  th e ir  opinions and a ttitudes on the need fo r 
a programme of communication with analysts. There is evidence in the 
lite ra tu re  tha t, despite a l l  th e ir  e ffo rts  at communication, companies 
fee l poorly served by analysts. Typ ica lly they may fee l tha t analysts 
undervalue th e ir  company and that analysts have fa ile d  to understand 
and to in te rp re t properly the information tha t has been communicated 
to them. Many companies seem to consider tha t analysts are poorly 
qua lified  and lack the necessary experience to make informed 
judgements. Accordingly, companies were asked fo r  th e ir  views on the 
qua lity  of analysts' reports.
I t  was considered that i f  companies were not to ta l ly  sa tis fie d  with 
the current s itua tion  at the time of the survey they might have ideas 
fo r improving communications with analysts. These opinions were 
so lic ite d  by asking companies to w rite  comments on the top ic .
One aspect of the C ity tha t has been c r it ic is e d  by industry is its  
perceived short-termism. The lite ra tu re  indicates tha t many 
in d u s tr ia lis ts  are unhappy with the short term investment patterns 
that occur when immediate p ro fits  are a p r io r ity .  Investment funds 
may be moved rap id ly  from one company to another in an attempt to 
rea lise short term gains. The investing in s titu tio n s  have, to a 
certain extent, contradicted these c ritic ism s  and claimed tha t they 
are interested in long term investment and growth. Companies were 
asked fo r th e ir  views on th is  matter.
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This section has considered the four main general research questions 
and outlined the way in which specific  questions were formulated and 
included in the questionnaire in an attempt to provide the answers.
7.3 Formulation of specific  hypotheses
The preceding section set out the general research questions that 
arise from the lite ra tu re  discussed in chapters two to s ix . In order 
to answer these points a selection of questions were proposed re la ting  
both to simple factual information about the company's programme of 
investor re la tions with analysts and to company opinions about the 
a c t iv ity .  In the f i r s t  instance, the data gathered can be used to 
provide descriptive s ta tis t ic s  enabling an overview of the s itua tion  
to be obtained. This section w il l  propose a number of specific  
hypotheses which can be tested using appropriate s ta t is t ic a l tests . 
Each hypothesis w i l l  be supported using evidence from the lite ra tu re .
I t  is a reasonable assumption that d iffe re n t companies w il l  incur 
varying costs, in terms of both money and organisational e f fo r t ,  in 
carrying out th e ir  investor re la tions programme with analysts. 
Companies are competing fo r  cap ita l in the market place and responding 
to demands fo r information from analysts. In theory they w i l l  be 
w illin g  to provide information to the extent that the costs of 
providing the information do not exceed the perceived benefits a ris ing  
from provision of the information. This process of information 
provision is subject to the re s tra in t imposed by legal and regulatory 
bodies.
7.3.1 The association between company size and the cost of 
communications with analysts (hypothesis HI)
An area of information disclosure tha t has been studied extensively by 
researchers in the past is  the extent of information disclosure in 
annual reports. Authors such as Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai
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(1971), Buzby (1974 & 1975), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), F irth  (1984), 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Cooke (1989) and Gray and Roberts (1989) 
have hypothesized and tested fo r a lin k  between company size and the 
extent of disclosure in annual reports. I t  seems appropriate to tes t 
a s im ila r hypothesis in the context of the investor re lations 
programme with analysts.
This w i l l  be tested via the nu ll hypothesis tha t the costs incurred by
companies in communicating with analysts are not related to company
size. This can be stated as fo llows:
HI There is no association between costs incurred in 
communicating with analysts and company size.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is that there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and company size, e ithe r large company size is 
associated with a high costs or large company size is associated with 
low costs.
I f  = Cost of analyst communications programme incurred by 
Company i and i f  = Size of company i ,  then, in re la tion  to 
company j ,  e ither
> Y j  where X-j > Xj or,
Y^  < Yj where X^  > Xj
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis does not specify a d irec tion  and two-tailed 
tests are therefore appropriate. In view of the exploratory nature of 
the study a l l  the hypotheses w il l  be formulated in th is  way even 
though there may be an p r io r i case fo r  specifying a d irection  fo r  the 
a lte rna tive  hypothesis.
In order to tes t the nu ll hypothesis HI, the data obtained from the 
companies needs to be related to a suitable variable describing 
company size. Since there is no d e fin it iv e  measure of company size i t  
is appropriate to consider the measures used by the researchers 
mentioned above. Turnover was used in three cases, assets size in
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter 7 155
four cases, tangible net assets in one case, number of stockholders in 
two cases, market value of equity in one case and market value of 
equity and book value of debt in one other case. Six p o s s ib ilit ie s
therefore arise here but th is  is not an exhaustive l i s t .  The number
of employees is another possible variable and there are several others 
that could be used.
For the purpose of th is  study i t  was decided to use average market
cap ita liza tio n  of equity fo r  the twelve months p rio r to the time of
issue of the questionnaire obtained from Datastream. This variable 
was considered appropriate as investor re la tions is concerned with the 
marketing of the company's cap ita l to investors. Market 
cap ita liza tio n  is thus the most relevant measure of company size in 
th is  instance.
7.3.2 The association between m arketab ility  o f shares and the cost of 
company communication w ith analysts (hypothesis H2)
There are two aspect of m arketab ility  that w i l l  be considered here, 
world-wide m arke tab ility  and m arketab ility  on the home stock exchange 
in terms of trading frequency.
One hypothesis that has been tested in connection with disclosure in 
annual reports is tha t there might be a lin k  between lis t in g  status 
and information disclosure. This has been investigated by Cerf 
(1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), Buzby (1975) and Cooke (1989). A 
positive  association between level of disclosure and lis t in g  status 
was established by these studies with the exclusion of Buzby.
In the current study, i t  is proposed to  u t i l is e  th is  hypothesis. In 
the studies noted above companies were categorised as lis te d  or 
un listed, apart from Cooke's study where he categorised the companies 
as un lis ted, lis te d  in Sweden and lis te d  in Sweden and abroad. The 
companies selected fo r th is  survey a l l  have a f u l l  l is t in g  on the 
London Stock Exchange. I f  they also have quotations on other stock
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exchanges they are competing a c tive ly  fo r cap ita l in more than one 
market place.
Companies lis te d  on the London Stock Exchange are not a l l  equal in 
terms of the breadth and depth of the market fo r  th e ir  shares. From 
the point of view of the company i t  would seem to be desirable fo r its  
shares to be easily  marketable. Shareholders w i l l  benefit from a 
smaller spread between bid and o ffe r prices where there is an active 
market in a company's shares. Shareholders may be less w ill in g  to 
invest in a company whose shares are only th in ly  traded. Accordingly, 
a company might perceive communications with analysts as a way of 
generating in te rest in its  shares and hence improving th e ir  
m arketab ility .
In view of the above comments i t  is appropriate to investigate the 
re la tionsh ip  between m arketab ility  and investor re la tions costs. This 
w i l l  be tested via the nu ll hypothesis that there is no re la tionsh ip  
between share m arketab ility  (as measured by m ultip le  l is t in g  and 
trading frequency) and the costs incurred in communicating with 
analysts. This can be stated as fo llows:
H2 There is no association between costs incurred in 
communicating with analysts and m arketab ility  of company shares.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is that there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and share m arketab ility . E ither higher costs are 
associated with higher m arketab ility  or higher costs are associated 
with lower m arketab ility .
Where X-j = Cost of analyst communication programme incurred by 
Company i and Y-j = m arketab ility  of equity, then, in re la tion  to 
company j ,  e ither
Yj  > Y j  where Xj  > X j  or,
Yj  < Y j  where Xj  > X j
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A related line  of enquiry was followed by H irs t (1988), who 
investigated the re la tionsh ip  between stockbrokers' research and share 
m arketab ility . He attempted to measure the resources allocated to 
researching p a rticu la r companies but found that research output was 
not s ig n if ic a n tly  related to the number of bargains or stock market 
turnover. His data, however, was gathered in 1983, p r io r to the 
increased awareness of the importance of investor re la tions as 
evidenced by the lite ra tu re  reviewed in chapter four.
In order to te s t the nu ll hypothesis H2 fo r  m arketab ility  on the 
London stock exchange a number of variables were used. At the time of 
the survey, company stocks were categorised as alpha, beta or gamma 
stocks according to the number of market makers. This ordinal data 
was used in testing  with the data obtained from the survey. More 
exact data was obtained from the London Business School Risk 
Measurement Service which provides a trading frequency variable, the 
average time elapsing between trades.
7.3.3 The association between risk measures and the cost of analyst 
communications (hypothesis H3)
I t  is a generally perceived wisdom that the stock market does not lik e  
shocks. Company management do not, in general, want th e ir  shares to 
exh ib it price v o la t i l i t y .  This can lead to such cosmetic techniques 
as income smoothing and management p re ferring  to maintain a steady 
dividend po licy (Ronen & Sadan 1981). I t  is generally accepted that 
the United Kingdom stock market approximates a state of semi-strong 
e ffic iency . Market shocks can occur when information known only to 
the company and not anticipated by the market is released. One way 
fo r companies to avoid th is  is to provide information regu la rly  to 
analysts. The information can be provided e x p lic it ly  but the 
lite ra tu re  indicates tha t companies fee l the need to provide 
information in a more covert form in certa in  instances.
Companies that communicate with analysts can provide information of 
d iffe re n t types. F irs t ly  they can provide information that has
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already been published. This is of no benefit to the analyst apart 
from the convenience element, the information is provided and the 
analyst need not seek i t  out. Secondly the company can provide 
advance knowledge of information that w i l l  eventually be published.
This could be an overt statement (eg the p ro fits  figu re  in the set of 
accounts tha t w i l l  be published next week) but i t  is more lik e ly  to be 
a subtle h in t (eg the p ro fits  may not be as good as expectations).
Early release of information to the market in th is  way reduces shocks 
at a la te r stage. Companies who ac tive ly  communicate with analysts 
should therefore benefit from reduced share price v o la t i l i t y .  Th ird ly 
companies can provide vo lu n ta rily  information tha t is not required to 
be published, th is  may change the market's estimation of the r is k  of 
the share, e ithe r the market/systematic r is k  (beta) or the firm  
specific  or non-systematic r is k .
F irth  (1984) investigated the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
corporate annual reports and its  association with security r is k  
measures. The level o f disclosure was investigated to see i f  i t  was 
associated with systematic r is k  (beta), unsystematic r is k  and variance 
of return. The resu lts  revealed no s ig n ifica n t association between 
the amount of disclosure and the level of stock market r is k .
In view of the above comments, i t  is appropriate to investigate the 
re la tionsh ip  between r is k  and investor re la tions costs. This w i l l  be 
tested via the nu ll hypothesis tha t the cost of the company's 
programme of communication with analysts is not associated with the 
stock market's assessment of company r is k . This can be stated as 
fo llows:
H3 There is no association between costs incurred in 
communicating with analysts and stock market r is k  measures fo r  the 
company.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is that there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and company r is k  measures.
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Where = Cost of analyst communication programme of Company i ,  
and Y-j = Equity r is k  measure, then, in re la tion  to company y, 
e ithe r
Y-j > Yj where X-j > Xj or,
Yi < Yj where > Xj
The London Business School Risk Measurement Service provides a varie ty
of r is k  measures tha t were used in testing  the nu ll hypothesis H3.
These are the beta, the s e n s it iv ity  of the share price to general 
market movements, the v a r ia b il i ty  (standard deviation) of the returns 
on the shares and the specific  r is k , the r is k  of non-market related 
fluc tua tions in the share price.
7.3.4 The association between p ro fitab ility  and the cost of analyst 
comnunications (hypothesis H4)
Company management are lia b le  to receive c r it ic is m  from the investing 
public when th e ir  p ro f it  figures f a l l  or are poor compared to the 
sector. A company with low p ro fits  may fee l the need to expend extra 
e ffo r t in explaining the reasons fo r  th is  to analysts. Other 
managements may prefer to maintain a low p ro file  when p ro fits  are 
poor. Companies with good p ro f it  performance may wish to broadcast 
the good news among analysts and fund managers, perhaps to a ttra c t new 
investors and induce goodwill in ex isting  investors. Other companies, 
fearing a takeover bid, may be less inclined to expand the investor 
re la tions e f fo r t .
Previous researchers have investigated the association between 
p r o f i ta b i l i ty  and disclosure in company accounts. Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) found tha t less p ro fitab le  firms disclosed inadequate 
information in accounts but Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) found that 
disclosure s ig n if ic a n tly  decreased as p ro f i ta b i l i ty  increased.
Roberts and Gray (1988a) found no s ig n ifica n t association between 
p ro f i ta b i l i ty  and accounts disclosure a fte r con tro lling  fo r  company
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size although Gray and Roberts (1989) found tha t voluntary information 
disclosure was s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with p ro f i ta b i l i ty .  Beattie 
and Jones (1992) found tha t companies with 'good' performance were 
s ig n if ic a n tly  more lik e ly  to use graphs, a form of voluntary 
disclosure, in th e ir  annual reports.
In view of the above remarks i t  seems appropriate to investigate the
re la tionsh ip  between p r o f i ta b i l i ty  and investor re la tions costs. This 
w i l l  be tested via the nu ll hypothesis that the p r o f i ta b i l i ty  of a 
company is not associated with the costs incurred in communicating 
with analysts. This can be stated as fo llows:
H4 There is no association between costs incurred in
communicating with analysts and company p ro f i ta b i l i ty .
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is tha t there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and company p ro f ita b i l i ty .  E ither higher p ro f i ta b i l i ty
is associated with higher costs or higher p r o f i ta b i l i t y  is associated
with lower costs.
Where X-j = Cost of analyst communication programme incurred by 
company i and Y-j = P ro f ita b il i ty  of company i ,  then, in re la tion  
to company j ,  e ithe r,
> Yj where Xj > Xj or,
Yj < Yj where Xj > Xj
There are many measures of p ro f i ta b i l i ty  and a selection of those 
provided by Datastream were used in th is  instance. These are 
Datastream company accounts items 707, return on cap ita l employed,
711, trading p ro f it  margin, 716 pre-tax p ro f i t  margin and 703, return 
on shareholders' cap ita l.
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7.3.5 The association between gearing and the cost of analyst 
communications (hypothesis H5)
High gearing can be a problem fo r companies when there is an economic 
downturn. Problems with loan creditors can lead to cap ita l 
restructuring  and the need fo r rescue packages. Companies with a high 
level of gearing may need to keep analysts well informed as a form of 
reassurance. However companies in severe d i f f ic u l t y  may see l i t t l e  
point in try in g  to maintain an investor re la tions programme i f  they 
are too busy try ing  to salvage the business.
Previous researchers have hypothesized a lin k  between gearing and 
disclosure in company accounts. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) found that 
cap ita l gearing was s ig n if ic a n tly  negatively associated with 
disclosure. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) found no s ig n ifica n t e ffects 
due to financ ia l leverage on voluntary disclosure. Roberts and Gray 
(1988a) found that gearing was not a facto r explaining disclosure 
whereas Gray and Roberts (1989) noted that gearing was s ig n if ic a n tly  
p o s itive ly  associated with voluntary disclosure when using one type of 
tes t (Mann-Whitney) but not the other (chi-square).
In view of the above remarks i t  appears appropriate to investigate the 
re la tionsh ip  between gearing and investor re la tions costs. This w il l  
be tested via the nu ll hypothesis that there is no association between 
gearing and the cost of communicating with analysts. This can be 
stated as fo llows:
H5 There is no association between costs incurred in
communicating with analysts and company gearing.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is that there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and company gearing. Either higher gearing is 
associated with higher costs or higher gearing is associated with 
lower costs.
Where Xi = Cost of analyst communication programme incurred by
Company i and Yi = Gearing, then, in re la tion  to company j ,  e ither
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Yj > Yj where Xj > Xj  or,
Yj < Yj where Xj > Xj
The variables used here are Datastream company accounts items 731,
cap ita l gearing, 732, income gearing and 733, borrowing ra tio .
Capital gearing is defined as preference cap ita l plus debt divided by 
cap ita l employed (less in tangib les). Income gearing is the proportion 
of in te rest charges to operating and other income. Borrowing ra tio  is 
debt divided by equity cap ita l plus reserves (plus deferred tax minus 
in tangib les).
7.3.6 The association between recent takeovers and the cost of 
analyst communications (hypothesis H6)
During the 1980s both the UK and the US economies saw a boom in 
takeovers. Many commentators have c r it ic is e d  predatory takeovers and 
the associated e v il of short-termism (see Marsh (1990) fo r  a detailed 
discussion). Thus companies which have made takeovers may be keen to 
maintain good investor re la tions in order to avoid accusations of 
asset s tripp ing . Some companies have made unprofitable takeovers, 
leading to severe losses or th e ir  eventual destruction. Companies 
having made takeovers may need to sa tis fy  the C ity that th is  is not 
the case. Overall then, takeover a c t iv ity  may lead to increased 
investor re la tions e f fo r t .  One re s tra in t arises from the regulations 
of the C ity Panel on Takeovers and Mergers which curb the extent to 
which companies may communicate during takeover bids.
In view of the above remarks i t  appears appropriate to investigate the 
re la tionsh ip  between takeover a c t iv ity  and investor re la tions costs. 
This w i l l  be tested via the nu ll hypothesis that the cost of the 
company's programme of communication with analysts is  not associated 
with recent takeover a c t iv ity .  This can be stated as fo llow s:
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H6 There is no association between costs incurred in 
communicating with analysts and recent takeover a c t iv ity  by the 
company.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is that there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and recent takeover a c t iv ity .  E ither a high level of 
recent takeover a c t iv ity  is associated with higher costs or a high 
level o f recent takeover a c t iv ity  is associated with lower costs.
Where X-j = Cost of analyst communication programme of Company i ,  
and = Number of recent takeovers, then, in re la tio n  to company
y
> Yj where > Xj or,
Y-j < Yj where X-j > Xj
The variable used here in testing  the nu ll hypothesis H6 is the number
of takeovers by the company lis te d  in the Quality of Markets Quarterly
Review, (subsequently the Stock Exchange Quarterly with Quality of 
Markets Review), published by the London Stock Exchange, fo r the 
twelve months p rio r to the c ircu la tio n  of the questionnaire.
7.3.7 The association between insider shareholdings and the cost of 
analyst communications (hypothesis H7)
Companies which have a large proportion of th e ir  shares held by 
insiders such as d irectors and th e ir  fam ilies may be less interested 
in a ttrac ting  in s titu t io n a l investors fo r fear of losing contro l.
They may be smaller companies with a low level investor re la tions 
programme. Shareholding by management may reduce agency costs since 
managers have an in te res t not only in th e ir  emoluments and perquisites 
of o ffice  but also in the performance of th e ir  shares. Such companies 
may fee l that they can reduce th e ir  investor re la tions programme 
compared to those companies with a lower level of insider
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shareholdings which need to demonstrate the prob ity  of management to 
the C ity.
E arlie r researchers have hypothesized an association between insider 
shareholdings and analyst fo llow ing and accounting disclosures.
Bhushan (1989b) found that there was a s ig n ifica n t negative 
corre la tion between the number of analysts fo llow ing a firm  and the 
percentage of insider shareholdings. Forker (1992) found tha t the 
proportion of the firm  owned by management was not a s ig n ifica n t 
predictor fo r  the q u a lity  of option disclosure in accounts.
In view of the above comments i t  is considered appropriate to 
investigate the re la tionsh ip  between insider shareholdings and 
investor re la tions costs. This w i l l  be done via the nu ll hypothesis 
that the cost of the company's programme of communication with 
analysts is  not associated with the level of insider shareholdings. 
This can be stated as fo llow s:
H7 There is no association between costs incurred in 
communicating with analysts and the level of insider 
shareholdings.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is that there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and the level of insider shareholdings. E ither a high 
level of insider shareholdings is  associated with high costs or a high 
level of insider shareholdings is associated with low costs.
Where Xj = Cost of analyst communication programme of Company i ,  
and Y-j = Level of insider shareholdings, then, in re la tio n  to 
company y
Yj > Yj where Xj > Xj or,
Yj < Yj where Xj > Xj
The variable used in testing  the nu ll hypothesis H7 is the percentage 
of shares held by the board of d irec to rs , th e ir  fam ily and associates 
as lis te d  in Crawford's D irectory of C ity Connections (Kinloch, 1992).
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7.3.8 The association between substantial shareholdings and the cost 
of analyst communications (hypothesis H8)
Substantial shareholders may be in s titu t io n a l investors who have made 
a large investment in a p a rticu la r company. They may be other 
companies who have b u ilt  up a stake and may intend eventually to  t r y  a 
takeover or they may be wealthy ind iv idua ls. UK companies are 
required to disclose substantial shareholdings over three per cent in 
th e ir  accounts. Companies where there are substantial shareholdings 
may ta i lo r  th e ir  investor re la tions programmes to existing  major 
investors, or they may wish to a ttra c t more investors. I t  is easier 
to bu ild  up a substantial stake in a small company rather than a large 
company so companies with substantial shareholdings may be smaller 
companies with fewer resources to devote to investor re la tions .
Bhushan (1989b) found that the number of in s titu tio n s  investing and 
the percentage held by in s titu tio n s  was p o s itive ly  associated w ith the 
number of analysts fo llow ing a US company. This re su lt was based on a 
c u t-o ff of one per cent fo r  defining a substantial shareholding.
In view of the above discussion i t  is considered appropriate to 
investigate the re la tionsh ip  between the level of substantial 
shareholdings and investor re la tions costs. This w i l l  be tested via 
the nu ll hypothesis tha t the cost of the company's programme of 
communication with analysts is not associated with the level of 
substantial shareholdings. This can be stated as fo llows:
H8 There is no association between costs incurred in 
communicating with analysts and the level o f substantial 
shareholdings.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is tha t there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and substantial shareholdings. Either a high level of 
substantial shareholdings is associated with high costs or a high 
level of substantial shareholdings is associated with low costs.
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Where Xj = Cost of analyst communication programme of Company i ,
and Yj = Level of substantial shareholdings, then, in re la tion  to
company y, e ither
Y-j < Yj fo r Xj > Xj or
Y, > Yj fo r  X, > Xj
The variables used in testing  the nu ll hypothesis H8 are the 
percentage of shares held by a l l  substantial shareholders and the 
number of substantial shareholdings as lis te d  in Crawford's Directory 
of C ity Connections (Kinloch, 1992).
7.3.9 The association between line of business and the cost of analyst 
conanuni cat ions (hypothesis H9)
There are a number of reasons ind icating tha t there might be some lin k  
between the amount of e f fo r t  companies devote to communicating with 
analysts and the line  of business in which they operate. Many 
businesses are cyc lica l in nature. For example, the 1980s saw a boom 
in property development and re ta il in g  followed by a slump. When a 
pa rticu la r industry is r id in g  high and the market is b u llish  i t  may 
not have to compete so hard fo r  ca p ita l. However, when things are 
going wrong the incentive to maintain close contacts with analysts 
could increase.
This hypothesis has been tested by previous researchers in the context 
of disclosure in company accounts. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) found 
that industry was a s ig n ifica n t ind ica tor o f disclosure in accounts. 
Gray and Roberts (1989) found that the cap ita l goods sector was 
s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with more disclosure.
Bhushan (1989b) used a s ix category indu s tria l c la ss ifica tio n  and 
concluded that a firm 's  industry influences the extent of analyst 
fo llow ing and also found (1989a) differences across industries in the 
marginal information content of earnings announcements.
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In view of the above i t  appears to be appropriate to investigate the 
re la tionsh ip  between indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  and investor re la tions 
costs. This w i l l  be tested via the nu ll hypothesis that there is no 
association between the company's lin e  of business and the costs 
incurred in communicating with analysts. This can be stated as 
fo llows:
H9 There is no association between costs incurred in 
communicating with analysts and company line  of business.
The a lte rna tive  hypothesis is that there is a re la tionsh ip  between 
costs incurred and company line  of business.
Where = Cost of analyst communication programme of company i 
and Lj = the sub-set of companies in the same line  of business 
and the mean value of fo r each subset Lj^ ^ is denoted as 
<^>(K)* ^ ( K )  depends on K
The variable used here is the indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  provided by 
Datastream.
7.3.10 The plan for hypothesis testing
Prior to the commencement of hypothesis testing  i t  is necessary to 
decide whether to carry out one-tailed or tw o-ta iled  tes ts . One­
ta ile d  tests are appropriate when the a lte rna tive  hypothesis specifies 
a d irection  and tw o-ta iled tests are appropriate when no d irec tion  is 
specified. The tw o-ta iled tes t is considered to be more suitable in 
the case of exploratory analysis.
In th is  study the a lte rna tive  hypotheses do not have a specified 
d irec tion  as th is  is an exploratory analysis of the investor re la tions 
a c t iv ity .  I t  was therefore decided to carry out tw o -ta il tes ts .
I t  is also necessary to decide in advance on the required confidence 
level fo r  re jection  of the nu ll hypothesis. In th is  study i t  was
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decided to take a significance level of less than or equal to .05.
This is in accordance with standard practice.
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter has drawn on the lite ra tu re  reviewed in chapters two to 
six in order to present a l i s t  o f research questions that are relevant 
to the area under study. The questions have been divided into two 
broad groups. General research questions re la te  to the need to fin d  
out what is curren tly  being practised in the area of company 
communications with analysts. These general questions also seek to 
establish company opinion about the current state of a ffa irs . Answers 
provided to these general questions should provide a good overview of 
a c t iv it ie s  and opinions w ith in  the selected population. The spec ific  
hypotheses provide an opportunity to investigate possible explanatory 
variables fo r an individual company's behaviour.
The chapter has referred, in passing, to the method of co llec tion  of 
data. This comprised a postal questionnaire survey The next chapter 
w i l l  review in d e ta il the question of an appropriate research 
methodology. I t  w i l l  then describe in de ta il the methods and 
techniques employed in carrying out the survey.
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Chapter 8 Design and Execution of the Research Project
8.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the choice of methodology fo r  the research 
project and then describes how the questionnaire was designed and 
c ircu la ted . The population and the achieved response rate is 
described along with reasons fo r  non-response.
In addition to the questionnaire survey, two case study observations 
were carried out to improve the researcher's understanding of the 
investor re la tions process. These are described in th is  chapter.
The independent variables to be used in testing  the hypotheses 
proposed in chapter seven are then described.
8.2 Choice of methodology
Company communications with analysts and fund managers can be viewed 
as being an informal part of the financ ia l reporting and general 
information disclosure process. As such, the methodology used in 
researching disclosure in company accounts is of relevance. Another 
view of investor re la tions is tha t i t  is essen tia lly  fin an c ia l public 
re la tions and can be included in the d isc ip lines of marketing and 
management.
Many studies of disclosure in financ ia l reports adopt a p o s it iv is t  
methodology whereby a large number of company accounts are surveyed, 
data is obtained and hypotheses may be tested. In some cases 
researchers calculate an index of disclosure (Marston and Shrives, 
1991) which is used as a measure of the amount of disclosure, 
voluntary or otherwise. I t  is common fo r  univariate tests of 
association between company characteris tics and disclosure to be 
carried out and m u ltiva ria te  analysis, possibly involving m ultip le  
regression is then performed. I t  is also possible to survey users and 
preparers of accounts to obtain th e ir  opinions on disclosures. Gray
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and Roberts (1989) used questionnaires and interviews to assess 
corporate a ttitudes to voluntary disclosures.
Details of company communications with analysts and fund managers are 
not enclosed in the annual report, there are no legal requirements fo r 
companies to keep records of meetings and other investor re la tions 
a c t iv it ie s . The only way of obtaining information is d ire c tly  from 
company o f f ic ia ls .  I t  was decided to use a postal questionnaire 
because th is  was the f i r s t  study to be carried out concentrating on 
company communications with analysts. (Chapter s ix  provides de ta ils  
of previous studies that touched b r ie f ly  on the area.) By using a 
postal questionnaire a large number of quoted companies could be 
contacted and a picture of UK investor re la tions b u il t  up. An 
interview or case study methodology would have re s tr ic te d  the number 
of companies involved because of time and financ ia l constraints.
Another possible methodology fo r investigating company communications 
with analysts is the event study approach. Walmsley, Yadav and Rees 
(1992) have studied the information content of the company meeting 
programme of the Society of Investment Analysts from 1985 to 1990. By 
examining share price movements fo r  companies holding meetings under 
the auspices of the society they concluded that the meetings generated 
information which was impounded in to  the share price . The problem 
with th is  methodology is that i t  only answers one question about the 
investor re la tions process whereas a questionnaire approach, although 
sa c rific in g  some o b je c tiv ity , provides a richer more varied data set 
that is  s t i l l  amenable to s ta t is t ic a l tes ting . Companies hold many 
meetings apart from those studied by Walmsley et a l. (1992). The 
event study approach has not been used to study telephone 
conversations and one to one meetings (special meetings) and s ite  
v is its .  There is no public information source providing a 
comprehensive lis t in g  of these communication events and the practica l 
d i f f ic u lt ie s  of obtaining th is  data fo r a large number of companies 
would be a problem.
The event study approach, when i t  can be applied, is  c le a rly  a 
valuable way of investigating investor re la tions but the questionnaire 
methodology used in th is  study has advantages. I t  enables the
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researcher to understand, by means of quantita tive  and qu a lita tive  
information, the whole procedure under study. This project can thus 
be seen as complementary to those using an event study methodology.
Company communications with analysts have also been used as an 
explanatory variable in econometric modelling studies. In a study of 
the re la tionsh ip  between stockbrokers' research and share 
m arke tab ility , H irs t (1988) used stepwise regression to establish the 
determinants of m arketab ility  as measured by market size and spreads. 
Variables selected fo r  input in to  the regression model included 
company co-operativeness and a measure of company contact along with 
other aspects of stockbrokers' research processes.
Analyst fo llow ing has been studied using econometric modelling.
Bhushan (1989b) examined the major determinants of the number of 
analysts fo llow ing a firm . A simple model proposed f iv e  variables 
l ik e ly  to influence a f irm 's  analyst fo llow ing. Ordinary least 
squares regressions were run, under a number of d iffe re n t 
specifica tions, to investigate the v a lid ity  of the model. O'Brien and 
Bhushan (1990) modelled analyst fo llow ing and in s titu t io n a l ownership 
as simultaneous equations. They investigated both firm  and industry 
characteris tics as determinants of analyst fo llow ing and in s titu tio n a l 
ownership. Single equation ordinary least squares regressions and 
simultaneous estimations of the two equation system were carried out.
As noted above, use has also been made of m ultip le  regression to model 
disclosure, as measured by an index of disclosure, in company 
accounts. Cooke (1989), fo r  example, used stepwise regression to 
id e n tify  important variables explaining voluntary disclosure in 
Swedish accounts as measured by an index. The variables selected fo r  
entry in to  the model were: quotation status, parent company 
re la tionsh ip , annual sales, to ta l assets size and number of 
shareholders.
In conclusion, i t  can be stated that the postal questionnaire approach 
was considered to be appropriate. This method has been used in 
s im ila r research projects and has several advantages. While 
acknowledging the v a lid ity  o f other research methods tha t have been or
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could be employed i t  was decided to re ly  on the questionnaire as the 
main data gathering instrument.
8.3 Design of questionnaire
The aim of th is  section is to describe the steps taken in the design 
of the postal questionnaire.
Drafting was carried out a fte r reviewing the available lite ra tu re  and 
deciding on the main top ic areas to be investigated. In the d ra fting  
process consideration was given to the general p rinc ip les of 
questionnaire design (Oppenheim, 1966) and the proposed use of the 
Minitab package fo r subsequent s ta t is t ic a l analysis (Newcastle upon 
Tyne Polytechnic Computer Unit, 1986 and Minitab Inc ., 1989).
The p ilo t  questionnaire was k ind ly reviewed by two colleagues at the 
University of Northumbria lecturing in psychology and one colleague 
lecturing in s ta t is t ic s . The p ilo t  was tested by asking four 
companies to complete i t  with the researcher present and noting 
comments and points of d i f f ic u l ty .  Three local public lim ited  
companies agreed to th is  and one London based company was also 
contacted. In each case the o f f ic ia l  responsible fo r  investor 
re la tions was sent a copy of the questionnaire p r io r to the interview. 
When the interviewer arrived the interviewee e ithe r completed the 
questionnaire in her presence or went through the responses he had 
already made. The Investor Relations Society was also contacted and 
the committee member responsible fo r  research, who was also head of 
investor re la tions fo r a large UK public lim ited  company, commented in 
w ritin g  on the p i lo t  questionnaire.
A fte r receiving a l l  comments from the p ilo t  testing  a revised version 
was completed and f in a l ly  reviewed by the committee member responsible 
fo r research at the Investor Relations Society.
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Table 8-1 Response to postal questionnaire
Responses Refusals
No. % No. %
1/8/91-16/9/91 232 42.4 41 7.5
17/9/91-28/2/92 92 16.8 21 3.8
1/3/92-6/7/92 13 2.4 7 1.3
Total responses 337 61.6 69 12.6
Total population 547 100.0
Table 8-2 Analysis o f reasons given fo r  refusal
No. %
Company policy 26 37.7
No time 16 23.2
No specific  reason 12 17.4
Too long 4 5.8
Taken over 3 4.3
De lis t in g 1 1.4
Other 7 10.1
Total 69 100.0
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8.4 Population and response rate
The aim of th is  section is to describe the population of companies 
selected fo r survey, to examine the response rate and consider the 
problem of possible bias due to non-response.
I t  was decided to select only large quoted UK companies fo r the 
survey. Although smaller companies do invest time and e ffo r t  in 
communications with analysts i t  was f e l t  that the a c t iv it ie s  o f large 
companies should be the focus o f th is  research. This is in accordance 
with much other research in the area of fina n c ia l disclosure and
reporting which tends to concentrate on those companies tha t are
prominent in the cap ita l markets.
The Financial Times UK Top 500 l i s t  of companies was used. This was 
published in week ending January 11 1991 and was calculated from each 
company's average market ca p ita lisa tio n  in June 1990 (Financial Times, 
1991b). The questionnaire was prepared fo r posting during June and 
July 1991 and i t  was noted that 15 of the 500 companies had been taken 
over, merged, become unquoted or gone in to receivership. I t  was 
therefore decided to extract an up to date l i s t  of the top 500 UK 
quoted companies, by market value of equity, as on 1st July 1991 using 
Datastream. The two l is ts  were merged to form a population of 547 
companies which were quoted at 1st July 1991 and were on e ithe r one or 
the other of the two l is ts .  Since the content of the top 500 
companies is constantly changing i t  was f e l t  appropriate to include
those companies that had dropped out of the top 500 since, the
Financial Times l i s t  was compiled and to include companies tha t were 
new to the top 500 at the time of preparing the Datastream l i s t .  In 
fac t only 448 companies were on both l is ts ,  ind icating the v o la t i l i t y  
of l is ts  that are prepared on the basis of market ca p ita lisa tio n .
Copies of the questionnaire were sent out by second class post on 1st 
August 1991. They were accompanied by a le t te r  requesting assistance 
(see appendix A) and a reply paid envelope. A reminder with 
questionnaire and reply paid envelope was sent out on 16th September. 
Where the companies were members of the Investor Relations Society the 
reminder le t te r  was sent out on headed notepaper by Mr. W. Stoker, who
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N N* MEAN STDEV
MARKET VALUE (£m)
Respondents 315 10 1084 2394
Population 525 22 932 2257
LOG(MARKET VALUE)
Respondents 315 10 2.5437 0.6201
Population 525 22 2.4707 0.6029
MIN MAX MEDIAN Q1 Q3
MARKET VALUE (£m)
Respondents 16 23491 287 107 960
Population 5 23491 217 101 786
LOG(MARKET VALUE)
Respondents 1 2143 4.3709 2.4575 2.0309 2.9823
Population 0 6866 4.3709 2.3363 2.0026 2.8957
NOTE: N* represents missing values
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was at the time the committee member in charge of research (see 
appendix A). In other cases the reminder le t te r  was signed by the 
p rinc ipa l researcher fo r  the project (see appendix A).
A good response was achieved and a f in a l reminder, with questionnaire 
and reply paid envelope, was sent out at the beginning of March 1992 
(see appendix A).
On analysing the refusals the main reason given was company po licy. 
There were 12 anonymous respondents included in the 337 responses.
Thus there were 153 companies tha t did not respond or refuse to take 
part, reduced to 141 a fte r deducting the anonymous respondents.
With a 61.6% response rate the like lihood  of serious non-response bias 
is obviously less of a problem than might have been encountered with a 
lower response ra te . The market values at 1st August 1991 of the 
population of companies were compared with the market values of the 
respondent companies. This was done by downloading Datastream equity 
market value data (MV). The mean market value of the population was 
£932.1 m illio n  with a standard deviation of £2,257.1 m illio n  The mean 
fo r  the respondents was £1,084 m illio n , standard deviation £2,394 
m illio n . This difference is not s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level fo r a 
two t a i l  Z -test g iving a Z score of 1.213. However, the population 
size d is tr ib u tio n  is affected by o u tlie rs  and a more symmetrical 
d is tr ib u tio n  can be obtained by a logarithm ic transformation. In th is  
case the Z-test is s ig n ifica n t at the 0.032 level (Z value 2.15). I t  
must be concluded tha t the respondents are not equivalent to a random 
sample of the population. They tend to be larger in size than the 
population as a whole. This is not a serious problem since analysts 
and fund managers tend to concentrate on larger companies, especially 
those in the FTSE100 stock exchange index. The responses from the 
early respondents were compared to those from the la te  respondents and 
there were no s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n ifica n t differences.
As an additional check, to ensure tha t a good proportion of the most 
important companies had responded, the Financial Times UK Top 500 l i s t  
fo r 1992 was compared with the l i s t  of respondents and i t  was noted 
that responses had been received from the 72 of the top 100 companies.
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Table 8-4 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r continuous independent variables
N N* MEAN MEDIAN
SIZE
AV(MV) 325 0 951 265
LOGTAVMV 325 0 2.5028 2.4231
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 325 0 0.4708 0.0000
LOGLIST 325 0 0.0875 0.0000
TRADFREQ 322 3 0.1988 0.0000
LOGTRADF 322 3 0.05829 0.00000
RISK
BETA 309 16 0.9958 1.0300
VARIAB 309 16 35.210 33.400
SQRTVAR 309 16 5.8791 5.7793
SPECRISK 309 16 26.642 24.000
LOGTSRSK 309 16 1.3974 1.3802
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 311 14 17.44 16.39
711TPM 295 30 15.34 12.03
716PTPM 309 16 9.59 8.27
703R0SC 317 8 13.82 12.40
GEARING
731CGEAR 312 13 35.07 30.40
732IGEAR 304 21 32.31 17.68
SQRTIG 304 21 16.009 15.674
733BR 318 7 0.676 0.430
SQRTBR 318 7 2.7505 2.7258
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 325 0 0.0431 0.0000
LOGTAKEO 325 0 0.01220 0.00000
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 324 1 5.734 0.320
NEGRBFA% 324 1 -0.5964 -0.7576
TOTSSH 324 1 17.46 13.05
SQRTOTSH 324 1 3.683 3.748
NOOFSSH 324 1 1.6265 1.0000
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8.5 Case study observations
The questionnaire approach can be c r it ic is e d  on the basis that the 
data obtained is incomplete compared to the case study approach. This 
is because only selected topics are studied by means of a r ig id  pre­
prepared set of questions. I t  can be argued that case study 
observation yie lds riche r, more complex, complete and in teresting 
data. I t  was decided, therefore, to carry out a lim ited  number of 
case study observations. One company was approached and permission 
was obtained to attend the meeting fo r in s titu t io n a l investors on both 
the interim  results and f in a l results announcement day. This 
experience gave additional insight into the investor re la tions process 
and confirmed the view that the questionnaire had been well drafted to 
cover essential aspects of meetings fo r analysts and fund managers.
8.6 The independent variables
8.6.1 Choice and source of variables
In order to tes t the hypotheses set out in chapter seven i t  was 
necessary to obtain fu rthe r information on the respondent companies. 
The questionnaire was designed to obtain the maximum amount of 
information on investor re la tions and the background information 
questions were kept to a minimum. I t  was f e l t  tha t pu b lic ly  available 
information should be collected from elsewhere to avoid the problems 
attached to asking the respondents fo r the information. Several 
sources were used to obtain data on the respondent companies. Some 
data was normally d is tribu ted  and the level of measurement was on an 
in terva l or ra tio  scale, in other cases the d is tr ib u tio n  was not 
normal and transformation was considered where appropriate. Other 
items were categorical or ord ina l. In testing  the hypotheses the 
nature of the variables was taken into account when choosing 
s ta tis t ic a l tests. A ll the independent variables were given an 
abbreviated name fo r the subsequent Minitab analysis, these w il l  be 
stated in the fo llow ing description.
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Table 8-4 (continued) Descriptive s ta tis t ic s  fo r continuous 
independent variables
TRMEAN STDEV SEMEAN
SIZE
AV(MV) 593 2085 116
LOGTAVMV 2.4737 0.6015 0.0334
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.1945 1.4834 0.0823
LOGLIST 0.0525 0.2101 0.0117
TRADFREQ 0.1121 0.5513 0.0307
LOGTRADF 0.04047 0.11376 0.00634
RISK
BETA 1.0009 0.2211 0.0126
VARIAB 34.582 9.925 0.565
SQRTVAR 5.8481 0.8055 0.0458
SPECRISK 25.669 10.484 0.596
LOGTSRSK 1.3908 0.1517 0.0086
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 17.62 33.50 1.90
711TPM 14.55 21.47 1.25
716PTPM 9.65 18.98 1.08
703ROSC 13.33 23.40 1.31
GEARING
731CGEAR 30.33 96.10 5.44
732IGEAR 23.32 76.22 4.37
SQRTIG 15.840 2.006 0.115
733BR 0.504 2.381 0.134
SQRTBR 2.7383 0.3336 0.0187
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.0000 0.2317 0.0129
LOGTAKEO 0.00000 0.06366 0.00353
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 3.478 12.537 0.696
NEGRBFA% -0.6059 0.3744 0.0208
TOTSSH 15.61 18.59 1.03
SQRTOTSH 3.575 2.217 0.123
NOOFSSH 1.5171 1.5073 0.0837
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To tes t hypothesis HI, tha t there is a positive  association between 
company size and investor re la tions a c t iv ity ,  a suitable measure of 
company size was needed. I t  was decided to use market ca p ita lisa tio n  
of equity. Using Datastream equity datatype market value (MV) the 
average market value fo r the year to 31st July 1991 was extracted fo r 
each respondent company (AV(MV)) using datachannel programme 900B. 
(Where there were two equities quoted the values were added together.) 
Fu ll de ta ils  of equity datatypes can be found in the 'Datastream 
D e fin itio n s ' manual (Datastream, 1990).
To tes t hypothesis H2, the possible association between m arketab ility  
and investor re la tions a c t iv ity ,  a number of measures were obtained. 
Information extracted from the London Share Service lis t in g  o f the 
Financial Times from the weekend of the seventh and eighth of 
September 1991 (Financial Times, 1991a) included the lis t in g  status 
( a l l  respondents were fu l ly  lis te d ) and the alpha or beta stock 
c la ss ifica tio n  (ALPHA coded as, 1 = alpha, 2 = beta) of the respondent 
companies.
Data re la tin g  to m arketab ility  was also obtained on disc from the 
London Business School Risk Measurement Service (1991). The trading 
frequency (TRADFREQ) is the average time in days between trades. A 
zero therefore denotes a heavily traded share and a value higher than 
zero indicates a less frequently traded share. A categorical variable 
was also constructed ind icating whether the shares were frequently 
traded or not (TFCAT). I f  TRADFREQ was zero TFCAT was coded as 0, i f  
TRADFREQ was greater than zero TFCAT was coded as 1.
Overseas m arketab ility  was also relevant in testing  hypothesis H2.
The Stock Exchange Quarterly, Summer Edition, A p ril - June 1991 (pp. 
55-56) included a table o f UK companies lis te d  on overseas stock 
exchanges. From th is  table the number of overseas stock exchanges on 
which the respondent company had a quotation at the time of the survey 
(LISTINGS) was obtained. A categorical variable was also constructed, 
coded as 1 fo r any number of overseas lis t in g s  and 0 fo r companies 
with a UK lis t in g  only (OSEALIST).
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Table 8-4 (continued) Descriptive s ta tis tic s  fo r continuous 
independent variables
MIN MAX Q1 Q3 TEST1
SIZE
AV(MV) 22 19326 96 831 0.658
LOGTAVMV 1.3324 4.2861 1.9843 2.9195 0.976
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.0000 12.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.843
LOGLIST 0.0000 1.1139 0.0000 0.0000 0.975
TRADFREQ 0.0000 6.8000 0.0000 0.2000 0.730
LOGTRADF 0.00000 0.89209 0.00000 0.07918 0.910
RISK
BETA 0.2000 1.5800 0.8550 1.1400 0.993
VARIAB 16.600 75.980 28.950 39.700 0.984
SQRTVAR 4.0743 8.7167 5.3805 6.3008 0.987
SPECRISK 12.300 73.860 19.075 31.200 0.933
LOGTSRSK 1.0899 1.8684 1.2805 1.4942 0.984
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -411.39 184.29 9.91 24.29 0.643
711TPM -217.80 83.81 8.30 19.09 0.741
716PTPM -224.79 74.07 4.10 13.54 0.700
703ROSC -144.70 240.00 6.38 19.65 0.806
GEARING
731CGEAR -665.95 1455.02 16.78 41.59 0.476
732IGEAR -227.90 820.83 7.42 33.17 0.633
SQRTIG 0.316 32.386 15.343 16.161 0.696
733BR -6.420 31.630 0.180 0.730 0.548
SQRTBR 0.7616 6.2153 2.6796 2.7803 0.651
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.980
LOGTAKEO 0.00000 0.47712 0.00000 0.00000 0.996
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0.000 72.310 0.040 4.975 0.735
NEGRBFA% - 1.0000 -0.0136 -0.9615 -0.1674 0.934
TOTSSH 0.00 82.80 0.00 26.15 0.971
SQRTOTSH 1.000 9.154 1.000 5.211 0.998
NOOFSSH 0.0000 7.0000 0.0000 3.000 0.993
NOTE 1: TEST = M initab's correlation test fo r normality, a
corre la tion  of 1 indicates a perfectly normal d is tribu tion
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To tes t hypothesis H3, data re la ting  to r is k  was obtained from the 
London Business School Risk Measurement Service fo r July 1991. This 
included the beta or market r is k  (BETA), the s e n s it iv ity  of the share 
price to general market movements. Also used were the v a r ia b il i ty  or 
standard deviation (VARIAB) of the returns on the share and the 
specific  r is k  (SPECRISK), the r is k  of non market related fluc tua tions 
in the share price.
To te s t hypotheses H4 and H5, Datastream was used to obtain a number 
of accounting numbers measuring p r o f i ta b i l i t y  and gearing. These are 
termed 'company accounts items' and are given a Datastream code number 
which w i l l  be used in th is  analysis. The accounting period ending in
1991 was taken, i f  there was no such period the nearest available was
taken. Data was downloaded using datachannel programme 900C. The 
ra tios  were:
703 Return on shareholders' cap ita l (703R0SC)
707 Return on cap ita l employed (707ROCE)
711 Trading p ro f it  margin (711TPM)
716 Pre-tax p ro f it  margin (716PTPM)
731 Capital gearing (731CGEAR)
732 Income gearing (732IGEAR)
733 Borrowing ra tio  (733BR)
The Company Accounts D efin itions Manual (Datastream, 1992) provides 
detailed d e fin itio n s  of the ra tios  above.
To tes t hypothesis H6, the association between recent takeovers and 
investor re la tions a c t iv ity ,  the tables of mergers and acquisitions in 
the Quality of Markets Quarterly Review and, subsequently, the Stock 
Exchange Quarterly were examined. The number of takeovers and mergers
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Table 8-5 Spearman rank corre la tion fo r independent variables
AV(MV) LISTING TRADFRE0 BETA
MARKETABILITY
LISTING 0.497**
TRADFREQ -0.659** -0.297**
RISK
BETA 0.034 0.110 -0.231**
VARIAB -0.381** -0.088 0.048 0.624**
SPECRISK -0.542** -0.196** 0.200** 0.303**
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE -0.067 -0.010 0.088 -0.108
711TPM 0.115* 0.104 0.053 -0.223**
716PTPM 0.024 0.044 0.122* -0.247**
703R0SC 0.042 0.069 0.048 -0.100
GEARING
731CG 0.061 0.201** -0.177** 0.253**
732IG 0.105 0.168** -0.146** 0.292**
733BR 0.187** 0.161** -0.204** 0.236**
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.016 0.101 -0.011 -0.005
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.416** -0.238** 0.310** 0.105
TOTSSH -0.353** -0.161** 0.289** 0.007
NOOFSSH -0.465** -0.227** 0.346** 0.047
VARIAB SPECRISK 707R0CE 711TPM
RISK
SPECRISK -0.907**
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE -0.130** -0.089
711TPM -0.232** -0.180** 0.174**
716PTPM -0.206** -0.107 0.345** 0.862**
703R0SC -0.195** -0.166** 0.819** 0.214**
GEARING
731CG 0.169** 0.058 -0.126** -0.107*
732IG 0.203** 0.082 -0.503** -0.126*
733BR 0.071 -0.053 -0.241** -0.075
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.062 -0.077 -0.005 -0.010
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0.228** 0.273** 0.126* -0.022
TOTSSH -0.287** 0.374** -0.038 0.041
NOOFSSH -0.281** 0.356* -0.046 -0.050
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by respondent companies in the period 1st August 1990 to 31st July 
1991 (TAKEOVER) was obtained.
Hypotheses H7 and H8 propose an association between insider 
shareholdings, substantial shareholdings and investor re la tions 
a c t iv ity .  The number of shares held by the board, th e ir  fam ily and 
associates (BFA%) and deta ils  of substantial shareholdings of over 
three per cent of equity was taken from Crawford's D irectory of C ity 
Connections (Kinloch, 1992). The to ta l percentage of substantial 
shareholdings was calculated (TOTSSH) and the number of such 
shareholdings (NOOFSSH). A categorical variable was also constructed 
showing whether or not there were any substantial shareholdings 
(SSHY/N). This was coded as 0 fo r no substantial shareholdings and 1 
to denote the existence of substantial shareholdings.
To tes t hypothesis H9, an industria l c la ss ifica tio n  fo r each 
respondent was taken from Datastream using the equity datatype INDC 
and datachannel programme 900B. The fiv e  le t te r  alphabetic codes 
thus obtained were converted to a four way c la ss ifica tio n  as per the 
Datastream manual 'Indices, in terest and exchange ra tes ' (Datastream, 
1992, pp. IM-1 to IM-6):
1 Capital goods
2 Consumer goods
3 Other groups
4 Financial groups
8.6.2 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables
Descriptive s ta tis t ic s  fo r the independent continuous variables were 
obtained using M initab's DESCRIBE command (table 8-4). O utliers were 
investigated to ensure they were correct. This was a pa rticu la r 
problem with the Datastream p ro f i ta b i l i ty  and gearing ra tio s . The
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Spearman rank corre la tion fo r  independent
variables
716PTPM 703R0SC 731CG 732IG
PROFITABILITY
703R0SC 0.387**
GEARING
731CG -0.298** -0.109
732IG -0.397** -0.471** 0.570**
733BR -0.232** 0.058 0.758** 0.519*’
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.020 0.014 0.076 0.032
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0.041 0.065 -0.102 -0.076
TOTSSH 0.074 -0.060 -0.086 0.052
NOOFSSH 0.001 -0.085 0.010 0.093
733BR TAKEOVER BFA% TOTSSH
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.035
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.145* 0.029
TOTSSH -0.087 -0.024 0.120*
NOOFSSH -0.035 0.045 0.235** 0.869**
KEY:
**  = Spearman corre la tion  s ign ifican t at the .01 level (two ta i l  tes t) 
* = Spearman corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level (two t a i l  te s t)
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small number of large negative p ro f i ta b il i t ie s  were correct and caused 
by loss making companies. The small number of large negative cap ita l 
gearing and borrowing ra tios  were also correct in terms of the 
Datastream d e fin itio n s . (These deducted intangib le assets from the 
denominator leading to the p o s s ib ility  of negative gearing in extreme 
cases.)
For each of the variables a normality te s t, provided by the Minitab 
s ta t is t ic s  package, was carried out (M initab, 1989, pp. 4-8). Each 
data set was transformed by taking the square root (SQRT), the 
logarithm to the base ten (LOGT) and the negative reciprocal (NEGR) to 
discover which transformation gave a more normal d is tr ib u tio n  compared 
to the raw data. Where there were negative or zero values a constant 
integer was added to each data item to obtain a minimum value around 
one fo r  the data set p rio r to transformation. This removed the 
problem of taking logarithms and square roots o f negative numbers 
(Erickson and Nosanchuk, 1979, pp. 100-119). The best transformation, 
i f  one ex is ts , is shown in table 8-4 adjacent to the raw data.
The Spearman rank corre la tion  matrix was calculated (table 8-5). This 
shows the extent to which the selected independent variables are 
associated with each other.
I t  was noted that company size was quite highly p os itive ly  correlated 
with m arketab ility  and the negative corre la tion  with insider 
shareholdings and substantial shareholdings was also quite high.
Also, company size was quite h igh ly negatively correlated with 
spec ific  r is k . Previous empirical evidence on accounting disclosures 
leads one to expect that company size may be a dominant variable in 
explaining investor re la tions a c t iv ity .
Strong corre la tion  between pairs of independent variables might 
produce spurious associations between the independent variables and 
the dependent variables in univariate tests of association. To 
control fo r  in teraction e ffects  and to assess the marginal explanatory 
power of d iffe re n t independent variables i t  was therefore decided to 
carry out a second stage o f m u ltiva ria te  analysis (Forker, 1992, p. 
120).
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Table 8-6 Details of categorical independent variables
OSEALIST CODE COUNT PERCENT
NONE 0 265 81.54
1-12 1 60 18.46
N= 325
ALPHA CODE COUNT PERCENT
ALPHA 1 277 85.23
BETA 2 47 14.46
N/A * 1 0.31
N= 325
TFCAT CODE COUNT PERCENT
FREQUENT 0 206 63.98
LESS FREQUENT 1 116 36.02
N= 322
*= 3
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Details of the categorical variables are shown in table 8-6. I t  can 
be seen that 60 out o f 325 respondents had at least one overseas 
lis t in g .  There were 277 alpha stocks and 47 beta stocks. There were 
206 companies with frequent trading and 116 with less frequent 
trad ing. Respondents were fa i r ly  evenly s p l i t  between cap ita l groups 
(96), consumer groups (99), other groups (84) and financ ia ls  (46). 
Most companies (229) had at least one substantial shareholder.
8.7 Conclusions
This chapter has considered the problem of which methodology to adopt 
in order to investigate the area of company communications with 
analysts and fund managers. As a re su lt of the voluntary and 
unregulated nature of the investor re la tions process there are no 
public w ritten  records of meetings and telephone conversations. The 
only evidence external to  the firm  may be the fac t that a meeting has 
taken place on a certa in  date. I t  was decided that evidence should be 
obtained d irec t from the companies involved by means of a postal 
questionnaire.
The questionnaire was then designed, drafted, amended and fin a lise d . 
The survey instrument was sent out on 1st August 1991.
Use of a questionnaire enabled a large number of companies to be 
contacted. The top 500 UK companies, as measured by market 
ca p ita lisa tion , were sent a copy of the questionnaire. A fte r the 
usual fo llow  up procedures an excellent response rate of 61.6% was 
achieved.
In order to tes t the hypotheses set out in chapter seven i t  was 
necessary to co lle c t data from other sources to represent the 
independent variables. This was done and the variables were 
investigated and subjected to transformation where necessary.
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Table 8-6 (continued) Details of categorical independent variables
4WAYINDC CODE COUNT PERCENT
CAPITAL 1 96 29.54
CONSUMER 2 99 30.46
OTHER 3 84 25.85
FINANCIAL 4 46 14.15
N= 325
SSH(Y/N) CODE COUNT PERCENT
NO 0 95 29.32
YES 1 229 70.68
N= 324
*= 1
Marston, C . L . : 1993 Chapter 8 181
The follow ing chapters nine to th irteen  w i l l  discuss the resu lts  
obtained from the analysis of the questionnaire responses and the 
subsequent testing of hypotheses.
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Chapter 9 Organisation of the Investor Relations Function: Results
and Analysis
9.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the results  of section one of the postal 
questionnaire survey. Section one relates to the organisation of the 
investor re la tions function (see appendix A). Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  
are set out and the data obtained is then used to tes t the hypotheses 
proposed in chapter seven. The detailed tables of results  are set out 
in appendix B and summary tables of selected results are included in 
the main te x t of the chapter. Conclusions are then drawn based on the 
results of the s ta t is t ic a l analysis.
The results presented in th is  chapter are only a part of the overall 
set of results  describing company investor re la tions . The various 
hypotheses w i l l  be tested again in subsequent chapters using data from 
la te r sections of the questionnaire. The next chapter w i l l  consider 
the methods used by companies to communicate with analysts and the 
evaluation by companies of th e ir  investor re la tions e ffo r t .
9.2 Results of Questionnaire survey: The organisation of the
investor re la tions function
9.2.1 Director involvement in investor relations
Investor re la tions can be carried out by company personnel of varying 
degrees of se n io rity . However, i t  is generally considered to be 
desirable fo r the d irectors to be involved in managing and executing 
the programme. I t  was found that in fac t a l l  companies reported 
d irector involvement in investor re la tions and in 85% of cases e ithe r 
two, three or four d irectors partic ipated (table B - l) .
The percentage of the to ta l d irectorate  involved in the investor 
re la tions function was calculated. I t  was found tha t 20-50% of the
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Table 9-1 Percentage of d irectorate involved in the investor 
re la tions function
COUNT PERCENT
0-20% 33 10.0
21-30% 95 28.7
31-40% 90 27.2
41-50% 57 17.2
51-100% 25 16.9
N= 331
* = 6
MEAN MEDIAN
0.38010 0.33333
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d irectors were involved fo r  72% of the respondents (tables 9-1 and B- 
2 ).
The involvement of the ind ividual d irectors in investor re la tions was 
investigated and i t  was found that the finance d irec to r was the most 
important contribu tor, being involved to a 'la rge  extent' in 76% of 
cases. Investor re la tions can be considered to be a form of marketing 
of the company to investors. I t  was therefore in teresting to note 
that while 61 companies reported the existence of a marketing d irec to r 
in only 9 cases was th is  d irec to r involved in investor re la tions , 
(table B-3)
Company d irectors have many demands on th e ir  time and the importance 
of investor re la tions can be measured by the number of d irec to r days 
devoted to  i t .  The average number of days was 36.5 fo r  a l l  the 
d irec to rs , the minimum was zero days and the maximum 260 days, (tables 
9-2 and B-4)
The significance of these resu lts  is  that d irectors of large UK quoted 
companies do indeed devote substantial e f fo r t  to investor re la tions , 
in accordance with the recommendations in the lite ra tu re  (see chapter 
fo u r) .
9.2.2 Organising and staffing the investor relations function
I f  a company views investor re la tions as important i t  is perhaps more 
lik e ly  to formalise arrangements. The survey established the 
organisational aspects of investor re la tions including whether or not 
there was an investor re la tions o ff ic e r  (tab le B-5) and the 
departmental structure (tab le B-6).
A m inority of companies (48%) had no designated investor re la tions 
o ff ic e r, 32% had one with IR as part of the re sp o n s ib ilitie s  but only 
66 companies (20%) had an IR o ff ic e r  where the main re spo n s ib ility  was 
investor re la tions . The job t i t l e ,  when provided, varied widely to 
include the terms 'investo r re la tio n s ', 'corporate a f fa ir s ',  'pub lic
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Table 9-2 Number of working davs in a year that d irectors devote to 
investor re la tions
COUNT PERCENT
0-30 169 66.27
31-60 53 20.78
61-90 15 5.88
91-120 10 3.92
over 120 8 3.14
N= 255
*= 82
MEAN MEDIAN
36.54 30.00
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re la tio n s ' and 'corporate communications'. In some cases the IR 
o ff ic e r  was stated as being the Finance D irector or Company Secretary. 
The IR o ff ic e r  reported to the board or the ch ie f executive or finance 
d irec to r in most cases. These resu lts  show that companies vary widely 
in th e ir  approach to managing the investor re la tions e f fo r t .
Companies were asked to state the number o f s ta ff  working fo r the 
investor re la tions o ff ic e r . The average here was 2.5 but in only 44 
cases were the s ta ff  working mainly on investor re la tions (table B-7). 
These companies had investor re la tions establishments ranging from an 
IR o ff ic e r  on his own to a team of 13, with a mean of 2.7 support 
s ta ff .
The annual gross salary b i l l  fo r  the investor re la tions o ff ic e r  and 
h is/her s ta ff  was £107K on average fo r  the 85 companies which answered 
the question. However, th is  included s ta ff  with duties other than 
investor re la tions . Only th ir ty  companies with dedicated investor 
re la tions s ta ff  answered th is  question and the average was £11IK with 
a maximum salary b i l l  of £250,000 and a minimum of £40,000.
These resu lts  show c le a rly  a wide va rie ty  of approaches among the 
largest UK quoted companies. In many cases, investor re la tions work 
is part of corporate a ffa irs , corporate communications, public 
re la tions , finance or the company secretary's department. R elative ly 
few companies maintain a s ta ff  of IR spec ia lis ts . This is not to say 
that IR is not important, rather tha t i t  is  not often carried out as a 
separate specialism but usually as part of a wider range of duties.
9.2.3 The investor relations budget and consultancy expenditure
The annual budget a lloca tion , excluding s ta ff  costs, fo r  the investor 
re la tions function was found to vary w idely, from a low of £2,500 to a 
maximum of £1,000,000 with an average spend of £180,272. (72 
respondents stated that the information was not available and 116 that 
i t  was not applicable, see tables 9-3 and B-8). This apparently wide 
varia tion  may be less so in practice since certa in types of
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Table 9-3 Annual budget a llocation fo r the investor re lations 
function (excluding salary b i l l ) .
£ COUNT PERCENT
up to 50,000 63 42.28
50,001-100,000 28 18.79
100,001-200,000 24 16.11
200,001-500,000 18 12.08
500,001 and over 16 10.74
N= 149
*_ 188
MEAN MEDIAN 
180,272 100,000
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expenditure may be included under d iffe re n t budgets according to 
company po licy. An example of th is  is the cost of the annual report. 
Several respondents marked th e ir  questionnaire to say the budget 
included the cost of the annual report whereas those reporting very 
small budgets are un like ly  to have included the annual report. 
Companies which did not provide the information because i t  was 'not 
ava ilab le ' may have wished to re ta in  c o n fid e n tia lity . Companies 
stating the question was not applicable presumably did not budget 
separately fo r investor re la tions .
Although most companies have an in-house investor re la tions capab ility  
they also usually re ta in  the services of an external consultant. 264 
(79%) of respondents reported that they did so. The costs incurred on 
consultants in the past 12 months varied from a low of £2,500 to a 
high of £700,000 with an average of £52,146. (49 respondents stated
the information was not available and 71 stated i t  was not applicable, 
see tables 9-4 and B-9). The wide va ria tion  can be p a rtly  explained 
by the fac t that some respondents were recently p riva tised u t i l i t ie s  
tha t had borne heavy costs associated with f lo ta t io n . The smaller 
amounts can be explained e ithe r by companies carrying out a l l  IR work 
in-house or by a desire to maintain a low p ro f ile , a point made by 
some companies on th e ir  questionnaires.
Since investor re la tions is concerned with a l l  investor groups i t  was 
appropriate to find  out what proportion of the external consultant's 
charges related to communications w ith analysts and fund managers. 
Responses were received from 135 respondents and the answers here 
varied widely from 0% (23 respondents) to 100% (5 respondents) (table 
B-10).
9.2.4 Investor relations policy
Some companies tend to formalise a l l  procedures whereas others adopt a 
more f le x ib le  approach. In the case of investor re la tions where there 
is the potentia l fo r inappropriate action, such as breach of the Stock 
Exchange L is ting  Agreement, a formal po licy may well be desirable.
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Table 9-4 Cost incurred in past 12 months on external investor 
re la tions consultant
£ COUNT PERCENT
up to 20,000 69 31.94
20,001-40,000 70 32.41
40,001-100,000 58 26.85
100,001-700,000 19 8.80
N= 216
*= 121
MEAN MEDIAN
52,146 30,000
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However, only 64 respondents reported that th e ir  company had taken 
such action (table B - l l ) .  This is relevant to the concept of 
corporate governance, a clear statement from top management, in 
w ritten  form, should help prevent abuse of insider information via 
investor re la tions personnel. Those who oppose regulation could 
argue, however, that the market can deal with those companies which 
pers is ten tly  favour selected parties via th e ir  investor re la tions 
function. Unusual price movements and transaction volume a fte r 
private brie fings w i l l  not go unnoticed in the markets.
9.3 Results of Hypothesis Testing
9.3.1 Introduction
Five continuous measures of e f fo r t  devoted to investor re la tions were 
obtained from the data and used fo r  hypothesis tes ting . These were 
the percentage of the d irectorate  involved in managing or executing 
the investor re la tions function (%DIRINIR), the d irec to r involvement 
index (INDEX), the d irec to r days devoted to IR (DIRDAYS), the annual 
budget a lloca tion  fo r the IR function (BUDGET) and the cost incurred 
on an external investor re la tions consultant in the past 12 months 
(COSTS). The d is tr ib u tio n  of these variables was investigated fo r 
normality and i t  was found that the f i r s t  two were reasonably normal 
(table B-12). Each variable was transformed by taking the square 
root, log to the base ten and the negative recip roca l. The 
corre la tion  tes t fo r  normality provided by the Minitab package was 
used to compare the various transformations w ith the raw data and the 
best transformation was selected fo r  subsequent analysis where 
appropriate (tab le B-12).
The d irec to r involvement index (INDEX) was a constructed variable 
taking each d irec to r active in IR and scoring them from three i f  they 
were 'involved to a large extent' to one i f  they were 'involved to a 
minor extent' (tables B-3 and B-12). Since the level of measurement 
achieved fo r th is  variable is ordinal rather than in te rva l the
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appropriateness of parametric s ta t is t ic a l tests was considered a t the 
subsequent testing stage.
The corre lation matrix fo r these variables is shown in table B-13. 
Although they are a l l  measures of resources devoted to IR they are not 
highly correlated with each other. This is not surprising since 
investor re la tions is a complex a c t iv ity ,  i t  cannot be measured 
easily. The data obtained is an attempt to obtain de ta ils  of 
d iffe re n t dimensions of the a c t iv ity .  Thus no one item of data can 
represent the whole.
In addition to the continuous measures noted above there were two data 
items indicating the resources devoted to IR where the responses were 
in three ordered categories. A respondent was coded as a two i f  there 
was a dedicated investor re la tions o ff ic e r , as a one i f  there was an 
investor re la tions o ff ic e r  whose work included other duties and as a 
zero i f  there was no designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r  
(IROFFICER). A s im ila r scoring system was applied to s ta ff  working 
fo r the investor re la tions o ff ic e r  (IRSTAFF). I f  they were dedicated 
mainly to IR th is  was scored as a two, where th e ir  work involved other 
duties as a one and where there were no such s ta ff as zero.
F ina lly  there were two simple yes/no ordinal measures of e ffo r t  
devoted to investor re la tions . These were whether or not there was a 
separate investor re la tions department (IRDEPT) and whether or not an 
external IR consultant was employed (IRCONS). I t  might be expected 
that companies taking investor re la tions more seriously would tend to 
have a separate department. Employing an external consultant is a 
cost incurred on IR and therefore denotes resources devoted to IR.
The four ordinal measures of resources devoted to IR were available 
fo r more companies than the IR budget (BUDGET) and consultant 
expenditure figures (COSTS). Respondents are generally more inclined 
to answer simple yes/no questions than to provide more detailed 
information. The questionnaire was designed to ensure that i f  
companies were not prepared to reveal detailed information about th e ir  
IR e ffo r t then at least an ordinal measure was usually obtained as an 
a lternative.
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In order to te s t the hypotheses proposed univariate analysis was f i r s t  
carried out between the collected data and the independent variables. 
Out of 337 responses twelve were anonymous so only 325 cases were 
used. Testing was carried out via the nu ll hypotheses, of no 
association, HI to H9 set out in chapter 7. Tests used included 
calcu lation of the significance of the Pearson corre la tion  (tab le  B- 
14) and the Spearman rank corre la tion  (table B-15) when both dependent 
and independent variables were continuous. Two-tailed tests of 
significance were used here as the a lte rna tive  hypotheses set out in 
chapter 7 did not specify a d irec tion  fo r the re la tionsh ip  between the 
variables. The Kruskal-Wallis tes t was used when one variable was 
continuous and the other categorical. This tes t is the nonparametric 
version o f one way analysis of variance and i t  was considered more 
appropriate to use i t  here in view of the skewed d is tr ib u tio n  of some 
of the data (tables B-16 to B-20, B-23, B-24, B-27 and B-28). The 
chi-square tes t was used when both variables were categorical or 
ordinal (tables B-21, B-22, B-25 and B-26).
9.3.2 The percentage of the directorate involved in managing or 
executing the investor relations programme (%DIRINIR)
This data item relates to the involvement of d irectors in investor 
re la tions (table 9-1). I t  should be borne in mind that the size of 
the board is a fac to r that depends on company size and cu ltu re , some 
companies seem to prefer to have re la tiv e ly  large numbers of 
d irectors. Among the respondents the median number of executive 
d irectors was fiv e  but the maximum was 45. The number of non­
executive d irectors ranged from none to 17 with a median of four. A 
small company with a small board may have a large percentage of 
d irectors involved through necessity, a large company may have a 
smaller percentage of d irectors involved but the to ta l e f fo r t ,  eg in 
d irec to r days, may be more. The detailed results  o f the tests are 
shown in tables B-14, B-15 and B-16 in appendix B.
Hypothesis HI is that there is no association between company size and 
the variable %DIRINIR. The natural expectation is tha t larger
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companies w il l  exert greater investor re la tions e f fo r t .  However, 
smaller companies that are try in g  to grow and a ttra c t the a tten tion  of 
the C ity may make a special e ffo r t  in investor re la tions.
The percentage of d irectors involved in IR (%DIRINIR) was negatively 
correlated to company size (LOGTAVMV) and th is  was s ig n ifica n t at the 
.01 level fo r both the Pearson and the Spearman corre lations (tables 
B-14 and B-15). The nu ll hypothesis can therefore be rejected fo r  
th is  variable. I t  seems that smaller companies tend to have a higher 
proportion of the d irectorate involved in the IR function, th is  seems 
to agree with in tu it io n  fo r the reason stated above.
Hypothesis H2 is that there is no association between the 
m arketab ility  of a company's shares and the variable %DIRINIR. There 
were several measures of m arketab ility  used to  tes t th is  hypothesis. 
These were the number of overseas lis t in g s  (LISTINGS), trading 
frequency (TRADFREQ) and th e ir  categorical equivalents, whether or not 
there was an overseas l is t in g  (OSEALIST) and trading frequency 
category (TFCAT). Whether or not the stock was rated as an alpha or 
beta (ALPHA) was an additional measure of m arketab ility .
The percentage of d irectorate involved in IR was negatively correlated 
with LISTINGS and the Spearman rank corre la tion  was s ig n ifica n t at the 
.05 leve l. A dd itiona lly  the OSEALIST variable was s ig n ifica n t at the 
.025 leve l. However TRADFREQ, TFCAT and ALPHA, measures of 
m arketab ility  w ith in  the UK were not s ig n ifica n t.
The nu ll hypothesis can be rejected, therefore, fo r the measures of 
world-wide m arketability  but not fo r  measures of m arketab ility  in the 
UK.
Hypothesis H3 is that there is no association between stock market 
r is k  measures and the variable %DIRINIR. Variables from the London 
Business School r is k  measurement service were used. These were the 
beta or market r is k  (BETA), the v a r ia b il i ty  (VARIAB) and the specific  
r is k  (SPECRISK).
Marston, C.L. 1993 Chapter 9 190
The percentage of d irectors involved in IR (%DIRINIR) was not 
s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with BETA. But the Spearman rank corre la tion  
was s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level fo r  both v a r ia b il ity  and spec ific  
r is k  and the association was pos itive . More r isky  companies had a 
higher percentage of d irectors involved in IR. I t  appears, therefore, 
that the nu ll hypothesis can be rejected fo r 2 out of 3 r is k  measures.
Hypothesis H4 is that there is no association between company 
p ro f i ta b i l i ty  and the variable %DIRINIR. Datastream ra tio s  were used 
to tes t the hypothesis. Return on cap ita l employed (707R0CE), trading 
p ro f it  margin (711TPM), pre-tax p ro f it  margin (716PTPM) and return on 
shareholders' cap ita l (703R0SC) were used.
In respect of the percentage of d irectors involved in IR (%DIRINIR) 
there were no s ig n ifica n t resu lts . Accordingly, the nu ll hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis H5 is that there is no association between gearing and the 
variable %DIRINIR. Since gearing is associated with increased r is k  
fo r shareholders i t  might lead to increased IR e ffo r t .  However some 
highly geared companies might be in such d i f f ic u l ty  that they decide 
to minimise IR e ffo r t  since i t  would do no good. Datastream ra tios  
fo r cap ita l gearing (731CGEAR), income gearing (732IGEAR) and 
borrowing ra tio  (733BR) were used to tes t the hypothesis. There were 
no s ig n ifica n t results in respect of percentage of d irectors involved 
in IR and thus the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis H6 is that there is no association between recent takeover 
a c t iv ity  and the variable %DIRINIR. The natural assumption is  that 
such action would increase IR a c t iv ity  although some companies might 
wish to minimise p u b lic ity  on a takeover. The variable used was the 
number of takeovers lis te d  in the Quality of Markets Quarterly in the 
year p r io r to the survey (TAKEOVER). In respect of the percentage of 
d irectors involved in IR there was no s ig n ifica n t association and the 
nu ll hypothesis cannot, therefore, be rejected.
Hypothesis H7 is that there is no association between the level of 
insider shareholdings and the variable %DIRINIR. A company more or
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less contro lled by a fam ily or group of d irectors might be more 
inclined to secrecy or less keen to a ttra c t in s titu tio n a l investors. 
The variable used was the percentage of shares held by board fam ily 
and associates (BFA%) taken from Crawford's D irectory of C ity 
Connections.
In the cases of the percentage of d irectorate involved in IR 
(%DIRINIR) there was no s ig n ifica n t association and the nu ll 
hypothesis cannot therefore be rejected.
Hypothesis H8 is that there is no association between the level of
substantial shareholdings and the variable %DIRINIR. In the UK, 
substantial shareholders are often in s titu t io n a l investor 
organisations but of course they may also be possible predators or 
priva te  investors. The variables used were to ta l percentage of 
substantial shareholdings (TOTSSH), number of substantial
shareholdings (NOOFSSH) and whether or not there were any such
shareholdings (SSH(Y/N)). There were no s ig n ifica n t associations in 
respect o f the percentage of d irectors involved in IR and so the nu ll 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis H9 is tha t there is no association between company line  of 
business and the variable %DIRINIR. Trading conditions in certa in 
lines of business might d ic ta te  one course of action in investor 
re la tions w h ils t companies in d iffe re n t businesses are not affected. 
For example, i f  one sector is doing very badly the companies involved 
might fee l the need to reassure th e ir  shareholders and stress future 
prospects via enhanced IR e f fo r t .  The variable used here was a four 
way indus tria l c la s s ific a tio n  (4WAYINDC) extracted from Datastream and 
comprising category one, cap ita l goods, category two, consumer goods, 
category three other groups and category four, fin a nc ia ls . There was 
a s ig n ifica n t re su lt here in that financ ia ls  had a lower percentage of 
d irectors involved in IR.
In concluding th is  section, i t  appears the percentage of d irectors 
involved in investor re la tions is not s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with 
the independent variables fo r  f iv e  of the hypotheses but tha t there 
are s ig n ifica n t re la tionships in the case of hypotheses one, two,
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three and nine. For reasons stated at the beginning of th is  section 
i t  is clear that %DIRINIR is not an absolute measure of investor 
re la tions e f fo r t ,  i t  only measures one aspect of the underlying 
variable. The other variables w i l l  now be considered in turn in order 
to bu ild  up a more complete p icture of the success or otherwise of the 
in i t ia l  hypotheses in explaining IR a c t iv ity .
9.3.3 The director involvement index (INDEX)
The index of d irec to r involvement was constructed as an a lte rna tive  
measure to the percentage of d irectors involved in IR. The maximum 
possible score was 30 and the actual maximum scored was 18 with a 
minimum 4 and a mean of 8.022 (table B-12). Hypothesis tes ting  in 
respect of HI was carried out and i t  was found tha t there was a 
s ig n ifica n t association at the .01 level between company size and 
INDEX fo r  both the Pearson and Spearman corre la tions. The association 
was pos itive , larger companies had more d irec to r involvement as 
measured by INDEX and thus the nu ll hypothesis can be rejected.
Testing hypothesis H2 yielded mixed re su lts . The Spearman Rank 
corre la tion  was s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with INDEX at the .01 level 
fo r  trading frequency. More frequently traded shares had a higher 
value fo r  INDEX. The Pearson corre la tion  gave a s ig n ifica n t re su lt at 
the .05 level fo r  the log of the trading frequency. The Kruskal- 
Wallis tes t on the categorical version of the variable (TFCAT) was 
also s ig n ifica n t at the .05 leve l.
In respect of the measures of world-wide m arketab ility  the Spearman 
Rank corre la tion  was not s ig n ifica n t but the Pearson co rre la tion  was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .05 leve l. Companies with more lis t in g s  had a 
larger d irec to r e f fo r t  (INDEX). The Kruskal-Wallis tes t on the 
categorical version of the variable (OSEALIST) was also s ig n ifica n t at 
the .05 leve l.
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Overall i t  seems that the nu ll hypothesis can be rejected and i t  can 
be concluded that companies with more marketable shares tend to have 
higher d ire c to r involvement as measured by INDEX.
Moving to Hypothesis H3 there was no s ig n ifica n t association between 
r is k  measures and INDEX so the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
S im ila rly  the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected fo r H4, H5, H6 and H7 
as there were no s ig n ifica n t associations between p r o f i ta b i l i ty ,  
gearing and percentage of shares held by insiders.
Hypothesis H8 gave co n flic tin g  resu lts . The Pearson corre la tion  was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level fo r the transformed percentage of shares 
held by substantial shareholders (SQRTTOTSH) and fo r  the number of 
substantial shareholdings. The association was negative so companies 
with more substantial shareholdings tend to devote less d irec to r 
e ffo r t to IR. The Spearman rank corre la tion  fo r INDEX did not give 
s ig n ifica n t resu lts  however. The nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected, 
therefore, in view of the fac t that the nonparametric tes t is  probably 
safer due to the nature of the dependent variable.
In respect of hypothesis H9 the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected 
since the tes t o f association between 4WAYINDC and INDEX is not 
s ig n ifica n t.
I t  appears, therefore, that there is  an association between the 
constructed variable fo r d irec to r e f fo r t  (INDEX) and company size and 
m arketab ility . Thus only two out of nine of the hypotheses y ie ld  a 
positive  re su lt.
9.3.4 Director days devoted to investor relations per annum (DIRDAYS)
The respondents' estimate of the number of d irec to r days spent in one 
year on investor re la tions is another measure of IR e ffo r t  that was 
provided by 255 respondents (table 9-2). Hypothesis testing  showed 
that th is  variable was po s itive ly  associated with company size at the
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.01 level fo r  both Pearson and Spearman corre la tions. So the n u ll 
hypothesis HI can be rejected.
The nu ll hypothesis H2 of no association between DIRDAYS and 
m arketab ility  was tested. In respect of m arketab ility  w ith in  the UK, 
the logged value of the trading frequency (LOGTRADF) gave a 
s ig n ifica n t re su lt at the .01 leve l, as did the ranked value 
(TRADFREQ). The categorical version of the variable (TFCAT) was 
s ig n ifica n t at the 0.000 leve l. Alpha stocks also had more d irec to r 
days devoted to IR than beta stocks (s ig n ific a n t at the .001 le ve l). 
Thus the nu ll hypothesis can be rejected and i t  seems that more 
marketable companies have more d irec to r days devoted to IR.
In respect of world-wide m arketab ility , the Pearson corre la tion  was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r LISTINGS and the logged value LOGLIST 
but the Spearman corre la tion  was not s ig n ifica n t and nor was the te s t 
based on the categorical version of the variable (OSEALIST). Thus fo r 
world-wide m arketab ility  the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
In the cases of hypotheses H3, H4, H5, H6, H7 and H8 the nu ll 
hypothesis cannot be rejected since there were no s ig n ifica n t resu lts  
in the tests of association. However, there was a s ig n ifica n t re su lt 
at the 0.022 level fo r H9, indus tria l c la s s ific a tio n . I t  appears that 
cap ita l goods companies and other groups devote most d irec to r time to 
IR followed by consumer groups with financ ia ls  having the lowest value 
fo r DIRDAYS.
I t  seems then that larger companies devote more d irec to r days to IR 
and tha t these also have more marketable shares in the UK. The number 
of days also depends on the type of company. D irector days are not, 
of course, the only s ta ff  days devoted to IR, some companies may make 
greater use of more jun io r s ta ff  and re ly  less on the d irec to rs .
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9.3.5 The annual investor relations budget (BUDGET)
The annual budget a lloca tion  fo r  the investor re la tions function was 
provided by 149 respondents (tab le 9-3). On testing  the data the 
results  were s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r a l l  three measures of 
co rre la tion  of company size (HI) and BUDGET.
Hypothesis H2 is that there is no association between the 
m arketab ility  o f a company's shares and the variable BUDGET. On 
tes ting , the resu lt was s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r the Pearson 
co rre la tion  of the log o f the trading frequency (LOGTRADF) and the 
Spearman corre la tion  of TRADFREQ. The categorical version o f the 
variable TFCAT gave a tes t resu lt s ig n ifica n t at the .000 level as did 
the ALPHA variable. Thus companies with more frequently traded shares 
had larger investor re la tions budgets.
In terms of world-wide m arke tab ility , the three corre la tion  tests were 
s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level and the categorical variable OSEALIST was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .000 leve l. Thus companies with larger investor 
re la tions budgets (BUDGET) had more lis t in g s  on overseas exchanges.
The nu ll hypothesis can, therefore, be rejected.
The lin k  between r is k  and IR a c t iv ity  (H3) was not c lea rly  
established. The Spearman rank corre la tion  of BUDGET and specific  
r is k  was negative and s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level but the other 
results were not s ig n ifica n t. The nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected 
on the basis of th is  evidence.
Hypothesis H4 is that there is no association between company 
p r o f i ta b i l i t y  and the variable BUDGET. The Spearman rank corre la tion  
with BUDGET was negative fo r  the return on cap ita l employed (707R0CE) 
and s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l. This was also the case fo r  return 
on shareholders' cap ita l (703R0SC) but significance was at the .05 
leve l. There is an ind ication here tha t companies with higher IR 
budgets are less p ro fita b le  in terms of return on cap ita l but tests on 
p ro f it  margins and Pearson corre lations fo r  a l l  p r o f i ta b i l i t y  measures 
gave no s ig n ifica n t resu lts . Therefore, the nu ll hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.
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In the case of gearing (H5) the Pearson corre lations gave no 
s ig n ifica n t results  but the Spearman corre la tion  of income gearing 
(732IG) and BUDGET was positive  and s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l.
This indicates that companies with higher income gearing had higher IR 
budgets but overa ll the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
In respect o f recent takeover a c t iv ity  (TAKEOVER) the Pearson 
corre la tion  was s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level whereas the Spearman was 
not. Testing the nu ll hypothesis H6 does not, therefore, y ie ld  a 
clear re su lt.
Hypothesis H7 re lates to insider shareholdings (BFA%). The tests here 
showed a s ig n ifica n t association at the .01 level and the corre lations 
were negative. Thus investor re la tions budgets decrease with 
increasing shareholdings by insiders. The nu ll hypothesis can, 
therefore, be rejected.
Testing the nu ll hypothesis H8 showed a s ig n ifica n t resu lt at the .01 
level fo r  the transformed to ta l of substantial shareholdings 
(SQRTTOTSH) and the number of substantial shareholdings (N00FSSH) fo r 
both the Pearson and Spearman corre la tions. The nu ll hypothesis can 
be rejected and i t  appears that IR budget decreases with increased 
substantial shareholdings. The reason fo r  th is  could be tha t having 
attracted substantial investors the company is sa tis fie d  but in 
re a lity  i t  w i l l  s t i l l  keep them informed. Since smaller companies are 
more l ik e ly  to have substantial shareholders the reason fo r the resu lt 
could be the influence of a th ird  variable, company size. I f  a 
company is re la tiv e ly  small i t  w i l l  be easier fo r  an in s titu tio n a l 
investor to break the 3% disclosure ba rrie r and be disclosed as a 
substantial shareholder.
In respect of hypothesis H9 there was no s ig n ifica n t association 
between BUDGET and 4WAYINDC so the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Overall the tests of the variable BUDGET have produced more 
s ig n ifica n t resu lts  than the previous variables. The investor 
re la tions budget increases with company size and the m arketab ility  of
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the shares whereas i t  decreases as insider and substantial 
shareholdings increase.
9.3.6 The cost incurred in the past twelve months on an external 
investor relations consultant (COSTS)
This variable was provided by 216 respondents (table 9-4) and is a 
measure of expenditure on investor re la tions . I t  does not, however, 
give any ind ication of to ta l expenditure since d iffe re n t companies 
w il l  have d iffe re n t s p lits  between work carried out in-house and by 
the external consultant. The Pearson corre la tion  between BUDGET and 
COSTS is 0.459 (table B-13).
Hypothesis HI is that there is no association between company size and 
the variable COSTS. The corre la tion  re la ting  company size to COSTS 
was positive  and s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r both Pearson and 
Spearman corre la tions. The nu ll hypothesis tha t there is no 
association between company size and IR a c t iv ity  can be rejected.
Hypothesis H2 is  that there is no association between the 
m arketab ility  of a company's shares and the variable COSTS. I t  was 
found that COSTS increased with the m arketab ility  of shares. 
Correlation of the logged trading frequency (LOGTRADF) with COSTS was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l. The rank corre la tion  of COSTS and the 
variable (TRADFREQ) gave a s ig n ifica n t re su lt at the .01 leve l. The 
categorical variables TFCAT and ALPHA gave a s ig n ifica n t re su lt at the 
.000 level in the Kruskal-Wallis te s t. In respect of world-wide 
m arketab ility  the number of lis t in g s  gave a positive  corre la tion 
s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r a l l  three tests and the categorical 
variable 0SEALIST gave a re su lt s ig n ifica n t at the .000 leve l. The 
nu ll hypothesis can be rejected and there appears to be a positive  
lin k  between expenditure on external IR consultants and m arketability  
of shares.
Hypothesis H3 is that there is no association between stock market 
risk  measures and the variable COSTS. The Spearman rank corre la tion
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of COSTS and specific  r is k  was s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level but the 
Pearson corre la tion  was not. V a r ia b ility  and beta did not appear to 
be associated with costs. I t  seems that the nu ll hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.
Testing nu ll hypothesis H4 (p ro f ita b i l i ty )  yielded no s ig n ifica n t 
resu lts  and so the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis H5 is that there is no association between gearing and the 
variable COSTS. The Pearson corre la tion  coe ffic ien ts  were not 
s ig n ifica n t but the Spearman rank corre lations fo r cap ita l gearing and 
borrowing ra tio  were p o s itive ly  related to costs and s ig n ifica n t at 
the .05 leve l. In view of the lack of normality of these variables, 
even with transformation, the nonparametric tes t is probably safer and 
i t  can be concluded that more h ighly geared companies tend to spend 
more on external IR consultants.
Hypothesis 6 (takeover a c t iv ity )  gave no s ig n ifica n t resu lts  on 
testing  and thus the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
In respect of H7, shareholdings by insiders, there was a negative 
co rre la tion , s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l, fo r both the Pearson 
corre la tion  of the transformed variable NEGRBFA% and the rank 
co rre la tion . The nu ll hypothesis can be rejected and i t  can be 
concluded, therefore, that companies with more shares held by insiders 
tend to spend less on external IR consultants.
There were negative corre lations between the variables re la ting  to 
substantial shareholdings and these were a l l  s ig n ifica n t at the .01 
leve l. The Kruskal-Wallis tes t on the categorical variable SSH(Y/N) 
was also s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l. In respect of hypothesis H8 
then, the nu ll hypothesis can be rejected and i t  appears tha t as 
substantial shareholdings increase external IR consultancy costs 
decrease.
The tes t of association between line  of business and COSTS did not 
y ie ld  a s ig n ifica n t resu lt and so the nu ll hypothesis H9 cannot be 
rejected.
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Overall, the pattern of resu lts  fo r  COSTS and the 9 hypotheses is 
fa i r ly  s im ila r to that fo r BUDGET. There is a clear lin k  between 
COSTS and company size, m arketab ility  and shareholder p ro file  with a 
somewhat weaker association with cap ita l gearing.
9.3.7 The existence of a designated investor relations officer 
(IROFFICER)
Companies were divided in to three ordered categories, those with no IR 
o ff ic e r  (160), those with an IR o ff ic e r  whose work involved other 
duties (102) and those with a dedicated IR o ff ic e r  (63). The 
presumption here is tha t th is  variable provides an insight into 
overall IR e ffo r t  since the existence of an IR o ff ic e r  implies that 
the company is serious about the a c t iv ity .
The Kruskal-Wallis tes t was used to tes t the hypotheses against the 
continuous variables (tab le B-23) and the chi-square tes t was used
with the categorical variables (tab le B-21).
The re su lt fo r  testing  the nu ll hypothesis HI (s ize) is s ig n ifica n t at 
the .000 level so i t  appears that larger companies are more lik e ly  to 
have a dedicated IR o ff ic e r  and the nu ll hypothesis can, therefore, be 
rejected.
The resu lts  fo r  testing  the nu ll hypothesis H2 (m arketab ility) are 
s ig n ifica n t at the .000 level fo r  trading frequency (TRADFREQ), at the 
.001 level fo r  the categorical variable TFCAT and the .01 level fo r 
ALPHA. Thus companies with more marketable shares tend to have a 
dedicated investor re la tions o ff ic e r . In respect of world-wide 
m arketab ility  the tes t fo r  LISTINGS is s ig n ifica n t at the .000 level 
and the categorical version 0SEALIST at the .001 leve l. Thus the nu ll 
hypothesis can be rejected and there is a clear association between 
the existence of an IR o ff ic e r  and m arketab ility .
Testing the nu ll hypothesis H3 ( r is k )  gives a s ig n ifica n t association
between IROFFICER and specific  r is k  at the .004 leve l. The more r isky
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companies are less lik e ly  to have an IR o ff ic e r . There is no 
s ig n ifica n t resu lt fo r beta or v a r ia b il ity .
Testing the nu ll hypotheses H4 (p ro f i ta b i l i ty ) ,  H5 (gearing) and H6 
(takeover a c t iv ity )  did not y ie ld  any s ig n ifica n t resu lts  and 
therefore the nu ll hypotheses cannot be rejected.
Testing the nu ll hypotheses H7 and H8 gave resu lts  tha t were 
s ig n ifica n t at the .000 level in the Kruskal-Wallis tes ts . The firms 
with dedicated investor re la tions o ffice rs  tended to have fewer shares 
held by insiders and substantial shareholders. The nu ll hypotheses 
can therefore be rejected.
In respect of indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  (H9) the chi-square tes t was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .02 level and i t  appears tha t firms in 'o ther 
groups' were more lik e ly  to have a dedicated IR o ff ic e r  whereas firms 
in 'ca p ita l goods' were less l ik e ly  to have one.
Overall the patten of results  fo r the categorical variable IROFFICER 
is  s im ila r to tha t fo r BUDGET and COSTS. The important explanatory 
variables appear to be company size, share m arketab ility  and 
shareholder p ro f ile . Specific r is k  is also important in th is  case.
9.3.8 The existence of dedicated investor relations staff (IRSTAFF)
Companies were divided into categories depending on whether s ta ff 
working fo r  the investor re la tions o ff ic e r  were dedicated to IR (43), 
whether th e ir  work involved other duties (107) or whether there were 
no such s ta ff  (175).
I t  was found that large companies tended to have dedicated IR s ta ff .  
This was s ig n ifica n t at the .000 level so the nu ll hypothesis HI can 
be rejected.
In respect of m arketab ility  (H2) there were s ig n ifica n t results  at the 
.000 level fo r LISTINGS and TRADFREQ the continuous variables and at
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the .001 level fo r TFCAT and OSEALIST and ALPHA, the categorical 
variables. Companies with more marketable shares were more lik e ly  to 
have dedicated investor re la tions s ta ff  and the nu ll hypothesis can, 
therefore, be rejected.
In the case of r is k  (H3) the Kruskal-Wallis tes t was s ig n ifica n t at 
the .000 level fo r  specific  r is k  and IRSTAFF. Beta and v a r ia b il i ty  
were not s ig n ifica n t.
For hypotheses H4 ( p ro f i ta b i l i ty ) ,  H5 (gearing) and H6 (takeover 
a c t iv ity )  the nu ll hypothesis could not be rejected since there were 
no s ig n ifica n t resu lts .
Companies with fewer shares held by insiders (BFA%) and substantial 
shareholders (TOTSSH) tended to have dedicated IR s ta ff .  This was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .000 level so the nu ll hypotheses H7 and H8 can be 
rejected.
As fo r  indu s tria l c la ss ifica tio n  the chi-square tes t was s ig n ifica n t 
at the .05 level and financ ia ls  were more l ik e ly  to have dedicated IR 
s ta ff than cap ita l goods companies. The nu ll hypothesis H9 can, 
therefore, be rejected.
Once again the tests fo r  th is  variable (IRSTAFF) show a s im ila r 
pattern with company size, share m arke tab ility  and shareholder p ro file  
showing strong resu lts . Specific r is k  seems to be associated with the 
variable IRSTAFF as i t  is with IROFFICER.
9.3.9 The existence of a separate investor relations department 
(IRDEPT)
This categorical variable (IRDEPT) divided respondents in to those 
companies with a separate investor re la tions department (30) and those 
without (295). Hypothesis HI is tha t there is no association between 
company size and the variable (IRDEPT) and hypothesis H2 is that there 
is no association between the m arketab ility  of a company's shares and
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter 9 202
the variable (IRDEPT). On tes ting , company size (HI) was s ig n ifica n t 
at the .000 level and m arketab ility  (H2) was s ig n ifica n t at the .000 
level fo r LISTINGS, at the .001 level fo r  TRADFREQ and OSEALIST 
although ALPHA was not s ig n ifica n t. The nu ll hypothesis can be 
rejected fo r  HI and H2 as i t  seems tha t larger companies with more 
marketable shares have a greater tendency to have separate IR 
departments.
The nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected fo r  H3 ( r is k ) ,  H5 (gearing), H6 
(takeover a c t iv ity ) ,  H8 (substantia l shareholdings) and H9 ( in d u s tr ia l 
c la s s if ic a tio n ). The s ta t is t ic a l tests of these variables with IRDEPT 
did not y ie ld  any s ig n ifica n t results  at a t least the .05 leve l.
There was one s ig n ifica n t resu lt fo r  H4 (p ro f i ta b i l i ty )  as return on 
shareholders' cap ita l gave a Kruskal-Wallis tes t re su lt that was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .047 leve l. More p ro fita b le  companies were more 
lik e ly  to have a separate IR department. Since the other three 
measures of p ro f i ta b i l i ty  did not give a s ig n ifica n t re su lt the nu ll 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
This variable (IRDEPT) gave fewer pos itive  resu lts  in the hypothesis 
tests than some of the other measure of IR a c t iv ity .  The reason is 
possibly due to the small number of companies in category one, those 
with a separate department. However the basic pattern is not in 
c o n flic t with e a rlie r results  since the predominance of size and 
m arketab ility  as s ig n ifica n t variables is borne out.
9.3.10 The existence of an external investor relations consultant 
(IRCONS)
The m ajority of respondents (256) had an external IR consultant, only 
68 did not. None of the hypothesis tests  yielded a s ig n ifica n t re su lt 
apart from H9 ( in d u s tr ia l c la s s if ic a tio n ). The chi-square tes t was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .001 level and i t  appeared that financ ia l companies 
were less lik e ly  to have an external consultant whereas 'other groups'
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were more lik e ly  to have one. The nu ll hypothesis can, therefore, be 
rejected.
This variable was obviously less successful in discovering 
associations between IR a c t iv ity  and the explanatory variables. I t  
seems tha t most companies in the top 500 have external consultants and 
the m inority that do not are not s ig n if ic a n tly  d iffe re n t in terms of 
the variables under tes t.
9.4 M ultiva ria te  analysis of data on organisation of investor 
re la tions
In addition to the univariate tests of association i t  was decided to 
carry out m ultivaria te  analysis using the dependent variables INDEX, 
DIRDAYS, BUDGET and COSTS. (%DIRINIR was not used since the 
s ig n ifica n t univariate results obtained were fewer in number and in 
the opposite d irection  to the resu lts  fo r  the other variab les.) The 
Minitab stepwise regression command was used with 17 predictor 
variables, LOGTAVMV, LOGLIST, LOGTRADF, BETA, SQRTVAR, LOGTSRSK, 
707ROCE, 711TPM, 716PTPM, 703ROSC, 731CGEAR, SQRTIG, SQRTBR, LOGTAKEO, 
NEGRBFA%, SQRTOTSH and NOOFSSH. The transformed version of the 
independent variable was used where appropriate. The routines were 
also run using raw data fo r  the independent variables but better 
results were obtained with the transformed variables. The routines 
were also run using the transformed version of the dependent variables 
but better results were obtained with the raw data.
Variables were entered in to the equation i f  the F -s ta tis t ic  was 
greater than four, the default value set by the Minitab package 
(Minitab Inc, 1989 p .7-15-7-17). The square root o f the F -s ta tis t ic  
is the t - s ta t is t ic .  Using an F -s ta t is t ic  of four as a c r ite r io n  fo r  
entry into the regression equation is  approximately equivalent to a 
p rob ab ility  fo r the t - r a t io  of 0.05 (Norusis, 1990 p .278). The f i r s t  
step adds the variable with the largest F -s ta t is t ic ,  th is  is 
equivalent to choosing the variable w ith the largest p a rtia l 
co rre la tion . Once useful variables had been id e n tifie d  using the
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Table 9-5 S ign ifican t resu lts  fo r data on organisation of investor 
re la tions with company spec ific  variables
INDEX DIRDAYS BUDGET COSTS
SIZE
AV(MV) f t * * f t * * f t * * f t * *
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS A** f t * *
TRADFREQ * * * ** **
RISK
BETA A
VARIAB B
SPECRISK f t * * A*
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE B **
711TPM B
716PTPM A
703R0SC *
GEARING
731CG B*
732IG * *
733BR B*
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER B
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% B* B**
TOTSSH B * * B**
NOOFSSH B * * **
KEY:
**  = Spearman rank co rre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at at least the 0.01 level 
(two t a i l  tes t)
* = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at the 0.05 level (two t a i l  
te s t)
A = variable enters in to  regression equation when F -s ta tis t ic  is 4 
( t - s ta t is t ic  is 2)
B = variable enters in to  regression equation when F -s ta tis t ic  is  2 
( t - s ta t is t ic  is 1.04)
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stepwise rou tine , m ultip le  regression was carried out to obtain more 
d e ta il.
In respect o f the d irec to r involvement index (INDEX) only company size 
(LOGTAVMV) and pre-tax p ro f it  margin (716PTPM) entered the equation 
which had an R-square of only 4.6% (tab le B-29 and B-30). For 
d irec to r days (DIRDAYS) only size entered the equation and R-square 
was 4.0% (tab le  B-31 and B-32). In respect o f annual budget 
a lloca tion  fo r  investor re la tions (BUDGET) the company size 
(LOGTAVMV), spec ific  r is k  (LOGTSRSK), number of overseas lis t in g s  
(LOGLIST) and BETA entered the equation and R-square was 38.7% (table 
B-33 and B-34). F in a lly , fo r  the cost of an external consultant 
(COSTS) the variables entering the equation were LOGLIST, LOGTAVMV and 
LOGTSRSK with an R-square of 20.7% (table B-35 and B-36).
There are several reasons why the variables id e n tifie d  as s ig n ifica n t 
in the univariate analysis are not the same as those found by stepwise 
regression. The set of missing values is d iffe re n t fo r the pairwise 
univariate tests and the m u ltiva ria te  tes ts . The independent 
variables obtained from Datastream and London Business School had 
missing values fo r  certa in  companies, th is  problem is  compounded in 
the m u ltiva ria te  tes ts . The univariate tests show association but do 
not show causation and a th ird  variable may be responsible fo r 
apparent but spurious corre la tions. There are also problems 
associated w ith running the m ultip le  regression model i f  the data is 
not appropriate, th is  w i l l  be considered la te r.
The stepwise regression routine was run fo r  a second time with the 
value of c r i t ic a l  F -s ta t is t ic  reduced from four to two in order to see 
which variables would be entered into the equation next. With an F- 
s ta t is t ic  o f four the required t - s ta t is t ic  is two but with the F- 
s ta t is t ic  reduced to two the required t - s ta t is t ic  is reduced to 1.4 
and more variables can enter the equation. The p rob ab ility  fo r the t -  
s ta t is t ic  is  higher than 0.05 but an exact equivalence cannot be 
stated. The actual s ignificance level associated with the F -s ta tis t ic  
is d i f f ic u l t  to compute since i t  depends on both the number of cases 
and variables and the corre la tions between independent variables 
(Norusis, 1990 p .278) The F -s ta t is t ic  o f two was found to be
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suitable since only a small number of extra variables entered the 
equation in most cases when compared with the stepwise regression 
using an F -s ta t is t ic  of four.
In the case of INDEX one fu rthe r variable 711TPM entered the equation. 
For DIRDAYS three more variables entered, NOOFSSH, SQRTOTSH and 
707R0CE. In the case of BUDGET, two more variables LOGTAKEO and 
NEGRBFA% entered the equation. For the COSTS regression f iv e  more 
variables entered in. These were SQRTOTSH, NEGRBFA%, SQRTVAR, SQRTBR 
and 731CGEAR (tables B-37 to B-40).
The results of the stepwise regression routines were compared with the 
univariate Spearman rank corre la tion  resu lts  (table 9-5). I t  can be 
seen that company size is the dominant fac to r fo r  both types of te s t. 
Rejection of the nu ll hypothesis HI is therefore supported by the 
evidence.
The results  are in agreement fo r overseas lis t in g s  but not fo r  trading 
frequency. Since trading frequency is strongly correlated with size 
(Spearman rank corre la tion  0.659) th is  would explain why the 
univariate tests show s ig n ifica n t association while the TRADFREQ 
variable does not figure  in the regression equations. Rejection of 
the nu ll hypothesis H2 is therefore supported fo r  BUDGET and COSTS fo r 
overseas m arketab ility  (LISTINGS) but not fo r  m arketab ility  w ith in  the 
UK.
The table shows c lea rly  fo r  r is k  measures tha t specific  r is k  is 
important fo r  BUDGET and COSTS. However the sign of the coe ffic ien ts  
is positive  fo r  the regression but negative fo r  the univariate tes t 
the Spearman rank co rre la tion . I t  appears tha t once the e ffe c t o f size 
has been removed by using regression then BUDGET and COSTS increase 
with specific  r is k . This is  fu rthe r support fo r  re jec tion  of the nu ll 
hypothesis H3.
In respect of tests of nu ll hypothesis H4, p r o f i ta b i l i ty  measures 
appearing in the regressions do not agree with the resu lts  of the 
univariate tes ts . There is some agreement fo r  the gearing measures,
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hypothesis H5, since fo r  COSTS the univariate and m ultivaria te  tests 
agree. This indicates that as cap ita l gearing increases so do COSTS.
Rejection of nu ll hypothesis H6, takeover a c t iv ity ,  was not supported 
by the univariate tests . TAKEOVER only appears in the equation fo r 
BUDGET at the weaker level in the stepwise regressions.
Tests of hypothesis H7, insider shareholdings, show agreement fo r 
univariate and stepwise regression although the variable (BFA%) only 
enters in at the weaker leve l. BUDGET and COSTS decrease as BFA% 
increases.
Tests on substantial shareholdings, hypothesis H8 (TOTSSH and NOOFSSH) 
show co n flic tin g  resu lts  when comparing the univariate and 
m u ltiva ria te  tes ts . This may be due to the fa c t that company size is 
highly negatively correlated with TOTSSH (Spearman rank corre la tion  - 
0.353) and NOOFSSH (Spearman rank corre la tion  -0.465).
In view o f the fa c t tha t BUDGET was the dependent variable showing the 
highest R-square i t  was decided to carry out a m ultip le  regression 
using a l l  the independent variables mentioned above plus a set of 
dummies to  represent the 4-way indu s tria l c la s s ific a tio n . The results 
are shown in Table B-41. The resu lts  are somewhat d iffe re n t from 
those of the stepwise routine since only company size (LOGTAVMV) has a 
p less than .05. This is in agreement with the overa ll resu lt tha t 
size is the dominant explanatory variable. Entering the indus tria l 
c la ss ifica tio n  dummies in to the equation improved the R-square 
(adjusted fo r  t ie s )  from 38.2% to 39% but a p a rtia l F-test showed that 
th is  change was not s ig n ifica n t at the .05 leve l.
Due to the problem of missing values fo r  both the dependent and 
independent variables only 128 cases were used out o f 325. There were 
20 cases where the X value gave the observation a large influence and 
12 cases where the observation had a large standardised residual. No 
warnings of ill-co n d itio n ed  data (m u ltic o llin e a r ity  or small 
co e ffic ie n t of va ria tion ) were issued by Minitab. The residuals were 
p lotted against the f i t te d  values and the actual values of BUDGET. 
There seemed to be a tendency fo r the residuals to increase as BUDGET
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increased and vice versa. This would indicate that the existing  model 
should be modified or that there is another independent variable or 
variables missing from the model. The corre la tion  te s t fo r normality 
of residuals gave a value of 0.971. P lo tting  the residuals in turn 
against the predictor variables showed up no clear patterns or trends. 
Taking the log of the dependent variable BUDGET did not improve the 
re s u lt, nor did taking the raw value of the predictor variables rather 
than the mixture of raw and transformed variables used in Table B-41. 
I t  appears therefore tha t missing variables, not specified in the 
o rig in a l hypotheses, are responsible fo r the lack of f i t  but th is  is 
probably compounded by the fac t tha t there is  no one measure of 
investor re la tions a c t iv ity  and tha t the data used here as the 
dependent variable is not ideal. The personal characteris tics of the 
company d irectors and management s ty le  may be q u a lita tive  variables 
a ffec ting  the investor re la tions e f fo r t  but they cannot be 
incorporated in to the regression model.
9.5 Conclusions
This chapter has set out the resu lts  of the f i r s t  part of the 
questionnaire re la tin g  to the organisation of the investor re la tions 
function. Tests of association were performed in order to investigate 
the hypotheses set out in chapter seven. Data items re la ting  to the 
amount of e f fo r t  devoted to investor re la tions were compared with the 
explanatory or independent variables. M u ltiva ria te  analysis was also 
carried out.
Overall i t  was found that company size (hypothesis HI) was a 
s ig n ifica n t variable in univariate tests of association of the amount 
of e f fo r t  devoted to investor re la tion s . I f  investor re la tions is 
considered to be a form of voluntary information disclosure th is  
re su lt can v a lid ly  be compared with lite ra tu re  using a disclosure 
index to measure disclosure in company accounts. Cerf (1961), Singhvi 
and Desai (1971), Buzby (1975), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Cooke 
(1989), Roberts and Gray (1988a), Gray and Roberts (1989) a l l  report a
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positive  association between company size and various types of 
information disclosure.
M arke tab ility  of a company's shares was found to be p o s itive ly  and 
s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with investor re la tions e ffo r t  (hypothesis 
H2). Comparing th is  resu lt to the disclosure index lite ra tu re , a 
s im ila r association was obtained by Singhvi and Desai (1971) but Buzby 
(1975) found that disclosure was not linked to l is t in g  status. More 
recently Cooke (1989) found a s ig n ifica n t association between 
disclosure and quotation status. In a d iffe re n t area of enquiry,
H irs t (1988) found tha t m arketab ility  was not re lated to stockbroker 
research.
In general IR e ffo r t  was negatively associated with specific  r is k  in 
the univariate tes ting , less r isky  companies tended to have greater 
e f fo r t  devoted to IR. The results of the m ultip le  regression analysis 
however changed the sign ind icating tha t, once the e ffe c t o f size had 
been removed, more risky  companies tended to devote more e f fo r t  to IR. 
The other r is k  measures, beta and v a r ia b il i ty ,  gave few s ig n ifica n t 
resu lts  (hypothesis H3). This can be compared with the conclusions of 
F irth  (1984) who found no s ig n ifica n t association between amounts of 
disclosure and systematic r is k  (BETA), unsystematic (spec ific ) r is k  or 
variance o f re turn. Thomas (1986) found tha t r isky  companies tend to 
make some reference to fu ture p ro fits  in th e ir  interim  reports whereas 
less r isky  companies do not do so.
There is some lite ra tu re  attempting to model the analyst fo llow ing and 
in s titu t io n a l ownership. This ty p ic a lly  includes r is k  measures as 
possible explanatory variables. Bhushan (1989b) found a positive  
association between return v a r ia b il i ty  of the firm  and the number of 
analysts fo llow ing a firm . O'Brien and Bhushan (1991) found that 
analysts tended to avoid v o la t i l i t y  and tha t in s titu tio n s  seemed to 
prefer firms whose r is k  had increased.
The resu lts  of th is  study in respect o f hypothesis H3 can be seen to 
add to the body of previous research evidence ind icating tha t r is k  has 
some re la tion  to company behaviour in the cap ita l marketplace. There
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are several d iffe re n t measures of r is k  and a clear picture has not yet 
emerged.
In respect of p ro f i ta b i l i ty  (hypothesis H4) there were very few 
s ig n ifica n t results link ing  the various p r o f i ta b i l i ty  measures to IR 
e ffo r t .  This can be compared with the resu lts  of Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) who found that less p ro fitab le  firm s disclosed inadequate 
information in accounts. In c o n flic t with th is  re su lt Belkaoui and 
Kahl (1978) found that disclosure s ig n if ic a n tly  decreased as 
p ro f i ta b i l i ty  increased. Roberts and Gray (1988a) found no 
s ig n ifica n t association between p r o f i ta b i l i t y  and accounts disclosure 
a fte r con tro lling  fo r company size. Gray and Roberts (1989) found 
that voluntary information disclosure was s ig n if ic a n tly  associated 
with p ro f i ta b i l i ty .  Beattie and Jones (1992) found that companies 
with 'good' performance are s ig n if ic a n tly  more lik e ly  to use graphs in 
th e ir  annual reports.
The lack of firm  conclusions from the tests carried out on investor 
re la tions data re fle c ts  the varied results  achieved by previous 
researchers. Perhaps th is  lack of a lin k  between company behaviour 
and accounting performance stems from the various problems associated 
with the v a lid ity  of accounting numbers and the su b je c tiv ity  involved 
in measuring accounting p ro f it .  A lte rn a tive ly , i t  may be that 
companies cannot be expected to behave consistently i f  th e ir  p ro fits  
are high or low. Some companies with high p ro fits  may be keen to 
spread the news, other may wish to keep a low p ro file  to avoid 
predators or adverse comment from so c ia lis ts .
Gearing (hypothesis H5) was not linked with IR e f fo r t  in most of the 
tests carried out. This can be compared with the resu lts  of Belkaoui 
and Kahl (1978) who found that cap ita l gearing was s ig n if ic a n tly  
negatively associated to disclosure. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) found 
no s ig n ifica n t e ffects due to financ ia l leverage on voluntary 
disclosure. Roberts and Gray (1988a) found tha t gearing was not a 
facto r explaining disclosure whereas Gray and Roberts (1989) noted 
that gearing was s ig n ifica n t in one te s t (Mann-Whitney) but not in 
another (Chi-Square) when explaining voluntary disclosure.
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Once again i t  can be argued that gearing is an accounting number with 
measurement su b je c tiv ity  a ffec ting  its  usefulness. This could explain 
the apparent lack of association between investor re la tions e ffo r t  and 
what is supposedly an important accounting ra tio  fo r analysts.
Another explanation is tha t there is no reason to believe tha t firms 
w il l  behave in a consistent way i f  th e ir  gearing is high or low. Some 
firm s with high gearing may wish to keep quiet about i t  while others 
may make a great e ffo r t to explain i t  to analysts.
Recent takeovers by the respondents (hypothesis H6) were found not to 
be associated with investor re la tions a c t iv ity .  I t  appears that the 
small number of respondents (12 out o f 325) who had carried out a 
takeover were not s ig n if ic a n tly  d iffe re n t in th e ir  investor re la tions 
e f fo r t .  This may be due to the regulations o f the C ity Panel on 
Takeover and Mergers curbing the extent to which companies may 
communicate at such times.
The number of shares held by board fam ily and associates (hypothesis 
H7)) was found to be s ig n ifica n t fo r BUDGET and COSTS. The 
re la tionsh ip  was one of negative co rre la tion . Comparing th is  with 
previous resu lts , Bhushan (1989b) found there was a s ig n ifica n t 
negative re la tionsh ip  between the number of analysts fo llow ing a firm  
and the percentage of insider shareholdings. Forker (1992) found that 
the proportion of the firm  owned by management was not a s ig n ifica n t 
predictor fo r  the qua lity  of option disclosure in the accounts. The 
results  o f th is  study indicate that companies that are more closely 
held by d irectors are less l ik e ly  to devote funds to  investor 
re la tions which seems in accordance with in tu it io n . Forker, however, 
hypothesised that the proportion of equity owned by management bears 
an indeterminate re la tion  to disclosure qua lity  because of 'opposing 
forces' operating.
The amount and number of substantial shareholdings (hypothesis H8) was 
found to be s ig n ifica n t and negatively correlated with BUDGET and 
COSTS. Substantial shareholdings are those over 3% as required to be 
disclosed by the London Stock Exchange lis t in g  agreement. They 
consist of both in s titu tio n a l and private investors (other than 
d irec to rs ). This resu lt c o n flic ts  w ith Bhushan (1989b) who found tha t
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the number of in s titu tio n s  investing and the percentage held by 
in s titu tio n s  was p o s itive ly  associated with the number of analysts 
fo llow ing a US company. The d iffe re n t re su lt could be due to country 
specific  differences. The US stock market is fa r larger and the top 
companies are re la tiv e ly  larger than top UK companies. Bhushan's data 
fo r the explanatory variable was based on holdings of at least 1% 
whereas th is  survey had a c u t-o ff of 3%.
F ina lly , i t  was found the association with the four way industria l 
c la ss ifica tio n  (hypothesis H9) was s ig n ifica n t fo r %DIRINIR, DIRDAYS 
and BUDGET but not fo r  INDEX and COSTS. I t  was s ig n ifica n t fo r 
IROFFICER, IRSTAFF and IRCONS but not fo r IRDEPT. This set of results  
can be compared with Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) who found tha t industry 
was a s ig n ifica n t ind icator o f disclosure in accounts and Gray and 
Roberts (1989) who found indu s tria l c la ss ifica tio n  was s ig n ifica n t and 
that the cap ita l goods sector was p o s itive ly  associated w ith more 
disclosure. Bhushan (1989a) used a 6 category indus tria l 
c la ss ifica tio n  and concluded tha t a firm 's  industry influences its  
extent of analyst fo llow ing and also found tha t there are differences 
across industries in the marginal information content o f earnings 
announcements. The results of th is  study are therefore, broadly, in 
line  with previous studies in terms of overa ll outcome but the 
d iffe re n t versions of the explanatory variable prevent comparison of 
results fo r  specific  industries.
The m ultiva ria te  analysis subsequent to the univariate tes ting  bore 
out the find ing  that company size was the dominant explanatory 
variable fo r aspects of the organisation of investor re la tions . Some 
results  conflic ted  with the univariate te s t resu lts  although the 
importance of overseas lis t in g s , specific  r is k  and insider 
shareholdings was confirmed.
In conclusion i t  should be noted tha t th is  is the f i r s t  study to 
attempt to lin k  investor re la tions a c t iv ity  to explanatory variables. 
I t  is part of the larger lite ra tu re  on disclosure but studies of 
disclosure in company accounts are somewhat d iffe re n t to the current 
study. S im ila rly , the lite ra tu re  attempting to model analyst
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fo llow ing in terms of explanatory variables has a d iffe re n t focus 
analyst a c t iv ity  rather than investor re la tions a c t iv ity .
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Chapter 10 Companies' Assessment o f and Execution o f the Investor
Relations Programme: Results and Analysis
10.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the results  of sections two and three of the 
questionnaire. Section two related to surveys o f C ity opinion about a 
company. Section three provided an overview of the methods used by 
respondents to communicate with analysts and fund managers (see 
appendix A). Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  are set out and the data obtained 
is then used to te s t the hypotheses proposed in chapter seven.
Detailed tables of results  are set out in appendix C and selected 
summary resu lts  are incorporated in the chapter. Conclusions are then 
drawn based on the resu lts  of the s ta t is t ic a l analysis.
The previous chapter dealt with the organisation of the investor 
re la tions function and considered several variables, such as investor 
re la tions budget (BUDGET), which measured d iffe re n t dimensions of a 
company's investor re la tions e f fo r t .  This chapter introduces new 
variables and continues the investigation started in chapter nine.
10.2 Results of questionnaire survey: Assessing the contribution of
the investor re la tions function
There are several market research organisations that o ffe r specialised 
surveys of C ity opinion about a company. Companies are na tu ra lly  
concerned about th e ir  image in the C ity and these surveys can provide 
an insight as to whether the investor re la tions programme is 
e ffe c tive . I t  was found that 144 out of 337 (57%) respondents had 
commissioned a market research survey in the past. The actual number 
of surveys varied from n i l  to six in the past twelve months and from 
n il  to 22 in the previous four years (tables C-l and C-2).
I t  was found tha t the vast m ajority of respondents had the surveys 
carried out by an external firm . Only two companies used in-house
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s ta ff ,  and nine companies used both in-house s ta ff  and external 
consultants.
The companies' reasons fo r commissioning the most recent surveys were 
investigated (tables C-3 to C-6). The most important reason was to 
assess the success of the investor re la tions programme. This reason 
was considered to be of at least some importance fo r 88% of the 139 
companies answering the question. General in te rest was the next most 
important reason and was considered important by 84% of companies.
Only 29 companies had commissioned surveys in order to assess the need 
fo r setting up an investor re la tions function. This is not surprising 
since most respondents had some sort of investor re la tions function as 
reported in table B-6.
10.3 Results of questionnaire survey: Execution of the investor
re la tions programme
Respondents were asked about the methods used to communicate with 
analysts and the re la tive  importance of these d iffe re n t means of 
communication (appendix A). Respondents were asked to rank the fiv e  
lis te d  methods o f communication as of 'high importance', 'moderate 
importance', 'minor importance or 'not at a l l  - not done'. Overall, 
one-to-one meetings w ith analysts and fund managers were seen as the 
most important a c t iv ity ,  th is  was followed by answering telephone 
queries, meeting delegates from d iffe re n t organisations and providing 
feedback on analysts' reports. F in a lly , mailing information to 
analysts and fund managers was seen as least important of the lis te d  
a c tiv it ie s  (tables C-16 to C-20).
A number of companies mentioned other a c t iv it ie s  on the questionnaire, 
the most important of these was s ite  v is its  which was mentioned by 
th ir ty  respondents.
I t  is clear from the results  of the survey tha t companies view 
personal contacts with analysts and fund managers as important and
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that merely sending out a copy of the annual report and other o f f ic ia l  
information is not considered a sa tis facto ry course of action.
The anonymous responses were deleted before fu rthe r analysis was 
carried out reducing the number of cases from 337 to 325. Table C-21 
compares the average importance of the various a c t iv it ie s  and the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks tes t was used to assess the 
significance of differences between the rankings. Placing the 
a c tiv it ie s  in order of importance, ind ividual meetings were 
s ig n if ic a n tly  more important than telephone queries (p = 0.000). There 
was no s ig n ifica n t difference between telephone enquiries and general 
meetings. General meetings were s ig n if ic a n tly  more important than 
feedback provision (p = 0.000) which was more important than mailings
(p = 0.000).
I f  companies view an a c t iv ity  as important they are lik e ly  to devote 
resources to  i t .  The answers discussed above can therefore be used as 
a device to measure IR e f fo r t ,  the underlying variable. In order to 
obtain an ordinal measure of e f fo r t  devoted to investor re la tions the 
to ta l of the number of a c t iv it ie s  undertaken and weighted according to 
th e ir  importance (3 = high importance, 2 = moderate importance 1 = 
minor importance) was calculated. This constructed variable 
(ACTIVITY) was normally d is tribu ted  (tab le C-22).
10.4 Results of hypothesis testing
10.4.1 Introduction
Four continuous measures of e ffo r t  devoted to investor re la tions were 
obtained from the data and used fo r  hypothesis tes ting . These were 
the number of surveys of C ity opinion in the past 12 months 
(SURVEYS(A)), the number of surveys more than 12 months ago but less 
than 5 years ago (SURVEYS(B)) and the to ta l number of surveys in the 
past f iv e  years (SURVEYS) which was the sum o f the previous two 
variables. These variables were tested fo r normality (table C-10) and 
the best transformation was calculated and displayed beneath the
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de ta ils  o f the raw data. In the case of SURVEYS(A) th is  was the 
square root whereas log to the base ten was superior fo r SURVEYS(B) 
and SURVEYS. The corre la tion  between these three variables in shown 
in table C-9. The Spearman rank corre la tion  between SURVEYS(A) and 
SURVEYS(B) is negative ind icating a lack of consistency in survey 
commissioning by companies over time.
The investor re la tions a c t iv ity  index (ACTIVITY) was calculated by 
taking each investor re la tions a c t iv ity  of the company and scoring 
them from 3 i f  they were considered of 'high importance' to 2 i f  of 
'moderate importance' and 1 i f  of 'minor importance' (table C-22). I t  
was found that ACTIVITY was normally d is trib u te d . Since the level of 
measurement achieved fo r th is  variable is ordinal rather than in terva l 
the appropriateness of parametric s ta t is t ic a l tests was considered at 
the subsequent testing  stage. The ind iv idua l components of ACTIVITY, 
that is , the importance o f the fiv e  lis te d  methods o f communicating 
with analysts, were also investigated.
In addition to the four continuous measures of e f fo r t  devoted to 
investor re la tions there was one categorical measure i.e . whether or 
not any surveys of C ity opinion had been commissioned (SURVEYS(Y/N)). 
Out of 325 non-anonymous respondents 136 had had surveys carried out 
at some time in the past. Companies which had not done so were 
presumably less concerned with th e ir  image in the C ity than those who 
had.
In order to te s t the hypotheses univariate analysis was f i r s t  carried 
out between the collected data and the independent variables. Testing 
was carried out via the nu ll hypotheses, o f no association, HI to H9 
set out in chapter 7. Tests used included ca lcu la tion o f the 
significance of the Pearson and Spearman corre lations when both 
variables were continuous. Two-tail tests o f significance were used 
here as the a lte rna tive  hypotheses set out in chapter 7 did not 
specify a d irec tion  fo r the re la tionsh ip  between the variables. The 
Kruskal-Wallis tes t was used when one variable was continuous and the 
other categorical. The chi-square s ta t is t ic  was calculated when both 
variables were categorical or o rd ina l.
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10.4.2 Whether or not the company had commissioned surveys 
(SURVEYS(Y/N))
The data item SURVEYS(Y/N) can be treated as a categorical measure 
indicating e ffo r t  devoted to investor re la tions . The hypotheses 
proposed in chapter seven and tested previously in chapter nine 
against variables re la ting  to organisation o f investor re la tions w il l  
now be considered. The hypotheses were tested using the Kruskal- 
Wallis tes t (table C-8) fo r  the continuous independent variables and 
the chi-square tes t fo r  the categorical independent variables (table 
C-7).
On viewing table C-8 i t  can be seen that larger companies were more 
lik e ly  to have commissioned surveys than smaller ones. The nu ll 
hypothesis HI can therefore be rejected at the 0.000 level of 
confidence.
S im ila rly  companies with more marketable shares as measured by 
LISTINGS and TRADFREQ were more lik e ly  to have commissioned surveys at 
the .000 level of confidence. This lends support to re jec tion  of the 
nu ll hypothesis H2. In addition, the resu lts  fo r  the categorical 
measures of m arketability were s ig n ifica n t at the .001 level (table C- 
7).
In respect of r is k , the tes t fo r BETA was not s ig n ifica n t but
companies with lower v a r ia b il ity  (p = 0.012) and spec ific  r is k  (p =
0.000) were more lik e ly  to have commissioned surveys. There is thus 
some support fo r re jection  of the nu ll hypothesis H3.
P ro f ita b il ity  measures provided mixed results  although a lower trading 
p ro f it  and pre tax p ro f it  margin were associated w ith commissioning of
surveys (p = 0.005). Tests on return on cap ita l employed and
shareholders' capita l were not s ig n ifica n t. The nu ll hypothesis H4 
cannot be rejected in respect of th is  variable.
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In respect o f hypothesis H5, both higher cap ita l gearing and borrowing 
ra tio  were s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with SURVEYS(Y/N) at the .046 and 
.008 level but income gearing was not s ig n ifica n t.
The tes t on takeover a c t iv ity  was not s ig n ifica n t and so nu ll 
hypothesis H6 cannot be rejected.
The number of shares held by insiders was higher fo r companies that 
had no surveys (p = 0.003). The nu ll hypothesis H7 can therefore be 
rejected. S im ila rly  companies with more substantial shareholders were 
less l ik e ly  (p = 0.000) to have had surveys and the nu ll hypothesis H8 
can be rejected.
The tes t on the line  of business was not s ig n ifica n t so the nu ll 
hypothesis H9 could not be rejected.
In concluding th is  section i t  appears that companies tha t had 
commissioned surveys of C ity opinion were larger (HI) with more 
marketable shares (H2). They were less r isky  (H3) and more highly 
geared (H5). They had fewer shares held by insiders and substantial 
shareholders (H7 & 8). The nu ll hypotheses H4 (p ro f i ta b i l i ty ) ,  H6 
(takeover a c t iv ity )  and H9 ( lin e  of business) could not be rejected.
10.4.3 The number o f surveys commissioned (SURVEYS(A), SURVEYS(B) AND 
SURVEYS)
The previous section dealt with a categorical variable, whether 
surveys had been commissioned or not. This section considers the 
actual number of surveys which provides at least an ordinal measure of 
e ffo r t  devoted to investor re la tions . The corre la tions between these 
variables and the continuous independent variables are shown in tables 
C - ll and C-12. The association with the categorical independent 
variables is shown in tables to C-13 to C-15.
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Since SURVEYS is equal to the sum of SURVEYS(A) and SURVEYS(B) the 
three variables w i l l  be dealt with together in th is  discussion of 
hypothesis tes ting .
In respect of hypothesis HI both SURVEYS(A) and SURVEYS were 
s ig n if ic a n tly  p o s itive ly  correlated with company size at the .01 level 
fo r  the Spearman co rre la tion . SURVEYS(B) did not however provide a 
s ig n ifica n t re su lt. Overall there does appear to be an association 
between company size and surveys of C ity opinion. The nu ll hypothesis 
HI can therefore be rejected.
The m arketab ility  of shares overseas (LISTINGS) was s ig n if ic a n tly  
p o s itive ly  correlated with SURVEYS(A) at the .05 level and with 
SURVEYS at the .01 leve l. SURVEYS(B) however did not provide a 
s ig n ifica n t re s u lt. Trading frequency (TRADFREQ) and its  categorical 
versions (TFCAT and ALPHA) did not y ie ld  s ig n ifica n t associations.
The nu ll hypothesis H2 can be rejected in respect o f overseas 
m arketab ility  but not in the case of measures of m arketab ility  in the 
UK.
In testing  hypothesis H3 i t  was found that the Spearman corre la tion 
fo r  BETA was not s ig n ifica n t but tha t v a r ia b il i ty  and specific  r is k  
were s ig n if ic a n tly  negatively correlated with SURVEYS(A) only 
(s ig n ifica n t at the .01 le ve l).
P ro f ita b il i ty  was s ig n if ic a n tly  p o s itive ly  associated with SURVEYS(A) 
at the .01 level fo r  trading p ro f it  margin and pre-tax p ro f it  margin 
and at the .05 level fo r  return on shareholders' ca p ita l. However 
SURVEYS(B) was negatively associated with return on shareholders' 
cap ita l (s ig n ific a n t at the .05 le ve l). There were no s ig n ifica n t 
results  fo r  SURVEYS. Rejection of the nu ll hypothesis H4 receives 
some support in respect of recent surveys (SURVEYS(A)) but overall the 
nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
I t  was found tha t SURVEYS(A) and SURVEYS were s ig n if ic a n tly  negatively 
correlated with TOTSSH and N00FSSH when using Spearman's rank 
co rre la tion . This was not the case fo r  SURVEYS(B). There is thus 
some support fo r  re jec tion  of nu ll hypothesis H8 in tha t companies
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with more substantial shareholdings seem less lik e ly  to have 
commissioned surveys.
The tests carried out indicate that nu ll hypotheses H5 (gearing), H6 
(takeover a c t iv ity ) ,  H7 (ins ide r shareholdings) and H9 ( in d u s tr ia l 
c la ss ifica tio n ) cannot be rejected.
In concluding th is  section i t  appears tha t recent surveys (SURVEYS(A)) 
yielded more in the way of s ig n ifica n t resu lts  than SURVEYS(B) and 
to ta l surveys (SURVEYS). This is rather d i f f ic u l t  to explain. There 
is no reason to believe that the 12 months p r io r to th is  survey should 
be d iffe re n t from the four years p rio r to tha t in terms of 
commissioning surveys. I t  may be that the answers fo r  SURVEYS(A) are 
more accurate due to the shorter time lapse. Bearing th is  in mind i t  
appears that larger, less r isky  and more p ro fitab le  companies with 
fewer substantial shareholders were more l ik e ly  to have commissioned 
C ity opinion surveys in the 12 months p rio r to the survey.
10.4.4 The index of investor relations activ ity  (ACTIVITY)
The index of investor re la tions a c t iv ity  (ACTIVITY) was obtained by 
summing the various a c t iv it ie s  weighted according to th e ir  importance 
to the company. This ordinal measure of investor re la tions e ffo r t  was 
used to te s t the various hypotheses by ca lcu la ting the corre lations 
with the continuous independent variables (tables C-23 and C-24) and 
the Kruskal-Wallis te s t fo r  the categorical independent variables 
(table C-25).
The index (ACTIVITY) was p o s itive ly  correlated with company size (HI) 
and th is  was s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l, so larger companies tended 
to carry out more a c t iv it ie s  and view them as more important than 
smaller ones.
In respect of m arketab ility  (H2), both overseas l is t in g  (LISTINGS) and 
trading frequency (TRADFREQ) were s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r the 
Spearman co rre la tion . The tes t on the categorical versions of the
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variable OSEALIST and TFCAT gave s ig n ifica n t results  too. Thus 
companies with more marketable shares tended to have a higher value 
fo r  ACTIVITY.
There was no apparent association between company r is k  (H3) or 
p r o f i ta b i l i t y  (H4) and the a c t iv ity  index.
Although the Pearson corre la tion  fo r  ACTIVITY and income gearing was 
s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level th is  was not the case fo r the Spearman 
corre la tion . There were no other s ig n ifica n t associations between 
gearing measures and ACTIVITY so the nu ll hypothesis H5 cannot be 
rejected.
Takeover a c t iv ity  (H6) and insider shareholdings (H7) were not 
s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with the a c t iv ity  index. The evidence fo r 
H8, substantial shareholdings, was inconclusive since the Pearson 
corre la tion  gave a s ig n ifica n t re su lt at the .05 leve l, whereas the 
Spearman did not. The Spearman is probably the safest resu lt here as 
a non-parametric tes t is more appropriate due to the level of 
measurement of ACTIVITY. F in a lly , the indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  was 
not s ig n ifica n t and the nu ll hypothesis H9 cannot be rejected.
In concluding th is  section i t  appears that company size and 
m arketab ility  of shares were p o s itive ly  associated with the a c t iv ity  
index.
10.4.5 Importance of the individual investor relations activities  
(GENERAL, SPECIAL, TELEPHONE, FEEDBACK and MAILING)
The answers to the individual questions which had been used to build 
up the a c t iv ity  index were then investigated. Kruskal-Wallis tests of 
association were then carried out to investigate association between 
the importance of the various IR a c t iv it ie s  and the continuous 
independent variables (tables C-31 to C-35). Chi-square tests were 
carried out to see i f  there were any s ig n ifica n t differences at least
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at the .05 level between the importance of the IR a c t iv it ie s  and the 
categorical independent variables (tables C-25 to C-29).
The f i r s t  variable considered in th is  section is the importance of 
holding general meetings (GENERAL) which is rated from 2 (not done (1) 
combined with minor importance (2)) to 3 (moderate importance) to 4 
(high importance).
Examining table C-31 i t  appears that companies with a higher trading 
p ro f it  margin (711TPM), and income gearing (732IGEAR) rated general 
meetings as being of minor importance. There were no other 
s ig n ifica n t resu lts . In the case of GENERAL and the categorical 
variables there was a s ig n ifica n t re su lt fo r ind us tria l c la ss ifica tio n  
only. Financials were more lik e ly  to rate these as not done or of 
minor importance than the other groups (table C-26).
For the ra ting  of meetings fo r individuals or small groups from the 
same organisation (SPECIAL), results  of the testing  are shown in 
tables C-32 and C-27.
Companies with high trading frequency (TRADFREQ and TFCAT) tend to 
rate special meetings as of high importance. A dd itiona lly , high 
income gearing (732IGEAR) was associated with a moderate or high 
importance fo r special meetings and high cap ita l gearing (731CGEAR) 
and borrowing ra tio  (733BR) companies tended to rate special meetings 
as being of high importance. There were no other s ig n ifica n t 
re lationships at the .05 leve l.
The importance of answering telephone queries (TELEPHONE) from 
analysts was s ig n if ic a n tly  higher fo r  large companies (AV(MV)) with 
overseas lis t in g s  (LISTINGS and OSEALIST) and higher trading frequency 
(TRADFREQ and TFCAT). Companies with both a larger to ta l percentage 
(TOTSSH) and number of substantial shareholdings (NOOFSSH) were more 
lik e ly  to view telephone queries as of minor importance (table C-33 
and C-28). The there were no other s ig n ifica n t re la tionships fo r the 
variable (TELEPHONE).
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Table 10-1 Summarised results  of tests on importance of IR a c t iv it ie s  
and the company spec ific  independent continuous variables
ACTIVITY GENERAL SPECIAL
SIZE
AV(MV) **
MARKETABILITY
LISTING **
TRADFREQ ** *
RISK
BETA
VARIABILITY
SPECRISK
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE
711TPM *
716PTPM
703ROSC
GEARING
731CG **
732IG * *
733BR **
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER
SHAREHOLDER
DETAILS
BFA%
TOTSSH
NOSSH *
INDUSTRIAL CLASS
4WAYINDC **
KEY:
**  = Kruskal-Wallis te s t or Spearman rank corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at 
the .01 level
* = Kruskal-Wallis te s t or Spearman rank corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at 
the .05 level
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Providing feedback (FEEDBACK) on analysts' reports was s ig n if ic a n tly  
more important fo r  smaller companies. Companies with high trading 
frequency tended to view th is  a c t iv ity  as of moderate importance 
whereas high v a r ia b il i ty  and specific  r is k  companies were more lik e ly  
to rank i t  as highly important. Companies w ith a greater proportion 
of shares held by board fam ily and associates (BFA%) ranked provision 
of feedback as h igh ly important s ig n if ic a n tly  more often (table C-34 
and C-29). There were no s ig n ifica n t associations between 
p r o f i ta b i l i t y ,  gearing, takeover a c t iv ity ,  substantial shareholdings 
and the variable FEEDBACK.
There were three s ig n ifica n t resu lts  fo r the tests of association 
between the importance of mailing information to analysts (MAILING) 
and the independent variables (tab le C-35 and C-30). Larger companies 
with more lis t in g s  were more l ik e ly  to  rank th is  a c t iv ity  as 
moderately important. Companies with fewer substantial shareholders 
(NOOFSSH) were more lik e ly  to rank mailings as of moderate importance. 
There were no other s ig n ifica n t associations using th is  variable.
In concluding th is  section i t  appears that the variables representing 
the importance of the f iv e  investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  do not give 
consistent resu lts . The rankings provided by the respondents are of 
course subjective and do not necessarily provide an objective measure 
of the importance to the company. Combining the resu lts  o f th is  
section w ith the resu lts  fo r  the ACTIVITY index there appears to be 
support fo r  re jec tion  o f nu ll hypothesis HI (s ize) fo r  four out o f six 
of the variables and fo r  re jec tion  of nu ll hypothesis H2 
(m arke tab ility ) fo r  f iv e  out o f s ix o f the variables. This summary is 
shown in table 10-1.
10.5 M u ltiva ria te  analysis of data on assessment of the investor 
re la tion  function
In addition to the univariate tests of association i t  was decided to 
carry out m u ltiva ria te  analysis of the dependent variables, 
SURVEYS(A), SURVEYS(B), SURVEYS and ACTIVITY. The Minitab stepwise
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Table 10-1 (continued) Summarised results of tests on importance of 
IR a c t iv it ie s  and the company specific  independent continuous 
variables
TELEPHONE FEEDBACK MAILING
SIZE
AV(MV) * * **
MARKETABILITY
LISTING * *
TRADFREQ ** *
RISK
BETA
VARIABILITY **
SPECRISK **
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE
711TPM
716PTPM
703R0SC
GEARING
731CG
732IG
733BR
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER
SHAREHOLDER
DETAILS
BFA% **
TOTSSH *
NOOFSSH* **
INDUSTRIAL CLASS
4WAYINDC
KEY:
**  = Kruskal-Wallis or Spearman rank corre lation s ig n ifican t at the 
.01 level
* = Kruskal-Wallis or Spearman rank corre lation s ign ifica n t at the .05 
level
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regression routine was used with 17 predictor variables, LOGTAVMV, 
LOGLIST, LOGTRADFREQ, BETA, SQRTVAR, LOGTSRSK, 707ROCE, 711TPM, 
716PTPM, 703ROSC, 731CGEAR, SQRTIG, SQRTBR, LOGTAKEO, NEGRBFA%, 
SQRTOTSH and NOOFSSH. The transformed version of the predictor 
variables was used where appropriate. The routines were also run 
using raw data but better results were obtained with the transformed 
independent variables. On comparing the resu lts  using the transformed 
dependent variables and the raw data fo r  the dependent variables i t  
was found that the transformed version gave better resu lts  and these 
are reported here. Variables were entered in the equation i f  the F- 
s ta t is t ic  was greater than 4, the default value set by Minitab which 
is approximately equivalent to a significance level of .05. Once 
useful variables had been iden tified  using the stepwise routine, 
m ultip le regression was carried out to obtain more d e ta il.
In respect of the number of surveys in the past twelve months 
(SURVEYS(A)) the variables entering the equation were LOGLIST,
716PTPM, 707R0CE and 731CGEAR (table C-36). I t  was decided to 
investigate which variables would enter the regression equations next 
i f  the required significance level was reduced in the Minitab stepwise 
regression routine. On reducing the F -s ta t is t ic  from the default 
value o f four to two, variables can enter the equation i f  the t -  
s ta t is t ic ,  which is the square root of the F -s ta t is t ic , is 1.4 rather 
than 2. One fu rthe r variable, LOGTRADF entered the equation (tab le C- 
40). Repeating the exercise fo r SURVEYS(B) i t  was found tha t no 
variables entered the equation. On reducing the F-value to 2, one 
variable LOGLIST entered the equation (tab le C-41). For the to ta l 
SURVEYS only LOGLIST entered the equation even when the F-value was 
reduced to 2. For the a c t iv ity  index (ACTIVITY) only LOGTRADF and 
SQRTIG entered the equation fo r both F-values (tab le C-39).
On examining the R-square achieved from running the stepwise and the 
subsequent m ultip le  regression routines i t  appears tha t SURVEYS(A) is 
the variable tha t can best be explained by the regression model. (The 
R-square is  16.4% and R-sq(adjusted fo r  t ie s )  = 13.7%.) I t  was 
decided, fo r th is  variable only, to carry out a m ultip le  regression 
using a l l  seventeen predictor variables plus the dummy variables fo r 
industria l c la ss ifica tio n . The results are shown in table C-42. The
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Table 10-2 S ian ifican t results fo r tests of data on assessment and
execution of investor re la tions with company specific  independent
variables.
SURVEYS(A) SURVEYS(B) SURVEYS ACTIVITY
SIZE
AV(MV) ** **  **
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS
TRADFREQ
*A
B
B **
**A
RISK
BETA
VARIABILITY
SPECRISK
**
** *
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE
711TPM
716PTPM
703ROSC
A
**
**A
*
*
GEARING
731CG
732IG
733BR
A
A
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA%
T0TSSH
NOOFSSH
**
**
**
**  *
KEY:
**  = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at at least the 0.01 level 
(two t a i l  tes t)
* = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ig n ifican t at the 0.05 level (two t a i l  
te s t)
A = enters into regression equation when c r i t ic a l F value is 4 
B = enters into regression equation when c r i t ic a l F value is 2.
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R-sq(adjusted fo r tie s ) was only 12.8%. A p a rtia l F-test showed that 
addition of the dummy variables was not s ig n ifica n t at the .05 leve l.
The results of the stepwise regressions were compared with the results 
of the univariate analysis (table 10-2). The results  of the two sets 
of tests were not to ta lly  consistent. In p a rticu la r, company size 
(HI) did not enter in to the regression equations fo r the four 
variables. The lin k  between m arketab ility  (H2) and the variables was 
fa ir ly  clear fo r  both sets of tests . The univariate and m ultivaria te  
analysis confirmed a positive  association between p ro f i ta b i l i ty  (H4) 
and SURVEYS(A). This could indicate tha t companies de libera te ly  time 
surveys to be held when they are doing w e ll. There was no clear 
support fo r re jection  of the remaining nu ll hypotheses H3 H5 H6 H7 and 
H8 in respect of the four variables considered in table 10-2.
The continuous dependent variables used in th is  chapter, SURVEYS(A), 
SURVEYS(B), SURVEYS and ACTIVITY have yielded rather d iffe re n t results  
to those used in chapter nine, INDEX, DIRDAY, BUDGET and COSTS. This 
is not unexpected because they are d iffe re n t variables achieving 
d iffe re n t levels of measurement.
10.6 Conclusions
This chapter has set out the results  of parts two and three of the 
questionnaire providing an overview of how companies assess the 
contribution of the investor re la tions programme, what methods 
companies use to communicate with analysts and the re la tive  perceived 
importance of those methods. Tests of association were performed in 
order to test the hypotheses set out in chapter seven. Questionnaire 
answers were compared with the explanatory or independent variables.
Overall, i t  was found that those companies which had commissioned 
surveys of C ity opinion were larger w ith more marketable shares than 
those who had not. They had lower spec ific  r is k  and v a r ia b il i ty  of 
equity and were more highly geared with fewer shares held by insiders 
and substantial shareholders. The number of surveys commissioned in
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the past twelve months varied from a low of zero up to s ix . Companies 
that were more p ro fitab le  with more marketable shares appeared to have 
commissioned more surveys.
The perceived importance of the f iv e  types of investor re la tions 
a c t iv it ie s  was investigated. Categorising respondents according to 
the perceived importance and testing fo r  associations with the 
independent variables showed no clear pattern of support fo r  the nine 
hypotheses. An a c t iv ity  index was then constructed and i t  was found 
that larger companies with more marketable shares had a higher 
a c t iv ity  index score.
The next chapter w i l l  consider the detailed resu lts  on company 
meetings with analysts and fund managers. A number o f new variables 
derived from th is  data w i l l  be tested against the nine hypotheses.
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Table 11-1 Attendance bv company o f f ic ia ls  at meetings with analysts 
and fund managers
YES NO N/A
Non-executive chairman 71 66 197
Chief executive 280 10 44
Managing d irecto r 120 9 205
Finance d irecto r 320 7 7
Marketing d irec to r 28 37 269
Company secretary 47 267 20
Chief Accountant 33 192 109
Investor re la tions o ff ic e r 91 17 226
Head of public re la tions 71 61 202
External financ ia l public 
re la tions consultant 104 161 69
N=334
.....
Note: Most respondents (245) had e ither a Chief Executive or a 
Managing D irector. 88 respondents had both.
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Chapter 11 Company meetings with Analysts and Fund Managers: Results
and Analysis
11.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the results of section four of the postal 
questionnaire survey (appendix A). This section re lates to meetings 
fo r analysts and fund managers. Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  are set out 
and the data obtained is then used to tes t the hypotheses proposed in 
chapter seven. The detailed tables of results  are set out in appendix 
D. Conclusions are then drawn based on the resu lts  of the s ta t is t ic a l 
analysis.
11.2 Results of questionnaire survey section 4 : Company meetings 
with analysts and fund managers.
11.2.1 Organisation of meetings for analysts and fund managers
Out of 337 respondents 334 stated that they held meetings fo r  analysts 
and fund managers. Companies were then asked which company o f f ic ia ls  
attended some or a l l  or these meetings. Ten o f f ic ia ls  were specified 
and respondents were able to add up to three other names. The Finance 
Director was the company o f f ic ia l  mentioned most frequently by 
companies as attending meetings. The high level of attendance of 
Chief Executives and Managing Directors indicates the importance that 
companies attach to communications with analysts (tab le 11-1 and 
tables D-l to D-10).
Respondents were asked whether they kept a record of the proceedings 
of meetings with analysts and fund managers. In the case of general 
meetings ( fo r groups of delegates from a number of d iffe re n t employing 
organisations) the m ajority of companies kept records, but fo r  special 
meetings (with individuals or small groups from one organisation) 
barely ha lf kept records (tables D - ll and D-12).
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11.2.2 Number of meetings held by companies in the past twelve months 
and size of analyst following
Respondents were then asked fo r de ta ils  of how many meetings they had 
held in the past 12 months. Answers here showed a wide va ria tion  from 
0 to 50 (median 4) fo r  general meetings and from 0 to 125 (median 20) 
fo r special meetings (tables D-13 and D-14).
Companies were then asked how many analysts and fund managers were on 
the c ircu la tion  l i s t  fo r in v ita tio n  to meetings. There was a wide 
varia tion again here. From 0 to 120 (median 20) fo r  se ll-s id e  
analysts and from 0 to 700 (median 30) fo r  buy-side analysts and fund 
managers (tables D-15 and D-16).
Since analysts do not attend a l l  the meetings to which they are 
invited i t  was also considered relevant to ask how many analysts had 
actually attended meetings in the past twelve months. The median 
number of se ll-s ide  analysts attending meetings was 20 and fo r  buy- 
side analysts and fund managers i t  was 25. The results  were quite 
sim ilar to the number on the in v ita tio n  l i s t ,  ind icating that 
companies were achieving a good attendance at th e ir  meetings (tables 
D-17 and D-18).
An additional measure of the in te rest shown by the C ity in a company 
is the number of stockbroking firms and in s titu t io n a l investor 
organisations that have sent representatives to the company meetings. 
I t  was found that the number varied from zero to 88 fo r  stockbrokers 
(median 15) and from zero to  250 fo r  in s titu tio n s  (median 20) (tables 
D-19 and D-20).
11.2.3 Provision of information on past performance and future 
prospects
I t  was considered important to attempt to discover what type of 
information is passed to analysts and fund managers at meetings. A 
l is t  of possible items was constructed on the basis o f a review of the 
lite ra tu re  and discussion with p rac titione rs  at the p ilo t  stage.
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Table 11-2 Importance of disclosure of information on past 
performance at meetings with analysts and fund managers.
MEAN STDEV RANK
Explanation of recent results 
in the context of the general 
economic environment
3.7 0.7 1
Explanation of 
structure of balance 
sheet and gearing
3.3 0.9 2
Explanation of accounting 
po lic ies
2.7 0.9 3
Additional breakdown of 
published figures by 
line  of business
2.6 1.3 4
Performance of recent 
acquisitions
2.6 1.4 5
Additional breakdown of 
published figures by 
geographical area
2.0 1.3 6
Outcome of completed 
research and 
development projects
1.3 1.3 7
Note:
Ranking scale 4 = High importance, 3 = Moderate importance, 2 = Minor 
importance, 1 = Not at a l l ,  0 = not applicable
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Summary tables 11-2 and 11-3 and deta iled tables D-21 to D-47 re la te  
to the question which asked respondents what type of information the 
company provides to delegates at meetings. The f i r s t  seven items 
lis te d  were concerned with past performance. Twenty items re la ting  to 
future prospects were then lis te d . Due to the sensitive nature of 
th is  type of announcement the questionnaire added the r id e r 'subject 
i f  necessary to p rio r announcement to the London Stock Exchange'. 
Respondents were requested to indicate the re la tive  importance of the 
disclosures. The scale ranged from 0 fo r  not applicable, 1 fo r not at 
a l l ,  2 fo r minor importance, 3 fo r moderate importance to 4 fo r high 
importance.
Out of the seven items on past performance an explanation of recent 
results in the context of the general economic environment was ranked 
overall as most important. This was followed by an explanation of the 
structure of the balance sheet and gearing. Of least importance was 
the outcome of completed research and development projects which was 
stated to be not applicable by 133 of respondents.
There were twenty items re la ting  to fu tu re  prospects lis te d  on the 
questionnaire. Respondents rated disclosure of information on company 
strategy in the long term and the short term as being most important. 
Least important was the f i r s t  announcement of new research and 
development projects, mainly because th is  was deemed to be not 
applicable by 149 respondents.
11.3 Results of hypothesis testing
11.3.1 Introduction
Eight continuous measures of e ffo r t  devoted to investor re la tions were 
obtained from the data and used fo r hypothesis tes ting . (Anonymous 
responses were deleted leaving 325 respondents.) These were the 
number of general meetings in the past twelve months (GENERALS) and 
the number of special meetings (SPECIALS). The number of se ll-s ide  
analysts on the company's c ircu la tio n  l i s t  (LIST(A)) and the number of 
buy-side analysts and fund managers (L1STCB)). The number of s e ll-
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Table 11-3 Importance of disclosure of information on fu ture 
prospects at meetings with analysts and fund managers.
MEAN STDEV RANK
Company strategy 
in the long term
3.7 0.7 1
Company strategy 
in the short term
3.5 0.7 2
Company strategy 
fo r p a rticu la r segments 
of the business
3.4 1.0 3
Cash flow  s itua tion 3.3 0.9 4
Dividend policy 3.3 0.9 5
Company strategy on 
future acquisitions
3.1 1.1 6
Further explanation 
of major new projects 
and developments that 
have already been 
announced
3.0 2.0 7
Long term 
investment plans
2.9 1.2 8
F irs t announcement of 
major new projects and 
developments
2.8 1.3 9
Company strategy on 
future disposals of 
segments of the 
business
2.5 1.4 10
Further explanation 
of p ro fits  forecast that 
has already been made
2.1 1.6 11
F irs t announcement 
of p ro fits  forecast
2.0 1.6 12
F irs t announcement 
of new contracts
1.6 1.3 13
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side analysts attending meetings in the past twelve months 
(ANALYST(A)) and the number of buy-side analysts and fund managers 
(ANALYST(B)). The number of stockbroking firms represented at 
meetings in the past twelve months (FIRMS) and the number of 
in s titu tio n a l investor organisations (INVESTOR). These measures can 
be considered to give some idea of e f fo r t  devoted to investor 
re lations but also to the success of the company in a ttra c tin g  a 
following of analysts and fund managers. Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  are 
set out in table D-48.
The d is tr ib u tio n  of the variables was investigated fo r  normality and 
they were then transformed by taking the log to the base ten, the 
square root and the negative reciprocal. The corre la tion  te s t fo r  
normality provided by Minitab was used to  compare the various 
transformations with the raw data and the best transformation was 
selected fo r subsequent analysis where appropriate (tab le D-48).
The corre lation between the eight variables was calculated and is 
displayed in table D-49. In respect of the Spearman rank corre la tion  
the value of the coe ffic ien t ranged from a low of 0.194 to a high of 
0.821. A ll the eight measures re la te  to company meetings but each one 
covers a d iffe re n t aspect of the meetings programme and the varia tion  
in the corre lation is only to be expected.
The null hypotheses set out in chapter 7 were tested using univariate 
analysis. Tests used included the Pearson and Spearman corre la tion  
and the Kruskal-Wallis te s t. Subsequently m u ltiva ria te  analysis was 
performed and is discussed in the next section 11.4.
11.3.2 Data on meetings and analyst following
The eight variables extracted from the questionnaire responses were 
used to test the nine hypotheses. The co rre la tion  between the 
(dependent and continuous independent variables was calculated and the 
results  are shown in table D-50 fo r the Pearson and D-51 fo r  the 
Spearman rank corre la tion . The Kruskal-W allis tes t was used to tes t
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Table 11-3 (continued) Importance of disclosure of information on 
future prospects at meetings with analysts and fund managers.
MEAN STDEV RANK
Further explanation of 
new contracts that have 
already been announced
1.6 1.3 14
Current state of 
order book
1.5 1.5 15
Further explanation 
of new products that 
have already been 
announced
1.5 1.3 16
F irs t announcement 
of new products
1.4 1.4 17
Prospects of current 
research and development 
projects
1.1 1.2 18
Further explanation 
of new research and 
development projects that 
have already been announced
1.1 1.2 19
F irs t announcement of 
new research and 
development projects
0.9 1.1 20
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fo r association between the dependent variables and the categorical 
independent variables. The results are shown in tables D-51 to D-57.
Hypothesis HI is that there is no association between company size and 
the meetings variables. For both the Pearson and Spearman 
correlations the co e ffic ie n t was positive and s ig n ifica n t at at least 
the .01 level fo r a l l  eight measures of investor re la tions meetings. 
The null hypothesis can therefore be rejected and i t  appears that 
larger companies hold more meetings and have a larger fo llow ing of 
analysts and fund managers.
Hypothesis H2 is that there is no association between the 
m arketability of a company's shares and the meetings variables. 
World-wide m arketability  is represented by the number of lis tin g s  
outside the UK (LISTINGS). The eight variables were p o s itive ly  
correlated with LISTINGS and th is  was s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r 
both Pearson and Spearman rank corre lations. A dd itiona lly  the 
categorical version of the variable, whether or not a company had an 
overseas lis t in g  (OSEALIST), yielded a resu lt s ig n ifica n t at the 0.000 
level in the Kruskal-Wallis tests against the eight variables. The 
null hypothesis can therefore be rejected and i t  appears that overseas 
lis tin g s  by UK companies are associated with more meetings and a 
greater analyst fo llow ing.
In respect of m arketab ility  on the UK stock market the variable 
trading frequency (TRADFREQ) gave s ign ifican t (a t the .01 leve l) 
Spearman rank corre la tion  coeffic ien ts fo r a l l  eight variables. (The 
Pearson correlations were s ign ifican t at the .01 level fo r  seven out 
of eight of the variables, fo r the variable GENERALS i t  was not 
s ig n ifica n t.)  The companies with more frequently traded shares tended 
to have more meetings and a greater analyst fo llow ing . The 
categorical version of the variable (TFCAT) and whether or not the 
share was an alpha stock (ALPHA) also yielded s ig n ifica n t resu lts  in 
the Kruskal-Wallis tests against the eight variables. These were 
s ign ifican t at the 0.000 level fo r seven of the variables and at the 
0.005 and 0.035 fo r the variable GENERALS. Thus the n u ll hypothesis 
can be rejected. The companies with more marketable shares w ith in  the 
UK appeared to hold more meetings and have a larger analyst fo llow ing.
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter 11 232
Hypothesis H3 is that there is no association between stock market 
r is k  measures and the meetings variables. The variables used were the 
beta or market r is k  (BETA), the v a r ia b il i ty  (VARIAB) and the specific  
r is k  (SPECRISK). In respect of the BETA the Spearman rank corre la tion
was positive and s ign ifican t at the .01 level fo r LIST(A) and
ANALYST(A) and at the .05 level fo r LIST(B). The corre la tion  was not 
s ig n ifican t fo r the remaining five  variables related to meetings and 
analyst fo llow ing. The v a r ia b il ity  (VARIAB) was negatively correlated 
with the eight dependent variables. This was s ig n ifica n t at the .01 
level fo r ANALYST(A), ANALYST(B), FIRMS and INVESTORS and at the .05 
level fo r LIST(A) and LIST(B). Thus firm s with lower share price 
v a r ia b il ity  have a higher analyst fo llow ing. In terms of specific  
r is k  (SPECRISK) the Spearman rank corre la tion was negative and
s ign ifica n t at the .01 level fo r seven of the variables and at the .05
level fo r GENERALS. Firms with lower specific  r is k  tend to have more 
meetings and a higher analyst fo llow ing. The nu ll hypothesis can be 
rejected since there is a s ign ifican t association between the r is k  
measures and the dependent variables.
Hypothesis H4 is that there is no association between company
p ro f ita b i l i ty  and the meetings variables. Four measures of
p ro f i ta b i l i ty  were used and the Spearman corre la tion  between them and 
the eight dependent variables was found to be s ig n ifica n t at the .05 
level in only seven out of 32 cases. The corre la tion  was positive  in 
9 cases and negative in 23 cases. Overall there does not appear to be 
a s ign ifican t association between p ro f i ta b i l i ty  and number of meetings 
and analyst fo llow ing and the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis H5 is that there is no association between gearing and the
meetings variables. Three measures of gearing were used and 
correlated with the eight measures of meetings and analyst fo llow ing. 
In respect of the Spearman rank corre la tion the corre la tion  
coe ffic ien t was positive  in 23 cases and s ig n ifica n t at at least the 
.05 level in 16 out of 24 cases. There does appear to be some 
association between number of meetings and analyst fo llow ing and 
increasing gearing.
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Hypothesis H6 is that there is no association between recent takeover 
a c t iv ity  and the meetings variable. The corre lations yielded no 
support fo r re jec tion  of the nu ll hypothesis.
Hypothesis H7 is tha t there is no association between the level of 
insider shareholdings and the meetings variables. There was a 
negative Spearman rank corre la tion s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r 7 
out of 8 of the dependent variables and the percentage of shares held 
by insiders (BFA%). This lends support to re jec tion  of the nu ll 
hypothesis H7.
Hypothesis H8 is tha t there is no association between the level of 
substantial shareholdings and the meetings variables. In testing  th is  
hypothesis the to ta l percentage of substantial shareholdings was used 
(TOTSSH) and the number of substantial shareholdings (NOOFSSH). The 
eight variables were negatively correlated with TOTSSH and NOOFSSH.
The Spearman rank co e ffic ien t was s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r  13 
out of 16 of the tests and at the .05 level fo r  one te s t. The 
remaining two tests fo r  the variable GENERALS did not give a 
s ign ifican t re su lt. The categorical version o f the variable, whether 
or not there were any substantial shareholdings (SSH(Y/N), yielded 
mixed results in the Kruskal-Wallis tes t with 4 out of 8 tests being 
s ign ifican t at at least the .05 leve l. Overall i t  appears that there 
is some support fo r re jec tion  of nu ll hypothesis H8 in respect of 
investor re la tions meetings and substantial shareholdings.
Hypothesis H9 is that there is no association between company line  of 
business and the meetings variables. The Kruskal-Wallis te s t of 
4WAYINDC against the eight dependent variables showed that in seven 
cases there was no significance at the required level of .05 percent. 
In respect of the variable GENERALS the re su lt was s ig n ifica n t at the 
.01 level and 'o ther groups' held more general meetings than companies 
in the other three categories. In view of the overa ll resu lt the nu ll 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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Table 11-4 S ign ifican t results  fo r data on meetings and analyst 
fo llow ing with company specific  variables.
GENERALS SPECIALS L IS T (A ) L IS T (B )
SIZE
AV(MV) ** * *g **A **A
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS **A **A **A **A
TRADFREQ ** **A ** **
RISK
BETA **A *A
VARIAB B * *
SPECRISK * ** ** **
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE *B
711TPM
716PTPM * *
703R0SC
GEARING
731CGEAR ** *
732IGEAR * * A
733BR ** * *g *
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER
SHAREHOLDER
DETAILS
BFA% ** * *A **
TOTSSH ** g **A **
NOOFSSH *B **A **
KEY:
**  = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ign ifica n t at the .01 level (two t a i l  
tes t)
* = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ig n ifican t at the .05 level (two ta i l  
te s t)
A = Enters in to regression equation when c r i t ic a l F-value is 4
B = Enters into regression equation when c r it ic a l F-value is 2
GENERALS = Number of general meetings in past 12m
SPECIALS = Number of special meetings in past 12m
LIST(A) = Number of se ll-s id e  analysts on c ircu la tion  l i s t  
LIST(B) = Number of buy-side analysts on c ircu la tion  l i s t
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11.4 M ultivaria te  analysis of data on meetings and analyst fo llow ing.
In addition to the univariate tests of association m u ltiva ria te  
analysis was carried out fo r the eight dependent variables describing 
the number of meetings and the analyst fo llow ing . The Minitab 
stepwise regression command was used w ith 17 predictor variables, 
LOGTAVMV, LOGLIST, LOGTRADFREQ, BETA, SQRTVAR, LOGTSRSK, 707ROCE, 
711TPM, 716PTPM, 703ROSC, 731CGEAR, SQRTIG, SQRTBR, LOGTAKEO,
NEGRBFA%, SQRTOTSH and NOOFSSH. The routine was also run using the 
raw version of the predictor variables but better resu lts , in terms of 
achieved R-square, were obtained using the transformations. Variables 
were entered into the equation i f  the F -s ta t is t ic  was greater than 4, 
th is  is the default value set by M initab. When a variable is entered 
into the regression equation the F tes t is  carried out fo r  the 
hypothesis that the coe ffic ie n t of the entered variable is  0. The 
p robab ility  associated with an F s ta t is t ic  of 3.84 is approximately 
equivalent to 0.05 fo r large samples. Once useful variables had been 
iden tifie d  using the stepwise routine, m u ltip le  regression was carried 
out to obtain more de ta il (tables D-60 to  D-75). The R-square 
(adjusted) achieved was 16.3% fo r GENERALS, 20.2% fo r  SPECIALS, 44.4% 
fo r LIST(A), 19.8% fo r LIST(B), 44.5% fo r  ANALYST(A), 31.5% fo r 
ANALYST(B), 35.3% fo r FIRMS and 29.5% fo r  INVESTORS. The regression 
model appears to be better at predicting se ll-s id e  analyst fo llow ing 
as compared to buy-side analyst and fund manager fo llow ing.
The stepwise regression was repeated w ith the c r i t ic a l F value reduced 
from 4 to 2 in order to see which variables would be entered in to the
equation next and a m ultip le  regression was performed using the new
set of variables where th is  d iffe red  from the variables id e n tifie d  in 
the f i r s t  stepwise routine (tables D-67 to  D-81).
The results of the m ultip le  regressions were compared with the 
significance of the Spearman rank corre la tions between the eight 
dependent variables and the seventeen independent variables (table 11- 
4). Each hypothesis w i l l  now be considered in turn to id e n tify
s im ila r it ie s  between the univariate and the m u ltiva ria te  analysis.
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Table 11-4 (continued) S ign ifican t results fo r data on meetings and 
analyst fo llow ing with company specific  variables.
ANALYST(A) ANALYST(B) FIRMS INVESTORS
SIZE
AV(MV) **A **A **A **A
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS **A **A * * * *A
TRADFREQ * * * * * *A * *
RISK
BETA A
VARIAB * * * * * * * *
SPECRISK * * * * * *g * *
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE * *
711TPM B
716PTPM * *
703ROSC
GEARING
731CGEAR * * * *
732IGEAR * B * * B
733BR * * * * * * * *
TAKEOVER
ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER
SHAREHOLDER
DETAILS
BFA% * * g * * * * * *
TOTSSH * * g * * * * 3 * *
NOOFSSH * * g * *g * * * *
NOTE
**  = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ign ifican t at the .01 level (two ta i l  
tes t)
* = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ign ifican t at the .05 level (two t a i l  
tes t)
A = Enters in to  regression equation when c r it ic a l F-value is 4
B = Enters into regression equation when c r it ic a l F-value is 2
GENERALS = Number of general meetings in past 12m
SPECIALS = Number of special meetings in past 12m
LIST(A) = Number of se ll-s ide  analysts on c ircu la tion  l i s t  
LIST(B) = Number of buy-side analysts on c ircu la tion  l i s t
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For hypothesis HI (company size) the corre la tion  was s ig n ifica n t at 
the .01 level fo r a l l  eight variables and the company size variable 
entered into the regression equation fo r  six variables with F set at 4 
and add itiona lly  fo r SPECIALS with F set to 2. In only one case 
(GENERALS) did size not enter into the regression equation. Rejection 
of nu ll hypothesis HI is fu rther supported by the m ultiva ria te  
analysis.
In the case of m arketab ility  (H2) the number of overseas lis t in g s  was 
s ign ifican t in univariate analysis fo r a l l  e ight of the variables and 
entered into the regression equation fo r  seven out of e ight. The 
trading frequency was s ig n ifica n t fo r a l l  e ight variables but entered 
into the regression equation fo r only two of the variables. Thus fo r 
world wide m arketability  the m ultivaria te  analysis supports re jec tion  
of nu ll hypothesis H2 but the conclusion is less clear fo r  
m arketability w ith in  the UK.
Hypothesis H3 yielded somewhat d iffe r in g  resu lts  in the univariate and 
m ultivaria te analysis. In respect of BETA the agreement was quite 
good, as fo r the three s ign ifican t corre lations the variables also 
entered into the regression equation. For v a r ia b il i ty  (VARIAB) there 
were six s ig n ifica n t correlations but VARIAB did not enter in to  the 
regression equation fo r any of the six variables. For specific  r is k  
(SPECRISK) there were eight s ign ifica n t corre lations but fo r  only one 
variable (FIRMS) did SPECRISK enter into the regression equation and 
only when the F value was reduced to 2 from the default of 4.
The univariate analysis had provided l i t t l e  support fo r  re jec tion  of 
nu ll hypothesis H4 (p ro f ita b il i ty )  and the m u ltiva ria te  analysis was 
sim ilar leading to the conclusion that the nu ll hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.
In respect of gearing (H5) the univariate analysis had yielded some 
support fo r  re jection  of the nu ll hypothesis, with three gearing 
measures and eight dependent variables there were 16 out of a possible 
24 s ign ifican t corre la tions. The m ultip le  regression did not provide 
further confirmation . One gearing variable entered the regression 
equation fo r four of the dependent variables but in only one case did
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th is  correspond with a s ign ifican t corre la tion fo r that gearing 
variable. The link  between gearing and investor re la tions a c t iv ity  is 
not c lea rly  supported by the results of the m u ltiva ria te  analysis.
Rejection of nu ll hypothesis H6 (takeover a c t iv ity )  received no 
support from e ither the univariate or the m ultiva ria te  analysis.
Univariate analysis fo r  hypothesis H7 (shares held by insiders) gave 
s ign ifican t tes t results fo r six out of eight corre lations but the 
variable (BFA%) only entered into the regression equation fo r LIST(A) 
and ANALYST(B). I t  would appear that once the e ffe c t of size has been 
accounted fo r the level of insider shareholdings becomes less 
important in predicting investor re la tions a c t iv ity .
Rejection of nu ll hypothesis H8 (substantial shareholdings) had been 
quite strongly supported by the univariate analysis. For both TOTSSH 
and NOOFSSH there were seven out of eight s ig n ifica n t corre la tions.
The variable TOTSSH entered into the regression equation fo r four of 
the variables, SPECIALS, LIST(A), ANALYST(A) and FIRMS. The variable 
NOOFSSH entered into the regression equation fo r  SPECIALS, LIST(A), 
ANALYST(A) and ANALYST(B). On reviewing table 11-4 i t  can be seen 
that the m ultivaria te  analysis supports the univariate analysis fo r 
hypothesis H8. There is one problem in that the corre la tions fo r  both 
TOTSSH and NOOFSSH are negative but in the regression equations the 
coeffic ien ts  fo r TOTSSH are negative and fo r NOOFSSH are positive .
The main conclusion aris ing from a comparison of the m u ltiva ria te  
analysis and the univariate analysis is that company size seems to be 
the most important variable in determining the number of meetings and 
the analyst fo llow ing. The number of overseas lis t in g s  is also 
important.
The variables used fo r analysis in th is  chapter were the number of 
meetings held (GENERALS and SPECIALS) and three measures of the size 
of the se ll-s ide  analyst follow ing (LIST(A), ANALYST(A), FIRMS) and 
buy-side analyst and fund manager fo llow ing (LIST(B), ANALYST(B), 
INVESTORS) of the company. Chapter 9 looked at variables associated 
with the organisation of the investor re la tions function and chapter
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10 analysed the number of surveys of C ity opinion. A ll the variables 
considered re la te  in some way to investor re la tions a c t iv ity .  The 
achieved R-square (adjusted) using the regression model was ju s t over 
40% fo r two out of eight of the dependent variables. This can be 
compared with the best R-square (adjusted) achieved previously of ju s t 
under 40% fo r the m ultip le  regression of the investor re la tions budget 
(BUDGET) in chapter nine.
11.5 Conclusions.
This chapter has set out the results of part four of the questionnaire 
which dealt with the general organisation of meetings and obtained 
deta ils of what information is disclosed to analysts at meetings. I t  
was notable that company finance d irectors, ch ie f executives and 
managing directors were greatly involved in the meetings. This 
indicates the high level of importance that companies attach to 
meetings with analysts and fund managers and the predominance of 
financia l information in the investor re la tions process. Company 
strategy in the long term and the short term were the two items of 
information that were ranked as the most important fo r  discussion in 
meetings with analysts and fund managers.
Data was collected to measure investor re la tions a c t iv ity  in the 
context of meetings. Hypotheses set out in chapter seven were tested 
by comparing data from the questionnaire with the explanatory or 
independent variables. Overall i t  was found tha t larger companies 
with more marketable shares had held more meetings and had a larger 
analyst fo llow ing.
The next chapter w il l  consider fu rthe r aspects o f the investor 
re lations programme, telephone conversations with analysts and fund 
managers, company feedback on analysts' reports and mailing 
information.
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Table 12-1 Company o f f ic ia ls  answering telephone ca lls  from analysts 
and fund managers
Yes No N/A
Non-executive chairman 24 111 197
Chief executive 206 83 43
Managing d irec to r 79 48 205
Finance d irec to r 302 24 6
Marketing d irec to r 12 53 267
Company Secretary 48 265 19
Chief Accountant 26 200 106
Investor re la tions o ff ic e r 91 17 224
Head of public re la tions 65 66 201
External financ ia l public 
re la tions consultant
80 183 69
N = 332
NOTE: Most respondents (245) had either a chief executive or a 
managing d ire c to r. 88 respondents had both.
i
’j
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Chapter' 12 238
Chapter 12 Telephone Conversations. Company Feedback on Analysts' 
Reports and Mailing Information: Results and Analysis
12.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the results of sections f iv e , six and seven of 
the questionnaire (see appendix A). Section fiv e  asked about company 
telephone conversations with analysts and fund managers. Section s ix  
of the questionnaire dealt with the extent to which companies are 
w illin g  to help analysts and give them guidance on th e ir  research 
output. Section seven of the questionnaire sought to discover whether 
companies mail information to analysts and what type of information is 
sent out. Descriptive s ta tis tic s  are set out and the data obtained is 
then used to te s t the hypotheses proposed in chapter seven. The 
detailed tables of results are set out in appendix E. Conclusions are 
then drawn based on the results of the s ta t is t ic a l analysis.
12.2 Results of questionnaire survey section f iv e : Telephone
conversations with analysts and fund managers.
I t  was established that 98.5% of respondents engaged in telephone 
conversations with se ll-s ide  analysts w h ils t 94.31% did so with buy- 
side analysts and fund managers (table E-l & E-2).
The next question sought to establish which company o f f ic ia ls  answer 
telephone enquiries. The Finance Director was mentioned most often 
here (302 times) although the Chief Executive (206 times) or Managing 
Director (79 times) was also frequently involved. Once again th is  
result indicates the importance that companies attach to communication 
with analysts and fund managers (tables E-3 to E-12). Where the 
respondent had a non-executive chairman i t  was found tha t in only 24 
cases out of 126 was the chairman involved in telephone conversations. 
Out of 65 companies with a marketing d irec to r, in only 28 cases did 
the th is  d irecto r speak to analysts on the telephone. Where there was 
an investor re la tions o ff ic e r and th is  post was held by a separate 
ind ividual, telephone ca lls  with analysts were made in 91 out of 108
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cases. For the 131 companies with a head of public re la tions , th is  
o f f ic ia l was involved in telephone conversations in 50% of cases. For 
80 respondents out of 263, the external financ ia l public re la tions 
consultant answered telephone queries.
Telephone conversations are re la tiv e ly  private compared to meetings 
and there may be a greater r is k  of the company o f f ic ia ls  passing on 
price sensitive inside information. Respondents were asked whether a 
record was kept of telephone conversations. None of the respondents 
made tape recordings of telephone conversations. A s ig n ifica n t 
m inority (45.05%) did, however, keep a w ritten  record (tables E-12 &
E-13). Sixteen companies stated that no record was made in some cases 
but that in others i t  was. This indicates that only some, but not 
a l l ,  telephone conversations were deemed important enough fo r  a 
w ritten record to be made of them.
Analysts and fund managers who attend a company investor re la tions 
meeting may be invited to telephone the company la te r i f  they have any 
subsequent queries. Some analysts may decline to ask certa in 
questions at general meetings to prevent other competing analysts 
hearing the answer. These results show that telephone conversations 
are widespread and an important part of the investor re la tions 
programme.
12.3 Results of questionnaire survey section s ix : Company feedback
on se ll-s ide  analysts' reports.
This section of the questionnaire dealt with the extent to which 
companies are w illin g  to help analysts and give them guidance on th e ir  
research output.
Some companies are the subject of greater a ttention from analysts than 
others. Table E-15 shows that the number of analysts' reports 
produced varied widely from 0 to 350 in a 12 month period. The mean 
value was 22.3 and the median was 12. Some, but not a l l ,  analysts' 
reports were passed to the company fo r comment as is shown in table E-
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16. The number varied from 0 to 50 with a mean of 9.3 and median of 
6. The reason why some reports are not passed to the company could be 
because of re s tra in t on the part of the analysts. Also certa in 
companies may favour some analysts and be less helpfu l to others.
The next question asked what action does the company take when i t  
receives a d ra ft analyst's report fo r comment or when an analyst 
telephones to discuss a d ra ft report. Four options were presented 
with space fo r companies to describe additional procedures.
Respondents were able to t ic k  as many actions as were applicable.
Only 3 respondents out of 336 stated that analysts' reports were never 
received. Only 1 respondent stated that feedback is never provided. 
The vast m ajority of companies (94%) did correct factual errors in 
analysts' reports. Just under ha lf (49%) offered comments on the 
accuracy of analysts' predictions (tables E-17 to E-20).
Respondents were then asked to specify company po licy when asked to 
comment on analysts' p ro f it  forecasts (table E-21). The m ajority 
(77%) stated that comments are made, 21% that comments are never made 
and 2% that the company is never asked fo r comments. The term p ro f it  
forecast in th is  question was more specific  than the term 'ana lysts ' 
predictions' used in the previous question which was intended to 
encompass general business prospects, fu ture strategy, share price 
movements and future accounting numbers. On examining the resu lts  i t  
is apparent that companies are more w ill in g  to comment on p ro f it  
forecasts than analysts' predictions.
Respondents then indicated company procedures in making comments on 
analysts' p ro f it  forecasts. The results  are shown in tables E-22 TO 
E-26. Only 66 out of 335 respondents ticked the box ind icating that 
comments were not made. The other respondents were presented with 5 
procedures plus space fo r describing th e ir  own po licy i f  d iffe re n t.
I f  a forecast is reasonable 71% stated they would make no comment 
whereas 24% would confirm th is  with the analyst. I f  a forecast is not 
reasonable only 4 out of 335 would make no comment. 44% stated that 
they would inform the analyst i f  a forecast is not reasonable and i t  
is p a rticu la rly  worth noting that 53% of companies provide analysts 
with guidance on the amount of error in th e ir  p ro f it  forecasts.
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Table 12-2 Types of information sent to analysts and/or fund managers
Yes No
Annual report 287 1
Interim  report 284 4
Company news service 
announcements
206 82
Information brochures 131 155
General press releases 161 127
Takeover documents 130 158
Documents designed fo r 
analysts
68 220
Quarterly reports 14 274
N = 288
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Although companies were invited to t ic k  as many options as were 
applicable there is some inconsistency in the answers and i t  appears 
that some companies have ticked only the most important option to them 
rather than a ll applicable options.
These results are important since they show the level of assistance 
offered to analysts with th e ir  forecasts and the d iffe re n t procedures 
adopted by companies. This arises from the unclear regulatory regime 
at the time of the survey. Mounting pressure fo r s t r ic te r  regulation 
and increased qua lity  of corporate governance may lead to a d iffe re n t 
set of practices in the near fu ture .
12.4 Results of Questionnaire survey: Mailing information to
analysts and fund managers.
Section seven of the survey instrument asked companies about the 
mailing of information to analysts and fund managers. There were 49 
respondents who did not do so and they omitted th is  part o f the 
questionnaire.
The number of organisations on the companies' mailing l is ts  is shown 
in tables E-29 to E-31. There was a wide varia tion from 1 to 200 fo r  
firms of stockbrokers with a mean of 27.3 and median of 20 and from 0 
to 4500 (mean 93.4 median 30) fo r in s titu t io n a l investor 
organisations. Companies, therefore, seem to have more in s titu tio n a l 
investors on th e ir mailing l is ts  than stockbrokers. This is probably 
because of the high importance of in s titu tio n s  in the UK stock market 
and the decline of individual shareholders. Some respondents also 
sent information to other organisations employing analysts but 168 out 
of 212 respondents who answered th is  question did not.
The next question asked what information is  sent to analysts and/or 
fund managers. Not surpris ing ly the annual report and the interim  
report were mentioned by most respondents (99%) (table 12-2 and tables 
E-32 to E-39). Most respondents (72%) semt out copies of stock 
exchange company news service announcements. Some companies also semt
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out general press releases (56%), information brochures (46%) and 
takeover documents (45%). Only 68 companies (23%) designed documents 
specially fo r analysts. Quarterly reports were only sent out by 5% of 
companies, th is  is because very few UK lis te d  companies produce these 
reports.
These results indicate that analysts and fund managers receive 
preferentia l treatment compared to individual shareholders who 
normally only receive the documents to which they are e n tit le d  by 
statute or regulation. There is a trend to o ffe r abridged accounts to 
shareholders in order to save money. An individual shareholder who is 
interested in fo llow ing a company does not have free or easy access to 
stock exchange company news service announcements.
Mailing information to analysts and fund managers is possibly the 
least costly a c t iv ity  in terms of s ta ff time and expense.
A dd itiona lly , companies can use mail shots to keep in touch with 
analysts from overseas who can only ra re ly  attend meetings. Referring 
back to chapter 10 section 4.5 and table C-21 i t  can be seen that 
th is  a c t iv ity  is viewed as being less important than meetings, 
telephone ca lls  and feedback provision.
12.5. Results of hypothesis testing
12.5.1 Introduction
Five continuous measures of e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions were 
obtained from the data and used fo r hypothesis tes ting . The section 
on company feedback on analysts' reports produced the number of s e ll-  
side analysts reports produced in the past twelve months as estimated 
by the respondent (REPORTS) and the number of analysts' reports passed 
to the company fo r comment in the past twelve months (COMMENT). The 
section on mailing information gave data on the number of stockbrokers 
on the company mailing l i s t  (BROKERS), the number of in s titu t io n a l 
investors (INSTINV) and other organisations employing analysts 
(OTHER). (The section on telephone conversations was used fo r
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descriptive s ta tis t ic s  only and not fo r hypothesis testing  as the 
questions were not so designed.) The d is tr ib u tio n  of each variable 
was investigated using the corre lation te s t fo r  normality provided by 
Minitab. A transformation was carried out fo r use in subsequent 
testing where appropriate (tables E-40 & E-57).
In addition to the continuous measures noted above there were two 
simple yes/no measures of e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions . These 
were whether or not the company mailed information to se ll-s id e  
analysts (MAILING(A)) and buy-side analysts and fund managers 
(MAILING(B)). Companies which mail information to analysts and fund 
managers are using resources so these variables provide an ordinal 
measure of investor re la tions a c tiv ity .
In order to tes t the hypotheses, univariate analysis was f i r s t  carried 
out between the collected data and the independent variables. The 325 
respondents who had iden tified  themselves were used and the twelve 
anonymous responses were omitted. The Pearson and Spearman 
correlations were used when both the variables were continuous and the 
Kruskal-Wallis tes t was used when one variable was continuous and the 
other categorical. The chi-square tes t was used when both variables 
were categorical or ord ina l.
M ultivariate analysis was carried out subsequently and w i l l  be dealt 
with in the next section (12.6).
12.5.2 The number of sell-side analysts' reports produced (REPORTS) 
and passed to the company for comment (COMMENT)
The number of reports (REPORTS) was provided by 265 respondents and 
the number received fo r comment (COMMENT) by 276 respondents. These 
variables are ind irec t measures of investor re la tions e f fo r t ,  i f  a 
company is successful in in teresting analysts i t  is  l ik e ly  tha t more 
reports w il l  be prepared. Tables E-41 and E-42 show the Pearson and 
Spearman correlations between REPORTS and COMMENT and the continuous 
independent variables. The Kruskal-Wallis tests of association
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between REPORTS and COMMENT and the categorical independent variables 
are shown in tables E-43 and E-44.
Company size (HI) was p os itive ly  correlated with REPORTS and COMMENT 
and th is  was s ig n ifican t at the .01 level fo r  the Pearson and the 
Spearman rank corre la tions. The nu ll hypothesis HI can therefore be 
rejected.
The m arketability  of shares (H2) was p o s itive ly  correlated with 
REPORTS and COMMENT fo r the number of overseas lis t in g s  (LISTINGS) and 
th is  was s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level fo r the Spearman and Pearson 
corre lations. The Kruskal-Wallis te s t was s ig n ifica n t at the 0.000 
level using the categorical version of the variable (0SEALIST). In 
respect of m arketab ility  w ith in  the UK the variable TRADFREQ was 
negatively correlated with REPORT and COMMENTS and th is  was 
s ign ifica n t at the .01 leve l. (A frequently traded share has a 
trading frequency of 0 s ign ify ing  tha t on average there is no period 
of time between trades.) The categorical version of the variable 
(TFCAT) gave a test resu lt that was s ig n ifica n t at the 0.000 level fo r 
both REPORT and COMMENT. The nu ll hypothesis H2 can therefore be 
rejected and i t  seems that companies with more marketable shares have 
more analysts' reports produced on them and receive more of these fo r 
comment.
Hypothesis H3 is that there is no association between stock market 
r isk  measures and the variables REPORT and COMMENT. On testing  there 
was no s ig n ifica n t association of REPORT with BETA but a negative 
corre la tion , s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l, with v a r ia b il i ty  (VARIAB) 
and specific  r is k  (SPECRISK). For COMMENT there was no association 
with BETA and the Spearman rank corre la tion  with v a r ia b il i ty  was not 
s ign ifican t although the Pearson corre la tion  was s ig n ifica n t at the 
.05 leve l. COMMENT was negatively correlated with specific  r is k  and 
th is  was s ign ifica n t at the .01 leve l. There is some support fo r 
re jection of nu ll hypothesis H3 since companies with lower v a r ia b il i ty  
and specific  r is k  appear to a ttra c t more analyst comment.
There was no association between p r o f i ta b i l i t y  (H4) and REPORT and 
COMMENT. Hypothesis H5 is that there is no association between
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gearing and the variables REPORT and COMMENT. REPORTS was p o s itive ly  
correlated with the borrowing ra tio  (733BR) and the Spearman rank 
corre lation was s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level but the other 
correlations using two other measures of gearing and COMMENT were not 
s ig n ifica n t. There was no s ig n ifica n t association between takeover 
a c t iv ity  (H6) and REPORT and COMMENT. The nu ll hypotheses cannot be 
rejected fo r H4, H5 and H6.
There was strong support fo r re jec tion  of nu ll hypotheses H7 and H8. 
The correlations between insider shareholdings (BFA%), substantial 
shareholdings (TOTSSH), number of substantial shareholdings (NOOFSSH) 
and the variables REPORT and COMMENT were negative and s ig n ifica n t at 
the .01 leve l. Companies with a greater percentage of shares held by 
insiders and substantial shareholders a ttra c t less in terest from 
analysts in the form of w ritten  reports.
F ina lly , the association between indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  (4WAYINDC) 
(H9) and REPORT and COMMENT was tested. The Kruskal-Wallis tests were 
not s ig n ifica n t and so the nu ll hypothesis cannot be rejected.
In concluding th is  section i t  appears that the number of analysts' 
reports both produced and passed to the company fo r  comment is not 
s ig n ifica n tly  associated with the independent variables fo r three of 
the hypotheses but tha t there are s ig n ifica n t re lationships in respect 
of hypotheses HI, H2, H3, H7 and H8. The larger, more marketable, 
less risky  companies with fewer shares held by insiders and 
substantial shareholders are analysed more and receive more requests 
fo r help with analysts' reports.
12.5.3 The mailing of information to sell-side analysts (MAILING(A)) 
and buy-side analysts and fund managers (MAILING(B)).
A m inority of companies stated that they did not mail information to 
se ll-s ide  analysts or buy-side analysts and fund managers. Whether or 
not a company did mail information was used as an ordinal measure of 
e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions . To te s t the various hypotheses,
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the Kruskal-Wallis tes t was used with the independent continuous 
variables (tables E-53 & E-54) and the chi-square te s t w ith the 
categorical independent variables (tables E-55 & E-56).
I t  was noted that larger companies were more l ik e ly  to mail 
information. This was s ign ifican t at the 0.000 level fo r MAILING(A) 
and the 0.001 level fo r MAILING(B). Rejection o f nu ll hypothesis HI 
receives support from these results .
In respect of overseas lis t in g s  (LISTING) the Kruskal-Wallis te s t was 
s ign ifica n t at the 0.022 level fo r MAILING(A) and at the 0.010 level 
fo r MAILING(B). Companies with overseas lis t in g  were more l ik e ly  to 
mail information. The chi-square tes t using the categorical version 
of the variable (0SEALIST) was s ign ifican t at the .05 level fo r 
MAILING(A) and the .02 level fo r MAILING(B). For trading frequency 
(TRADFREQ) in the UK i t  was noted that companies w ith more frequently 
traded shares were more lik e ly  to mail information (p = 0.000 fo r 
MAILING(A) and MAILING(B)). The chi-square tests were s ig n ifica n t at 
the 0.001 level fo r  the categorical version of the variable TFCAT. 
Rejection of nu ll hypothesis H2 is supported and i t  appears that 
companies with more marketable shares are more l ik e ly  to mail 
information to analysts and fund managers.
The value of beta, v a r ia b il ity  and specific  r is k  were not 
s ig n ifica n tly  associated with e ither MAILING(A) or MAILING(B) at the 
required level of .05. The nu ll hypothesis H3 cannot be rejected.
There was no support fo r re jection of nu ll hypothesis H4 
(p ro f ita b il i ty )  or H5 (gearing). The number of takeovers (H6), 
insider shareholdings (H7) and substantial shareholdings (H8) were not 
s ig n ifica n tly  associated with MAILING(A) or MAILING(B). Rejection of 
the line  of business hypothesis (H9) was not supported by the chi- 
square tests of MAILING(A), MAILING(B) and 4WAYINDC.
The hypothesis tests on categorical variables MAILING(A) and 
MAILING(B) have only yielded positive resu lts  fo r  HI and H2. Larger 
companies with more marketable shares are more l ik e ly  to mail 
information to analysts and fund managers.
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12.5.4 The size of the company's mailing l is t
The size of the company's mailing l i s t  was considered to be a possible 
useful variable fo r hypothesis tes ting . The number of stockbrokers 
(BROKERS), in s titu tio n a l investors (INSTINV) and other organisations 
employing analysts (OTHER) were used. These figures were provided by 
approximately 200 of the respondents fo r the three variables (table E- 
57).
The Pearson and Spearman rank corre lations between the variables and 
the independent continuous variables were calculated (tables E-58 & E- 
59). Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the variables and 
the independent categorical variables were carried out (tables E-60 to 
E-62).
On reviewing the overall results i t  was apparent tha t the variable 
OTHER had very few s ign ifica n t resu lts . Most respondents had answered 
th is  question with a zero and only 44 with a number. For th is  reason 
the subsequent analysis w i l l  concentrate on the variables BROKERS and 
INSTINV.
Rejection of nu ll hypothesis HI receives support at the .01 level fo r 
both variables fo r the Pearson and Spearman rank corre la tions. Larger 
companies tend to have larger mailing l is ts  and the nu ll hypothesis 
can be rejected.
Hypothesis H2 (m arketability) was examined and companies with more 
overseas lis tin g s  (LISTINGS) had s ig n if ic a n tly  larger mailing l is ts  (p 
= .01). Companies with more frequently traded shares (TRADFREQ) also 
had s ig n ific a n tly  larger mailing l is ts .  The tests on the categorical 
variables OSEALIST and TFCAT were also s ig n ifica n t at the 0.000 leve l. 
The nu ll hypothesis can therefore be rejected.
The Spearman rank corre la tion between BETA and BROKERS was positive  
and s ign ifican t at the .05 leve l. For INSTINV i t  was s ig n ifica n t at 
the .01 leve l. There was no association between v a r ia b il ity  and the
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size of the mailing l i s t .  The specific  r is k  was negatively 
correlation with BROKERS and INSTINV (s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l). 
So firms with a higher beta and lower specific  r is k  tended to have 
larger mailing l is ts  and re jection of nu ll hypothesis H3 is supported 
by the results .
There was no clear support fo r re jection  of nu ll hypothesis H4 
(p ro f ita b il i ty ) .  Although the Spearman rank corre la tion  between 
BROKERS and pre-tax p ro f it  margin was negative and s ig n ifica n t at the 
.05 level other results  were not s ig n ifica n t. The nu ll hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.
In respect of hypothesis H5 (gearing) the Spearman rank corre lations 
between BROKERS and cap ita l gearing (731CGEAR) and borrowing ra tio  
(733BR) were positive and s ign ifican t at the .01 leve l. There were no 
s ign ifican t results fo r  INSTINV or income gearing (732IGEAR). I t  
appears that companies with larger numbers of stockbrokers on th e ir  
mailing l i s t  appear to be more highly geared and re jection  of the nu ll 
hypothesis H5 is thus supported to a certa in  extent.
Recent takeover a c t iv ity  (H6) did not appear to be associated with 
size of mailing l is ts  fo r  the Spearman rank corre la tions although the 
Pearson corre lation between TAKEOVER and INSTINV was s ig n ifica n t at 
the .01 leve l. The nu ll hypothesis should not be rejected as the 
nonparametric tes t is more appropriate w ith the data used.
The percentage of insider shareholdings (BFA%) was negatively 
correlated with BROKERS and INSTINV and s ig n ifica n t at the .01 and the 
.05 level respectively fo r the Spearman rank co rre la tion . Rejection 
of nu ll hypothesis H7 is supported and companies with a higher 
proportion of shares held by insiders appear to have smaller mailing 
l is ts .
There was support fo r re jection  of nu ll hypothesis H8 as the Spearman 
rank correlations between BROKERS, INSTINV, the percentage held by 
substantial shareholders (TOTSSH) and the number of substantial 
shareholdings (NOOFSSH) were negative and s ig n ifica n t at the .01 
le ve l.
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Table 12-3 S ign ifican t resu lts  fo r data on analysts' reports and 
continuous independent variables
REPORTS COMMENT
SIZE
AV(MV) A** A **
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS A** **
TRADFREQ ** **
RISK
BETA
VARIAB **
SPECRISK ** **
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE
711TPM
716PTPM
703ROSC
GEARING
731CG B
732IG
733BR **
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER A
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% g ** **
TOTSSH g ** g * *
NOOFSSH ** **
KEY:
**  = Spearman rank co rre la tion  s ign ifican t at at least the 0.01 level 
(two t a i l  tes t)
* = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ign ifican t at the 0.05 level (two ta i l  
te s t)
A = enters into regression equation when c r it ic a l F value is 4 
B = enters into regression equation when c r it ic a l F value is 2
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Rejection of nu ll hypothesis H9 was not supported since the chi-square 
tests between BROKERS, INSTINV and industria l c la ss ifica tio n  
(4WAYINDV) were not s ign ifican t at the required level o f .05.
Overall there is strong support fo r re jection  of nu ll hypotheses HI, 
H2, H7 and H8. Larger companies with more marketable shares and fewer 
shares held by insiders and substantial shareholders have larger 
mailing l is ts  indicating a higher e ffo r t devoted to investor 
re la tions.
12.6 M ulitvaria te  analysis of data on analysts' reports and mailing 
lis ts
In addition to the univariate tests of association i t  was decided to 
carry out m ultivaria te  analysis of the dependent variables REPORTS, 
COMMENT, BROKERS AND INSTINV. The Minitab stepwise regression routine 
was run with the 17 predictor variables used in the previous chapters. 
The programme was run using both transformed versions of the variables 
and the raw data. The results of using the transformed version of the 
predictor variables are reported here. Variables were entered in to 
the regression equation i f  the F -s ta tis tic  was greater than 4, the 
default value set by Minitab which is approximately equivalent to a p 
value of .05. Once useful variables had been id e n tifie d  using the 
stepwise routine the m ultip le regression was carried out. The 
procedure was repeated reducing the F -s ta tis t ic  to 2 and redoing the 
m ultiple regression i f  more variables entered in to the equation.
For the number of analysts' reports produced in the past twelve months 
(REPORTS) the variables fo r size (LOGTAVMV), number of lis t in g s  
(LOGLIST) and takeovers (L0GTAKE0) entered into the regression 
equation (tables E-46 & E-47). Reducing the F -s ta t is t ic  to 2 caused 
the variables fo r substantial shareholdings (SQRTOTSH) and insider 
shareholdings (NEGRBFA%) to enter the equation (tab le E-50). The R 
square achieved, adjusted fo r degrees of freedom, was 25.5% and 25.7%. 
The results of the m ultip le  regression were compared with the 
univariate analysis Spearman rank corre la tion resu lts  (tab le 12-3).
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Table 12-4 S ign ifican t resu lts  fo r data on size of mailing l is ts  and 
continuous independent variables
BROKERS INSTINV
SIZE
AV(MV) A** **
MARKETABILITY
LISTING A** A**
TRADFREQ ** **
RISK
BETA * **
VARIAB
SPECRISK ** **
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE
711TPM
716PTPM A*
703R0SC
GEARING
731CG **
732IG B
733BR **
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER A
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% ** *
TOTSSH A** **
NOOFSSH ** **
KEY:
**  = Spearman rank corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at at least the .01 level 
(two ta i l  tes t)
*= Spearman rank co rre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level (two t a i l  
te s t)
A = enters into regression equation when c r i t ic a l F value is 4 
B = enters into regression equation when c r i t ic a l F value is 2
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Whilst there were nine s ig n ifica n t corre lations only four of the 
variables entered the regression. Takeover a c t iv ity  entered the 
regression but was not s ig n ifica n t in the univariate analysis. The 
m ultivariate analysis strengthens the case fo r re jection  o f the nu ll 
hypotheses HI (s ize ), H2 (overseas m arke tab ility ), H7 (ins ide r 
shareholdings) and H8 (substantia l shareholdings).
In respect of the number of analysts7 reports passed to the company 
fo r comment (COMMENT) in the past twelve months only size (LOGTAVMV) 
entered the f i r s t  regression equation and the R square (adjusted) was 
22.4% (table E-48 & E-49). Reducing the F -s ta tis t ic  enabled two 
fu rther variables to enter the equation, cap ita l gearing (731CGEAR) 
and substantial shareholding (SQRTOTSH) and R square (adjusted) was 
23.9% (table E-51). This re su lt can be compared with the univariate 
analysis where fo r seven s ig n ifica n t corre lations only two of the 
variables entered the regression. Capital gearing entered the 
regression but was not s ig n ifica n t in the univariate analysis. The 
m ultivariate analysis supports re jec tion  of the nu ll hypotheses HI 
(size) and H8 (substantial shareholdings).
The stepwise regression of the number of stockbrokers on the mailing 
l i s t  (BROKERS) id e n tifie d  four variables, lis t in g s  (LOGLIST), size 
(LOGTAVMV), substantial shareholdings (SQRTOTSH) and p r o f i ta b i l i t y  
(716PTPM). The R square (adjusted) was 40.0% (tables E-63 & E-64). 
Reducing the F -s ta tis t ic  to 2 led to income gearing entering the 
equation (SQRTIG) and the R square (adjusted) was 41.4% (tab le  E-69). 
Comparing th is  with the univariate analysis (table 12-4) showed that 
fo r eleven s ign ifican t corre lations four of the variables entered the 
regression. Income gearing entered the regression but was not 
s ign ifican t in the univariate analysis. The m u ltiva ria te  analysis 
adds support to re jection  of nu ll hypotheses HI (s ize ), H2 (overseas 
m arketability) and H8 (substantia l shareholdings).
For the number of in s titu tio n a l investors on the mailing l i s t  
(INSTINV) only number of lis t in g s  and takeovers entered the regression 
(tables E-65 & E-66). The R-square adjusted was 24.3%. The m ultip le  
regression supports the univariate resu lts  in only one case, the 
number of lis tin g s  (table 12-4).
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M ultip le regression using a ll independent variables was carried out 
fo r REPORTS and BROKERS, the two variables with the bette r results in 
the stepwise regressions. The four way indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  was 
included by means of three dummy variables but p a rtia l F-tests showed 
that the addition was not s ig n ifica n t. The results are shown in 
tables E-52 and E-71.
The m ultip le regression fo r REPORTS was carried out fo r  227 cases 
since 98 cases had missing values. The R square (adjusted) achieved 
was 39.0% and the variables with s ig n ifica n t p values agreed with 
those iden tified  in the stepwise routines (LOGTAVMV, LOGLIST,
L0GTAKE0, NEGRBFA% and SQRTOTSH). No warnings of ill-cond itioned  data 
were issued by Minitab. There were twelve cases where the observation 
had a large standardised residual and ten cases where the X value gave 
the observation a large influence. The residuals were p lotted against 
the f i t te d  values and the actual values of REPORTS. There was a 
tendency fo r residuals to increase as REPORTS increased and vice versa 
indicating a need to introduce fu rthe r variables to improve the model 
or respecify the existing model. The corre la tion tes t fo r  normality 
of residuals gave a value of 0.925.
The m ultip le regression fo r BROKERS used 187 cases, 138 cases 
contained missing values. The R square (adjusted) achieved was 40.2% 
and the variables with s ign ifican t p values at the .05 level were 
LOGTAVMV, LOGLIST and SQRTOTSH and, at the 0.1 leve l, SQRTIG. This 
was not in complete accordance with the variables id e n tifie d  by the 
stepwise routine which also included L0GTAKE0 and NEGRBFA%. No 
warnings of ill-cond itioned  data were issued by M initab. There were 
nine cases of observations with large standardized residuals and six 
observations where the X value gave i t  a large influence. The 
residuals were plotted against the f i t te d  values and the actual values 
of BROKERS. There was a tendency fo r residuals to increase as BROKERS 
increased and vice versa indicating a need to introduce fu rthe r 
variables to improve the model or respecify the ex is ting  model. The 
correlation test fo r normality of residuals gave a value of 0.9H.
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12.7 Conclusions
This chapter has set out the results of sections f iv e , six and seven 
of the questionnaire survey. I t  provides a description of company 
procedures fo r telephone conversations with analysts and fund 
managers, company feedback on se ll-s ide  analysts reports and the 
mailing of information. Tests of association were carried out using 
data obtained from the questionnaire and the independent variables in 
order to investigate the hypotheses set out in chapter seven. 
M ultivariate analysis was carried out to complement the univariate 
testing.
The vast m ajority of companies engaged in telephone conversations with 
analysts and fund managers and th is  a c t iv ity  frequently included the 
chief executive and finance d irec to r.
Most companies offered analysts some form of assistance with th e ir  
research reports and around ha lf commented on the accuracy of 
analysts' predictions and offered guidance on th e ir  errors in p ro f it  
forecasts.
Mailing of information to analysts and fund managers was carried out 
by most companies. Generally more information is sent out than would 
go to an individual shareholder. A m inority of companies send out 
documents specia lly designed fo r analysts.
Four continuous variables extracted from the questionnaire data were 
used fo r hypothesis tes ting , these were the number of research reports 
produced in the past twelve months, the number passed to the company 
fo r comment and the size of the mailing l i s t  of stockbrokers and 
in s titu tio n a l investors.
I t  was found that larger companies were the subject of more analyst 
research and received more reports fo r comment. They also had larger 
mailing l is ts  of brokers and in s titu tio n a l investors. This support 
fo r re jection of nu ll hypothesis HI is in accordance with the find ings 
in e a rlie r chapters nine, ten and eleven which looked at d iffe re n t 
variables related to the investor re la tions e ffo r t .
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The m arketability of the company's shares, in pa rticu la r the overseas 
lis t in g s , was an important explanatory variable with the tests 
supporting re jection  of nu ll hypothesis H2. Companies with larger 
mailing l is ts  that were more heavily researched had more marketable 
shares. This overall conclusion is s im ila r to the findings in 
chapters nine, ten and eleven.
The support fo r re jection  of nu ll hypotheses H3 ( r is k ) ,  H4 
(p ro f i ta b i l i ty ) ,  H5 (gearing), H6 (takeover a c t iv ity )  and H9 
(in d us tria l c la ss ifica tio n ) was less conclusive or non-existent fo r 
some of the four continuous variables considered in th is  chapter.
Rejection of nu ll hypotheses H7 and H8 received quite strong support. 
The variables were s ig n if ic a n tly  negatively correlated with the 
percentage of shares held by insiders and the shares held by 
substantial shareholders. This is in broad agreement with the 
findings of chapters nine, ten and eleven.
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Chapter 13 Company Close Seasons and Opinions on Relationships with 
Analysts and Fund Managers
13.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the results of sections eight and nine of the 
questionnaire (see appendix A). Section eight asked about the company 
policy on close seasons, whether i t  p roh ib its  or re s tr ic ts  
communications with analysts and fund managers at certa in times of the 
year or in certain circumstances. Section nine asked fo r the opinions 
of respondents on th e ir  company's re la tionsh ip  with analysts and fund 
managers.
The results obtained contribute to answering the overall research 
question regarding the nature of company communications with analysts 
and the general research question on the opinions of companies. An 
attempt is made to explain the d iffe re n t company responses on close 
seasons and opinions by making use of the explanatory variables that 
were used previously in testing the specific  hypotheses. The detailed 
tables of results are set out in appendix F. This is the f in a l 
chapter of resu lts . The overall conclusions a ris ing  from the resu lts  
set out in chapters nine to th irteen w il l  be discussed in the f in a l 
chapter fourteen.
13.2 Company close seasons
Companies were asked whether they prohibited or res tric ted  
communication with se ll-s ide  analysts, buy-side analysts, and/or fund 
managers at certa in times of the year. 151 (45%) respondents operated 
a p roh ib ition , 177 a re s tr ic tio n  (53%) and 31 (9%) had no close 
season. They were able to select more than one option and thus 22 
companies indicated tha t a proh ib ition  existed at some times and a 
re s tr ic tio n  at others (table F - l) .
The next question asked when the proh ib ition  or re s tr ic t io n  occurred 
(tables F-2 to F-4). There were 337 respondents and, a fte r deducting
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the 31 with no close season, a l l  306 operated a close season before 
the annual and interim  and results  announcement. Only 17 had a close 
season p rio r to the quarterly results but th is  was not applicable fo r 
94% of the respondents since few UK companies produce quarterly 
reports. 27 respondents mentioned other times when re s tr ic tio n s  were 
imposed, usually during takeovers.
Further questions asked about the number of days of p roh ib ition  or 
re s tr ic tio n  imposed on communications with analysts. The median 
response was s ix ty  days p rio r to both f in a l and interim  resu lts  fo r 
the 275 companies which answered th is  question (tables F-5 to F-7).
Respondents were then asked to describe the nature of th e ir  po licy of 
re s tr ic tio n  of communication. 148 respondents did th is , usually 
stating that general matters would be discussed but not the upcoming 
resu lts . Many mentioned here that price sensitive information would 
not be disclosed. A selection of comments is given below:
Only broad economic issues or wholly factual (non-financial and 
non price sensitive) issues may be discussed
Comments would not include de ta ils  re company's achievement of 
p ro f it  forecast etc
Calls would be taken and information given i f  i ts  omission would 
lead to a serious m isdirection of the market
Communication res tric ted  to dates of meetings and comments on 
nature of business and products - not on performance
Comment on current trading is prohibited. Issues of strategy fo r  
example, may be discussed but contact is not encouraged
Questions taken by ch ie f executive only during th is  period and 
analyst informed we are in our "purdah" period
The issue of company close seasons is an important one. Some 
companies operate a complete p roh ib ition  of communication at sensitive
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Table 13-1 Opinions on se ll-s ide  analysts
MEAN MEDIAN STDEV
Company meetings 
with se ll-s id e  analysts 
are a valuable means of 
communication
1.7207 2.000 0.6234
Company telephone 
conversations with 
se ll-s ide  analysts are 
a valuable means of 
communication
1.8825 2.0000 0.6830
My company would 
prefer not to hold 
se ll-s ide  analysts' 
meetings
4.2326 4.000 0.6676
My company would 
prefer not to ta lk  to 
se ll-s id e  analysts 
on the telephone
4.1459 4.000 0.7551
My company should 
not provide se ll-s ide  
analysts with guidance 
as to the accuracy of 
th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts
3.3446 4.000 1.1323
Sell-s ide  analysts 
pressurise my company 
fo r  information
3.1437 3.000 1.0395
Sell-s ide analysts 
are too concerned 
with short term 
p ro f it  opportunities
2.5471 2.000 0.9901
Sell-s ide analysts 
are not s u ff ic ie n tly  
interested in the 
long term prospects 
of my company
2.9970 3.000 1.0536
NOTE:
N = 337 (maximum number of missing values fo r eight questions is 12)
Ranking scale
1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Disagree, 5 = 
Strongly disagree
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times of the year while others s t i l l  release information se lec tive ly . 
I t  is simpler fo r companies to maintain a complete p roh ib ition  rather 
than having to exercise s k i l l  and judgement regarding what can and 
cannot be discussed in the close season. On the other hand, being 
unable to keep the markets informed fo r , on average, four months of 
the year could be viewed as a severe handicap to market e ffic iency .
13.3 Opinions on relationships with analysts and fund managers
The f i r s t  question related to the perceived qua lity  of research work 
carried out by analysts (table F-8). Six respondents said they had no 
opinion on the matter leaving 331 answering the question. There was a 
fiv e  point scale and respondents could rate the qua lity  of analysis as 
very poor, poor, acceptable, good or very good. 52% considered the 
general qua lity  to be acceptable and 42% considered i t  to be good.
Only 4% rated analysis as poor in general with 2% ra ting  i t  as very 
good.
Respondents were then asked to compare the q u a lity  of work produced by 
the two types of analyst, se ll-s ide  and buy-side (tables F-9 and F- 
10). 240 respondents rated se ll-s ide  analysts but only 199 rated buy-
side analysts. Many respondents noted tha t they did not see the 
analysis produced by buy-side analysts and as a re su lt they stated 
that they had no opinion or that the question was not applicable. The 
median ra ting of three fo r se ll-s ide  and buy-side analysts was the 
same (acceptable) but the mean ra ting  was s lig h t ly  higher fo r  s e ll-  
side (3.40) than fo r buy-side (3.39) analysts. I t  would seem th a t, in 
general, companies perceive l i t t l e  difference between the analysis 
carried out by the two types of analyst.
Since there seems to be a growing tendency fo r  companies to favour 
d ire c t communication with in s titu tio n a l investors at the expense of 
brokers' analysts the next questions were s p l i t  into two sections (see 
chapter 4.4).
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Table 13-2 Opinions on buv-side analysts and fund managers
MEAN MEDIAN STDEV
Company meetings 
with buy-side analysts 
and fund managers are 
a valuable means of 
communication
1.5061 1.000 0.5909
Company telephone 
conversations with 
buy-side analysts and 
fund managers are a 
valuable means of 
communication
1.9417 2.000 0.7603
My company would 
prefer not to hold 
meetings with buy-side 
analysts & fund managers
4.4233 4.000 0.6411
My company would 
prefer not to ta lk  
to buy-side analysts 
and fund managers 
on the telephone
4.1455 4.000 0.8708
My company should 
not provide buy-side 
analysts and fund 
managers with guidance 
as to fu ture p ro fits
3.1433 4.000 1.1956
Buy-side analysts 
and fund managers 
pressurise my company 
fo r information
3.6852 4.000 0.8654
Buy-side analysts 
and fund managers are 
too concerned with short 
term p ro f it  opportunities
3.3406 4.000 0.9335
Buy-side analysts 
& fund managers are not 
s u ff ic ie n tly  interested 
in the long term prospects 
of my company
3.5920 4.000 0.8784
NOTE:
N = 337 (maximum number of missing values fo r eight questions is 16)
Ranking scale
1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Disagree, 5 = 
Strongly disagree
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The f i r s t  set of questions asked fo r respondents' opinions on the 
value of investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  conducted fo r  the benefit of 
se ll-s ide  analysts, (tables F - l l  to F-16). Respondents were asked 
whether they strongly agreed, agreed, were uncertain, disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with a selection of statements.
The vast m ajority (93%) e ither agreed or strongly agreed that company 
meetings with se ll-s id e  analysts are a valuable means of 
communication. In the case of telephone ca lls  89% agreed or strongly 
agreed tha t they are valuable. Companies were keen to hold meetings 
fo r se ll-s ide  analysts since only 10 (3%) respondents agreed that they 
would prefer not to hold them and 93% disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
Only 19 respondents (6%) stated they would prefer not to ta lk  to s e ll-  
side analysts on the telephone. Whilst 26% agreed or strongly agreed 
that th e ir  company should not provide analysts with guidance as to the 
accuracy of th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts, a m ajority of 59% disagreed or 
strongly disagreed. I t  was agreed that se ll-s id e  analysts pressurised 
companies fo r information by 37% of respondents but 49% disagreed. On 
reviewing tables F - l l  to F-16 i t  seems that companies agree that 
communications with se ll-s id e  analysts are valuable and that they wish 
to continue ta lk ing  to analysts and providing guidance on th e ir  
forecasts.
The next two questions (tables F-17 and F-18) re lated to the top ica l 
debate on short-termism. The m ajority of respondents (59%) agreed or 
strongly agreed that se ll-s ide  analysts are too concerned with short 
term p ro f it  opportunities. Opinions were s p l i t  down the middle 
regarding whether analysts were s u ff ic ie n tly  interested in companies' 
long term prospects . While 40% e ithe r agreed or strongly agreed that 
se ll-s ide  analysts are not s u ff ic ie n t ly  interested in the long term 
prospects of th e ir  company, 20% were uncertain and 41% disagreed or 
strongly disagreed.
The next questions dealt with respondents' opinions on th e ir  company's 
re lationship with buy-side analysts and fund managers (tables F-19 to 
F-26). Most respondents (97%) agreed or strongly agreed that company 
meetings with buy-side analysts and fund managers are a valuable means 
of communication. In the case of telephone ca lls  83% agreed or
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strongly agreed that they are valuable. Companies were happy to hold 
meetings fo r buy-side analysts since only 6 (2%) respondents agreed 
that they would prefer not to hold them and 96% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. Only 24 respondents (7%) stated they would prefer not to 
ta lk  to buy-side analysts and fund managers on the telephone. Whilst 
35% agreed or strongly agreed that th e ir  company should not provide 
analysts with guidance as to the accuracy of th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts, 
a m ajority of 51% disagreed or strongly disagreed. I t  was agreed that 
buy-side analysts pressurised companies fo r  information by 14% of 
respondents but 73% disagreed. On reviewing table F-19 to F-23 i t  
appears that companies are generally in favour of maintaining 
communications with buy-side analysts and fund managers.
The next two questions dealt with respondents' perceptions of short- 
termism among fund managers and buy-side analysts (tables F-25 and F- 
26). While 21% agreed or strongly agreed that buy-side analysts and 
fund managers are too concerned with short term p ro f it  opportunities 
25% were uncertain and 54% disagreed*or strongly disagreed. Only 14% 
agreed or strongly agreed that buy-side analysts and fund managers are 
not s u ff ic ie n tly  interested in the long term prospects of th e ir  
company, 20% were uncertain and 66% disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
These results can be compared with the equivalent questions fo r s e ll-  
side analysts. I t  appears that buy-side analysts and fund managers 
are viewed as being less short-term ist, on average, than se ll-s id e  
analysts.
I t  should be noted that despite frequent c r it ic is m  of C ity short- 
termism the respondents were not unanimous in th e ir  perceptions of 
short-termism among analysts and fund managers. The m ajority of 
respondents did not agree that buy-side analysts and fund managers are 
short term ist. For se ll-s ide  analysts a m ajority agreed they are too 
concerned with short term p ro f it  opportunities. On the other hand, 
there was no m ajority agreement that se ll-s id e  analysts are not 
s u ff ic ie n tly  interested in the long term prospects of my company.
The f in a l question asked fo r  respondents' opinions and ideas as to how 
company communications with brokers' analysts, buy-side analysts and 
fund managers should be conducted in the fu tu re . A number o f themes
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emerged here. F irs t ly ,  i t  was clear that many respondents viewed one- 
to-one meetings and s ite  v is its  with fund managers as being 
increasingly important. Another concern expressed by respondents was 
the legal and regulatory environment governing investor re la tions.
Some respondents wanted more regulation or guidance, others wanted 
less. The follow ing is an il lu s tra t io n  of two d iffe r in g  points of 
view:
We exercise prudence and caution in a l l  our communications with 
the c ity  and fee l that any attempt to  leg is la te  to re s tr ic t  th is  
would be impractical and d i f f ic u l t  to enforce.
Clearer guide-lines are required/needed from Stock Exchange or 
other regulatory au thorities. Too much reliance is currently  
placed on market practice and ad hoc decisions by the individuals 
concerned in the process.
Another theme was the favoured treatment fo r  top analysts. Some 
companies place analysts in d iffe re n t d iv is ions and allow d iffe re n t 
levels of contact according to these rankings.
The overall impression gained from the answers received is tha t most 
companies are reasonably happy with the ex is ting  re la tionsh ip  between 
themselves and analysts and fund managers.
13.4 Analysis of results
13.4.1 Introduction
The measures obtained in sections one to seven of the questionnaire, 
as reported in chapters nine to twelve, were d iffe re n t aspects of 
e ffo rt or resources devoted to investor re la tion s . The data obtained 
from section eight and nine is somewhat d iffe re n t. The data on close 
seasons can be considered as a measure of organisational or in ternal 
control over the investor re la tions process. Company po licy can vary 
from lengthy periods of complete proh ib ition  to no close seasons at
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a l l .  I t  was therefore considered desirable to attempt to explain the 
d iffe re n t responses in the data on close seasons. I t  was decided to 
use the explanatory variables that were used previously, in attempting 
to explain the costs of company communications with analysts, to see 
i f  they were of use in explaining d iffe re n t company behaviour.
There were three categorical variables re la tin g  to the existence of 
close seasons. These were whether or not the company operated a 
p roh ib ition (PROHIB), whether or not i t  had a period of re s tr ic tio n  
(RESTRICT) and whether i t  had no close season at a l l  (SEASON). There 
were two continuous variables, the number o f days close season p rio r 
to the annual results announcement (ANNUAL) and the interim  results 
(INTERIM).
The data on opinions on company re lationships with analysts can be 
viewed as a measure of sa tisfaction with the investor re la tions 
process and its  outcome. I f  companies are sa tis fie d , then they are 
lik e ly  to feel that the benefits of the investor re la tions programme 
outweigh the costs. The data included three opinions on the qua lity  
of research and ten opinions on the value of the investor re la tions 
a c t iv ity . There were two data sets of opinions on whether companies 
are pressurised to reveal information and four sets of opinions on 
short-termism.
I t  was considered desirable to test the d iffe r in g  opinions of 
companies against the independent variables used previously in the 
hypothesis testing . This was to see i f  these variables were 
associated with the d iffe re n t opinions. For example, i t  might be 
expected that p ro fitab le  companies w il l  be praised by analysts and 
hence be more lik e ly  to be sa tis fied  with th e ir  re la tionsh ip  with 
analysts.
13.4.2 The existence of close seasons
The Kruskal-Wallis test of association was run to compare the 
dependent variables PROHIB, INTERIM and SEASON with the independent
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continuous variables representing company size, m arketab ility , r is k , 
p ro f ita b i l i ty ,  gearing, takeover a c t iv ity ,  insider shareholdings and 
substantial shareholdings. The chi-square tes t was also carried out 
using the independent categorical variables representing 
m arketability, industria l c la ss ifica tio n  and the existence of 
substantial shareholdings (tables F-27 to F-32). The tests were 
carried out via the nu ll hypothesis of no association between the 
dependent and independent variables.
In respect of whether or not companies operated a p roh ib ition  (PROHIB) 
there were no s ig n ifica n t resu lts  apart from those related to gearing 
and industria l c la s s ific a tio n . Companies tha t were more highly geared 
were more lik e ly  to operate a p roh ib ition , th is  was s ig n ifica n t at the 
0.013 level fo r cap ita l gearing and at the 0.033 level fo r  borrowing 
ra tio  (table F-27). For industria l c la ss ifica tio n  the chi-square tes t 
was s ig n ifica n t at the .02 leve l. On examining the standardised 
residuals i t  appears that companies in the cap ita l goods sector were 
more lik e ly  to operate a p roh ib ition .
There were no s ig n ifica n t resu lts  fo r  the tests of association between 
the existence of a re s tr ic tio n  of communication (RESTRICT) and the 
independent variables apart from m arketab ility  and industria l 
c la ss ifica tion  . Companies with a higher trading frequency (TRADFREQ) 
were more lik e ly  to have a re s tr ic t io n  (p = 0.029) and th is  was also 
true fo r the categorical version of the variable TFCAT where the ch i- 
square was s ig n ifican t at the .02 leve l. Also companies with an 
overseas lis t in g  (0SEALIST) were more l ik e ly  to have a re s tr ic tio n  
(chi-square s ig n ifica n t at the .05 le ve l). Perhaps companies with 
more marketable shares do not favour periods of complete p roh ib ition  
of communication as they need to keep the markets informed. The chi- 
square tes t of RESTRICT and indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  was s ig n ifica n t 
at the .05 leve l. On examining the standardised residuals i t  appeared 
that capita l goods companies were less l ik e ly  to operate re s tr ic tio n  
and 'other groups' were more l ik e ly  to .
When evaluating the tes t results fo r  the 146 companies having a 
proh ib ition (PROHIB) and the 174 with a re s tr ic t io n  (RESTRICT) i t  
should be borne in mind that a small group of 22 respondents operated
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both types of close season. The f in a l smaller group of 27 companies 
claiming to operate no close season (SEASON) yielded a greater number 
of s ign ifican t results  in the hypothesis tes ting .
On reviewing the results  of the Kruskal-Wallis tests of association 
(table F-29) and the chi-square tests (table F-32) there are a number 
of s ign ifican t resu lts . The companies with no close season were 
smaller (p = 0.001) and had fewer overseas lis t in g s  (p = 0.011) and 
lower trading frequency (p = 0.002). The resu lts  fo r the categorical 
versions of the variables 0SEALIST and TFCAT were also s ig n ifica n t at 
the .01 leve l.
With respect to r is k  measures these companies had higher v a r ia b il ity  
(p = 0.019) and specific  r is k  (p = 0.013). The p ro f i ta b i l i ty  measures 
yielded mixed resu lts . Companies with no close season had higher 
trading p ro f it  margins (p = 0.005) and pre-tax p ro f it  margins (p = 
0.002) but th e ir  returns on cap ita l employed and shareholders' cap ita l 
were not s ig n ific a n tly  d iffe re n t.
These companies were also less h ighly geared but the tes t was only 
s ign ifican t at the required level fo r  the borrowing ra tio  (p = 0.044).
There was no support at the required level of significance of .05 when 
testing the nu ll hypothesis of no association fo r takeover a c t iv ity ,  
insider shareholdings, substantial shareholdings and line  of business.
13.4.3 The length of the close seasons
The length of the close seasons p rio r to the annual (ANNUAL) and 
interim  results announcement (INTERIM) were tested against the 
independent variables. Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  are shown in table F-33 
and i t  should be noted that the median value of 60 days was given by 
186 out of 269 companies fo r  ANNUAL and by 179 out of 266 fo r  INTERIM. 
The Pearson and Spearman rank corre lations between ANNUAL and INTERIM 
and the independent continuous variables were calculated (tables F-36 
and F-37) and Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between ANNUAL and
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INTERIM and the independent categorical variables were carried out 
(tables F-34 and F-35). Tests were carried out via the nu ll 
hypothesis of no association between the close season variables and 
the independent variables.
For the length of the close season p r io r to the annual results 
announcement (ANNUAL) there were only two s ig n ifica n t results  on 
testing the nine sets of independent variables. The Spearman rank 
corre lation was negative and s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level fo r the 
number of overseas lis t in g s  (LISTINGS) and the to ta l percentage of 
shares held by substantial shareholders (TOTSSH). The Kruskal-Wallis 
test was s ign ifican t at the 0.029 level fo r  the categorical variable 
OSEALIST. To summarise, companies with overseas lis t in g s  and fewer 
substantial shareholdings seem to have shorter close seasons p rio r to 
th e ir  annual results announcement.
For the length of the close season p rio r to the interim  results 
announcement the Spearman rank corre la tion was negative and 
s ign ifica n t at the .01 level fo r company size and number of overseas 
lis t in g s  . The Kruskal-Wallis tes t was s ig n ifica n t at the 0.000 level 
fo r OSEALIST. The corre la tion was negative and s ig n ifica n t at the .05 
level fo r  income gearing and the .01 level fo r borrowing ra tio  . The 
Kruskal-Wallis test was s ig n ifica n t at the 0.023 level fo r  industria l 
c la ss ifica tio n  . The resu lts  indicate that companies in the financ ia l 
sector had shorter close seasons than those in cap ita l goods followed 
by consumer groups and 'o th e rs '. To summarise, the length of the 
close season p rio r to interim  results does seem to be shorter fo r 
large companies with overseas lis t in g s . Less highly geared companies 
have a shorter close season and indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  also appears 
to be s ig n ifica n t.
13.4.4 Opinions
The f i r s t  variable used was the respondent's opinion (OPINION) on the 
general qua lity  of analysts' reports, from a l l  sources, that are made 
on the company. This is a categorical variable measuring in d ire c tly
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the company's sa tis faction  with its  investor re la tions e ffo r t .  The 
Kruskal-Wallis (table F-38) and the chi-square tests (table F-40) were 
run using the independent variables to tes t fo r  associations. This 
was done via the nu ll hypothesis of no association between OPINION and 
the independent variables. The next variable was the opinion on the 
qua lity  of analysis carried out by se ll-s id e  analysts (SELLSIDE) 
(tables F-39 and F-41). The Kruskal-Wallis and chi-square tests were 
also run fo r the opinion on the qu a lity  of analysis carried out by 
buy-side analysts but there were no s ig n ifica n t results at the 
required level of 0.05.
I t  was found that smaller companies were more lik e ly  to have extreme 
views, ranking analysis as very good or poor whereas the larger 
companies were more l ik e ly  to rank analysis as acceptable or good.
This was s ign ifican t at the 0.02 level fo r  OPINION and at the 0.017 
level fo r SELLSIDE. This can possibly be explained by the fac t that 
smaller companies are followed by fewer analysts and the general 
qua lity  of the analysis fo r these companies can thus be affected more 
easily by one or two poor or very good analysts.
The companies with less frequently traded shares were more lik e ly  to 
rate analysis as very good. The Kruskal-Wallis tes t was s ig n ifica n t 
at the 0.032 level fo r OPINION and the 0.004 level fo r SELLSIDE. The 
categorical versions of the m arketab ility  variables used in the ch i- 
square test did not y ie ld  s ig n ifica n t results  fo r OSEALIST or ALPHA 
but fo r TFCAT chi-square was s ig n ifica n t at the 0.01 level fo r  both 
OPINION and SELLSIDE. On examining the standardised residuals i t  was 
noted that companies with low trading frequency were more lik e ly  to 
rate analysis as very good.
Companies with a greater number of substantial shareholdings (N00FSSH) 
were more lik e ly  to rate analysis in general as very good. This was 
s ign ifica n t at the 0.019 level fo r  OPINION but there were no 
s ign ifica n t results fo r TOTSSH or SSH(Y/N).
There were no s ig n ifica n t results fo r  r is k , insider shareholdings and 
line  of business so the nu ll hypothesis, of no association, cannot be 
rejected.
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The responses included data on sixteen fu rthe r opinions. These were, 
eight opinions on the value of the investor re la tions a c tiv it ie s  fo r 
se ll-s ide  analysts and eight opinions on the value of investor 
re lations a c tiv it ie s  fo r buy-side analysts and fund managers. The 
Kruskal-Wallis tes t was run to ide n tify  any s ig n ifica n t association 
between the 17 continuous independent variables and the opinion data 
(tables F-42 and F-43). The chi-square test was carried out to tes t 
fo r associations between the opinion data and the industria l 
c lass ifica tion  (4WAYINDC) (table F-43). Overall, there were few 
s ign ifican t results and i t  is only these that are shown in the results  
tables. In some cases i t  was necessary to combine values because of 
the small number of companies holding extreme opinions (strongly agree 
or strongly disagree).
The eight opinions on se ll-s ide  analysts w i l l  be considered f i r s t .  
There were no s ign ifican t results fo r opinion one: company meetings
with se ll-s ide  analysts are a valuable means of communication. For 
opinion two, company telephone conversations with se ll-s id e  analysts 
are a valuable means of communication, there were three s ig n ifica n t 
results. Larger companies with more frequently traded shares were 
more lik e ly  to strongly agree and smaller companies to strongly 
disagree or disagree (p = 0.001 fo r size and p = 0.027 fo r trading 
frequency). Add itiona lly , companies with low income gearing were more 
lik e ly  to strongly disagree or disagree (p = 0.024).
There were no s ign ifican t results fo r opinion three: my company would
prefer not to hold se ll-s ide  analysts' meetings. For opinion four, my 
company would prefer not to ta lk  to se ll-s ide  analysts on the 
telephone, there were two s ign ifican t resu lts . Smaller companies 
tended to answer strongly agree and agree while larger ones answered 
strongly disagree (p = 0.031). Companies with more shares held by 
insiders (BFA%) were more lik e ly  to answer strongly agree or agree (p 
= 0.037).
For opinion fiv e , my company should not provide se ll-s id e  analysts 
with guidance as to the accuracy of th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts, there was 
one s ign ifican t resu lt. Firms with low beta were more lik e ly  to 
answer strongly agree and those with a high beta to answer strongly
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disagree (p = 0.025). There were three s ig n ifica n t results fo r 
opinion s ix: se ll-s ide  analysts pressurise my company fo r
information. Smaller companies tended to answer uncertain or disagree 
while larger companies answered agree, strongly disagree or strongly 
agree (p = 0.002). Companies with more frequently traded shares 
tended to agree whereas those with less frequently traded shares 
tended to strongly agree (p = 0.001). Companies with fewer shares 
held by insiders were lik e ly  to strongly agree and those with more 
shares held by insiders were lik e ly  to answer uncertain (p = 0.046).
There were two s ign ifican t results fo r  opinion seven: se ll-s ide
analysts are too concerned with short term p ro f it  opportunities. As 
both capita l gearing (p = 0.040) and borrowing ra tio  (p = 0.047) 
increased, companies were lik e ly  to move from strongly disagree and 
disagree to agree and strongly agree. More highly geared companies 
were thus more lik e ly  to perceive se ll-s ide  analysts to be short 
term ist. There were no s ign ifican t results  fo r  opinion e ight: s e ll-
side analysts are not s u ff ic ie n tly  interested in the long term 
prospects of my company.
The eight opinions on buy-side analysts and fund managers w i l l  now be 
considered (table F-43). For opinion one, company meetings with buy- 
side analysts and fund managers are a valuable means of communication, 
there were six s ign ifican t resu lts . Large companies tended to 
strongly agree or agree (p = 0.016). Those with more lis t in g s  tended 
to strongly agree (p = 0.033) as did those with a higher trading 
frequency (p = 0.006). Companies with a higher pre-tax p ro f it  margin 
were more lik e ly  to answer uncertain or strongly disagree (p = 0.021). 
Companies with a lower capita l gearing (p = 0.026) and borrowing ra tio  
(p = 0.046) were more lik e ly  to answer uncertain or strongly disagree.
There were no s ign ifican t results fo r opinion two: company telephone
conversations with buy-side analysts and fund managers are a valuable 
means of communication. For opinion three, my company would prefer 
not to hold meetings with buy-side analysts and fund managers, there 
were three s ign ifican t results . The very large companies tended to be 
uncertain and the smallest companies seemed to strongly agree or 
agree. F a irly  large companies tended to strongly disagree (p =
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0.001). A s im ila r pattern was shown fo r  the number of lis t in g s  (p =
0.012). For trading frequency, companies with more frequently traded
shares tended to answer strongly disagree and those with less 
frequently traded shares to answer strongly agree or agree (p =
0.007).
For opinion four, my company would prefer not to ta lk  to buy-side 
analysts and fund managers on the telephone, there was one s ig n ifica n t
resu lt. Larger companies strongly disagreed and smaller companies
agreed or strongly agreed (p = 0.000). For opinion f iv e , my company 
should not provide buy-side analysts and fund managers with guidance 
as to future p ro fits , there was one s ig n ifica n t re su lt. Companies 
with a lower trading p ro f it  margin answered strongly agree whereas 
those with the highest margin tended to answer uncertain (p = 0.006).
For opinion s ix , buy-side analysts and fund managers pressurise my 
company fo r information, there was one s ig n ifica n t re su lt. Companies 
with a higher return on capita l employed were more lik e ly  to strongly
agree or agree and those with a lower return to be uncertain (p =
0.036). There were no s ign ifican t resu lts  fo r  opinion seven: buy-
side analysts and fund managers are too concerned with short term 
p ro f it  opportunities.
Opinion eight, buy-side analysts and fund managers are not
s u ffic ie n tly  interested in the long term prospects of my company, gave
three s ign ifican t resu lts . Larger companies were more lik e ly  to 
disagree or strongly disagree (p = 0.008). Companies with more 
lis tin g s  were more lik e ly  to strongly disagree (p = 0.007) as were 
companies with more frequently traded shares (p = 0.012).
Considering the results overall there is  not a strong pattern or 
consistent support fo r the idea that the explanatory variables might 
be associated with company opinions. At the most, i t  appears that 
company size and to a lesser extent m arke tab ility  of shares do seem to 
be associated with opinions on some top ics.
A chi-square tes t was performed using the opinion data and the four 
way industria l c la ss ifica tion  to see i f  there was any association
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between line  of business and the various opinions. There was only one 
s ig n ifica n t resu lt (table F-44) fo r  opinion four: my company would
prefer not to ta lk  to se ll-s ide  analysts on the telephone. I t  can be 
concluded tha t there is no overall association between opinions on the 
investor re la tions process and company lin e  of business.
13.5 Conclusions
One main conclusion aris ing from th is  chapter is tha t companies 
operate a wide va rie ty  of po lic ies with respect to close seasons when 
they re s tr ic t  or p roh ib it communications with analysts and fund 
managers. This can vary from, fo r example, s ix ty  to ninety days of 
complete p roh ib ition  p rio r to both the interim  and f in a l results to no 
close seasons at a l l  fo r a m inority of the respondents. Many 
companies, however, choose to re s tr ic t  rather than absolutely p roh ib it 
communication.
The testing  attempted to explain the observed differences in po licy on 
close seasons. Companies with no close seasons were more lik e ly  to be 
small with no overseas lis t in g s . Companies with overseas lis t in g s  and 
higher trading frequency were more lik e ly  to have a re s tr ic tio n  rather 
than a p roh ib ition . These results could indicate that the po licy 
depends on the demand fo r information experienced by the companies. 
This was borne out by the fac t that companies with overseas lis t in g s  
were more lik e ly  to have shorter close seasons p rio r to results  
announcements.
Company opinions about the investor re la tions a c t iv ity  and the q ua lity  
of analysts' reports show a wide va ria tion . Most respondents were 
sa tis fie d  with the work of analysts, find ing  th e ir  reports e ithe r 
acceptable or good. The m ajority agreed tha t meetings and telephone 
conversations were a valuable means of communication and wished to 
continue with them. Opinions were equally divided on whether s e ll-  
side analysts pressurise companies fo r information but i t  was 
generally agreed that buy-side analysts and fund managers did not do 
th is . I t  was not f e l t  by the m ajority tha t buy-side analysts and fund
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managers are short-te rm ist. On the other hand, there were more 
companies tha t perceived se ll-s ide  analysts to be short-term ist.
The testing  attempted to explain the d iffe re n t opinions expressed by 
respondents. No consistent pattern emerged here indicating that 
opinions were not read ily  explained by the selected independent 
variables.
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Chapter 14 Conclusions
14.1 Introduction
The achievements of th is  project can be c la ss ifie d  in to two main 
areas. The f i r s t  is the co llec tion  and presentation o f/de ta iled  set 
of resu lts  tha t describe the investor re la tions processes of large UK 
quoted companies. The second is the development and investigation of 
a model seeking to explain the observed differences between companies 
in terms of the costs and e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions . This 
chapter w i l l  consider the achievements of the study, discuss any 
lim ita tio ns  and suggest fu rthe r possible lines of research.
14.2 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  on company communications with analysts 
and fund managers
The data obtained from respondent companies and presented in the 
results  chapters provides, fo r the f i r s t  time in the UK, a 
comprehensive p icture  of the way in which large quoted companies 
carry out th e ir  investor re la tions programmes with pa rticu la r 
emphasis on th e ir  dealings with analysts and fund managers. These 
results are p a rtic u la r ly  in teresting in that they confirm the 
priv ileged position of analysts and fund managers as recip ients of 
company information. The results  provide an answer to the overall 
research question regarding the nature and e ffe c t, w ith in  the 
organisation, of the investor re la tions process. The four general 
research questions were:
How much does i t  cost companies ( in  terms of both money and 
organisational e ffo r t)  to maintain a programme of communications 
with analysts and fund managers?
What methods are used by individual companies in getting th e ir  
message across?
What information is communicated to analysts?
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What are the opinions of companies regarding the costs and 
benefits of communicating with analysts?
The responses to the d iffe re n t sections of the questionnaire w i l l  now 
be considered in turn with the aim of h igh ligh ting  points of 
in te res t.
14.2.1 The organisation of the investor relations function
The survey obtained a detailed p icture of the way in which companies 
organise th e ir  investor re la tions (see 9 .2). I t  established the 
degree of involvement of the board of d irectors and the 
organisational arrangements fo r  carrying out investor re la tions in 
terms of departmental structure, s ta ffin g  and use of external 
consultants. I t  also established the size of investor re la tions 
budgets and consultancy costs incurred. The overall impression is 
that investor re la tions as a d isc ip line  or management a c t iv ity  
appears to have established i t s e l f  f irm ly  w ith in  the respondent 
organisations.
These resu lts  can be viewed in the context o f the investor re la tions 
lite ra tu re  reviewed in chapter 4. This lite ra tu re  consisted mainly 
of advice to management regarding the importance of investor 
re la tions with only sparse empirical evidence (see 4.6) on the status 
of investor re la tions w ith in  organisations. The findings of th is  
study establish c le a rly  the extent to which investor re la tions has 
captured a ro le  w ith in  the large UK quoted company.
14.2.2 Assessing the contribution of the investor relations function
One way in which companies can assess whether the costs incurred on 
investor re la tions have yielded benefits is by commissioning surveys 
of C ity opinion. These were described in chapter 4.6 and are carried 
out by market research organisations such as MORI. The resu lts  here
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(see 10.2) show tha t the m ajority of companies (57%) had thought i t  
worth while to pay fo r such surveys. The main reason given was to 
assess the success of the investor re la tions programme. This gives 
fu rthe r evidence of company commitment to investor re la tions .
14.2.3 Execution of the investor relations programme
The second general research question asked what methods of 
communication are used by ind ividual companies in getting th e ir  
message across. The descriptive resu lts  (see 10.3) show that the 
m ajority (a t least 95%) of companies used special meetings, general 
meetings, telephone conversations and feedback on analysts' reports 
and 88% used mailing of information.
These resu lts  provide clear evidence of the extent to which analysts 
and fund managers have become a priv ileged group in terms of access 
to companies and receipt of information. There are policy 
im plications here fo r  leg is la to rs  and regulators in the fu tu re . I f  
an attempt is made in the fu ture to ban any of the a c t iv it ie s  i t  is 
l ik e ly  to  have implications fo r the operation of the stock market.
14.2.4 Company meetings with analysts and fund managers
Meetings were researched in some de ta il by Lee and Tweedie (1981) and 
Arnold and Moizer (1984), as reviewed in chapter 6.3. Their work was 
referred to in d ra fting  th is  section of the questionnaire and the aim 
was to increase knowledge about meetings by widening the scope of the 
questions and obtaining the point of view of the company rather than 
the analyst.
The th ird  general research question asked what information is 
communicated by companies to analysts. In order to answer th is  
question section 4 of the questionnaire focussed on information 
discussed at meetings. Topics that might be discussed at meetings
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were lis te d  and companies provided an indication of whether they were 
discussed along with the re la tive  importance of each top ic .
The resu lts  here (see 11.2.3) provided an in teresting  data set which 
was useful in attempting to answer the research question. The 
sensitive nature of the question in view of the insider dealing 
le g is la tion  and stock exchange lis t in g  agreement meant that the 
questions had to be framed in a suitable manner. I t  was not possible 
to ask d ire c tly  whether price sensitive inside information was being 
provided to analysts.
Apart from the content of the meetings the survey also obtained data 
on the number of meetings and attendance at meetings in the twelve 
month period p rio r to the survey (see 11.2.2). This measurement of 
a c t iv ity  levels provides an indication of company e ffo r t and response 
in terms of attendance from the analysts and fund managers. No 
s im ila r data was located in the lite ra tu re  survey and th is  project 
appears to be the f i r s t  to establish data of th is  kind. This data is 
fundamental to an overall appreciation of the importance of meetings 
as part of the investor re la tions programme.
14.2.5 Telephone conversations with analysts and fund managers
The resu lts  of the questions on telephone conversations with analysts 
and fund managers (see 12.2) were of p a rticu la r in te rest because they 
confirmed the special p riv ilege  of th is  group in terms of having 
telephone access to d irectors and other o f f ic ia ls .  Anecdotal 
evidence obtained at a research seminar (see 4.4) indicated that 
analysts use telephone conversations a fte r meetings to ask questions 
when they do not want competing analysts to hear the answer. The 
findings of th is  study c le a rly  show tha t telephone conversations with 
analysts and fund managers are the norm and any attempt to ban them 
would have an e ffe c t on the working practices of analysts with 
possible implications fo r the working of the stock market.
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14.2.6 Company feedback on sell-side analysts'reports
Another way of answering the general research question regarding what 
information is communicated was to ask companies how cooperative they 
were in helping analysts with th e ir  research reports and p ro f it  
forecasts. Company feedback on these can be viewed as transmission 
of information. The response data (see 12.3) was p a rtic u la r ly  
in te resting  here as 94% of companies corrected factual errors in 
analysts' reports, 49% offered comments on the accuracy of analysts' 
predictions and 77% said they would comment on p ro f it  forecasts.
These resu lts  can be regarded as a key find ing  confirming practices 
which would be considered by some to be un fa ir i f  not i l le g a l.
Subsequent to th is  study the stock exchange has set out consultative 
guide-lines advising companies against correcting analysts' forecasts 
(see 2 .8). This w i l l  probably lead to changes in behaviour in the 
fu ture i f  companies obey the s p ir i t  of the guide-lines. Thus the 
findings here w i l l  be useful as a benchmark in assessing changes 
caused by the new guide-lines in any fu ture research p ro ject.
14.2.7 Mailing information to analysts and fund managers
The questionnaire responses established that most companies mail 
o f f ic ia l  information to analysts (see 12.4) but a small number (23%) 
send out documents designed specia lly  fo r  analysts. This find ing  is 
in accordance with Ryder and Regester's (1989) recommendation that a 
company fa c t book should be prepared as part of the investor 
re la tions e ffo r t  (see 4.3).
Of p a rticu la r in te rest is the fa c t tha t many companies send stock 
exchange company news service announcements to analysts and fund 
managers (see table 12-2) when individual shareholders are not so 
well informed. Once again, the analysts and fund managers appear to 
be a priv ileged group in terms of information mailed to them.
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14.2.8 Company close seasons
The resu lts  here (see 12.3) establish fo r the f i r s t  time in a 
comprehensive manner the va rie ty  of practices regarding close 
seasons. At the p ilo t  stage the researcher was alerted to the fac t 
that some close seasons are not in fa c t completely close. This was 
investigated by amending the questionnaire accordingly and asking 
companies to explain in w ritin g  how they res tric te d  rather than 
prohibited communication during th e ir  close seasons. One respondent 
wrote here 'the investor re la tions o ff ic e r  knows his job ' implying 
that s k i l l  and judgement was involved in coping with the s itua tion .
The London Stock Exchange conference fo r industry (1988) proceedings 
discussed the problem of analysts pressurising companies fo r 
information p rio r to results  announcements (see 4.7). Subsequent to 
th is  survey the London Stock Exchange (1993) consultative document on 
the dissemination of price sensitive information has recommended tha t 
i f  companies wish to have an in-house ru le  regarding close seasons 
they should s t i l l  announce price sensitive information where 
necessary. They should also issue correcting statements in the 
normal way i f  a fa lse market is developing in th e ir  shares.
The matter of company close seasons is l ik e ly  to be subject to 
fu rthe r discussion and scrutiny in the fu ture  and so the resu lts  of 
th is  survey provide a useful p icture of the s itua tion  at the time.
14.2.9 Opinions on company relationships with analysts and fund 
managers
The fourth  general research question was what are the opinions of 
companies regarding the costs and benefits of communicating with 
analysts. The questionnaire attempted to answer th is  by asking fo r 
respondents' views on the qua lity  of research carried out on th e ir  
company (see 13.3). I f  companies are sa tis fied  with research th is  
indicates tha t the investor re la tions e ffo r t  has yielded some 
benefit. I f  analysts' reports are of prime importance in determining
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stock market prices and perceptions of company prospects then, i f  a 
company is unsatisfied with research th is  indicates tha t investor 
re la tions is a cost with no benefit. The findings showed that 52% 
rated analysis as acceptable, 42% considered i t  to be good and only 
4% rated i t  as poor with 2% ra ting  i t  as very good.
Respondent were also asked fo r  th e ir  opinions on the value of 
investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  conducted fo r the benefit of se ll-s ide  
analysts and buy-side analysts and fund managers. The overall 
impression from the results was that companies found the investor 
re la tions process valuable.
The opinions expressed here by the respondents indicate a general 
level o f sa tis fac tion  with the status quo and th is  evidence should be 
useful to  po licy makers in proposing changes. I t  might, fo r  example, 
be argued tha t as the current system seems to be working well then an 
imposition of additional regulation is undesirable.
14.2.10 The achievement of the descriptive statistics in answering 
the general research questions
Overall the data set obtained from the questionnaire survey has been 
successful in answering the research questions. The results  as 
presented provide fo r  interested parties a comprehensive and detailed 
description of the investor re la tions process as i t  was carried out 
at the time of the survey. The special re la tionsh ip  between 
companies and analysts and fund managers is c le a rly  established and 
th is  provides an insight in to  the workings of the cap ita l marketplace 
especially regarding the provision of information.
Lee and Tweedie (1981), Arnold and Moizer (1984) and Day (1986) a ll 
commented on company contacts with analysts and suggested that th is  
was an area worthy of fu rthe r investigation (see 6 .3). Their 
comments provided the in i t ia l  impetus fo r th is  project and i t  is 
clear tha t the information obtained by th is  survey is a useful 
addition to our understanding of the workings of the stock market.
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14.3. Hypothesis testing  of variables representing costs of and 
e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions against the independent 
variables
14.3.1 Introduction
The overa ll research question sought to establish the causes of the 
investor re la tions process. In order to help answer th is  question 
nine spec ific  research questions were formulated as testable 
hypotheses. The underlying ra tiona le  was that companies should only 
devote cash and organisational resources to investor re la tions i f  
there is  a reason fo r  doing so. As the descriptive results  showed, 
there were wide differences between companies in terms of costs 
incurred on, and e f fo r t  devoted to , the investor re la tions process. 
D iffe ren t company characteris tics might help to explain d iffe re n t 
a c t iv ity  levels.
The selection of the nine hypotheses and the independent variables 
used fo r  testing  was influenced by previous lite ra tu re  on information 
disclosure in company accounts.
From the questionnaire responses a number of categorical, ordinal or 
continuous variables were extracted and used fo r  hypothesis tes ting . 
I t  was decided to use both univariate and m u ltiva ria te  tests in the 
analysis. The tests used were the Pearson and Spearman rank 
co rre la tion , the Kruskal-Wallis tes t and the chi-square te s t. For 
the continuous dependent variables stepwise regression and m ultip le  
regression analysis was used.
In respect of data on the organisation of the investor re la tions 
function there were fiv e  continuous variables and four ordinal 
variables measuring e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions (see 9.3 and 
9.4).
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The data on surveys of C ity opinion was used to provide three 
continuous measures and one ordinal measure of e f fo r t  devoted to 
investor re la tions (see 10.4 and 10.5).
The data on the execution of the investor re la tions programme was 
then considered. The perceived importance of each of the fiv e  types 
of investor re la tions a c t iv ity  was used to construct an index of 
investor re la tions a c t iv ity .  On the basis that a company is lik e ly  
to devote investor re la tions e ffo r t  to an a c t iv ity  i t  considers 
important i t  was f e l t  that th is  index might be a proxy measure of 
investor re la tions e ffo r t .
The results on company meetings with analysts and fund managers were 
then considered. Eight continuous measures re la ting  to the number of 
meetings and size of audience were obtained and used as a measure of 
e ffo r t devoted to investor re la tions.
Responses obtained on company feedback on analysts' reports were used 
to obtain two continuous measures, the number of reports produced and 
reports passed to the company fo r comment (see 12.5).
There were two ordinal measures of investor re la tions e ffo r t 
contained in the data on mailing information, whether or not the 
company mailed information at a l l  to se ll-s ide  analysts and/or to 
buy-side analysts and fund managers (see 12.5). Data on the size of 
mailing l is ts  yielded two continuous variable measures of e ffo r t  
devoted to investor re la tions .
The continuous measurements of investor re la tions cost or e f fo r t  were 
compared with each other to see i f  any were highly correlated but 
th is  was found not to be the case. There might be some case fo r 
try ing  to combine the measurements to form an index of investor 
re la tions e ffo r t  s im ila r to the disclosure indices used by 
researchers in measuring disclosure in company accounts. I t  was not 
considered feasib le  to attempt th is  with the current survey data set. 
The problem here is s im ila r to measurement o f, fo r example, 
educational attainment. Educational attainment is an underlying 
variable not amenable to d ire c t measurement. Attainment scores fo r
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Table 14-1 S ign ifican t resu lts  fo r hypothesis testing bv univariate 
analysis of 20 dependent variables measuring investor re la tions cost 
or e f fo r t  against the continuous independent variables
TEST 1 + COEFF - COEFF
SIZE
AV(MV) 19 19 0
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 17 17 0
TRADFREQ 17 0 17
RISK
BETA 5 5 0
VARIAB 7 0 7
SPECRISK 16 0 16
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 4 0 4
711TPM 1 1 0
716PTPM 7 2 5
703ROSC 2 1 1
GEARING
731CG 7 7 0
732IG 5 5 0
733BR 10 10 0
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 0 0
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 13 0 13
TOTSSH 15 0 15
N00FSSH 15 0 15
MAXIMUM 20 20 20
NOTE:
TEST 1 = The number of times the Spearman Rank corre la tion between the 
independent variable and the 20 dependent variables was s ig n ifica n t at 
the .05 level (two t a i l  te s t) .
+ COEFF = Indicates the number o f positive corre la tion  coe ffic ien ts
- COEFF = Indicates the number of negative corre la tion coe ffic ien ts
Dependent variables are: INDEX, DIRDAYS, BUDGET, COSTS, SURVEYS(A), 
SURVEYS(B), SURVEYS, ACTIVITY, GENERALS, SPECIALS, LIST(A), LIST(B), 
ANALYST(A), ANALYST(B), FIRMS, INVESTORS, REPORTS, COMMENT, BROKERS, 
INSTINV. (see glossary fo r  d e fin it io n )
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mathematics, English and other subjects can be combined to bu ild  up 
an overall p icture but the individual subject scores may not be 
highly correlated.
In summarising the results of the hypothesis testing  i t  should be 
noted tha t 21 continuous measures of costs or e ffo r t  devoted to 
investor re la tions were extracted from the data. Most of these were 
straightforward answers to questions but there were two constructed 
variables or a c t iv ity  indices. Univariate analysis using tw o -ta il 
tests of significance of the corre la tion  coe ffic ien ts  fo r  the 
continuous independent variables and the Kruskal-Wallis tes t fo r the 
categorical independent variables was carried out. Stepwise 
regression and m ultip le  regression was then carried out fo r  twenty of 
the dependent variables (see tables 14-1, 14-2 and 14-3). (The 
variable fo r  the percentage of the d irectora te  involved in investor 
re la tions (%DIRINIR) was not used in m u ltiva ria te  analysis fo r 
reasons stated in chapter 9 .4 .)
A dd itiona lly , there were seven ordinal dependent variables measuring 
investor re la tions a c t iv ity  which were tested using the Kruskal- 
Wallis te s t against the continuous independent variables and using 
the chi-square te s t with the categorical independent variables (see 
tables 14-4, 14-5 and 14-6).
The summary tables 14-1 to 14-6 provide an overview of the detailed 
results of the hypothesis testing  as summarised in the results 
chapters.
14.3.2 Achievements of the hypothesis testing
A review of tables 14-1 and 14-2 reveals that the hypotheses selected 
and employed in the univariate analysis have established a number of 
s ig n ifica n t associations between the investor re la tions variables and 
the independent variables. The m ultiva ria te  testing  has provided 
additional confirmation of the importance of some of the independent 
variables id e n tifie d  as important in the univariate analysis. This
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Table 14-2 S ign ifican t resu lts  fo r hypothesis testing bv m ultivaria te  
analysis of 20 dependent variables measuring investor re la tions cost 
or e ffo r t against the continuous independent variables
TEST TOTAL COEFF
2 3 + -
SIZE
AV(MV) 13 1 14 14 0
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 14 1 15 15 0
TRADFREQ 3 1 4 1 3
RISK
BETA 5 0 5 4 1
VARIAB 0 2 2 1 1
SPECRISK 2 1 3 3 0
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 1 2 3 1 2
711TPM 0 2 2 1 1
716PTPM 3 0 3 1 2
703ROSC 0 0 0 0 0
GEARING
731CG 1 2 3 2 1
732IG 2 3 5 0 5
733BR 0 2 2 1 1
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 1 3 3 0
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 1 4 5 0 5
TOTSSH 2 7 9 0 9
NOOFSSH 1 4 5 5 0
MAXIMUM 20 20 20
NOTE:
TEST 2 = The number of times the independent variable entered the 
regression equation using the Minitab stepwise routine with the 
c r i t ic a l F-value set at the default value of 4.
TEST 3 = The number of times the independent variable entered the 
regression equation using the Minitab stepwise routine w ith the 
c r i t ic a l F-value set at the value of 2.
COEFF + /- = The number of times the variable entered the regression 
equations with a positive/negative coe ffic ien t
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analysis has also succeeded in explaining up to 47% of the varia tion  
observed in the investor re la tions variables. This is a good 
achievement fo r an exploratory study with a ten ta tive  model adapted 
from existing  lite ra tu re  in a d iffe re n t subject area.
Of p a rticu la r note is the fac t that company size was s ig n if ic a n tly  
p o s itive ly  associated with the investor re la tions variables in 19 out 
of 20 cases. This re su lt is in agreement with the empirical results 
in the disclosure lite ra tu re  which found that increased disclosure 
was associated w ith company size. The m u ltiva ria te  analysis supports 
th is  conclusion fo r  14 out of 20 investor re la tions variables.
The next important find ing  is that the existence of overseas lis t in g s  
(LISTINGS) is an important explanatory variable associated with 
increased investor re la tions e ffo r t in both the univariate and 
m u ltiva ria te  analysis.
Although trading frequency in the UK (TRADFREQ) and specific  r is k  
(SPECRISK) were frequently s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with the investor 
re la tions variables in the univariate analysis the resu lts  of the 
m u ltiva ria te  analysis did not confirm the importance of these 
variables.
Another important find ing  is the s ig n ifica n t negative corre la tion  
between insider shareholdings (BFA%) and substantial shareholdings 
(TOTSSH and NOOFSSH). Even though the m u ltiva ria te  analysis appears 
to give less support to the importance of these variables, the to ta l 
substantial shareholdings figu re  is included in 9 out of 20 of the 
regressions id e n tifie d  by the step-wise routines.
The summary table 14-3 supplements the information in 14-1 as i t  
shows the resu lts  of testing  the investor re la tions variables against 
categorical versions of some of the continuous variables. In 
p a rticu la r these resu lts  confirm tha t the existence of an overseas 
lis t in g  (OSEALIST) and frequent trading in the UK (TFCAT and ALPHA) 
is  frequently s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with a greater investor 
re la tions e f fo r t .
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Table 14-3 Summary of s ig n ifica n t results fo r Kruskal-Wallis tests of 
continuous dependent variables and the categorical independent 
variables
Independent variable OSEALIST TFCAT ALPHA
Organisational variables
%DIRINIR
INDEX
DIRDAYS
*
*
* *
BUDGET * * *
COSTS * * *
Surveys variables
SURVEYS(A)
SURVEYS(B)
SURVEYS
*
*
A c tiv ity  index
ACTIVITY * * *
Meetings variables
GENERALS * * *
SPECIALS * * *
LIST(A) * * *
LIST(B) * * *
ANALYST(A) * * *
ANALYST(B) * * *
FIRMS * * *
INVESTORS * * *
Feedback variables
REPORTS * * *
COMMENT * * *
Mailing l i s t  variables
BROKERS * * *
INSTINV * *
TOTAL 18 17 15
MAXIMUM 21 21 21
NOTE: The * indicates that the Kruskal-Wallis test was s ig n ifica n t at 
at least the .05 leve l.
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Another facet of the analysis is summarised in table 14-4. This 
deals with the ordinal measures of investor re la tions e ffo r t  that 
were extracted from the questionnaire responses in order to 
supplement the continuous variable data. The results  in th is  table 
support the impression gained from table 14-1 that size, 
m arketab ility  and shareholder de ta ils  are the variables most often 
s ig n if ic a n tly  associated with investor re la tions e ffo r t in the 
univariate analysis.
As noted above i t  is considered that the m ultip le  regression model 
has achieved a good resu lt in that the R-square adjusted went up to 
47% in the various models selected by the stepwise routine fo r each 
investor re la tions variable. Reviewing the results  in d e ta il fo r  the 
organisational variables, the R-square adjusted fo r BUDGET was 38.9%, 
fo r  COSTS 22.6%, fo r  DIRDAYS 6.6% and fo r  INDEX (of D irector 
involvement) 5.0%. This indicates perhaps that fu ture e ffo rts  should 
be devoted to extracting and modelling data on actual costs incurred 
rather than on ind irec t measures of investor re la tions related to 
d irec to r e f fo r t .
For the surveys variables the R-square was 13.9% fo r  SURVEYS(A), 1.0% 
fo r  SURVEYS(B) and 6.1% fo r SURVEYS. This would suggest that the 
commissioning of surveys is not p a rtic u la r ly  well explained by the 
model used in th is  study.
The a c t iv ity  index variable (ACTIVITY) was not well explained by the 
model as the achieved R-square was only 3.2%. This was a constructed 
variable, as was INDEX which also yielded a poor re su lt. This 
indicates tha t care should be taken in the fu ture  i f  any e ffo rts  are 
made to construct an overall investor re la tions disclosure index 
s im ila r to the disclosure indices popularly used in measuring 
disclosure in annual reports.
The meetings variables yielded good resu lts , the achieved R-square 
(adjusted) was 16.3% fo r GENERALS, 23.5% fo r  SPECIALS, 46.4% fo r 
LIST(A), 19.8% fo r  LIST(B) 45.8% fo r ANALYST(A), 31.5% FOR 
ANALYST(B), 34.4% fo r  FIRMS and 27.3% fo r  INVESTORS. The feedback 
variables had an R-square (adjusted) of 25.7% fo r  REPORTS and 23.9%
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Table 14-3 (continued) Summary of s ig n ifican t results  fo r Kruskal- 
W allis tests o f continuous dependent variables and the categorical 
independent variables
Independent variables SSH(Y/N) 4WAYINDC
Organisational variables
%DIRINIR *
INDEX
DIRDAYS *
BUDGET * *
COSTS *
Surveys variables
SURVEYS(A) *
SURVEYS(B) *
SURVEYS *
A c tiv ity  index
ACTIVITY
Meetings variables
GENERALS *
SPECIALS
LIST(A) *
LIST(B) *
ANALYST(A) *
ANALYST(B)
FIRMS *
INVESTORS
Feedback variables
REPORTS *
COMMENT
Mailing l i s t  variables
BROKERS *
INSTINV
TOTAL 10 5
MAXIMUM 21 21
NOTE: The * indicates that the Kruskal-Wallis tes t was s ig n ifica n t at 
at least the .05 leve l.
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fo r COMMENT. The mailing l i s t  variables had an R-square (adjusted) 
of 41.4% fo r BROKERS and 24.3% fo r INSTINV.
Overall the m ultip le regression exercise yie lds some encouraging 
results which lead to the conclusion that there is  fu rth e r scope fo r 
improving the model by build ing on the findings here.
14.3.3 Discussion of the hypothesis testing
The fact that some of the independent variables proved not to be 
s ig n ific a n tly  associated with the investor re la tions variables is not 
without in te rest. As th is  is an exploratory study of a complex 
phenomenon i t  is not surprising that some of the expected 
relationships did not emerge from the tes ting . The resu lts  obtained 
from the p rio r research on disclosure were discussed in the chapter 
proposing the hypotheses and were not consistent among researchers 
apart from the fac t that size was consistently associated with higher 
disclosure. This is broadly in line  with the findings here. This 
study proposed a re la tiv e ly  large number of hypotheses and in some 
cases used more than one independent variable per hypothesis. The 
disclosure index lite ra tu re  used in formulating the hypotheses 
ty p ic a lly  employed fewer independent variables and used only one 
dependent variable. I t  was f e l t  appropriate to select nine 
hypotheses in th is  study as there was no a p r io r i reason fo r 
discarding any of them and the study was o f an exploratory nature.
At the analysis stage there was a problem of missing values. In 
completing the questionnaire respondents tended to answer a l l  the 
simple yes/no and ranking questions but fewer provided detailed 
figures such as amounts of money spent on investor re la tions . The 
number of respondents out of 325 answering a p a rticu la r question is 
c lea rly  shown in the results tables and should be borne in mind when 
in terpreting the resu lts .
There were also missing values fo r the independent variables, 
p a rticu la r ly  fo r accounting numbers extracted from Datastream (see
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Table 14-4 Summary of s ig n ifica n t results fo r Kruskal-Wallis tests of 
7 ordinal dependent variables measuring investor re la tions cost or 
e f fo r t  against the continuous independent variables
NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
SIZE
AV(MV) 6
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 6
TRADFREQ 6
RISK
BETA 0
VARIAB 2
SPECRISK 3
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 0
711TPM 1
716PTPM 2
703ROSC 3
GEARING
731CG 1
732IG 0
733BR 2
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 4
TOTSSH 3
NOOFSSH 3
MAXIMUM 7
NOTE: Dependent variables were IROFFICER, IRSTAFF, IRDEPT, IRCONS, 
SURVEYS(Y/N), MAILING(A), MAILING(B). (see glossary fo r d e fin it io n )
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table 8-4). In some cases th is  was because the accounts were not 
available to Datastream but also because the ra tios  selected were not 
available fo r  some financ ia l companies. The r is k  measures from the 
London Business School Risk Measurement Service were missing fo r 
sixteen companies, the main reason being that they were recently 
quoted and not enough data was available at the time of the survey to 
calculate beta, v a r ia b il i ty  and specific  r is k .
The univariate tests dealt with missing values on a pairwise basis 
but when m ultip le  regression was used a case was dropped i f  any of 
the independent variables was missing ( lis tw is e  de le tion). Another 
approach might be to discard a l l  cases with missing values when 
calcu la ting univariate tests . In view of the small number of missing 
values and the fa c t that Minitab did not o ffe r a lis tw ise  deletion 
option when ca lcu lating a corre la tion  matrix th is  was not pursued.
Use was made of the m ultip le regression model because previous 
researchers had employed th is  technique when modelling disclosure in 
company accounts. Cooke (1989) used stepwise regression routines 
with variables representing quotation status, number of subsidiaries 
in group, and company size, to attempt to explain disclosure as 
measured by an index. He achieved an R-square of around 60%. Chow 
and Wong-Boren (1987) used firm  size, gearing and proportion of fixed 
assets to to ta l assets as independent variables and a disclosure 
index as the dependent variable and achieved an R-square of 15%.
Gray and Roberts (1988) used stepwise regression to model disclosure 
scores against turnover, gearing, d iv e rs ific a tio n  by line  of business 
and geographically and trading p ro f it  as a percentage of turnover. 
Their achieved R-square was 45% fo r  disclosure scores based on UN 
requirements and 24% fo r to ta l disclosure scores. This project used 
20 d iffe re n t investor re la tions cost or a c t iv ity  measures as the 
dependent variable in stepwise regression. This was followed by 
m ultip le  regression using independent variables ide n tifie d  by the 
stepwise routine. As noted above, the best achieved R-square was 
around 47% with 6 out of 20 regressions achieving an R-square over 
40%. This is considered to be a success as the area is new to 
empirical investigation and the resu lts  bear comparison with the 
disclosure lite ra tu re  which has been carried out over many years
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Table 14-5 S ign ifican t resu lts  fo r Kruskal-Wallis tests of 7 ordinal 
dependent variables measuring investor re la tions cost or e ffo r t 
against the continuous independent variables
IROFFICER IRSTAFF IRDEPT
SIZE
AV(MV) * * *
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS * * *
TRADFREQ * * *
RISK
BETA
VARIAB *
SPECRISK * *
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE
711TPM
716PTPM *
703R0SC * *
GEARING
731CG
732IG
733BR *
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% * * *
TOTSSH * *
NOOFSSH * *
NOTE:
The * indicates that the Kruskal-Wallis test was s ig n ifica n t at at 
least the .05 level
There were no significant results for IRCONS so it has not been
included in the table
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allowing researchers to re fine  th e ir  models in the lig h t of 
experience.
There are problems involved in using the m ultip le  regression model. 
F irs t ly ,  i t  is based on a linear re la tionsh ip  and th is  may not be 
appropriate in explaining investor re la tions although there is no a 
p r io r i reason to suggest tha t a quadratic or any other type of 
function would be more appropriate. The next problem is the e ffec t 
of omitted variables. I t  was not possible to include a l l  variables 
which might possibly a ffec t the investor re la tions e f fo r t .  There 
might be some benefit in fu rth e r analysis adding additional 
variables. A dd itiona lly , some of the data could be improved or 
d iffe re n t time periods could be considered. The data on takeovers 
could be improved to include attempted mergers and perhaps take in a 
longer time period than the year p r io r to the survey.
There may be other variables that are important but which cannot 
easily  be incorporated in the regression model. These include the 
company cu ltu re , whether i t  is secretive or open, the personality of 
the Chief Executive and his a ttitu d e  towards investor re la tions , and 
the preferences of the Finance D irector who is the person p rim arily  
responsible fo r  the financ ia l message sent out by the company.
As noted in the detailed resu lts  chapters, e ffo rts  were made to 
transform the data to achieve normality and o u tlie rs  were 
investigated p rio r to input in to the regression package. Residuals 
were examined by p lo ttin g  them against ind ividual predictor variables 
and the predicted values. Testing to see i f  residuals were normally 
d is tribu ted  yielded sa tis fac to ry  resu lts . M u ltic o llin e a rity  was not 
a p a rticu la r problem since none of the independent variable were 
highly correlated.
Overall then, i t  can be said that the data obtained in the project 
was subject to the usual problems inherent in th is  type of empirical 
work in the social sciences. One cannot be too dogmatic about the 
apparent confirmation of certa in  hypotheses and the re jection  of 
others u n til other researchers produce findings tha t help bu ild  up an
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Table 14-5 (continued) S ign ifican t results  fo r Kruskal-Wallis tests 
of 7 ordinal dependent variables measuring investor re la tions cost or 
e f fo r t  against the continuous independent variables
SURVEYS(Y/N) MAILING(A) MAILING(B)
SIZE
AV(MV) * * *
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS * * *
TRADFREQ * * *
RISK
BETA
VARIAB *
SPECRISK *
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE
711TPM *
716PTPM *
703R0SC *
GEARING
731CG *
732IG
733BR *
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% *
TOTSSH *
NOOFSSH *
NOTE:
The * indicates that the Kruskal-Wallis tes t was s ig n ifica n t at at 
least the .05 level
There were no significant results for IRCONS so it has not been
included in the table
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overall p icture and understanding of the phenomenon of company 
communications with analysts.
14.3.4 Possible reformulation of hypotheses
With hindsight i t  is possible to ask the question whether the set of 
hypotheses selected were the best under the circumstances and whether 
any changes should be made in fu ture research. A ll the hypotheses 
had been id e n tifie d  from previous research apart from H6 which was 
introduced on a p r io r i grounds as i t  was f e l t  that there might be an 
association between takeover a c t iv ity  and investor re la tions cost or 
e f fo r t .
Hypothesis H6 turned out to be the least successful in terms of 
s ig n ifica n t results  but th is  in i t s e l f  is in te resting . Before 
abandoning the hypothesis i t  might be worthwhile investigating other 
ways of measuring the dependent variable. This study looked at the 
number of takeovers in the 12 months p rio r to the survey. The period 
could be extended and the amounts of money involved in re la tion  to 
the size of the company might be a fac to r worth investigating. 
Attempted takeovers which fa ile d  could also be considered. Another 
angle could be whether the company i t s e l f  had been subject to a 
takeover b id. Perhaps the method of analysis employed is not 
appropriate fo r investigating the e ffec t of takeovers on the investor 
re la tions process. A case study approach involving interviews could 
shed more lig h t on the matter.
The indu s tria l c la ss ifica tio n  (H9) was also fa i r ly  unsuccessful in 
terms of s ig n ifica n t resu lts  and in th is  case i t  might be worthwhile 
investigating a more detailed breakdown into industry groups rather 
than the four way c la ss ifica tio n  tha t was used. This could cause 
problems in the s ta t is t ic a l testing  i f  there are only a few companies 
in any one indus tria l group.
On reviewing the summarised resu lts  in tables 14-1 and 14-2 i t  is 
apparent that hypotheses H3, H4 and H5 (r is k  measures, p r o f i ta b i l i ty
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Table 14-6 Summary of s ig n ifica n t results fo r chi-square tests of 7 
ordinal dependent variables and the categorical independent variables
Independent variable OSEALIST TFCAT ALPHA
Organisational variables
IROFFICER * * *
IRSTAFF * * *
IRCONS
IRDEPT * *
Surveys variables
SURVEYS(Y/N) * * *
Mailing variables
MAILING(A) * * *
MAILING(B) * *
TOTAL 6 6 4
MAXIMUM 7 7 7
Independent variables SSH(Y/N) 4WAYINDC
Organisational variables
IROFFICER * *
IRSTAFF * *
IRCONS
IRDEPT *
Surveys variables
SURVEYS(Y/N) *
Mailing variables
MAILING(A)
MAILING(B)
TOTAL 3 3
MAXIMUM 7 7
NOTE: The * indicates that the chi-square test was s ign ifican t at at 
least the .05 leve l.
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and gearing) were not overwhelmingly successful in explaining the 
investor re la tions cost or e ffo r t .  One idea here would be to analyse 
differences. Perhaps a change in r is k , p r o f i ta b i l i t y  or gearing 
would be more lik e ly  to e ffe c t investor re la tions cost or e f fo r t .
On balance, i t  is  probably better to carry out fu rthe r investigation 
regarding the less successful hypotheses rather than abandoning them 
immediately.
The other point to consider is whether to add fu rthe r explanatory 
variables to the model and th is  may well be a way forward. The 
degree of d iv e rs ific a tio n  both by product and geographically might 
have some bearing on the matter. A more complex company may fee l the 
need the engage in fu rthe r explanations of its  a c t iv it ie s  via the 
investor re la tions e f fo r t .  Although some segmental information is 
disclosed in UK annual reports i t  is s t i l l  the case tha t a single 
product or single country company discloses more about its  one 
d iv is ion  than a d ive rs ifie d  company does about i ts  various segments.
Another possible variable is  the recent issue of ca p ita l, e ithe r by 
an existing company or as a re su lt o f p riva tisa tio n . I t  might be 
expected tha t th is  type of event would increase the need to keep the 
markets informed via the investor re la tions process.
Another p o s s ib ility  worth investigating is the s ta b il i ty  of the board 
of d irecto rs. Where d irectors have been ousted or new d irectors 
brought in in response to business d if f ic u lt ie s  th is  may e ffe c t the 
investor re la tions e f fo r t .  However, business d if f ic u lt ie s  are l ik e ly  
to be re flected in fa l l in g  p ro fits  so th is  idea is linked to 
hypothesis H4.
Overall then i t  may be worth carrying out fu rthe r investigations 
regarding the hypotheses used in th is  study and adding some fu rth e r 
hypotheses in an attempt to improve the explanatory power of the 
model.
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14,4 Advantages and disadvantages of the questionnaire survey
technique
The questionnaire approach has many advantages and i t  was f e l t  that 
i t  was p a rtic u la r ly  suitable fo r  th is  pro ject. Use of a 
questionnaire enables the researcher to reach a large number of 
respondents and obtain data in a form suitable fo r  s ta t is t ic a l 
analysis. The fa c t that l i t t l e  was known about company 
communications with analysts indicated that a comprehensive 
questionnaire approach would be a good idea in order to establish a 
wide ranging knowledge base. I f  a good response rate is obtained to 
a questionnaire survey conclusions can be drawn about the population 
as a whole and hypothesis testing  and modelling can be carried out.
In contrast, case study research does not supply information about 
the population and time constraints usually severely re s tr ic t  the 
number of respondent organisations.
This pro ject achieved a good response rate which was viewed as a 
positive  sign that the questionnaire was well designed, easy to 
answer and concerning matters that were of in te rest to the 
respondents. As an incentive to respond, companies were promised a 
summary of the re su lts . This was issued in the form of a 62 page 
booklet containing results tables and summary comments. A number of 
recip ients wrote or telephoned to indicate tha t they (wS  ^ interested 
in the resu lts  and pleased to have received them.
The use of a postal questionnaires has some disadvantages.
Respondents may answer inco rrec tly , e ither mistakenly or 
de libe ra te ly . This problem would also occur with interviews and even 
i f  pa rtic ipan t observation were used the presence of the observer 
would a ffe c t behaviour. There was some inconsistency in some answers 
and th is  was noted in the detailed review of the resu lts . This 
probably arose when respondents were try in g  to f i l l  the survey in as 
quickly as possible and not taking great care. The inconsistencies 
noted were not considered to be serious. However, the answers given 
by companies did appear to agree with the p icture b u ilt  up from 
anecdotal evidence, from academic lite ra tu re  and the financ ia l press. 
For example, many companies admitted to giving analysts guidance on
r<- *
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th e ir  p ro f it  forecasts, an a c t iv ity  which could be interpreted as 
being ille g a l or at least against stock exchange ru les. I t  would 
have been surprising i f  no company had admitted to th is  and would 
possibly have indicated that questionnaires were not being f i l le d  in 
t ru th fu lly .
Another problem with th is  p a rticu la r survey is that the questionnaire 
was only completed by one respondent, usually the finance d irec to r, 
to whom the le t te r  was addressed. In some cases the questionnaire 
was passed to the investor re la tions o ff ic e r  or equivalent fo r 
completion. The facts regarding the investor re la tions process are 
lik e ly  to be independent of the id e n tity  of the respondent but the 
opinions could d if fe r .  Any opinion surveys should perhaps be 
directed to personnel at d iffe re n t levels w ith in  the organisation.
In p a rticu la r, an investor re la tions o ff ic e r  is l ik e ly  to be devoted 
to the d isc ip lin e  and keen to maintain its  importance w ith in  the 
organisation whereas the Chief Executive may be more l ik e ly  to view 
investor re la tions a c t iv it ie s  as a waste of time.
14.5 P o s s ib ilit ie s  fo r fu rthe r development of a theory of investor 
re la tions
At th is  stage i t  is worth considering whether the combination of the 
lite ra tu re  review and the research findings can be reevaluated to 
provide an improved theory or model of investor re la tions . The 
o rig ina l model, used in formulating the hypotheses, was tha t investor 
re la tions is essentia lly  part of the information disclosure process. 
I t  consists of voluntary disclosures, p rim arily  concerned with 
financ ia l matters, by informal methods as compared to the tra d itio n a l 
conduit of the annual reports and accounts. Voluntary disclosure 
w i l l  be made by companies i f  the benefits outweigh the costs, 
although there are severe p ractica l d if f ic u lt ie s  involved in 
measuring the l ik e ly  and actual costs and benefits of p a rticu la r 
disclosures. The approach taken by previous researchers into 
disclosure in company accounts is  tha t i t  can be explained by company 
spec ific  variables such as size, cap ita l structure, performance,
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organisational aspects and environmental factors. The project 
focussed on try in g  to apply th is  model to the investor re la tions 
a c t iv ity .  The resu lts  provided by the hypothesis testing provided a 
s ta rting  point fo r  fu rthe r investigations.
The resu lts  of th is  project c lea rly  establish that the market 
contains a set of priv ileged ind iv idua ls, the analysts and fund 
managers. Whether th is  is acceptable or not can be considered by 
examining the idea of a market fo r  inside information and the 
implications fo r regulation of such a market.
Investor re la tions can be viewed as a company's reaction to the 
information demands of the cap ita l market place, these demands 
emanating in p a rticu la r from expert users of accounting information 
and important customers fo r the firm 's  cap ita l. I f  government and 
stock exchange re s tr ic tio n s  on insider dealing were removed i t  might 
be possible fo r a market fo r  inside information to e x is t. This 
market would be subject to a number of problems. The company i t s e l f  
would be a monopoly provider of the information, there would be a 
large number of potentia l buyers of information containing a 
powerful, small, subgroup of analysts and fund managers. Monopolist 
monopsonist bargaining may thus re su lt. Information asymmetry would 
make contracting d i f f ic u l t ,  companies would not want to reveal the 
information to potentia l buyers as th is  could destroy the basis fo r 
the exchange. Even expert analysts cannot predict the e ffe c t of a 
p a rticu la r piece o f information on the share price and future 
prospects of the company and they would have to adjust the price 
offered accordingly. Also the value of a piece of inside information 
depends on the number of people i t  is sold to . Analysts would pay 
more fo r  exclusive righ ts  to information and there would be agency 
cost problems i f  contracts were made on th is  basis.
I f  information is a public good and an e ff ic ie n t,  liq u id  and 
transparent stock exchange is  the mainstay of a market c a p ita lis t  
economy then a market fo r inside information would require some level 
of regulation. The nature of UK in s titu tio n a l structures is such 
tha t a l l  cap ita l markets are subject to regulation. The regulation 
provides a level o f control over, and fo r the benefit o f, the market
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partic ipants. I f  analysts were able to purchase inside information 
some degree of regulation would be necessary to ensure that there was 
a positive e ffec t on the market as a whole.
To return to the real world i t  could be argued that investor 
re lations is the in s titu tio n a lis a tio n  of a group of transactions in 
the absence of a market. The market is prevented from operating by 
government intervention. Even without such intervention the market 
is lik e ly  to f a i l ,  or at least suffer from imperfections, fo r  the 
reasons outlined above. Coase's (1937) theory of the firm  and 
in te rna liza tion  theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) are useful in 
considering the growth of the firm  as an a lte rna tive  to organising 
transactions in the market place. These theories are possibly of 
some relevance, with adaptation, to investor re la tions . In the 
absence of a market fo r inside, unpublished information, an 
in s titu tio n , the investor re la tions industry, has evolved to overcome 
th is  fa ilu re . This in s titu t io n  is not contained w ith in  the firm  but 
there is nonetheless a stable pattern of transactions whereby 
meetings are held, telephone ca lls  made, s ite  v is its  conducted, 
mailshots sent out and research reports reviewed. The transaction 
involved is the exchange of information in return fo r  the possible 
provision of cap ita l. The provision of the annual and interim  report 
and accounts as required by law and statute can be viewed as the main 
information source with the investor re la tions function serving in an 
aux ilia ry  capacity.
Another possible line  of enquiry is the idea tha t companies are 
e ffe c tive ly  coerced into providing and investor re la tions programme 
fo r analysts and fund managers. They may fear tha t fa ilu re  to 
respond to information demands w i l l  lead to penalties. These could 
include lack of in s titu t io n a l investment, fewer share transactions 
and lower l iq u id ity  in the market fo r  th e ir  shares, inadequate 
analysis made available to prospective investors and misunderstanding 
o f financia l reports.
At th is  stage i t  appears tha t investor re la tions , in common with 
other economic and social phenomena, is lik e ly  to be the subject of 
competing or complementary theories and model bu ild ing attempts. The
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author considers that the voluntary financ ia l reporting model 
employed in th is  analysis has proved useful and appropriate.
14.6 Further research
I f  company communications with analysts are deemed to be worthy of 
fu rthe r investigation i t  is suggested that the use of d iffe re n t 
research methods would provide valuable additional insights. More 
case study research involving observations of general meetings, 
special meetings and s ite  v is its  would be in te resting . Examination 
of documents produced specia lly fo r analysts is another possible area 
of research which would illum inate the subject of company perceptions 
of analysts' information needs.
There is also scope fo r comparative in ternational research, comparing 
investor re la tions in the UK with the US and countries with less 
developed stock exchanges. P a rticu la rly  in te resting  would be an 
investigation of investor re la tions in the newly in d u s tr ia lis in g , 
high growth economies of the P acific  Rim and the struggling, former 
Soviet Bloc countries.
The changing s itua tion  in the UK means that a longitudinal study 
would be useful. This could repeat the o rig ina l survey once the 
Criminal Justice Act provisions, tightening up insider dealing 
le g is la tio n , have taken e ffe c t. As noted above (see 14.2.1), the 
London Stock Exchange is also consulting with a view to revising its  
rules on investor re la tions . Such a study would contribute to the 
debate, current in p o lit ic a l as well as academic c irc le s , regarding 
the costs and benefits of regulation. As an example, consider the 
normal routine when financ ia l scandals emerge. There is usually an 
outcry demanding tha t the government should do something about i t ,  
both to compensate the losers and prevent i t  happening again. 
Regulation costs the tax-payer money, c iv i l  servants must be employed 
to enforce the regulations and the regulated firms incur costs of 
compliance which are then passed on to th e ir  customers. There have 
been some extremely lengthy, expensive fraud t r ia ls  recently which
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have collapsed or resulted in acqu itta ls . This has called into 
question the ro le  of the government's Serious Fraud O ffice , the ju ry  
system and the value of leg is la tion  which u ltim a te ly  fa i ls  to punish 
even a small percentage of the g u ilty .
Returning to the subject of investor re la tions , i t  would be 
in teresting  to see i f  the answers to the questionnaire are d iffe re n t 
once the new regulatory regime gets underway. This would provide a 
measure o f the e ffe c t, i f  any, of the change in the ru les. There 
would also be scope fo r re lated research such as whether the new 
rules make the market more or less e ff ic ie n t and whether analysts 
perform bette r or worse or perhaps lose th e ir  jobs once inside 
information is less available to them and th e ir  value subsequently 
decreases. On the other hand, i t  may prove to be the case tha t the 
new rules w i l l  have l i t t l e  or no e ffec t on practice.
There are several topics closely related to th is  research project 
that would be worth investigating. The survey concentrated on one 
side of the investor re la tions process, the quoted company. I t  would 
be most in te resting  to carry out a s im ila r study but from the point 
of view of the audience, the analysts and fund managers.
The provision of financ ia l information via the annual report and 
other o f f ic ia l  documents is c lea rly  closely linked to the investor 
re la tions process. I t  would be valuable to investigate the extent to 
which annual reports f a i l  to provide the information that is required 
in the market place. The fa ilu re  of the annual report could be a 
cause of the investor re la tions process and an improved report 
process could remove the need fo r investor re la tions . Such an 
investigation would help accounting standard setters and regulators.
Since th is  survey was carried out in 1991 there has been a resurgence 
of in te res t in the subject of corporate governance. This has 
focussed on the d e s ira b il ity  of controls such as audit and 
remuneration committees. I t  can be suggested tha t the conduct of a 
companies investor re la tions programme should comply with the 
p rinc ip les of good corporate governance. Selective b rie fing  of 
analysts and leaks of price sensitive inside information are not in
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accord with good corporate governance. I t  would be in teresting to 
tes t fo r  an association between well organised and contro lled 
investor re la tions that complies with law and regulation and other 
indicators such as a proactive audit committee.
When analysing the questionnaire results  a number of areas where the 
questions could have been improved in order to extract superior 
information were noted. For example, the number of companies 
providing de ta ils  of investor re la tions budgets was rather low and i t  
was not possible to say what expenses were included in the budget 
figures provided. I t  might have been better to ask fo r  de ta ils  of 
the cost of producing the annual report separately from other costs. 
Respondents could also have been asked to indicate what costs were 
included in the budget. This would have provided additional valuable 
insights in to what areas of expenditure are viewed as part o f the 
costs of investor re la tions .
The meetings section of the questionnaire did not ask sp e c ifica lly  
about s ite  v is its  and perhaps th is  should have been included as a 
separate category although i t  was f e l t  at the time of d ra fting  that 
these could be considered as a form of meeting. There might also 
have been some value in investigating the reasons fo r  ca llin g  
meetings. Regular resu lts  announcement meeting can be contrasted 
with meetings to discuss s ituations that have arisen and need 
explanation.
The questionnaire only dealt f a i r ly  b r ie f ly  with the issue of costs 
and benefits of investor re la tions . This was done by asking fo r 
respondents' opinions on the value of the various aspects of the 
investor re la tions programme. I t  might have been benefic ia l to 
include more detailed and searching questions in try in g  to answer the 
research question. Questions could have been asked regarding the 
respondents' cost benefit analysis procedures, i f  any. The length of 
the questionnaire is a lim it in g  fac to r here as response rates are 
lik e ly  to f a l l  i f  a questionnaire is very long. A structured 
interview approach might have been a better way of investigating th is  
problem.
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Another point of note is the wide varia tion  in costs incurred and 
a c t iv ity  levels. The population surveyed consisted of large UK 
quoted companies but the varia tion  in size stretched from companies 
that would be ranked as large in te rna tiona lly  to fa i r ly  small. This 
suggests tha t a subdivision of the results might be useful. I t  might 
be expected that the results  from FTSE 100 companies would present a 
data set with smaller standard deviations fo r the measured variables. 
Another p o s s ib ility  would be to examine separately the data set fo r 
in te rn a tion a lly  lis te d  companies.
The questionnaire survey did not deal with information communicated 
by means of telephone conversations. I t  was not considered suitable 
to investigate th is  sensitive top ic using the questionnaire approach. 
Recording telephone conversations might be possible with the 
agreement of an organisation. However, such an action would be 
lik e ly  to a lte r  the nature of telephone conversations and perhaps 
cause discussion to be conducted in p riva te , face to face and away 
from the business premises.
I t  would also be in teresting  to compare the documents designed 
specia lly fo r  analysts with o f f ic ia l  material such as the annual 
report and establish whether any extra information is included.
I t  is hoped that the resu lts  of th is  research project and the 
suggestions fo r  fu rth e r research w il l  lead to more work being carried 
out on the subject of investor re la tions .
14.7 Concluding remarks
The aim of any research project is to increase human knowledge and 
understanding. Investor re la tions is a complex phenomenon about 
which l i t t l e  was known at the time of s ta rting  the pro ject. This 
exploratory study has gone some way towards increasing our knowledge 
of investor re la tions .
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The descriptive resu lts  obtained provide fo r the f i r s t  time a 
detailed p icture  of the way in which companies in the UK conduct 
th e ir  investor re la tions programmes and communicate with analysts and 
fund managers. The hypothesis testing  has provided results 
ind icating which company characteris tics are associated with 
d iffe r in g  levels of investor re la tions cost and e f fo r t .
Company communications with analysts and fund managers has proved to 
be an in te resting  topic fo r  investigation and the results  obtained 
here should help companies, po licy makers and the academic community 
in the fu tu re .
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Glossary
Abbreviations
4WAYINDC
703ROSC
707ROCE
711TPM
716PTPM
731CGEAR
732IGEAR
733BR
ALPHA
AV(MV)
BETA
BFA%
LISTINGS
LOGLIST
LOGTAKEO
LOGTAVMV
LOGTRADF
LOGTSRSK
NEGRBFA%
used fo r independent variables
Four way indus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  (1 = ca p ita l, 2 = 
consumer, 3 = other, 4 = fin a n c ia l)
Return on shareholders' ca p ita l, Datastream company 
accounts item 703
Return on cap ita l employed, Datastream company 
accounts item 707
Trading p ro f it  margin, Datastream company accounts 
item 711
Pre-tax p ro f it  margin, Datastream company accounts 
item 716
Capital gearing, Datastream company accounts item 
731
Income gearing, Datastream company accounts item 732 
Borrowing ra tio , Datastream company accounts item 
733
Whether a stock was rated alpha or beta on the 
London Stock Exchange at 7th September 1991 
Average market value of quoted equity fo r  the year 
to 31st July 1991
Beta, the s e n s it iv ity  of the share price to general 
market movements, as calculated by London Business 
School Risk Measurement service July 1991 
Percentage of equity held by board, fam ily and 
associates as lis te d  in Crawford's D irectory of C ity 
Connections 1992
Number of overseas stock exchange lis t in g s  at 1st 
August 1991
Log base ten of (LISTINGS + 1)
Log base ten of (TAKEOVER + 1)
Log base ten of AV(MV)
Log base ten of (TRADFREQ + 1)
Log base ten of SPECRISK
Negative reciprocal of (BFA% + 1)
NOOFSSH
OSEALIST
SPECRISK
SQRTBR 
SQRTIG 
SQRTOTSH 
SQRTVAR 
SSH(Y/N)
TAKEOVER
TFCAT
TOTSSH
TRADFREQ
VARIAB
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Number of substantial shareholdings lis te d  in 
Crawford's D irectory of C ity Connections 1992 
Whether or not there were any overseas lis t in g s  at 1 
August 1991
Specific r is k , the r is k  of non-market related 
fluc tua tions in the share price, as calculated by 
London Business School Risk Measurement service July 
1991
Square root of (733BR + 7)
Square root of (732IGEAR + 228)
Square root of (TOTSSH + 1)
Square root of VARIAB
Whether or not there were any substantial
shareholders (3% or more)
Number of takeovers in year to 31st July 1991 
Whether trading was FREQUENT (0 days between trades) 
or LESS FREQUENT (>0 days between trades)
Total percentage of equity held by substantial 
shareholders (holding 3% or more) as lis te d  in 
Crawford's D irectory of C ity Connections 1992 
Trading frequency (time between trades in days) as 
calculated by London Business School Risk 
Measurement service July 1991
V a r ia b ility  (standard deviation) of the returns on 
the share as calculated by London Business School 
Risk Measurement service July 1991
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Abbreviations
%DIRINIR
ACTIVITY
ANALYST(A)
ANALYST(B)
ANNUAL
BROKERS
BUDGET
COMMENT
COSTS
DIRDAYS
FEEDBACK
FIRMS
GENERAL
GENERALS
INDEX
INSTINV
INTERIM
INVESTOR
IRCONS
IRDEPT
IROFFICER
IRSTAFF
used fo r dependent variables
The percentage of the d irectorate involved in 
managing or executing the IR programme 
Index of IR a c t iv ity  (see 10.3)
Number of se ll-s ide  analysts attending meetings in 
past 12m
Number of buy-side analysts and fund managers
attending meetings in past 12m
Number of days close season p rio r to annual results
announcement
Number of stockbrokers on company mailing l i s t
Annual budget a lloca tion  fo r  IR
Number of se ll-s id e  analysts' reports passed to
company fo r  comment in the past 12m
Cost of external IR consultant in past 12m
Director days devoted to IR
Rank importance of providing feedback on analysts' 
reports
Number of stockbroking firms represented at meetings 
in past 12m
Rank importance of holding general meetings
Number of general meetings in past 12m
The index of d irec to r involvement in IR (see 9.3.1)
Number of in s titu t io n a l investors on company mailing
l i s t
Number of days close season p rio r to interim  resu lts  
announcement
Number of in s titu t io n a l investor organisations 
represented at meetings in the past 12m 
Whether or not there was an external IR consultant 
Whether or not there was an IR department 
Whether there is  a dedicated IR o ff ic e r , an IR 
o ff ic e r  with other duties or no IR o ff ic e r  
Whether s ta ff  working fo r IR o ff ic e r  are dedicated 
to IR, th e ir  work involves other duties, or there 
are no s ta ff
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LIST(A)
LIST(B)
MAILING
MAILING(A)
MAILING(B)
OPINION
OTHER
PROHIB
REPORTS
RESTRICT
SEASON
SELLSIDE
SPECIAL
SPECIALS
SURVEYS
SURVEYS(A)
SURVEYS(B)
SURVEYS(Y/N) 
TELEPHONE
Number of se ll-s ide  analysts on company's 
c ircu la tion  l i s t
Number of buy-side analysts and fund managers on 
company's c ircu la tion  l i s t  
Rank importance of mailing information 
Whether or not the company mailed information to 
se ll-s ide  analysts
Whether or not the company mailed information to 
buy-side analysts
Opinion of general qua lity  of analysts' reports 
Number of other organisations employing analysts on 
company mailing l i s t
Whether or not a company operated a p roh ib ition  on 
communication in its  close season 
Number of se ll-s ide  analysts' reports produced in 
the past 12m
Whether or not a company operated a re s tr ic t io n  on 
communication in its  close season 
Whether a company had a close season or not 
Opinion on qua lity  of analysis carried out by s e ll-  
side analysts
Rank importance of holding special meetings 
Number of special meetings in past 12m 
SURVEYS(A) + SURVEYS(B)
Number of surveys of c ity  opinion in past 12m 
Number of surveys more than 12m ago, less than 5 
years ago
Whether or not any surveys had been commissioned 
Rank importance of telephone conversations
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Abbreviations used fo r  s ta t is t ic a l terms
Chi-square test tables
STD RESIDUALS Standardized residuals
Descriptive statistics tables
NOBS Number of observations
Q1 F irs t q u a rtile
Q2 Third qua rtile
SEMEAN Standard error of the mean
STDEV Standard deviation
TEST M initab's corre la tion  tes t fo r normality
TRMEAN 5% trimmed mean
Kruskal-Wallis test tables
H The Kruskal-Wallis tes t s ta t is t ic
Z VALUE Indicates how the mean rank fo r the group d iffe rs
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Regression tables
Coef C oeffic ient
DF Degrees of freedom
F F -ra tio
MS MS error
R-SQ C oeffic ient of determination
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S The estimated standard deviation about the
regression line  
SS Sum of squares
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CONFIDENTIAL 
INVESTOR RELATIONS 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to discover how companies conduct th e ir  programmes of 
communication with brokers' analysts and in s titu tio n a l investors. I t  
also aims to fin d  out the views of company management about the value 
of investor re la tions . The results  w i l l  contribute to a better 
understanding of the factors influencing companies in th e ir  response 
to approaches from analysts.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION
1. The survey is  addressed to large companies with a quotation on the 
London Stock Exchange.
2. The questionnaire should be answered by the Finance D irector or an 
appropriate senior executive concerned with the investor re la tions 
programme.
3. The questions have been designed so as to minimise the time 
required fo r completion. For th is  reason, most questions require the 
respondent simply to t ic k  the appropriate box which represents h is/her 
opinion on the company's practice. However, some questions do seek to 
e l i c i t  factual information which may not be read ily  available. In 
respect o f these questions respondents have the option of providing 
the information or of s ta ting that i t  is not available.
4. A ll o f the information provided about the company w il l  be kept 
s t r ic t ly  con fiden tia l. The results  of the study w i l l  be presented in 
aggregate form only. The anonymity of rep lies from individual 
respondents and th e ir  companies w i l l  be ca re fu lly  protected.
5. Thank you fo r  your co-operation and support fo r  th is  research 
study. A summary o f the resu lts  o f the survey w i l l  be sent to  a l l  
partic ipan ts in due course.
I f  you have any queries about the study please do not hesitate to 
contact:
Miss C L Marston, BSc MAcc FCA ATII.
Senior Lecturer in Accountancy 
Newcastle Business School 
Newcastle Polytechnic 
E llison Building 
E llison Place 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 1BR
Tel: Day Time (091) 235 8951 (D irect lin e ) or (091) 232 6002 Ext.
4951: Evenings: (091) 384 4933
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
Analysts - persons involved in evaluating investments, irrespective of 
th e ir  employing organisation. They are sometimes known as fin an c ia l 
analysts or investment analysts.
Se ll-s ide/brokers ' analysts - persons working fo r  firms of 
stockbrokers, often in research departments.
Buy-side analysts - persons working fo r in s t itu t io n a l investors such 
as pension funds, insurance companies, merchant banks, investment and 
un it trus ts  etc. They are sometimes known as investment analysts.
Fund managers - persons working fo r  in s t itu t io n a l investors who may 
have analysts reporting to them or they may carry out th e ir  own 
analysis.
Investor re la tions - the lin k  between a company and the financ ia l 
community. Provides information to help the financ ia l community and 
investing public evaluate a company.
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INVESTOR RELATIONS SURVEY
SECTION 1: ORGANISATION OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS FUNCTION 
Question 1.1
Please state the number of d irectors (including the chairman) in your 
company by completing the boxes.
Executive d irectors 
Non-executive d irectors
I f  you have not answered the above, please t ic k  the box, 
Information not available I— I
Question 1.2
Please indicate the position of your company chairman.
Tick box
Chairman is a non-executive d irecto r L —I
Chairman is the Chief Executive I— I
Chairman is the Managing Director I— I
Other - please specify I— I
Question 1.3
Please specify how many of the directors are involved to some extent 
in managing and/or executing the investor re la tions function.
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the box. 
Information not available I— 1
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Question 1.4
To what extent are the members of your company's 
d irectorate involved in managing and/or executing the investor 
re la tions function.
(Please t ic k  one box in respect of each d irec to r)
0 1 2  3 4
Not Not at Minor Moderate Large 
applicable a l l  extent extent extent 
(no such 
d irec to r)
i )  Chairman - □  □  □  □  □
Non-executive
i i )  Chief 
Executive □ n  □ □ □
11 KS? □  □  □  □  □
iv ) Finance 
D irector eh □  □  n  eh
V) D irector^ □  □  □  □  □
Other d irectors 
(please specify)
Vi ) .................. I I 1 i I 1 1 I L, J
vii)  □ □ □ □ □
..........................  i i i i i i i i i i
ix)  □ □ □ □ □
x)  □ □ □ □ □
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Question 1.5
Can you provide an estimate of the number of working days in a year 
that the d irectors devote to investor re lations?
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box
Information not available I— I
Not applicable I— I
Question 1.6
Does your company have a designated investor re la tio n s /fin a n c ia l 
public re la tions o ffice r?
Yes (with investor re la tions 
as the main re spon s ib ility )
Yes (with investor re la tions 
as part of re spon s ib ilitie s )
No
Tick box 
□
□
□
Question 1.7
a) Please state the job t i t l e  i f  the answer to the above question was 
'Yes'
b) To whom the does the designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r  report?
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Question 1.8
Please indicate the position of the investor re la tions function w ith in  
your organisation.
i)  I t  is carried out by a separate department
i i )  I t  is carried out by a section of the 
public re la tions department
i i i )  I t  is carried out by the company 
secretary's department
iv) I t  is carried out by the finance d ire c to r 's  
department
v) I t  is carried out by company executives, 
with no central u n it or department
v i)  There is no investor re la tions function 
Other (please specify)
v i i  ) ...................................................................
Tick boxes
n  
□  
□  
□  
□  
□
□
Question 1.9
Please indicate the number of s ta ff working fo r  the investor 
re la tion s /fin a n c ia l public re la tions o ff ic e r  (includ ing c le r ic a l and 
secretaria l assistants)
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box. 
Information not available I
Not applicable I— I
Question 1.10
Are these s ta ff  dedicated to investor re la tio n s /fin a n c ia l public 
re la tions work or do they perform other duties?
Tick box
Yes - work is  mainly investor re la tions I— I
No - work involves other duties I— I
Not applicable 1— 1
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Question 1.11
Please can you provide an estimate of the annual gross salary b i l l  fo r 
the investor re la tions o ff ic e r  and h is/her s ta ff.
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box 
Information not available I— 1
□Not applicable
Question 1.12
Please can you give an approximate ind ication of the annual budget 
a lloca tion  fo r the investor re la tions function (excluding the salary 
b i l l ) .
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box 
Information not available I— I
Not applicable I— I
Question 1.13
Does your company currently employ the services of an external 
investor re la tions or financ ia l public re la tions consultant?
Yes
No
Tick box 
□  
□
Question 1.14
Can you provide an approximate indication of the cost incurred by your 
company in the past twelve months in re ta in ing the services of an 
external investor re la tions or financ ia l public re la tions consultant?
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box 
Information not available E—1
Not applicable I— I
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Question 1.15
I f  you were able to answer the above question please can you provide 
an estimate of the percentage of the consultant's charges that re la te  
to communications with analysts (both se ll-s id e  and buy-side) and fund 
managers as opposed to communications with other groups.
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box 
Information not available I— I
Not applicable I— I
Question 1.16
Does your company have a formal po licy or w ritten  description stating 
the objectives and respons ib ilities  of the investor re la tions 
function?
Yes 
No
Not applicable
Note: I f  your company does have such a document (whether general or
detailed) could you please attach a copy to the completed 
questionnaire.
Tick box 
□
□
□
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SECTION 2: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS 
FUNCTION
Question 2.1
Has your company commissioned any market research surveys of C ity 
opinion about your company?
I f  you have answered 'no' please omit th is  section and proceed to 
section 3.
Question 2.2
Please specify the number of surveys tha t have been commissioned by 
completing the boxes.
In the past 12 months
More than 12 months ago but 
less than fiv e  years ago
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the box 
Information not available C—I
Question 2.3
Please indicate whether these surveys were carried out in-house or by 
external organisations.
(Please t ic k  the relevant box)
Tick box
Both
External
In-house □
□
□
Information not available □
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Question 2.4
Please indicate the re la tive  importance of the fo llow ing factors in 
your company's decision to commission the most recent survey. 
(Please t ic k  one box fo r each item)
1 2 3 4
i )  General in terest
Not at Minor Moderate High
a ll importance importance importance□ □ □ □
i i )  To assess success i— i i— i i— i i— i
of investor re la tions •— 1 ■— ■ ‘— ■ *— '
programme
i i i )  To assess need fo r i— i i— i i— i j— i
setting up an investor ■— 1 «— • ■— ' '— '
re la tions function
iv) To assess need fo r i— i i— i i— i i— i
expanding investor ■— 1 ■— * '— ■ ■— *
re la tions function
Other (please specify)
v ) ...................................... □  □ □ □
v i  ) .................................... □ □  n  □
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SECTION 3: EXECUTION OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS PROGRAMME
Question 3.1
Please can you indicate the means by which your company communicates 
with analysts (se ll-s id e  and buy-side) and fund managers and the 
importance of the d iffe re n t means of communication.
(Please tic k  one box fo r  each item)
1 2  3 4
Not at a l l  
- not done
i)  By holding meetings 
which are attended by 
a number of delegates 
from d iffe re n t 
organisations
Minor Moderate High
importance importance importance
□ □ □ □
i i )  By holding meetings 
with individuals or 
small groups from the 
same organisation
□ □ □ □
i i i )  By answering 
telephone queries
iv ) By providing 
feedback on analysts' 
reports
v) By mailing 
information to 
analysts and fund 
managers
Other (please specify)
□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □
vi)
vii)
□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □
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SECTION 4: COMPANY MEETINGS WITH ANALYSTS AND FUND MANAGERS 
Question 4.1
Does your company hold meetings w ith any of the fo llow ing ? 
Sell-s ide analysts, buy-side analysts and fund managers.
Tick box
Yes I— J
No Q
I f  your company does not hold any such meetings please omit th is  
section and proceed to section 5.
Question 4.2
Which company o f f ic ia ls  represent the company at 
meetings ?
(Please t ic k  one box fo r each named o f f ic ia l . )  
(Where o f f ic ia ls  perform a dual ro le  please lin k
some or a l l  of these 
with a bracket.)
Yes No
Not 
applicable 
(no such 
o f f ic ia l)
i)  Chairman - Non-executive □ □ □
i i )  Chief Executive □ □ □
i i i )  Managing D irector □ □ □
iv) Finance Director □ □ □
v) Marketing D irector □ □ □
v i)  Company Secretary □ □ □
v i i )  Chief Accountant □ □ □
v i i i )  Investor Relations 
O fficer □ □ □
ix) Head of Public Relations □ □ □
x) External Financial Public 
Relations Consultant □ □ □
Other (please specify)
x i ) ............................................ □ □ □
x i i ) .......................................... □ □ □
x i i i ) ........................................ □ □ □
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Question 4.3
Does the company keep a record of the proceedings of these meetings? 
(General meetings are defined here as meetings fo r  a group of 
delegates from a number of d iffe re n t employing organisations. Special 
meetings are defined as meetings fo r individuals or small groups from 
one organisation.)
(Please t ic k  one box fo r each type of meeting)
General (or group) meetings
Special (or ind iv idua l) 
meetings
Yes No Not
applicable
□ □ □
□ □ □
Question 4.4
How many of these meetings did your company hold in the past twelve 
months?
(Please complete the box with a number or with a '? ' i f  the 
information is not available)
General meetings
Special meetings
Question 4.5
Please can you state the date of the most recent meetings held by your 
company.
(Please complete the boxes with a date or with a '? ' i f  the 
information is not ava ilab le .)
Day Month Year
General meeting
Special meeting
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Question 4.6
Approximately how many analysts are there on your company's 
c ircu la tio n  l i s t  of people who may be inv ited  to these meetings? 
(Please complete the boxes with a number or with a '? ' i f  the 
information is not available)
Sell-s ide analysts
Buy-side analysts & fund managers
Question 4.7
Can you provide an estimate of the number o f ind iv idual analysts who 
have attended at least one of your meetings (special or general) in 
the past 12 months?
(Please complete the boxes with a number or w ith a '? ' i f  the 
information is not available)
Sell-s ide analysts
Buy-side analysts & fund managers
Question 4.8
Can you provide an estimate of the number of stockbroking firms which 
sent representatives to your meetings (special or general) in the past 
12 months?
(Please complete the box with a number or with a '? ' i f  the 
information is not available)
Question 4.9
Can you provide an estimate of the number of in s titu t io n a l investor 
organisations which sent representatives to your meetings (special or 
general) in the past 12 months?
(Please complete the box with a number or with a '? ' i f  the 
information is not available)
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Question 4.10
Please indicate the types of information that your company provides to 
delegates (se ll-s id e  analysts and/or buy-side analysts and/or fund 
managers) at these meetings (special or general).
In respect of those types of information that are provided please can
you indicate th e ir  re la tive  importance
(Please t ic k  one box in respect of each item lis te d )
0 1 2  3 4
Not Not at 
applicable a l l
Past performance
i)  Explanation of 
recent results in 
the context of the 
general economic 
environment
i i )  Explanation of 
accounting po lic ies
i i i )  Additional 
breakdown of 
published figures 
by line  of business
iv) Additional breakdown 
of published figures 
by geographical area
v) Performance of recent 
acquisitions
v i)  Outcome of completed 
research and 
development projects
v i i )  Explanation of 
structure of balance 
sheet and gearing
Other (please specify)
v i i i  ) ..................................
□
□
□
□
□
Minor
import­
ance
□
□
Moderate
import­
ance
□ □ □ □
□  □  □  □
□ □ □ □
□
□
□ □ □ □
High
import­
ance
□
□
□
□
□
□
□ □  □  n
□  c n  c u  cm □
ix)
x)
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
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Question 4.10 (cont)
1
Not Not at 
applicable a ll
Future prospects
(Subject, i f  necessary,
to p r io r announcement to
the London Stock Exchange.)
x i)  F irs t announcement of 
major new projects and 
developments
x i i )  Further explanation 
of major new projects 
and developments that 
have already been 
announced
x i i i )  F irs t announcement 
of new products
xiv) Further explanation 
of new products that 
have already been 
announced
xv) F irs t announcement 
of new contracts
□
□
□
xvi) Further explanation of 
new contracts that have i— i
already been announced ■— >
x v ii)  Current state of 
order book
x v i i i )  Prospects of current 
research and development 
projects
x ix) F irs t announcement of 
new research and 
development projects
□
□
xx) Further explanation 
of new research and 
development projects that 
have already been announced
Minor Moderate High 
import- import- import­
ance ance ance
cn cm □  □
□  □
□
□
□
□
□
□  □
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□ □ □ □
□ □ □
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□  □
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Question 4.10 (cont)
1
Not Not at 
applicable a ll
Minor Moderate High 
import- import- import­
ance ance ance
xx i) F irs t announcement 
of p ro fits  forecast
x x ii)  Further explanation 
of p ro fits  forecast that 
has already been made
x x i i i )  Company strategy 
in the short term
xxiv) Company strategy 
in the long term
xxv) Company strategy 
fo r pa rticu la r segments 
of the business
xxvi) Company strategy on 
future acquisitions
xx v ii)  Company strategy on 
future disposals of 
segments of the 
business
x x v ii i)  Long term 
investment plans
xxix) Cash flow s itua tion
xxx) Dividend po licy
Other (please specify)
xxx i ) ................................
□  □  □  □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ n □ n □
□ □ □ □ □
□ n □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ n □
xxxii)
□  □  □  □ □
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SECTION 5: TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH ANALYSTS AND FUND MANAGERS
Question 5.1
Does your company engage in telephone conversations with analysts ?
Yes No
□ □
n □
Sell-s ide  analysts
Buy-side analysts and fund managers
I f  your company does not speak to analysts on the telephone please 
omit th is  section and proceed to section 6.
Question 5.2
Please indicate the company personnel who answer 
from analysts (se ll-s id e  and/or buy-side) and/or
(Please t ic k  one box in respect of each o f f ic ia l  
(Where o f f ic ia ls  perform a dual role please lin k
telephone enquiries 
fund managers.
l is te d . )
with a bracket.)
Yes No Not 
applicable 
(no such 
o f f ic ia l)
i )  Chairman - Non-executive □ □ □
i i )  Chief Executive □ □ □
i i i )  Managing D irector □ □ □
iv) Finance D irector □ □ □
v) Marketing D irector □ □ □
v i)  Company Secretary □ □ □
v i i )  Chief Accountant □ □ □
v i i i )  Investor Relations O fficer □ □ □
ix ) Head of Public Relations □ □ □
x) External Financial Public 
Relations Consultant n □ □
Other (please specify)
x i ) .............................................. □ □ □
xi i ) ............................................ □ □ □
xi i i ) .......................................... □ □ □
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Question 5.3
Does the company keep a record of the content of these telephone 
conversations?
(Please tic k  boxes)
A tape recording is made I— I
A w ritten  record is made t— I
No record is made t— I
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SECTION 6: COMPANY FEEDBACK ON SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS' REPORTS 
Question 6.1
Can you state the approximate number of reports on your company that 
have been produced by se ll-s ide /b rokers ' analysts in the past twelve 
months?
(Please complete the box with a number or w ith a '? ' i f  the 
information is not available)
Question 6.2
Can you state the approximate number of reports tha t have been passed 
to your company fo r comment p rio r to issue in the past twelve months? 
(Please complete the box with a number or with a '? ' i f  the 
information is not available)
Question 6.3
What action does your company take when i t  receives a d ra ft analyst's 
report fo r  comment or when an analyst telephones to 
discuss h is/her d ra ft report?
(Please t ic k  boxes)
i)  Analysts' reports are never 
received
i i )  Feedback is never provided
i i i )  Factual errors re la ting  to 
published information are corrected
iv) Comments are offered on the 
accuracy of analysts' predictions
Other (please specify)
v  ) .............................................................
□
n
□
□
□
vi) □
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Question 6.4
Please can you specify your company's po licy when asked to comment on 
analysts' p ro f it  forecasts.
(Please t ic k  one box)
i)  Company is never asked fo r 
comments
i i )  Comments are never made
i i i )  Comments are made
Question 6.5
□
□
□
I f  your company does make comments on analysts' forecasts please can 
you indicate your procedure.
(Please t ic k  boxes)
i)  I f  a forecast is reasonable no comment is made
i i )  I f  a forecast is reasonable the company 
confirms th is
i i i )  I f  a forecast is not reasonable no comment is made
iv) I f  a forecast is not reasonable the company informs 
the analyst
v) An analyst w i l l  be given some guidance regarding 
the size and d irec tion  of the error in his forecast
Other (please specify)
v i  ) .......................................................................................
□
□
□
□
□
□
v i i )  Not applicable □
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SECTION 7: MAILING INFORMATION TO ANALYSTS AND FUND MANAGERS 
Question 7.1
Does your company mail information to analysts?
Yes No
□ □
□ □
Sell-s ide analysts
Buy-side analysts and fund managers
I f  your company does not mail information to analysts please omit th is  
section and proceed to section 8.
Question 7.2
Approximately how many organisations employing analysts receive 
information from your company by mail?
(Please complete boxes with a number or w ith a '? ' i f  the information 
is not available)
Stockbrokers
In s titu tio n a l investors
Other
Question 7.3
What type of information is sent to analysts and/or fund managers? 
(Please t ic k  boxes)
i)  Annual report
i i )  Interim  report
i i i )  Quarterly reports
iv ) Copies of announcements sent to 
the company news service of the 
London Stock Exchange
v) Takeover documents
□
□
□
□
□
Question 7.3 (cont)
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Question 7.3 (cont)
v i)  Company information brochures 
and other promotional lite ra tu re
v i i )  General press releases
v i i i )  Documents designed sp e c ifica lly  
fo r analysts
Other, please specify
ix  ) ...........................................................
x) Information not available
□
□
□
n
□
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SECTION 8: GENERAL INFORMATION 
Question 8.1
Does your company p roh ib it or re s tr ic t  communication with se ll-s ide  
analysts, buy-side analysts and/or fund managers at certa in  times of 
the year?
(Please t ic k  relevant boxes)
Yes - a proh ib ition  operates 
at certa in times
Yes - a re s tr ic tio n  operates 
at certa in times
No
I f  you have answered 'no ' please omit th is  section and proceed to 
section 9.
□
□
□
Question 8.2
I f  you have answered 'yes' to the above question please specify the 
times during the year when communication is prohibited or res tric ted , 
(Please t ic k  boxes)
i)  P rior to the annual results 
announcement
i i )  P rior to the interim  results 
announcement
i i i )  P rior to the quarterly 
results announcement
Other (please specify)
iv  ) ..................................
v  ) ....................................
Yes No Not
applicable
□ □ n
□ □ □
□ □ □
□ □ □
□ □ □
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Question 8.3
Please specify the number of days fo r which communication is 
prohibited or res tric ted  p rio r to the annual resu lts  announcement.
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box
Information not available I— I
Not applicable I— I
Question 8.4
Please specify the number of days fo r  which communication is 
prohibited or res tric ted  p rio r to the interim  resu lts  announcement
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box
Information not available I— I
Not applicable I— I
Question 8.5
Please specify the number of days fo r  which communication is 
prohibited or res tric ted  p rio r to the quarterly resu lts  announcement
I f  you have not answered the above please tic k  the relevant box
Information not available I— I
Not applicable 1— 1
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Question 8.6
I f  your company operates a po licy of re s tr ic t io n  of communication 
rather than complete p roh ib ition  please describe the nature of the 
re s tr ic tio n .
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box
Information not available I— I
Not applicable I— I
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SECTION 9: OPINIONS ON YOUR COMPANY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ANALYSTS.
Some companies have expressed d issa tis fac tion  regarding the qua lity  of 
se ll-s ide /brokers ' analysts' reports. Others have expressed concern 
regarding the amount of time and energy devoted to responding to s e ll-  
side analysts' requests fo r  information and meetings. This section 
seeks to e l ic i t  your opinions on your company's re la tionsh ip  with both 
se ll-s ide  and buy-side analysts.
Question 9.1
How would you rate the general q ua lity  of analysts' reports, from a ll  
sources, that are made on your company?
(Please t ic k  one box)
1 2 3 4 5
Very Poor Acceptable Good Very 
poor good
□ □  □  □  n
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box 
No opinion I— I
Not applicable I— I
Question 9.2
How would you compare the qua lity  of analysis carried out by s e ll-  
side/brokers' analysts with buy-side analysts working fo r 
in s titu tio n a l investors?
(Please t ic k  one box fo r  each type of analyst)
1 2 3 4 5
Very
poor
Poor Acceptable Good Very
good
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
Sell-side 
analysts
Buy-side 
analysts
I f  you have not answered the above please t ic k  the relevant box 
No opinion I— 1
Not applicable —I
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Question 9.3
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the fo llow ing 
statements as they apply to your company and its  re la tionsh ip  with 
se ll-s ide /brokers ' analysts.
(Please t ic k  one box in respect of each item lis te d )
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
agree
i)  Company meetings i— i
with se ll-s id e  analysts *— ■ 
are a valuable means of 
communication
disagree 
□ □ □ □
i i )  Company telephone i— i i— i i— i ■— . i— ■
conversations with *— ‘ ■— ■ ■— ■ ■— ‘ ‘— ■
se ll-s ide  analysts are 
a valuable means of 
communication
i i i )  My company would 
prefer not to hold 
se ll-s ide  analysts' 
meetings
iv) My company would 
prefer not to ta lk  to 
se ll-s ide  analysts
on the telephone
v) My company should 
not provide se ll-s ide  
analysts with guidance 
as to the accuracy of 
th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts
v i)  Sell-s ide analysts 
pressurise my company 
fo r information
v i i )  Se ll-s ide analysts 
are too concerned
with short term 
p ro f it  opportunities
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 I
□ □ □ □ □
I I I I I 1 I I I 1
v i i i )  Se ll-s ide analysts i— i i— i i— i i— i i— i
are not s u ff ic ie n t ly  ■— ■ *— * •— ■ >— 1 *— '
interested in the 
long term prospects 
of my company
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Question 9.4
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the fo llow ing 
statements as they apply to your company and its  re la tionsh ip  with 
buy-side analysts and fund managers working fo r  in s titu tio n a l 
investors.
(Please t ic k  one box in respect of each item lis te d )
1 2 3 4 5
i )  Company meetings 
with buy-side analysts 
and fund managers are 
a valuable means of 
communication
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
agree disagree
□ □ □ □ □
i i )  Company telephone 
conversations with 
buy-side analysts and 
fund managers are a 
valuable means of 
communication
i i i )  My company would 
prefer not to hold 
meetings with buy-side 
analysts & fund managers
iv) My company would 
prefer not to ta lk  
to buy-side analysts 
and fund managers
on the telephone
v) My company should 
not provide buy-side 
analysts and fund 
managers with guidance 
as to fu ture p ro fits
v i)  Buy-side analysts 
and fund managers 
pressurise my company 
fo r information
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
v i i )  Buy-side analysts 
and fund managers are 
too concerned with short 
term p ro f it  opportunities
□ □  n  □  □
v i i i )  Buy-side analysts i— i i— i i— i j— i i— i
& fund managers are not I— ' '— • •— ' '— ' ■— I
s u ff ic ie n tly  interested 
in the long term prospects 
of my company
Marston, C . I_ . : 1993 Appendix A 35
Question 9.5
I f  you have any opinions or ideas as to how company communications 
with se ll-s ide /brokers ' analysts, buy-side analysts and fund managers 
should be conducted in the future please can you state these below.
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SECTION 10: RESPONDENT DETAILS
Thank you fo r completing th is  questionnaire. I t  would be most helpful 
i f  you could provide the fo llow ing information. Please note tha t your 
reply to th is  questionnaire w i l l  be kept s t r ic t ly  CONFIDENTIAL. The 
results of the study w il l  be reported in aggregate form only.
Your name.....................
Your job t i t l e ...........
Your telephone number 
Company name...............
I f  there are any aspects of the investor re la tions issue that you 
consider important and which are not covered here then please give 
your comments in the space provided below.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION - IT IS MUCH APPRECIATED.
PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE REPLY PAID ENVELOPE PROVIDED 
TO:
Miss C L Marston 
Newcastle Business School 
Newcastle Polytechnic 
E llison Building 
E llison Place 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 1BR
Comments:
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
DATE REPLY RECEIVED
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A-2 Letter to accompany f i r s t  mailing
1 August 1991
Dear
Investor Relations Survey
I am w riting  to you to request your kind co-operation in a survey of 
company investor re la tions. This work is being carried out by Glasgow 
University Business School in conjunction with Newcastle Business 
School, with Miss C.L.Marston as the p rinc ipa l researcher fo r  the 
project.
In recent years there has been an increased awareness of the 
importance of communication between industry and the C ity . This has 
led to a growth in the a c t iv ity  known as investor re la tions .
This survey focuses on the part of the investor re la tions programme 
which services the needs of financ ia l analysts. The overa ll aim is to 
establish how companies organise th e ir  communications with analysts.
I t  is hoped that the survey w il l  establish the current "state of the 
a rt" in th is  respect among B r ita in 's  top companies.
A ll replies to the survey w il l  be treated in s tr ic te s t confidence. 
Results w i l l  be presented in aggregate form only. P artic ipa ting  
companies w i l l  receive a short report h igh ligh ting  the main findings 
of the survey.
I would be most gratefu l i f  you could spare ha lf an hour of your time 
to complete the enclosed questionnaire.
Yours sincerely
Professor Sidney J Gray
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A-3 Letter to accompany second mailing to members of Investor 
Relations Society
September 1991
Dear
INVESTOR RELATIONS SURVEY
During the f i r s t  week of August you possibly received a postal 
questionnaire on the subject of investor re la tions from C laire Marston 
of Newcastle Business School. You may be interested to know that the 
Investor Relations Society is supporting th is  piece of market 
research, on the basis that the information gleaned w i l l  be most 
helpful when compiling our programme of fu ture  events. With th is  
pa rticu la r slant in mind, I hope you w i l l  not mind my w ritin g  to seek 
your co-operation as an IRS member, as we do not yet appear to have 
received a reply from your Company.
We realise that there are many demands on your time, but please note 
that i f  you do respond, you w il l  receive a report on the main 
find ings. This report w i l l  summarise how B r ita in 's  top companies 
conduct th e ir  re lationships with analysts. I t  w i l l  also contain 
opinions from companies about se ll-s id e  and buy-side analysts. 
Obviously the more replies received, the more va lid  and re lia b le  the 
report w i l l  be.
On behalf of C laire Marston, I enclose another copy of the 
questionnaire and a reply paid envelope fo r your convenience. I f  you 
or another Company Executive have already rep lied , please accept my 
apologies fo r troub ling you.
Yours sincerely,
Warren Stokes
Chairman, IRS Research Committee
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A-4 Letter to accompany second mailing to non-members of Investor 
Relations Society
October 1991
Dear
INVESTOR RELATIONS SURVEY
During the f i r s t  week of August you received a postal questionnaire on 
the subject of investor re la tions . Since I have not yet received a 
reply from you I am w riting  again in the hope of obtaining your 
cooperation.
I rea lise  that there are many demands on your time but please note 
that i f  you do partic ipa te  in the survey you w il l  receive a report on 
the main find ings. This report w i l l  summarise how B r ita in 's  top 500 
companies conduct th e ir  re lationships with analysts. I t  w i l l  also 
report the opinions of companies about brokers' analysts and 
in s titu tio n a l investor analysts. The more rep lies I receive the more 
va lid  and re lia b le  the report w i l l  be.
I enclose another copy of the questionnaire and a reply paid envelope 
fo r your convenience. I f  you have already replied please accept my 
apologies fo r troubling you again. I f  you have passed on the o rig ina l 
questionnaire to another company executive I would be grate fu l i f  you 
could also pass th is  reminder le t te r  on.
Yours sincerely
Miss C L Marston
Senior Lecturer in Accountancy
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A-5 Letter to accompany th ird  mailing
1 March 1992
Dear
INVESTOR RELATIONS SURVEY
Last August a survey was carried out to discover how B r ita in 's  top 550 
companies conduct th e ir  investor re la tions programmes. A fte r a fo llow  
up in mid September a very pleasing response rate of 60% was achieved. 
A ll pa rtic ipa ting  companies w il l  receive a short report h igh ligh ting  
the main findings of the survey in due course.
I am w riting  to your company again because I have not received a reply 
from you. A number of companies have replied anonymously and i f  th is  
applies in your case please accept my apologies fo r bothering you 
again. I f ,  however, you have not yet responded and would s t i l l  like  
to take part in the survey please complete the enclosed questionnaire 
and return i t  to me in the reply paid envelope provided.
Yours sincerely
Miss C laire L Marston 
Senior Lecturer in Accountancy
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Appendix B Tables of results on the organisation of the investor 
relations function
B-l Number of d irectors involved in investor re la tions function
B-2 Percentage of d irectorate involved in the investor re la tions
function
B-3 Involvement of d irectors in investor re la tions
B-4 Number of working days in a year tha t d irectors devote to
investor re la tions 
B-5 Existence of designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r
B-6 Position of investor re la tions function w ith in  organisation
B-7 Number o f s ta ff  working fo r  investor re la tions o ff ic e r  where
work is  mainly investor re la tions 
B-8 Annual budget a lloca tion  fo r  the investor re la tions function
(excluding salary b i l l )
B-9 Cost incurred in past 12 months on external investor
re la tions consultant 
B-10 Percentage of consultant's charges re la ting  to communications
with analysts and fund managers 
B - ll Does the company have a formal po licy or w ritten  description
fo r the investor re la tion  function?
B-12 Descriptive s ta tis t ic s  fo r  data on organisation of investor
re la tions
B-13 Correlation of data on organisation of investor re la tions
B-14 Pearson Correlation of data on organisation of investor
re la tions w ith company specific  variables 
B-15 Spearman rank corre lations of data on organisation of
investor re la tions with company spec ific  variables 
B-16 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on %DIRINIR
B-17 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on INDEX
B-18 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on DIRDAYS
B-19 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on BUDGET
B-20 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on COSTS
B-21 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r  (IROFFICER) and the 
independent categorical variables
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B-22 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
dedicated investor re la tions s ta ff  (IRSTAFF) and the 
independent categorical variables 
B-23 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the existence of a
designated IR o ff ic e r (IROFFICER) and the company specific  
independent continuous variables 
B-24 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the existence of
dedicated IR s ta ff (IRSTAFF) and the company specific  
independent continuous variables 
B-25 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
separate IR department (IRDEPT) and the independent 
categorical variables 
B-26 Chi-square tests of association between the existence o f an
external IR consultant (IRCONS) and the independent 
categorical variables 
B-27 Kruskal-Wallis test of association between the existence of a
separate investor re la tions department (IRDEPT) and the 
company specific  continuous variables 
B-28 Kruskal-Wallis test of association between the existence of
an external investor re la tions consultant (IRCONS) and the 
company specific  continous variables 
B-29 Stepwise regression of d irec to r involvement index (INDEX)
B-30 M ultip le regression of d irec to r involvement index (INDEX)
using variables iden tified  by stepwise regression 
B-31 Stepwise regression of d irec to r days (DIRDAYS)
B-32 M ultip le regression of d irec to r days (DIRDAYS) using
variables ide n tified  by stepwise regression 
B-33 Stepwise regression of investor re la tions budget (BUDGET)
B-34 M ultip le regression of investor re la tions budget (BUDGET)
using variables iden tifie d  by stepwise regression 
B-35 Stepwise regression of cost of external consultant in £k
(COSTS)
B-36 M ultip le  regression of cost of external consultant in £k
(COSTS) using variables id e n tifie d  by stepwise regression 
B-37 Stepwise regression of d irec to r involvement index (INDEX)
with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2 
B-38 Stepwise regression of d irec to r days (DIRDAYS) with c r i t ic a l
F value reduced to 2
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B-39 Stepwise regression of investor re la tions budget (BUDGET)
with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2 
B-40 Stepwise regression of external consultant costs (COSTS) w ith
c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2 
B-41 M ultip le  regression of investor re la tions budget in £k
(BUDGET) using a l l  independent variables
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Table B-l Number of directors involved in investor re la tions function
COUNT PERCENT
1 2 0.60
2 67 19.94
3 145 43.15
4 73 21.73
5 25 7.44
6 11 3.27
7 7 2.08
8 4 1.19
9 1 0.30
12 1 0.30
N= 336
*_ 1
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.4405 3.0000
NOTE:
The * indicates a missing value, where the respondent did not answer a 
particu la r question)
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Table B-2 Percentage of d irectorate involved in the investor 
re la tions function
COUNT PERCENT
0-20% 33 10.0
21-30% 95 28.7
31-40% 90 27.2
41-50% 57 17.2
51-60% 25 7.6
61-70% 15 4.5
71-80% 10 3.0
81-100% 6 1.8
N= 331
* = 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
0.38010 0.33333
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Table B-3 Involvement of d irectors in investor re la tions
Non-Executive Chairman
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 199 59.23
Not at a l l 28 8.33
Minor extent 57 16.96
Moderate extent 34 10.12
Large extent 18 5.36
N= 336
*= 1
Chief Executive Managing D irector
COUNT PERCENT COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 44 13.10 206 61.49
Not at a l l 2 0.60 5 1.49
Minor extent 12 3.57 29 8.66
Moderate extent 82 24.40 38 11.34
Large extent 196 58.33 57 17.01
N= 336 335
*_ 1 2
NOTE:
Most respondents (245) had e ither a Chief Executive or a Managing 
D irector. 88 respondents had both.
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Table B-3 (continued) Involvement of Directors in investor re la tions
Finance Director Marketing D irector
COUNT PERCENT COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 7 2.09 272 81.68
Not at a l l 7 2.09 30 9.01
Minor extent 10 2.99 19 5.71
Moderate extent 55 16.42 6 1.80
Large extent 256 76.42 6 1.80
N= 335 333
*= 2 4
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Table B-4 Number of working davs in a year tha t d irectors devote to 
investor re la tions
COUNT PERCENT
0-30 169 66.27
31-60 53 20.78
61-90 15 5.88
91-120 10 3.92
over 120 8 3.14
N= 255
*_ 82
MEAN MEDIAN
36.54 30.00
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Table B-5 Existence of designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r
COUNT PERCENT
No 0 163 48.37
Yes (as part of 
respons ib lities)
1 108 32.05
Yes (as main respo n s ib ility ) 2 66 19.58
N= 337
Table B-6 Position of investor re la tions function w ith in  organisation
COUNT PERCENT
Separate department 30 8.90
Section of public re la tions 
department
67 19.88
Company secretary's department 21 6.23
Finance d ire c to r 's  department 121 35.90
No central un it or department 93 27.60
No investor re la tions function 25 7.42
Other 28 8.31
Total 385
N= 337
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Table B-7 Number of s ta ff working fo r  investor re la tions o ff ic e r  
where work is mainly investor re la tions
COUNT PERCENT
0 1 2.33
1 11 25.58
2 11 25.58
3 10 23.26
4 4 9.30
5 5 11.63
13 1 2.33
N= 43
*= 1
MEAN MEDIAN
2.721 2.000
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Table B-8 Annual budget a llocation fo r the investor re la tions 
function (excluding salary b i l l )
£ COUNT PERCENT
up to 50,000 63 42.28
50,001-100,000 28 18.79
100,001-150,000 16 10.74
150,001-200,000 8 5.37
200,001-250,000 7 4.70
250,001-300,000 4 2.68
300,001-350,000 2 1.34
350,001-400,000 2 1.34
400,001-450,000 1 0.67
450,001-500,000 2 1.34
500,001 and over 16 10.74
N= 149
*= 188
MEAN MEDIAN 
180,272 100,000
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Table B-9 Cost incurred in past 12 months on external investor 
re la tions consultant
£ COUNT PERCENT
up to 10,000 23 10.65
10,001-20,000 46 21.30
20,001-30,000 54 25.00
30,001-40,000 16 7.41
40,001-50,000 23 10.65
50,000-100,000 35 16.20
100,001-200,000 14 6.48
200,001 and over 5 2.31
N= 216
*= 121
MEAN MEDIAN 
52,146 30,000
Table B-10 Percentage of consultant's charges re la ting  to 
communications with analysts and fund managers
COUNT PERCENT
%
0 23 17.04
1-20 38 28.15
21-40 15 11.11
41-60 33 24.44
61-80 11 8.15
81-100 15 11.11
N= 135
*_ 202
MEAN MEDIAN 
30.00 35.70
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Appendix B 53
Table B-11 Does the company have a formal po licy or w ritten  
description fo r  the investor re la tion  function?
COUNT PERCENT
No 0 240 71.43
Yes 1 64 19.05
Not applicable 2 32 9.52
N= 336
*_ 1
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Table B-12 Descriptive s ta tis t ic s  fo r data on organisation of 
investor re la tions
N N* MEAN MEDIAN
%D IRINIR 320 5 0.37936 0.33333
SQRT(%DIRINIR) 320 5 1.1725 1.1547
INDEX 324 1 8.022 8.000
SQRT(INDEX) 324 1 2.8053 2.8284
DIRDAYS 249 76 37.04 30.00
L0GT(DIRDAYS) 249 76 1.4500 1.4914
BUDGET 146 179 182024 100000
L0GT(BUDGET) 146 179 4.8673 5.0000
COSTS 210 115 52917 30000
L0GT(COSTS) 210 115 4.5117 4.4771
TRMEAN STDEV SEMEAN TEST
%DIRINIR 0.36825 0.16392 0.00916 0.961
SQRT(%DIRINIR) 1.1686 0.0679 0.0038 0.971
INDEX 7.880 2.291 0.127 0.973
SQRT(INDEX) 2.7919 0.3905 0.0217 0.992
DIRDAYS 32.56 35.61 2.26 0.838
L0GT(DIRDAYS) 1.4502 0.3341 0.0212 0.992
BUDGET 150364 245099 20285 0.828
L0GT(BUDGET) 4.9263 0.8014 0.0663 0.872
COSTS 42346 70375 4856 0.741
L0GT(COSTS) 4.5202 0.4970 0.0343 0.878
MIN MAX 01__ 03
%DIRINIR 0.07692 1.00000 0.25000 0.45202
SQRT(%DIRINIR) 1.0377 1.4142 1.1180 1.2050
INDEX 4.000 18.000 6.000 9.000
SQRT(INDEX) 2.0000 4.2426 2.4495 3.0000
DIRDAYS 0.00 260.00 15.50 42.00
L0GT(DIRDAYS) 0.0000 2.4166 1.2173 1.6330
BUDGET 0 1000000 30000 200000
L0GT(BUDGET) 0.0000 6.0000 4.4771 5.3010
COSTS 0 700000 20000 60000
L0GT(COSTS) 0.0000 5.8451 4.3011 4.7782
KEY:
%DIRINIR = percentage of d irectorate involved in investor re la tions
INDEX = index of d irec to r involvement in investor re la tions
DIRDAYS = d irec to r days devoted to IR per annum
BUDGET = annual investor re la tions budget
COSTS = cost of external IR consultant in past 12m
TEST = M initab's corre la tion  tes t fo r normality, a corre la tion  of 1
indicated perfect normality
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Table B-13 Correlation of data on organisation of investor re la tions
PEARSON
%DIRINIR INDEX DIRDAYS BUDGET
INDEX 0.422
DIRDAYS 0.108 0.245
BUDGET 0.036 0.209 0.079
COSTS 0.060 0.161 0.140 0.459
SPEARMAN RANK
%DIRINIR INDEX DIRDAYS BUDGET 
INDEX 0.457
DIRDAYS 0.156 0.260
BUDGET -0.057 0.244 0.274
COSTS -0.061 0.163 0.247 0.580
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Table B-14 Pearson Correlation of data on organisation of investor
re la tions with company specific  variables
%DIRINIR INDEX DIRDAYS BUDGET COSTS
SIZE
AV(MV) -0.098 0.122* 0.170** 0.446** 0.374**
LOGTAVMV -0.185** 0.199** 0.199** 0.528** 0.359**
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.031 0.128* 0.135** 0.467** 0.350**
LOGLIST -0.033 0.115* 0.157** 0.486** 0.408**
TRADFREQ 0.022 -0.091 -0.111 -0.176* -0.116
LOGTRADF 0.027 -0.119* -0.167** -0.266** -0.188**
RISK
BETA 0.023 0.092 0.029 -0.006 0.022
VARIAB 0.111 -0.052 0.028 -0.036 0.002
SQRTVAR 0.110 -0.044 0.016 -0.041 -0.002
LOGTSRSK 0.127* -0.095 -0.031 -0.097 -0.040
SPECRISK 0.120* -0.099 0.019 -0.054 -0.018
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE -0.020 -0.075 -0.086 -0.070 0.005
711TPM -0.063 -0.074 -0.100 0.047 -0.020
716PTPM -0.065 -0.105 -0.082 0.039 -0.010
703R0SC 0.003 -0.064 -0.037 -0.013 -0.065
GEARING
731CGEAR -0.017 -0.059 -0.043 -0.016 0.129
732IGEAR -0.059 -0.074 -0.080 0.125 0.039
SQRTIG -0.064 -0.084 -0.075 0.078 0.056
733BR -0.023 0.006 -0.040 -0.043 0.063
SQRTBR 0.004 0.027 -0.046 -0.041 0.076
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.080 -0.013 -0.045 0.192* 0.033
LOGTAKEO -0.076 -0.023 -0.050 0.166* 0.032
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0.090 -0.039 -0.046 -0.199* -0.127
NEGRBFA% 0.094 -0.074 -0.048 -0.337** -0.226**
TOTSSH -0.079 -0.107 -0.053 -0.201* -0.212**
SQRTOTSH -0.074 -0.112* -0.068 -0.214** -0.229**
NOOFSSH 0.017 -0.111* 0.004 -0.248** -0.207**
NOTE:
**= corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at the 0.01 level ( tw o -ta il te s t) 
* = corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at the 0.05 level ( tw o -ta il te s t)
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Table B-15 Spearman rank corre lations of data on organisation of
%DIRINIR INDEX DIRDAYS BUDGET COSTS
SIZE
AV(MV) -0.226** 0.172** 0.229** 0.622** 0.527**
MARKETABILITY
LISTING -0.116* 0.057 0.111 0.441** 0.329**
TRADFREQ 0.072 -0.133* -0.247** -0.545** -0.441**
RISK
BETA 0.053 0.030 0.069 0.051 0.135
VARIAB 0.123* -0.044 -0.000 -0.155 -0.058
SPECRISK 0.134* -0.092 -0.071 -0.249** -0.173*
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE -0.047 -0.097 -0.033 -0.216** -0.057
711TPM 0.012 0.041 -0.071 -0.068 -0.117
716PTPM 0.009 -0.027 -0.065 -0.099 -0.099
703ROSC -0.012 -0.100 -0.018 -0.171* -0.020
GEARING
731CG -0.012 -0.032 -0.023 0.095 0.138*
732IG -0.020 0.005 -0.000 0.235** 0.122
733BR 0.020 0.071 0.065 0.111 0.152*
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.072 -0.057 -0.035 0.039 0.026
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0.094 -0.057 -0.020 -0.405** -0.285**
TOTSSH -0.022 -0.078 -0.069 -0.219** -0.313**
NOOFSSH 0.049 -0.075 -0.034 -0.289** -0.286**
NOTE:
**= corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at the 0.01 level ( tw o -ta il te s t) 
*  = corre la tion  s ig n ifica n t at the 0.05 level ( tw o -ta il te s t)
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P*VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H
OSEALIST 0 264 0.3333 165.8 2.24
1 56 0.3038 135.3 -2.24 5.05 0.025
TFCAT 0 201 0.3333 153.7 -1.35
1 116 0.3750 168.1 1.35 1.82 0.177
ALPHA 1 272 0.3333 158.6 -0.67
2 47 0.3750 168.3 0.67 0.45 0.503
4WAYINDC 1 95 0.3750 172.6 1.52
2 97 0.3333 160.5 0.01
3 84 0.3333 176.9 1.89
4 44 0.2500 102.9 -4.44 21.39 0.000
SSH(Y/N) 0 93 0.3333 164.0 0.50
1 226 0.3333 158.3 -0.50 0.25 0.614
Table B-17 Kruskal -W allis tests of association on INDEX
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 264 8.000 160.6 -0.78
1 60 8.000 171.0 0.78 0.62 0.430
TFCAT 0 205 8.000 170.5 2.43
1 116 7.500 144.3 -2.43 6.03 0.014
ALPHA 1 276 8.000 165.0 1.41
2 47 8.000 144.3 -1.41 2.03 0.155
4WAYINDC 1 95 8.000 160.7 -0.23
2 99 8.000 158.3 -0.53
3 84 8.000 176.2 1.56
4 46 7.500 150.3 -0.96 2.88 0.410
SSH(Y/N) 0 94 8.000 174.6 1.55
1 229 8.000 156.8 -1.55 2.47 0.116
Table B-18 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on DIRDAYS
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 201 30.00 121.2 -1.70
1 48 30.00 140.9 1.70 2.91 0.088
TFCAT 0 154 30.00 136.9 3.65
1 93 24.00 102.7 -3.65 13.43 0.000
ALPHA 1 210 30.00 131.2 3.45
2 38 20.00 87.6 -3.45 11.98 0.001
4WAYINDC 1 76 30.00 133.5 1.24
2 79 30.00 120.7 -0.65
3 63 30.00 136.6 1.47
4 31 22.00 91.7 -2.75 9.70 0.022
SSH(Y/N) 0 70 30.00 131.0 0.89
1 178 30.00 121.9 -0.89 0.81 0.369
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table B-19 Kruskal -Wallis tests of association on BUDGET
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 104 50000 62.1 -5.12
1 42 200000 101.7 5.12 26.31 0.000
TFCAT 0 100 125000 87.9 6.36
1 45 30000 39.9 -6.36 40.70 0.000
ALPHA 1 128 100000 78.4 3.75
2 18 30000 38.5 -3.75 14.15 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 45 50000 57.1 -3.12
2 48 100000 75.8 0.47
3 37 150000 86.3 2.13
4 16 125000 82.9 0.95 11.12 0.011
SSH(Y/N) 0 47 100000 83.5 1.97
1 99 100000 68.7 -1.97 3.90 0.048
Table B-20 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on COSTS
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 171 25000 96.3 -4.60
1 39 80000 145.9 4.60 21.26 0.000
TFCAT 0 128 40000 125.3 6.32
1 80 20000 71.2 -6.32 40.14 0.000
ALPHA 1 179 30000 114.2 4.99
2 31 16000 55.2 -4.99 25.03 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 64 25000 95.1 -1.64
2 66 35000 116.7 1.81
3 59 30000 107.7 0.33
4 21 25000 95.7 -0.78 4.78 0.189
SSH(Y/N) 0 61 40000 122.4 2.58
1 149 30000 98.6 -2.58 6.69 0.010
* = p value adjusted fo r tie s
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Table B-21 Chi-square tests of accociation between the existence of a 
designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r  ( IROFFICER1 and the independent 
categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRQFFICER COLUMNS:OSEALIST
NO YES
0 1.89 -3.96
1 -0.02 0.04
2 -2.98 6.27
CHI-SQUARE = 67.414 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IROFFICER COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
0 -0.85 2.07
1 0.19 -0.47
2 1.11 -2.69
CHI-SQUARE = 13.739 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IROFFICER COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2 3 4
0 1.42 0.18 -1.77 0.07
1 -0.39 0.53 0.32 -0.64
2 -1.76 -0.96 2.41 0.70
CHI-SQUARE = 16.413 WITH D.F. = 6 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IROFFICER COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 -2.15 2.87
1 0.50 -0.67
2 2.79 -3.71
CHI-SQUARE = 35.144 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IROFFICER COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
NO YES
0 -1.56 1.00
1 0.38 -0.25
2 1.98 -1.28
CHI-SQUARE = 9.200 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE
NOTE:
IROFFICER coding 0 = no designated IR o ff ic e r  1 = IR o ff ic e r  whosw 
work involves other duties 2 = dedicated IR o ff ic e r
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Table B-22 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of 
dedicated investor re la tions s ta ff (IRSTAFF1 and the categorical 
independent variables
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRSTAFF COLUMNS: OSEALIST
NO YES
0 1.87 -3.92
1 -0.835 0.73
2 -3.22 6.77
CHI-SQUARE = 75.677 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL) 
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRSTAFF COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
0 -1.13 2.74
1 0.79 -1.91
2 1.03 -2.50
CHI-SQUARE = 20.332 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRSTAFF COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
0 1.16 0.23 -1.22 -0.36
1 -0.29 -0.28 1.21 -0.81
2 -1.88 -0.03 0.57 1.99
CHI-SQUARE = 13.105 WITH D.F. = 6 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL) 
STD RESIDUALS ROWS: IRSTAFF COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 -2.59 3.45
1 1.56 -2.09
2 2.76 -3.68
CHI-SQUARE = 46.594 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL) 
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRSTAFF COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
NO YES
0 -0.70 0.45
1 -0.42 0.27
2 2.08 -1.34
CHI-SQUARE = 7.084 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
NOTE:
IRSTAFF coding; 0 = no designated IR s ta ff ,  1 = IR s ta ff  with other 
duties, 2 = dedicated IR s ta ff
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Table B-23 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the existence of a 
designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r  (IROFFICER) and the company 
specific  independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 160 133.5 120.0 -8.12
1 102 382.6 173.5 1.36
2 63 1387.5 255.1 8.67 95.27 0.000
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 160 0.00E+00 140.9 -4.17
1 102 0.00E+00 162.3 -0.08
2 63 1.00E+00 220.1 5.37 70.22 0.000
TRADFREQ 0 159 0.00E+00 185.8 4.63
1 100 0.00E+00 152.2 -1.20
2 63 0.00E+00 114.8 -4.44 37.57 0.000
RISK
BETA 0 155 0.9800 143.7 -2.24
1 96 1.0550 168.1 1.73
2 58 1.0350 163.6 0.82 5.10 0.079
VARIAB 0 155 34.20 159.3 0.86
1 96 33.70 158.7 0.49
2 58 31.85 137.2 -1.68 2.83 0.244
SPECRISK 0 155 25.40 168.1 2.59
1 96 23.75 153.8 -0.16
2 58 20.15 121.9 -3.13 11.33 0.004
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 0 154 17.88 164.7 1.69
1 97 15.62 149.4 -0.88
2 60 15.94 144.4 -1.12 2.98 0.226
711TPM 0 150 12.62 154.6 1.36
1 91 11.03 136.5 -1.55
2 54 12.71 149.0 0.09 2.56 0.278
716PTPM 0 150 8.510 165.9 2.08
1 97 6.890 139.8 -2.02
2 62 8.595 152.5 -0.25 5.07 0.080
703ROSC 0 156 12.25 166.7 1.47
1 99 11.30 142.8 -2.13
2 62 13.35 165.6 0.63 4.53 0.105
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Table B-23 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the 
existence of a designated investor re la tions o ff ic e r  (IROFFICER) and 
the company specific  independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 155 29.51 153.8 -0.53
1 97 29.60 154.4 -0.28
2 60 32.80 167.0 1.00 1.01 0.604
732IGEAR 0 150 17.53 150.5 -0.38
1 95 18.04 149.7 -0.38
2 59 19.48 162.0 0.93 0.87 0.649
733BR 0 156 0.4050 155.0 -0.87
1 99 0.4100 152.7 -0.88
2 63 0.5100 181.4 2.11 4.49 0.106
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 160 0.00E+00 162.0 -0.18
1 102 0.00E+00 163.4 0.05
2 63 0.00E+00 164.8 0.17 0.38 0.825
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 159 0.9000 184.3 4.12
1 102 0.2450 156.4 -0.79
2 63 0.1000 117.2 -4.28 23.86 0.000
TOTSSH 0 159 17.450 182.6 3.79
1 102 9.470 150.6 -1.55
2 63 6.020 131.0 -2.97 16.48 0.000
NOOFSSH 0 159 2.000 185.7 4.38
1 102 1.000 152.8 -1.27
2 63 1.000 119.7 -4.04 25.32 0.000
KEY:
IROFFICER coding 0 = no designated IR o ff ic e r  1 = IR o ff ic e r  whose 
work involved other duties 2 = dedicated IR o ff ic e r  
* = p value adjsuted fo r tie s
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Table B-24 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the existence of
dedicated IR s ta ff (IRSTAFF) and the company specific  independent 
continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 175 138.1 124.3 -8.03
1 107 413.0 183.1 2.70
2 43 2021.2 270.5 8.06 90.96 0.000
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 175 0.00E+00 142.3 -4.29
1 107 0.00E+00 167.5 0.61
2 43 1.00E+00 236.1 5.48 76.12 0.000
TRADFREQ 0 174 1.00E-01 188.4 5.63
1 105 0.00E+00 139.5 -2.94
2 43 0.00E+00 106.2 -4.19 48.30 0.000
RISK
BETA 0 167 0.9900 145.0 -2.14
1 101 1.0500 169.9 2.04
2 41 1.0400 159.2 0.32 5.01 0.082
VARIAB 0 167 33.90 158.5 0.75
1 101 34.20 162.6 1.04
2 41 30.00 121.9 -2.55 6.61 0.037
SPECRISK 0 167 24.40 165.5 2.25
1 101 24.20 158.1 0.42
2 41 18.50 104.5 -3.89 15.55 0.000
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 0 168 17.88 165.2 1.96
1 106 15.44 147.9 -1.15
2 37 14.20 137.5 -1.34 4.21 0.123
711TPM 0 164 12.62 154.4 1.45
1 100 11.01 137.7 -1.48
2 31 13.05 147.2 -0.06 2.38 0.305
716PTPM 0 165 8.620 166.4 2.40
1 103 8.060 150.4 -0.64
2 41 5.350 120.5 -2.65 9.06 0.011
703R0SC 0 170 13.30 170.8 2.47
1 106 10.80 141.8 -2.37
2 41 13.20 154.5 -0.34 6.65 0.036
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Table B-24 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the 
existence of dedicated IR s ta ff  (IRSTAFF) and the company specific  
independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 169 29.30 149.9 -1.41
1 106 29.43 156.4 -0.01
2 37 33.22 187.1 2.20 5.17 0.076
732IGEAR 0 164 17.39 146.4 -1.31
1 104 17.59 153.3 0.11
2 36 23.62 178.0 1.86 3.83 0.148
733BR 0 170 0.4100 154.2 -1.10
1 106 0.3950 152.4 -0.97
2 42 0.5450 198.8 2.98 8.88 0.012
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 175 0.00E+00 161.6 -0.29
1 107 0.00E+00 163.1 0.01
2 43 0.00E+00 168.4 0.41 1.69 0.429
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 174 0.80500 181.1 3.85
1 107 0.24000 155.0 -1.01
2 43 0.03000 105.9 -4.25 23.28 0.000
TOTSSH 0 174 15.950 173.8 2.35
1 107 13.480 162.1 -0.06
2 43 5.080 117.7 -3.36 12.69 0.002
NOOFSSH 0 174 2.000 177.8 3.17
1 107 1.000 159.8 -0.36
2 43 1.000 107.2 -4.16 20.76 0.000
KEY:
IRSTAFF coding 0 = no designated IR s ta ff ,  1 = IR s ta ff  with other 
duties, 2 = dedicated IR s ta ff 
* = p value adjsuted fo r  tie s
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Table B-25 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
separate IR department (IRDEPT) and the independent categorical 
variables
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRDEPT COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
NO -0.21 0.51
YES 0.66 -1.61
CHI-SQUARE = 3.328 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRDEPT COLUMNS: OSEALIST
0 1
NO 0.87 -1.82
YES -2.72 5.72
CHI-SQUARE = 44.208 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRDEPT COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
NO -0.57 0.76
YES 1.78 -2.37
CHI-SQUARE = 9.722 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .01 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRDEPT COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
NO 0.31 -0.20 -0.03 -0.12
YES -0.96 0.62 0.09 0.37
CHI-SQUARE = 1.592 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRDEPT COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
0 1
NO -0.13 0.08
YES 0.41 -0.26
CHI-SQUARE = 0.257 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
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Table B-26 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of
an external IR consultant (IRCONS) and the independent categorical 
variables
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRCONS COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
NO -0.43 1.04
YES 0.22 -0.53
CHI-SQUARE = 1.601 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRCONS COLUMNS: OSEALIST
0 1
NO -0.19 0.40
YES 0.10 -0.20
CHI-SQUARE = 0.244 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRCONS COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
NO -0.43 0.57
YES 0.22 -0.29
CHI-SQUARE = 0.635 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRCONS COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
NO 0.86 -0.57 -2.53 3.01
YES -0.44 0.29 1.30 -1.55
CHI-SQUARE = 20.899 WITH D.F. = 3 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS : ROWS: IRCONS COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
0 1
NO -0.16 0.10
YES 0.08 -0.05
CHI-SQUARE = 0.045 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
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Table B-27 Kruskal-Wallis tes t of association between the existence
of a separate investor re la tions department fIRDEPT) and the company 
specific  continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 295 210.3 154.5 -5.13
1 30 1333.5 246.9 5.13 26.36 0.000
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 295 0.00E+00 155.5 -4.54
1 30 1.00E+00 237.2 4.54 45.16 0.000
TRADFREQ 0 292 0.00E+00 166.2 2.83
1 30 0.00E+00 115.7 -2.83 10.89 0.001
RISK
BETA 0 281 1.020 153.8 -0.76
1 28 1.035 167.3 0.76 0.58 0.446
VARIAB 0 281 33.50 156.3 0.83
1 28 32.80 141.6 -0.83 0.69 0.407
SPECRISK 0 281 24.10 157.4 1.52
1 28 22.20 130.6 -1.52 2.30 0.130
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 0 282 16.19 154.9 -0.65
1 29 17.60 166.3 0.65 0.42 0.519
711TPM 0 268 12.01 147.5 -0.32
1 27 13.31 152.9 0.32 0.10 0.752
716PTPM 0 279 8.090 153.9 -0.63
1 30 10.165 164.8 0.63 0.40 0.527
703R0SC 0 288 12.15 155.7 -1.99
1 29 15.70 191.3 1.99 3.97 0.047
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Table B-27 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tes t of association between the 
existence of a separate investor re la tions department ( IRDEPT) and the 
company specific  continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 283 29.95 154.6 -1.16
1 29 33.22 175.0 1.16 1.34 0.247
732IGEAR 0 275 17.67 152.2 -0.17
1 29 17.69 155.1 0.17 0.03 0.865
733BR 0 288 0.4200 157.1 -1.44
1 30 0.4900 182.5 1.44 2.07 0.151
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 295 0.00E+00 162.5 -0.30
1 30 0.00E+00 168.0 0.30 0.87 0.352
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 294 0.4300 167.0 2.73
1 30 0.1400 118.1 -2.73 7.46 0.006
TOTSSH 0 294 13.750 164.4 1.14
1 30 6.395 144.0 -1.14 1.33 0.250
NOOFSSH 0 294 1.000 165.1 1.58
1 30 1.000 136.7 -1.58 2.63 0.105
KEY:
IRDEPT coding of levels, 0 = no separate IR department, 1 = separate 
IR department
* = p value adjusted fo r tie s
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Table B-28 Kruskal-Wallis tes t of association between the existence
of an external investor re la tions consultant ( IRCONS) and the company 
specific  continous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 68 257.0 164.5 0.20
1 256 283.9 162.0 -0.20 0.04 0.844
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 68 0.OOE+OO 165.2 0.27
1 256 0.OOE+OO 161.8 -0.27 0.16 0.690
TRADFREQ 0 67 0.OOE+OO 170.8 0.97
1 254 0.OOE+OO 158.4 -0.97 1.27 0.260
RISK
BETA 0 67 1.040 156.5 0.21
1 241 1.020 153.9 -0.21 0.04 0.835
VARIAB 0 67 34.50 159.6 0.53
1 241 33.10 153.1 -0.53 0.28 0.595
SPECRISK 0 67 24.10 155.8 0.13
1 241 24.00 154.1 -0.13 0.02 0.896
707R0CE 0 64 15.24 142.0 -1.35
1 246 16.78 159.0 1.35 1.84 0.176
PROFITABILITY
711TPM 0 57 12.79 158.1 1.05
1 237 12.01 144.9 -1.05 1.11 0.293
716PTPM 0 64 8.470 163.2 0.88
1 244 8.085 152.2 -0.88 0.77 0.380
703R0SC 0 65 11.60 148.0 -1.04
1 251 13.00 161.2 1.04 1.08 0.298
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Table B-28 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis te s t of association between the
existence of an external investor re la tions consultant (IRCONS) and 
the company specific  continous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 65 25.30 144.1 -1.20
1 246 30.65 159.2 1.20 1.45 0.229
732IGEAR 0 63 18.19 151.9 -0.01
1 240 17.62 152.0 0.01 0.00 0.995
733BR 0 66 0.3700 151.6 -0.74
1 251 0.4300 161.0 0.74 0.55 0.460
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 68 0 .00E+00 161.2 -0.13
1 256 0 .00E+00 162.8 0.13 0.15 0.702
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 67 0.3000 164.8 0.27
1 256 0.3500 161.3 -0.27 0.07 0.786
TOTSSH 0 67 16.54 169.7 0.76
1 256 12.12 160.0 -0.76 0.59 0.441
NOOFSSH 0 67 2.000 165.0 0.30
1 256 1.000 161.2 -0.30 0.09 0.759
KEY:
IRCONS coding of levels, 1 = external IR consultant, 0 = no external 
IR consultant
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table B-29 Stepwise regression of d irec to r involvement index (INDEX)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF INDEX ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 278
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 47 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2
CONSTANT 6.250 6.269
LOGTAVMV 0.73 0.78
T-RATIO 3.15 3.39
716PTPM 0.0153
T-RATIO -2.22
S 2.28 2.27
R-SQ 3.47 5.17
Table B-30 M ultip le regression of d irec to r involvement index (INDEX! 
using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
INDEX = 6.44 + 0.700 LOGTAVMV - 0.0141 716PTPM
308 cases used 17 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io P
Constant 6.4438 0.5450 11.82 0.000
LOGTAVMV 0.7000 0.2109 3.32 0.001
716PTPM -0.014138 0.006718 -2.10 0.036
s = 2.232 R-sq = 4.6% R-sq(adj) = 3.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 2 72.482 36.241 7.28 0.001
Error 305 1519.086 4.981
Total 307 1591.568
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Table B-31 Stepwise regression of d irec to r d irec to r davs (DIRDAYS)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF DIRDAYS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 214
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 111 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1
CONSTANT 8.747
LOGTAVMV 11.9
T-RATIO 2.89
S 35.9
R-SQ 3.79
Table B-32 M ultip le  regression of d irecto r davs (DIRDAYS) using 
variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is 
DIRDAYS = 8.44 + 11.6 LOGTAVMV
249 cases used 76 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant 8.437 9.242 0.91 0.362
LOGTAVMV 11.575 3.631 3.19 0.002
s = 34.97 R-sq = 4.0% R-sq(adj) = 3.6%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 12424 12424 10.16 0.002
Error 247 302015 1223
Total 248 314439
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Table B-33 Stepwise regression of investor re la tions budget in £k 
f BUDGET ^
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF BUDGET ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 128
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 197 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2  3 4
CONSTANT -366.08 -1196.83 -998.68 -1031.71
LOGTAVMV
T-RATIO
217.14
7.58
278.19
8.54
222.24
5.27
239.73
5.64
L0GTSRSK
T-RATIO
481.88
3.48
424.58
3.05
546.18
3.64
L0GLIST
T-RATIO
186.59
2.05
184.57
2.05
BETA
T-RATIO
-177.15
-2.05
S
R-SQ
213.87
31.32
205.01
37.40
202.44
39.44
199.88
41.44
Table B-34 M ultip le  regression of investor re la tions budget in £k 
(BUDGET) using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
BUDGET = - 1014 + 230 LOGTAVMV + 553 LOGTSRSK + 158 1
- 187 BETA
141 cases used 184 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- r a t io  p
Constant -1013.8 252.5 -4.01 0.000
LOGTAVMV 230.23 40.37 5.70 0.000
LOGTSRSK 552.9 145.8 3.79 0.000
L0GLIST 157.65 83.43 1.89 0.061
BETA -187.01 83.35 -2.24 0.026
s = 197.6 R-sq = 38.7% R-sq(adj) = 36.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 4 3355601 838900 21.48
Error 136 5312665 39064
P
0.000
Total 140 8668265
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Table B-35 Stepwise regression of cost of external consultant in £k 
(COSTS)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF COSTS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 188
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 137 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3
CONSTANT 41.02 - 10.27 -174.01
LOGLIST 139 101 91
T-RATIO 6.01 3.54 3.19
LOGTAVMV 22 37
T-RATIO 2.14 3.07
LOGTSRSK 92
T-RATIO 2.36
S 66.9 66.3 65.5
R-SQ 16.27 18.30 20.70
Table B-36 M ultip le  regression of cost of external consultant in £k 
(COSTS) using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
COSTS = - 158 + 90.5 LOGLIST +34.6 LOGTAVMV +84.1 LOGTSRSK
203 cases used 122 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io  p
Constant -158.21 70.12 -2.26 0.025
LOGLIST 90.47 26.33 3.44 0.001
LOGTAVMV 34.57 11.22 3.08 0.002
LOGTSRSK 84.11 37.18 2.26 0.025
s = 63.99 R-sq = 20.7% R-sq(adj) = 19.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 3 212163 70721 17.27
Error 199 814872 4095
Total 202 1027036
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SteDwise rearession of d irec to r involvement index (INDEX1
with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF INDEX ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 278
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 47 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3
CONSTANT 6.250 6.269 6.137
LOGTAVMV 0.73 0.78 0.79
T-RATIO 3.15 3.39 3.41
716PTPM 0.0153 -0.0403
T-RATIO -2.22 -2.13
711TPM 0.024
T-RATIO 1.42
S 2.28 2.27 2.26
R-SQ 3.47 5.17 5.86
The regression equation is
INDEX = 6. 09 + 0.817 LOGTAVMV - 0.0383 716PTPM + 0.0220 711TPM
293 cases used 32 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant 6.0945 0 .5748 10.60 0.000
LOGTAVMV 0.8172 0 .2242 3.64 0.000
716PTPM -0.03834 0. 01870 -2.05 0.041
711TPM 0.02197 0.101677 1.31 0.191
s = 2.245 R-sq = 6.0% R-sq(adj) = 5.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 92.473 30.824 6.12 0.000
Error 289 1456.161 5.039
Total 292 1548.635
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Table B-38 Stepwise regression of d irec to r davs (DIRDAYS) with 
c r it ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF DIRDAYS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 111 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2  3 4
CONSTANT 8.7471 -7.1784 -0.2141 2.5966
LOGTAVMV
T-RATIO
11.9
2.89
16.0
3.44
16.3
3.53
16.2
3.52
NOOFSSH
T-RATIO
3.3
1.86
8.1
2.86
8.2
2.91
SQRTOTSH
T-RATIO
-4.3
-2.16
-4.5
-2.30
707ROCE
T-RATIO
-0.097
-1.54
S
R-SQ
35.9
3.79
35.7
5.34
35.4
7.39
35.3
8.43
The regression equation is
DIRDAYS = 1 . 7 + 1 6 . 1  LOGTAVMV +7.86 NOOFSSH - 4.14 SQRTOTSH 
- 0.0902 707R0CE
237 cases used 88 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant 1.69 12.68 0.13 0.894
LOGTAVMV 16.092 4.226 3.81 0.000
NOOFSSH 7.858 2.748 2.86 0.005
SQRTOTSH -4.144 1.891 -2.19 0.029
707ROCE -0.09018 0.06234 -1.45 0.149
s = 34.95 R-sq = 8.2% R-sq(adj) = 6.6%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 4 25158 6290 5.15
Error 232 283420 1222
Total 236 308578
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Table B-39 Stepwise regression of investor re la tions budget (BUDGET) 
with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF BUDGET ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 197 N(ALL CASES) = 325
N = 128
STEP
CONSTANT
1 2 
-366076 -1196828
3
-998676
4
-1031712 -
5
1039788 -
6
1019689
LOGTAVMV
T-RATIO
217139 278187 
7.58 8.54
222240
5.27
239725
5.64
240878
5.72
220349
4.98
LOGTSRSK
T-RATIO
481879
3.48
424582
3.05
546183
3.64
559914
3.77
541115
3.65
LOGLIST
T-RATIO
186586
2.05
184571
2.05
172901
1.94
167069
1.88
BETA
T-RATIO
-177149
-2.05
-194447
-2.26
-180008
-2.09
LOGTAKEO
T-RATIO
610261
1.93
586795
1.86
NEGRBFA%
T-RATIO
-76029
-1.45
S
R-SQ
213874 205006 
31.32 37.40
202437
39.44
199884
41.44
197701
43.17
196804
44.15
The regression equation is 
BUDGET = - 1013099 + 214866 
+ 143375 LOGLIST - 
- 66087 NEGRBFA%
LOGTAVMV + 552268 LOGTSRSK 
190111 BETA + 640597 LOGTAKEO
141 cases used 184 cases contain missing values
Predictor
Constant
LOGTAVMV
LOGTSRSK
LOGLIST
BETA
LOGTAKEO
NEGRBFA%
Coef Stdev 
-1013099 248799 
214866 41806 
552268 144137 
143375 82330 
-190111 83121 
640597 310353 
-66087 49383
t- ra t io
-4.07
5.14
3.83
1.74
-2.29
2.06
-1.34
P
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.084
0.024
0.041
0.183
s = 194569 R-sq = 41.5% R-sq(adj) = 38.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE
Regression
Error
Total
DF SS 
6 3.59544E+12 
134 5.07283E+12 
140 8.66827E+12
MS
5.99239E+11 15 
37856935936
F
.83 0.
P
000
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Table B-40 Stepwise regression of external consultant costs (COSTS)
with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF COSTS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 188
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 137 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4
CONSTANT 41023 - 10274 -174007 -165355
LOGLIST 138569 101375 91391 90393
T-RATIO 6.01 3.54 3.19 3.17
LOGTAVMV 22360 36862 32515
T-RATIO 2.14 3.07 2.66
LOGTSRSK 92365 105206
T-RATIO 2.36 2.65
SQRTOTSH -4292
T-RATIO -1.68
S 66935 66297 65492 65167
R-SQ 16.27 18.30 20.70 21.91
STEP 5 6 7 8
CONSTANT -169052 -231869 -310024 -318509
LOGLIST 87692 89411 87802 84049
T-RATIO 3.09 3.17 3.13 2.99
LOGTAVMV 25669 31950 32867 33683
T-RATIO 2.02 2.44 2.52 2.58
LOGTSRSK 111326 272654 284439 295217
T-RATIO 2.81 2.74 2.86 2.97
SQRTOTSH -4913 -5364 -5338 -5034
T-RATIO -1.92 -2.10 -2.10 -1.98
NEGRBFA% -26061 -26681 -25566 -25501
T-RATIO -1.83 -1.88 -1.81 -1.81
SQRTVAR -30048 -33162 -35685
T-RATIO -1.76 -1.94 -2.09
SQRTBR 28814 29478
T-RATIO 1.66 1.71
731CGEAR 126
T-RATIO 1.50
S 64756 64383 64071 63848
R-SQ 23.32 24.61 25.75 26.68
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Table B-40 (continued) Stepwise regression of external consultant 
costs (COSTS) with c r it ic a l F value reduced to 2
The regression equation is
COSTS = - 251412 + 83635 LOGLIST + 34522 LOGTAVMV + 265976 LOGTSRSK 
- 4929 SQRTOTSH - 20041 NEGRBFA% - 31771 SQRTVAR 
+ 11380 SQRTBR + 104 731CGEAR
195 cases used 130 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant -251412 85378 -2.94 0.004
LOGLIST 83635 27027 3.09 0.002
LOGTAVMV 34522 12797 2.70 0.008
LOGTSRSK 265976 97076 2.74 0.007
SQRTOTSH -4929 2427 -2.03 0.044
NEGRBFA% -20041 13616 -1.47 0.143
SQRTVAR -31771 16621 -1.91 0.057
SQRTBR 11380 12492 0.91 0.364
731CGEAR 104.04 82.48 1.26 0.209
s = 63687 R-sq = 25.8% R-sq(adj) = 22.6%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 8 2.62571E+11 32821397504 8.09
Error 186 7.54411E+11 4055972608
Total 194 1.01698E+12
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Table B-41 M ultip le  regression of investor re la tions budget in £k 
(BUDGET) using a l l  independent variables
The regression equation is
BUDGET = - 763 + 196 LOGTAVMV + 153 LOGLIST - 28 LOGTRADF
- 120 BETA - 17 SQRTVAR + 647 LOGTSRSK - 0.62 707R0CE
- 1.72 711TPM + 1.85 716PTPM + 0.282 703R0SC
- 0.056 731CGEAR + 0 .7  SQRTIG - 105 SQRTBR + 531 LOGTAKEO
- 103 NEGRBFA% - 27.4 SQRTOTSH
+ 23.7 NOOFSSH + 23.3 INDC2 + 110 INDC3 + 31 INDC4
128 cases used 197 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant -763.4 483.8 -1.58 0.118
LOGTAVMV 196.14 55.30 3.55 0.001
LOGLIST 153.01 95.30 1.61 0.111
LOGTRADF -28.1 204.0 -0.14 0.891
BETA -119.9 192.7 -0.62 0.535
SQRTVAR -17.1 124.4 -0.14 0.891
LOGTSRSK 647.0 595.1 1.09 0.279
707R0CE -0.624 1.274 -0.49 0.625
711TPM -1.722 2.568 -0.67 0.504
716PTPM 1.850 2.762 0.67 0.505
703ROSC 0.2823 0.8967 0.31 0.753
731CGEAR -0.0557 0.2249 -0.25 0.805
SQRTIG 0.68 11.43 0.06 0.953
SQRTBR -104.86 95.30 -1.10 0.274
LOGTAKEO 530.9 330.9 1.60 0.112
NEGRBFA% -102.78 59.16 -1.74 0.085
SQRTOTSH -27.38 17.65 -1.55 0.124
NOOFSSH 23.65 25.73 0.92 0.360
INDC2 23.28 49.64 0.47 0.640
INDC3 110.01 57.28 1.92 0.057
INDC4 31.5 105.2 0.30 0.765
s = 200.7 R-sq = 48 .6% R-sq(adj) = 39.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 20 4079516 203976 5.06 0.000
Error 107 4311961 40299
Total 127 8391476
NOTE:
INDC2, INDC3 and INDC4 are dummy variables denoting indus tria l 
c la ss ifica tio n , INDC1 is incorporated in the constant term.
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Appendix C Tables of results on the assessment of and execution of
the investor relations function
C-l Number of surveys in the past 12 months (SURVEYS(A))
C-2 Number of surveys more than 12 months but less than 5 years
ago (SURVEYS(B)
C-3 Reasons fo r commissioning survey i)  General in te rest
C-4 Reasons fo r commissioning survey i i )  To assess success of
investor re la tions programme 
C-5 Reasons fo r commissioning survey i i i )  To assess need fo r
setting up an investor re la tions function 
C-6 Reasons fo r  commissioning survey iv ) To assess need fo r
expanding investor re la tions function 
C-7 Chi-square tests of association between the commissioning of 
surveys of C ity opinion (SURVEYS(Y/N)) and the independent 
categorical variables 
C-8 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the responses to
whether or not surveys had been commissioned (SURVEYS(Y/N)) 
and the company specific  independent continuous variables 
C-9 Correlation of questionnaire responses on number of surveys
of C ity opinion
C-9 Correlation of questionnaire responses on number of surveys
of C ity opinion
C-10 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  questionnaire responses on number
of surveys
C- l l  Correlation of questionnaire responses on number of surveys
with company specific  variables 
C-12 Spearman rank corre la tion of questionnaire responses with
company specific  variables 
C-13 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between number of surveys
in past 12 months (SURVEYS(A)) and company specific  
categorical variables 
C-14 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between number of surveys
in past 4 years (SURVEYS(B)) and company specific  categorical 
variables
C-15 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between number of surveys
past 5 years (SURVEYS) and company specific  categorical 
variables
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C-16 Meetings fo r delegates from d iffe re n t organisations
C-17 Meetings fo r individuals or small groups from the same
organisation 
C-18 Answering telephone queries
C-19 Providing feedback on analysts' reports
C-20 Mailing information to analysts and fund managers
C-21 Respondents' opinion of importance of methods of
communication with analysts 
C-22 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  index of investor re la tions
a c t iv ity  (ACTIVITY)
C-23 Pearson Correlation of ACTIVITY with the continuous company 
specific  variables 
C-24 Spearman Rank Correlation of ACTIVITY with the continuous
company specific  variables 
C-25 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between ACTIVITY and
categorical independent variables 
C-26 Chi-square tests of association between the holding of
general meetings (GENERAL) and the independent categorical 
variables
C-27 Chi-square tests of association between the holding of
special meetings (SPECIAL) and the independent categorical 
variables
C-28 Chi-square tests of association between the answering of
telephone queries (TELEPHONE) and the independent categorical 
variables
C-29 Chi-square tests of association between providing feedback on
analysts' reports (FEEDBACK) and the independent categorical 
variables
C-30 Chi-square tests of association between mailing information
(MAILING) and the independent categorical variables 
C-31 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
holding general meetings and independent continuous variables 
C-32 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
holding special meetings and independent continuous variables 
C-33 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
answering telephone queries and independent continuous 
variables
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C-34 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
providing feedback on analysts' reports and independent 
continuous variables 
C-35 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
mailing information to analysts and independent continuous 
variables
C-36 Stepwise regression of number of surveys in past 12 months
(SURVEYS(A))
C-37 Stepwise regression of number of surveys more than 12 months
and up to 5 years ago (SURVEYS(B))
C-38 Stepwise regression of number of surveys in past f i ve  years
(SURVEYS)
C-39 Stepwise regression of index of investor re la tions a c t iv ity
(ACTIVITY)
C-40 Stepwise regression of surveys in past 12m (SURVEYS(A)) with
c r it ic a l F value reduced to 2 
C-41 Stepwise regression of surveys more than 12m and up to 5
years ago (SURVEYS(B)) with c r i t ic a l  F value reduced to 2 
C-42 M ultip le regression of number of surveys in past 12m
(SURVEYS(A)) using a l l  independent variables
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Table C-l Number of surveys in the past 12 months (SURVEYS(A))
COUNT PERCENT
0 35 24.48
1 75 52.45
2 24 16.78
3 4 2.80
4 2 1.40
5 1 0.70
6 2 1.40
N= 143
*_ 194
MEAN MEDIAN
1.1189 1.0000
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Table C-2 Number of surveys more than 12 months but less than 5 years 
aao { SURVEYS(B)
COUNT PERCENT
0 60 42.55
1 32 22.70
2 18 12.77
3 9 6.38
4 6 4.26
5 2 1.42
6 6 4.26
8 3 2.13
10 2 1.42
15 2 1.42
22 1 0.71
N= 141
*= 196
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.000 1.851
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Table C-3 Reasons fo r commissioning survey i)  General in te rest
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l 1 31 23.13
Minor importance 2 32 23.88
Moderate importance 3 52 38.81
High importance 4 19 14.18
N= 134
*_ 203
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.4403 3.0000
Table C-4 Reasons fo r commissioning survey i i )  To assess success of 
investor re la tions programme
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l 1 16 11.51
Minor importance 2 11 7.91
Moderate importance 3 24 17.27
High importance 4 88 63.31
N= 139
*_ 198
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.3237 4.0000
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Table C-5 Reasons fo r commissioning survey i i i )  To assess need fo r 
setting up an investor re la tions function
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l 1 105 78.36
Minor importance 2 16 11.94
Moderate importance 3 8 5.97
High importance 4 5 3.73
N= 134
* _ 203
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.3507 1.0000
Table C-6 Reasons fo r commissioning survey iv ) To assess need fo r 
expanding investor re la tions function
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l 1 62 45.93
Minor importance 2 28 20.74
Moderate importance 3 25 18.52
High importance 4 20 14.81
N= 135
*= 202
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.0222 2.0000
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Table C-7 Chi-square tests of association between the commissioning
of surveys of Citv opinion (SURVEYS(Y/N) ) and the independent 
categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS ROWS: SURVEYSfY/Nl COLUMNS: OSEALIST
NO YES
NO 1.20 -2.52
YES -1.41 2.97
CHI-SQUARE = 18.628 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS ROWS: SURVEYSfY/N) COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW 
NO -1.94 2.58
YES 2.30 -3.06
CHI-SQUARE = 25.099 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS ROWS: SURVEYSfY/Nl COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
NO -1.08 2.63
YES 1.27 -3.09
CHI-SQUARE = 19.258 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS ROWS: SURVEYSfY/Nl COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
NO -0.65 0.19 -0.12 0.82
YES 0.76 -0.22 0.14 -0.97
CHI-SQUARE = 2.731 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS ROWS: SURVEYSfY/Nl COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
NO YES
NO -1.50 0.96
YES 1.76 -1.13
CHI-SQUARE = 7.566 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
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Table C-8 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on the responses to
whether or not surveys had been commissioned (SURVEYS(YZN) ) and the 
company specific independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 189 155.4 133.0 -6.78
1 136 709.4 204.6 6.78 45.91 0.000
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 189 O.OOE+OO 149.8 -2.99
1 136 O.OOE+OO 181.4 2.99 19.55 0.000
TRADFREQ 0 188 O.OOE+OO 181.4 4.54
1 134 O.OOE+OO 133.6 -4.54 27.96 0.000
RISK
BETA 0 182 1.010 146.9 -1.91
1 127 1.040 166.6 1.91 3.65 0.056
VARIAB 0 182 34.30 165.7 2.52
1 127 32.50 139.7 -2.52 6.33 0.012
SPECRISK 0 182 25.85 174.7 4.63
1 127 21.00 126.8 -4.63 21.44 0.000
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 0 179 17.27 160.5 1.03
1 132 15.94 149.9 -1.03 1.05 0.305
711TPM 0 171 13.06 159.8 2.80
1 124 10.68 131.7 -2.80 7.81 0.005
716PTPM 0 176 9.435 167.3 2.79
1 133 6.860 138.7 -2.79 7.80 0.005
703ROSC 0 183 12.20 159.0 0.00
1 134 12.95 159.0 0.00 0.00 1.000
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 180 27.55 147.8 -1.99
1 132 31.95 168.4 1.99 3.97 0.046
732IGEAR 0 174 16.49 146.5 -1.37
1 130 19.49 160.5 1.37 1.88 0.170
733BR 0 183 0.3500 147.6 -2.68
1 135 0.4900 175.6 2.68 7.17 0.008
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 189 O.OOE+OO 163.8 0.19
1 136 O.OOE+OO 161.8 -0.19 0.34 0.563
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 188 0.7300 175.5 2.94
1 136 0.2000 144.5 -2.94 8.65 0.003
TOTSSH 0 188 16.600 180.2 4.01
1 136 7.785 138.0 -4.01 16.49 0.000
NOSSH 0 188 2.000 178.8 3.68
1 136 1.00 140.0 -3.68 14.26 0.000
KEY:
SURVEYS(Y/N) coding of levels, 0 = no surveys, 1 = surveys 
commissioned
Mar's ton, C.L. : 1993 Appendix C 91
Table C-9 Correlation of questionnaire responses on number of surveys
of Citv opinion 
PEARSON
SURVEYS(A) 
SURVEYS(B) 0.362
SURVEYS 0.598
SPEARMAN RANK
SURVEYS(A) 
SURVEYS(B) -0.111
SURVEYS 0.496
SURVEYS(B)
0.964
SURVEYS(B)
0.733
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Table C-10 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  questionnaire responses on 
number of surveys
N N* MEAN MEDIAN
SURVEYS(A) 135 190 1.1111 1.0000
SQRT(SURVEYS(A)) 135 190 1.4148 1.4142
SURVEYS(B) 133 192 1.910 1.000
LOGT(SURVEYS(B)) 133 192 0.3135 0.3010
SURVEYS 133 192 3.015 2.000
L0GT(SURVEYS) 133 192 0.5067 0.4771
TRMEAN STDEV SEMEAN
SURVEYS(A) 0.9835 1.0697 0.0921
SQRT(SURVEYS(A)) 1.3866 0.3322 0.0286)
SURVEYS(B) 1.395 3.218 0.279
LOGT(SURVEYS(B)) 0.2852 0.3310 0.0287)
SURVEYS 2.387 3.744 0.325
L0GT(SURVEYS) 0.4779 0.2565 0.0222)
MIN MAX Q1 Q3 TEST
SURVEYS(A) 0.0000 6.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.941
(SQRT(SURVEYS(A)) 1.0000 2.6458 1.0000 1.4142 0.989
SURVEYS(B) 0.000 22.000 0.000 2.000 0.851
L0GT(SURVEYS(B)) 0.0000 1.3617 0.0000 0.4771 0.991
SURVEYS 1.000 28.000 1.000 3.000 0.837
L0GT(SURVEYS) 0.3010 1.4624 0.3010 0.6021 0.996
KEY:
SURVEYS(A) = number 
SURVEYS(B) = number
of surveys 
of surveys
in past 12m 
more than 12m and less than 5 years ago
SURVEYS = to ta l surveys in past 5 years
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Table C - ll Correlation of questionnaire responses on number of
surveys with company specific  variables
SURVEYS(A) SURVEYS(B) SURVEYS
SIZE
LOGTAVMV 0.246** 0.156 0.203*
AV(MV) 0.207* 0.070 0.117
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.261** 0.071 0.135
LOGLIST 0.269** 0.157 0.210*
TRADFREQ 0.187* 0.124 0.157
LOGTRADF 0.096 0.064 0.082
RISK
BETA -0.029 0.059 0.042
VARIAB -0.178* - 0.035 -0.078
SQRTVAR -0.179* - 0.036 -0.079
LOGTSRSK -0.221* - 0.087 -0.133
SPECRISK -0.210* - 0.087 -0.130
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 0.156 - 0.003 0.043
711TPM 0.208* 0.103 0.152
716PTPM 0.223* 0.021 0.082
703ROSC 0.182* - 0.009 0.045
GEARING
731CGEAR -0.085 - 0.038 -0.057
732IGEAR -0.053 0.060 0.036
SQRTIG -0.008 0.059 0.048
733BR 0.006 - 0.005 -0.003
SQRTBR 0.022 - 0.006 0.001
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.069 - 0.047 -0.060
LOGTAKEO -0.067 - 0.044 -0.057
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.020 -0.014 -0.018
NEGRBFA% -0.124 -0.064 -0.090
TOTSSH -0.187* -0.126 -0.161
SQRTOTSH -0.187* -0.116 -0.152
NOOFSSH -0.216* -0.090 -0.138
KEY:
** = s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l, *  = s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level 
( tw o -ta il tes t)
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Table C-12 SDearman
Appendix C
rank corre la tion of Questionnaire
94
resDonses with
company specific  variables
SURVEYS(A) SURVEYS(B) SURVEYS
SIZE
AVMV 0.279** 0.069 0.238**
MARKETABILITY
LISTING 0.215* 0.146 0.264**
TRADFREQ -0.145 -0.022 -0.147
RISK
BETA -0.112 0.052 0.033
VARIAB -0.237** -0.026 -0.128
SPECRISK -0.288** -0.051 -0.180*
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 0.150 -0.088 0.017
711TPM 0.298** -0.061 0.058
716PTPM 0.286** -0.136 0.017
703R0SC 0.218* -0.176* -0.007
GEARING
731CG -0.137 0.117 0.031
732IG -0.082 0.115 0.063
733BR -0.001 0.017 0.020
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.056 0.010 -0.031
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.142 -0.039 -0.165
TOTSSH -0.253** -0.072 -0.259**
NOSSH -0.312** -0.024 -0.253**
KEY:
** = s ig n ifican t at the .01 leve l, *  = s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level 
(tw o -ta il tes t)
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Table C-13 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between number of
surveys in past 12 months (SURVEYS(A)l and company specific  
categorical variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H D*
OSEALIST 0 95 1.000 63.4 -2.08
1 40 1.000 78.8 2.08 5.20 0.023
TFCAT 0 106 1.000 69.8 1.64
1 27 1.000 56.2 -1.64 3.23 0.072
ALPHA 1 129 1.000 67.9 -0.15
2 6 1.000 70.4 0.15 0.03 0.865
4WAYINDC 1 45 1.000 60.2 -1.64
2 39 1.000 67.0 -0.19
3 36 1.000 78.2 1.83
4 15 1.000 69.5 0.16 5.14 0.163
SSH(Y/N) 0 50 1.000 78.6 2.42
1 85 1.000 61.7 -2.42 7.04 0.008
Table C- 14 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between number of
survevs in Dast 4 years (SURVEYS(B)l and comDanv sDecific categorical
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H D*
OSEALIST 0 94 1.000 63.6 -1.56
1 39 1.000 75.1 1.56 2.65 0.104
TFCAT 0 104 1.000 66.4 0 . 2 2
1 27 1.000 64.6 - 0 . 2 2 0.05 0.819
ALPHA 1 127 1.000 66.6 -0.57
2 6 1.000 75.8 0.57 0.35 0.552
4WAYINDC 1 44 1.00E+00 70.3 0.69
2 39 1.00E+00 73.4 1.24
3 35 0.00E+00 47.9 -3.41
4 15 2 .00E+00 85.1 1.93 14.51 0 . 0 0 2
SSH(Y/N) 0 49 1.000 66.9 -0.03
1 84 1.000 67.1 0.03 0 . 0 0 0.975
* = p-value adjusted fo r tie s
Table C-15 Kruskal- Wall is tests of association between number of
survevs Dast 5 vears (SURVEYS) and comDanv sDecific cateaorical
P*
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H
OSEALIST 0 94 1.000 61.3 -2.66
1 39 3.000 80.8 2.66 7.93 0.005
TFCAT 0 104 2.000 68.6 1.57
1 27 1.000 55.8 -1.57 2.77 0.096
ALPHA 1 127 2.000 67.1 0.20
2 6 1.000 64.0 -0.20 0.04 0.836
4WAYINDC 1 44 2.000 66.3 -0.14
2 39 2.000 70.1 0.61
3 35 1.000 59.5 -1.33
4 15 3.000 78.2 1.19 3.19 0.363
SSH(Y/N) 0 49 2.000 75.5 1.93
1 84 1.000 62.1 -1.93 4.20 0.041
* = p-value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table C-16 Meetings fo r delegates from d iffe re n t organisations
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l  - not done 1 8 2.41
Minor importance 2 22 6.63
Moderate importance 3 135 40.66
High importance 4 167 50.30
N= 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.3886 4.0000
Table C-17 Meetings fo r individuals or small groups from the same 
organisation
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l  - not done 1 6 1.80
Minor importance 2 8 2.40
Moderate importance 3 54 16.17
High importance 4 266 79.64
N= 334
*= 3
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.7365 4.0000
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Table C-18 Answering telephone queries
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l  - not done 1 2 0.60
Minor importance 2 32 9.58
Moderate importance 3 128 38.32
High importance 4 172 51.50
N= 334
*= 3
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.4072 4.0000
Table C-19 Providing feedback on analysts' reports
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l  - not done 1 15 4.52
Minor importance 2 58 17.47
Moderate importance 3 150 45.18
High importance 4 109 32.83
N= 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.0633 3.0000
M a r s t o n , C.L. : 1993 Appendix C 99
Table C-20 Mailing information to analysts and fund managers
COUNT PERCENT
Not at a l l - not done 1 41 12.20
Minor importance 2 93 27.68
Moderate importance 3 129 38.39
High importance 4 73 21.73
N= 336
*= 1
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.6964 3.0000
Table C-21 Respondents' opinion of importance of methods of 
communication with analysts
Rank
(n
Mean Median 
= 325)
Wilcoxon tes t 
p rob a b ility
1 Individual meetings 3.7329 4
0.000
2 Telephone queries 3.4161 4
0.734
3 General meetings 3.3906 3
0.000
4 Feedback on reports 3.0625 3
0.000
5 Mailing information 2.7006 3
KEY: Rankings of responses 1 = Not at a l l  
importance, 3 = Moderate importance, 4 =
- not done, 2 = Minor 
High importance)
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Table C-22 Descriptive s ta tis t ic s  fo r index of investor re la tions 
a c t iv ity  (ACTIVITY!
N N* MEAN MEDIAN
ACTIVITY 324 1 11.565 12.000
TRMEAN STDEV SEMEAN
ACTIVITY 11.555 2.606 0.145
MIN MAX Ql Q3 TEST
ACTIVITY 2.000 20.000 10.000 13.000 0.996
NOTE:
TEST = M initab's corre lation tes t fo r normality, a corre la tion of 1 
indicates a perfectly  normal d is tr ib u tio n
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Table C-23 Pearson Correlation of ACTIVITY with the continuous company 
specific  variables
ACTIVITY
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.083
LOGTAVMV 0.161**
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.096
LOGLIST 0.130*
TRADFREQ -0.090
LOGTRADF -0.164**
RISK
BETA 0.051
VARIAB 0.057
SQRTVAR 0.045
SPECRISK 0.048
LOGTSRSK 0.024
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -0.029
711TPM -0.038
716PTPM -0.033
703R0SC -0.020
GEARING
731CGEAR 0.031
732IGEAR -0.127*
SQRTIG -0.136*
733BR -0.028
SQRTBR -0.011
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.040
LOGTAKEO -0.044
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.054
NEGRBFA% -0.029
TOTSSH -0.114*
SQRTOTSH -0.090
NOOFSSH -0.122*
KEY:
** = s ig n ifica n t at the .01 level, * = s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level 
( tw o -ta il te s t)
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Table C-24 Spearman Rank Correlation of ACTIVITY with the continuous 
company specific  variables
ACTIVITY
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.177
MARKETABILITY
LISTING o . n r
TRADFREQ -0.187
RISK
BETA 0.052
VARIAB 0.033
SPECRISK -0.007
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -0.012
711TPM -0.021
716PTPM -0.027
703ROSC 0.009
GEARING
731CG 0.063
732IG -0.050
733BR 0.074
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.047
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.044
TOTSSH -0.083
NOOFSSH -0.103
KEY:
** = s ig n ifica n t at the .01 leve l, *  = s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level 
(tw o -ta il te s t)
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Table C-25 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between ACTIVITY and 
categorical independent variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H d*
OSEALIST 0 265 11.00 154.8 -3.15
1 59 12.00 197.2 3.15 10.06 0.002
TFCAT 0 205 12.00 173.0 3.07
1 116 11.00 139.9 -3.07 9.59 0.002
ALPHA 1 276 12.00 167.5 2.59
2 47 11.00 129.4 -2.59 6.80 0.009
4WAYINDC 1 96 11.00 153.2 -1.16
2 99 12.00 164.2 0.22
3 83 12.00 176.2 1.54
4 46 12.00 153.6 -0.70 3.21 0.361
SSH(Y/N) 0 94 11.50 161.0 -0.13
1 229 12.00 162.4 0.13 0.02 0.899
* = p-value adjusted fo r tie s
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Table C-26 Chi-square tests of association between the holding of 
general meetings (GENERAL) and the independent categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: GENERAL COLUMNS: OSEALIST
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
NO YES 
-0.24 0.50 
0.03 -0.06 
0.07 -0.15
CHI-SQUARE = 0.338 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: GENERAL COLUMNS: TFQAT
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
HIGH
-0.40
-0.06
0.22
LOW
0.54
0.08
-0.29
CHI-SQUARE = 0.594 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: GENERAL COLUMNS: AEPHA
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
ALPHA
-0.48
0.12
0.08
BETA
1.16
-0.30
-0.19
CHI-SQUARE = 1.729 WITH D.F. ■= 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: GENERAL COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
Not done or minor 
importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
1
-0.36
0.03
0.12
2
-0.47
-0.38
0.54
3
-1.49
1.99
-1.21
4
3.26
-2.20
0.67
CHI-SQUARE = 24.375 WITH D.F. •= 6 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: GENERAL COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
NO
-0.57
0.31
-0.05
YES
0.37
-0.20
0.03
CHI-SQUARE = 0.604 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
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Table C-27 : Chi-sauare tests of association between the holding of
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SPECIAL COLUMNS: OSEALIST
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
NO
0.42
0.74
-0.43
YES
-0.90
-1.56
0.92
CHI-SQUARE = 4.978 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SPECIAL COLUMNS: TFCAT
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
HIGH
0.12
-1.45
0.65
LOW
-0.16
1.93
-0.86
CHI-SQUARE = 7.042 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 1
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SPECIAL COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA
1
-0.39
-0.16
0.16
BETA
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
2
0.94
0.39
-0.38
CHI-SQUARE = 1.379 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SPECIAL COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
Not done or minor 
importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
1
-1.45
0.52
0.09
2
1.00
-0.64
0.07
3
-0.19
-0.51
0.28
4
0.88
0.89
-0.61
CHI-SQUARE = 6.108 WITH D.F. .= 6 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SPECIAL COLUMNS: SSHIY/N)
Not done or minor importance 
Moderate importance 
High importance
NO
0
0.26
-0.20
0.04
YES
1
-0.17
0.13
-0.02
CHI-SQUARE = 0.156 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
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Table C-28 Chi-square tests of association between the answering of
variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: TELEPHONE COLUMNS: OSEALIST
NO YES
Not done or minor importance 0.33 -0.70
Moderate importance 0.87 -1.83
High importance -0.89 1.88
CHI-SQUARE = 9.035 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: TELEPHONE COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 1
Not done or minor importance -1.31 1.74
Moderate importance -0.53 0.70
High importance 1.02 -1.36
CHI-SQUARE = 8.401 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: TELEPHONE COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
1 2
Not done or minor importance -0.69 1.69
Moderate importance -0.22 0.53
High importance 0.49 -1.19
CHI-SQUARE = 5.296 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: TELEPHONE COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2 3
Not done or minor
importance 0.58 -0.50 0.75
Moderate importance -0.32 0.30 0.25
High importance 0.03 -0.05 -0.54
CHI-SQUARE = 3.631 WITH D.F. = 6 (NOT SIGNIFICANT
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: TELEPHONE COLUMNS: SSH(Y/N)
NO YES
0 1
Not done or minor importance -1.02 0.66
Moderate importance 0.45 -0.29
High importance 0.06 -0.04
- 1.12
-0.32
0.76
CHI-SQUARE = 1.762 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
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Table C-29 Chi-square tests of association between providing feedback
on analysts' reports (FEEDBACK) and the independent categorical
variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: FEEDBACK COLUMNS: QSEALIST
NO YES
0 1
Not done or minor importance 0.38 -0.81
Moderate importance -0.39 0.82
High importance 0.15 -0.31
CHI-SQUARE = 1.754 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: FEEDBACK COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 1
Not done or minor importance -0.45 0.59
Moderate importance 1.17 -1.56
High importance -1.02 1.35
CHI-SQUARE = 7.193 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: FEEDBACK COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
1 2
Not done or minor importance -0.24 0.58
Moderate importance 0.12 -0.30
High importance 0.05 -0.12
CHI-SQUARE = 0.507 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: FEEDBACK COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
Not done or minor
importance 1.58 0.55 -1.83 -0.65
Moderate importance -0.16 -0.66 0.54 0.47
High importance -1.11 0.33 0.86 -0.02
CHI-SQUARE = 9.645 WITH D.F. = 6 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: FEEDBACK COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
NO YES
0 1
Not done or minor importance 0.87 -0.56
Moderate importance 1.19 -0.76
High importance -2.10 1.35
CHI-SQUARE = 9.269 WITH D.F. = 2 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .01 LEVEL)
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Table C-30 Chi-square tests of association between mailing 
information (MAILING) and the independent categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING COLUMNS: OSEALIST
NO YES
0 1
Not done or minor importance 0.81 -1.72
Moderate importance -0.52 1.10
High importance -0.40 0.85
CHI-SQUARE = 5.986 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 1
Not done or minor importance -1.08 1.43
Moderate importance 0.65 -0.87
High importance 0.59 -0.79
CHI-SQUARE = 5.366 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
1 2
Not done or minor importance -0.61 1.48
Moderate importance 0.02 -0.04
High importance 0.80 -1.94
CHI-SQUARE = 6.952 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
Not done or minor
importance 1.47 -0.02 -1.19 -0.51
Moderate importance -1.16 0.45 0.53 0.30
High importance -0.44 -0.58 0.89 0.29
CHI-SQUARE = 7.161 WITH D.F. = 6 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
NO YES
0 1
Not done or minor importance -0.86 0.55
Moderate importance 1.26 -0.81
High importance -0.53 0.34
LEVEL)
LEVEL)
LEVEL)
LEVEL)
CHI-SQUARE = 3.686 WITH D.F. = 2 (NOT SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
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Table C-31 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H
SIZE
AV(MV) 2 27 184.7 151.1 -0.55
3 134 285.1 163.3 0.47
4 159 264.9 159.7 -0.15 0.42
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 2 27 0.00E+00 167.8 0.43
3 134 0.00E+00 159.9 -0.10
4 159 0.00E+00 159.8 -0.14 0.41
TRADFREQ 2 26 0.00E+00 171.8 0.74
3 132 0.00E+00 159.0 0.01
4 159 0.00E+00 156.9 -0.42 0.81
RISK
BETA 2 26 1.040 151.6 -0.05
3 124 1.045 157.4 0.80
4 154 1.010 148.7 -0.76 0.67
VARIAB 2 26 33.50 145.1 -0.45
3 124 33.40 156.4 0.64
4 154 33.45 150.6 -0.38 0.50
SPECRISK 2 26 24.04 146.8 -0.35
3 124 24.10 155.4 0.47
4 154 23.75 151.2 -0.27 0.28
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 2 23 13.34 137.2 -0.92
3 132 16.36 152.0 -0.26
4 151 17.11 157.3 0.74 1.10
711TPM 2 22 19.48 190.7 2.63
3 128 11.43 139.9 -1.01
4 140 12.11 143.5 -0.39 7.03
716PTPM 2 23 11.890 194.8 2.40
3 129 8.030 148.6 -0.67
4 152 8.090 149.4 -0.61 5.78
703ROSC 2 22 13.49 160.2 0.20
3 134 11.90 148.2 -1.41
4 156 13.30 163.1 1.29 2.01
0.811
0.816
0.667
0.716
0.778
0.871
0.577
0.030
0.056
0.367
Table C-31 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between
importance of holding general meetings and independent continuous
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN
GEARING
731CGEAR 2 23 32.08
3 133 30.83
4 151 29.95
732IGEAR 2 23 22.59
3 129 19.11
4 147 15.86
733BR 2 23 0.5000
3 134 0.4050
4 156 0.4200
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 27 0.OOE+OO
3 134 0.00E+00
4 159 0.00E+00
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 2 26 0.6400
3 134 0.2350
4 159 0.5000
TOTSSH 2 26 22.04
3 134 11.45
4 159 12.19
NOOFSSH 2 26 1.500
3 134 1.000
4 159 1.000
RANK Z VALUE H P*
167.0 0.73
152.1 -0.33
153.7 -0.06 0.55 0.758
188.5 2.22
154.9 0.86
139.6 -2.04 7.10 0.029
187.8 1.70
150.6 -1.08
158.0 0.19 3.35 0.187
160.4 -0.01
159.3 -0.20
161.5 0.20 0.40 0.820
166.7 0.38
148.5 -1.89
168.6 1.66 3.60 0.166
190.3 1.75
156.0 -0.66
158.4 -0.31 3.18 0.204
175.4 0.89
159.7 -0.06
157.8 -0.43 0.86 0.650
KEY:
Coding of levels 2 = Not done and minor importance, 3 = Moderate
importance, 4 = High importance)
* = p-value adjusted for ties
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Table C-32 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H
SIZE
AV(MV) 2 13 207.4 156.5 -0.20
3 54 157.8 138.3 -2.00
4 255 318.8 166.7 1.94 4.17
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 2 13 0.00E+00 145.5 -0.63
3 54 0.00E+00 147.5 -1.21
4 255 0.00E+00 165.3 1.42 4.46
TRADFREQ 2 12 0.00E+00 163.3 0.12
3 54 1.00E-01 184.2 2.11
4 253 0.00E+00 154.7 -2.01 6.18
RISK
BETA 2 10 0.9050 121.8 -1.15
3 54 1.0200 159.8 0.57
4 242 1.0300 153.4 -0.04 1.55
VARIAB 2 10 32.15 114.4
3 54 35.90 176.4 2.09
4 242 33.10 150.0 -1.34 5.94
SPECRISK 2 10 21.60 132.4 -0.77
3 54 26.10 179.1 2.34
4 242 23.45 148.7 -1.86 5.81
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 2 11 20.78 182.1 1.03
3 52 16.58 150.3 -0.42
4 246 16.27 154.8 -0.08 1.16
711TPM 2 11 12.65 132.4 -0.58
3 48 10.99 142.6 -0.40
4 234 12.31 148.6 0.64 0.54
716PTPM 2 11 10.180 166.0 0.46
3 49 7.570 154.2 0.02
4 247 8.270 153.4 -0.23 0.21
703R0SC 2 11 16.10 186.8 1.07
3 53 11.80 155.4 -0.22
4 251 12.30 157.3 -0.28 1.16
0.125
0.108
0.046
0.460
0.052
0.055
0.560
0.763
0.899
0.561
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Table C-32(contl Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between
importance of holding special meetings and independent continuous 
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H
GEARING
731CGEAR 2 11 15.85 78.2 -2.91
3 52 22.57 128.7 -2.37
4 247 32.08 164.6 3.54 15.38
732IGEAR 2 11 6.400 85.3 -2.56
3 49 19.540 160.6 0.80
4 242 17.720 152.7 0.47 6.89
733BR 2 11 0.2700 97.0 -2.27
3 53 0.3000 134.5 -2.10
4 252 0.4500 166.2 2.99 10.46
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 13 0.00E+00 156.0 -0.22
3 54 0.00E+00 156.0 -0.48
4 255 0.00E+00 162.9 0.54 2.98
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 2 12 2.0250 196.7 1.36
3 54 0.4800 165.7 0.41
4 255 0.3000 158.3 -1.01 2.12
TOTSSH 2 12 7.750 153.4 -0.29
3 54 20.520 184.5 2.04
4 255 11.920 156.4 -1.75 4.27
NOOFSSH 2 12 1.000 152.2 -0.34
3 54 2.000 172.5 1.00
4 255 1.000 159.0 -0.77 1.12
0.000
0.032
0.006
0.226
0.346
0.119
0.570
KEY:
Coding of levels 2 = Not done and minor importance, 3 = Moderate
importance, 4 ■ High importance)
* = p-value adjusted for ties
Table C-33 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
answering telephone queries and independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 2 31 153.9 134.2 -1.72
3 124 208.9 150.2 -1.72
4 167 366.3 174.9 2.69 7.96 0.019
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 2 31 0.00E+00 153.6 -0.49
3 124 0.00E+00 150.4 -1.69
4 167 0.00E+00 171.2 1.93 8.31 0.016
TRADFREQ 2 31 1.00E-01 195.8 2.28
3 123 0.00E+00 165.2 0.80
4 165 0.00E+00 149.4 -2.13 9.86 0.007
RISK
BETA 2 30 0.9850 145.4 -0.56
3 117 1.0200 152.6 -0.22
4 160 1.0300 156.6 0.54 0.45 0.798
VARIAB 2 30 33.50 153.7 -0.02
3 117 33.30 153.7 -0.05
4 160 33.35 154.3 0.06 0.00 0.998
SPECRISK 2 30 24.40 168.4 0.94
3 117 24.00 151.1 -0.44
4 160 23.80 153.4 -0.13 0.92 0.630
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 2 30 17.79 162.1 0.49
3 121 17.30 161.3 1.07
4 157 15.42 147.9 -1.34 1.79 0.409
711TPM 2 29 12.94 151.0 0.30
3 114 11.85 143.4 -0.51
4 149 12.49 148.0 0.32 0.29 0.865
716PTPM 2 28 8.970 164.4 0.68
3 118 8.085 152.2 -0.20
4 160 8.015 152.5 -0.20 0.47 0.791
703ROSC 2 30 13.54 165.6 0.52
3 123 12.40 160.0 0.39
4 161 12.20 154.1 -0.69 0.56 0.755
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Table C-33 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between 
importance of answering telephone queries and independent continuous 
variables 
GEARING
731CGEAR 2 30 30.30 157.6 0.17
3 121 28.66 150.3 -0.74
4 158 31.39 158.1 0.62 0.54 0.762
732IGEAR 2 29 17.54 157.2 0.41
3 116 16.92 142.4 -1.36
4 156 18.06 156.3 1.09 1.86 0.394
733BR 2 30 0.4300 146.3 -0.74
3 123 0.3900 153.2 -0.75
4 162 0.4500 163.8 1.17 1.51 0.471
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 31 0.00E+00 165.8 0.27
3 124 0.00E+00 162.0 0.08
4 167 0.00E+00 160.3 -0.23 0.90 0.638
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 2 31 0.8000 176.6 0.98
3 124 0.3050 161.9 0.13
4 166 0.2900 157.4 -0.71 1.13 0.568
TOTSSH 2 31 22.70 200.1 2.47
3 124 13.30 156.7 -0.66
4 166 11.03 156.9 -0.82 6.25 0.044
NOOFSSH 2 31 2.000 201.6 2.57
3 124 1.000 161.8 0.13
4 166 1.000 152.8 -1.64 7.64 0.022
KEY:
Coding of levels 2 = Not done and minor importance, 3 = Moderate
importance, 4 = High importance)
* = p-value adjusted for ties
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Table C-34 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
variables 
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H I
SIZE
AV(MV) 2 70 290.0 164.9 0.45
3 145 358.3 171.8 1.99
4 105 160.2 142.0 -2.50 6.52 0
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 2 70 0.00E+00 155.6 -0.50
3 145 0.00E+00 165.0 0.79
4 105 0.00E+00 157.5 -0.40 1.42 0
TRADFREQ 2 69 0.00E+00 170.2 1.15
3 144 0.00E+00 146.4 -2.24
4 104 0.00E+00 169.1 1.37 6.78 0
RISK
BETA 2 67 1.020 142.9 -1.06
3 136 1.030 153.8 0.14
4 102 1.030 158.6 0.79 1.31 0
VARIAB 2 67 32.70 141.1 -1.25
3 136 32.35 140.5 -2.21
4 102 36.08 177.4 3.43 11.76 0
SPECRISK 2 67 24.00 142.2 -1.13
3 136 22.05 137.4 -2.77
4 102 26.75 180.9 3.91 15.43 0
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 2 67 17.81 163.1 1.00
3 138 15.99 149.1 -0.79
4 101 16.87 153.1 -0.05 1.13 0
711TPM 2 63 11.89 145.7 0.02
3 130 12.85 144.0 -0.28
4 97 11.95 147.4 0.28 0.09 0
716PTPM 2 66 8.445 152.6 0.01
3 138 8.100 148.4 -0.74
4 100 8.445 158.1 0.78 0.71 0
703R0SC 2 68 13.55 168.9 1.28
3 143 11.90 149.9 -1.19
4 101 12.40 157.5 0.14 2.07 0
.039
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Table C-34 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of 
providing feedback on analysts' reports and independent continuous 
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H d* 
GEARING
731CGEAR 2 67 28.72 136.5 -1.82
3 138 32.00 164.1 1.81
4 102 31.32 151.8 -0.31 4.46 0.108
732IGEAR 2 65 17.26 142.0 -0.84
3 134 18.99 153.9 0.70
4 100 17.16 150.0 -0.00 0.83 0.662
733BR 2 68 0.4150 151.4 -0.58
3 143 0.4100 160.0 0.54
4 102 0.4550 156.5 -0.07 0.42 0.811
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 70 0.00E+00 159.0 -0.15
3 145 0.00E+00 164.5 0.70
4 105 0.00E+00 156.0 -0.61 4.88 0.088
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 2 69 0.4600 163.5 0.36
3 145 0.2000 142.6 -3.08
4 105 1.1400 181.7 2.95 11.08 0.004
TOTSSH 2 69 11.80 158.9 -0.11
3 145 11.49 149.4 -1.88
4 105 14.90 175.4 2.09 5.00 0.083
NOOFSSH 2 69 1.000 157.7 -0.23
3 145 1.000 154.4 -0.99
4 105 2.000 169.2 1.25 1.71 0.425
KEY:
Coding of levels 2 = Not done and minor importance, 3 = Moderate
importance, 4 = High importance)
* = p-value adjusted for ties
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Table C-35 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between importance of
mailing information to analysts and independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 2 128 166.9 140.8 -3.37
3 125 366.3 179.1 2.52
4 71 322.3 172.5 1.02 11.59 0.003
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 2 128 0.00E+00 151.5 -1.71
3 125 0.00E+00 169.8 1.11
4 71 0.00E+00 169.5 0.72 6.50 0.039
TRADFREQ 2 128 0.00E+00 173.8 2.01
3 124 0.00E+00 153.8 -1.10
4 69 0.00E+00 150.2 -1.09 5.57 0.062
RISK
BETA 2 126 1.000 145.9 -1.41
3 116 1.030 157.1 0.40
4 66 1.045 166.3 1.22 2.44 0.296
VARIAB 2 126 32.85 152.3 -0.37
3 116 33.85 153.0 -0.24
4 66 34.00 161.5 0.72 0.52 0.772
SPECRISK 2 126 24.05 158.7 0.69
3 116 23.75 148.3 -0.94
4 66 24.20 157.3 0.29 0.90 0.638
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 2 124 16.19 160.5 0.80
3 118 16.36 150.1 -0.82
4 68 16.90 155.6 0.01 0.81 0.667
711TPM 2 118 11.78 141.9 -0.93
3 112 13.06 152.3 0.76
4 64 11.98 149.5 0.21 0.90 0.638
716PTPM 2 123 8.350 149.2 -0.84
3 117 8.090 156.9 0.36
4 68 8.300 160.0 0.57 0.77 0.682
703ROSC 2 126 13.20 162.7 0.67
3 123 11.90 151.0 -1.16
4 67 12.90 164.3 0.59 1.37 0.505
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Table C-35 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis te s ts  of association between 
importance of mailing information to analysts and independent 
continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE.. RANK Z VALUE H P*
GEARING
731CGEAR 2 124 30.51 158.6 0.41
3 119 29.27 157.5 0.22
4 68 31.06 148.8 -0.75 0.57 0.753
732IGEAR 2 121 18.19 156.1 0.67
3 114 18.06 151.2 -0.12
4 68 16.38 146.0 -0.65 0.60 0.739
733BR 2 126 0.4300 161.4 0.37
3 123 0.4000 157.4 -0.25
4 68 0.4800 157.6 -0.15 0.14 0.932
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 128 0.00E+00 165.4 0.44
3 125 0.00E+00 161.7 -0.12
4 71 0.00E+00 158.8 -0.38 2.25 0.326
BFA% 2 128 0.5000 168.8 1.05
3 125 0.2000 153.1 -1.36
4 70 0.3200 165.6 0.36 1.91 0.384
TOTSSH 2 128 15.060 172.2 1.58
3 125 9.200 150.5 -1.76
4 70 13.930 164.0 0.20 3.54 0.171
NOOFSSH 2 128 2.000 179.8 2.78
3 125 1.000 142.8 -2.93
4 70 2.000 163.6 0.16 9.96 0.007
KEY:
Coding of levels 2 = Not done and minor importance, 3 = Moderate
importance, 4 = High importance)
* = p-value adjusted for ties
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Table C-36 Stepwise regression of number of surveys in past 12 months 
(SURVEYS(A))
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF SQRT(SURVEYS(A)) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N =
114
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 211 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT 1.343 1.273 1.231 1.269 1.311
LOGLIST 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.36
T-RATIO 2.86 2.73 2.92 3.19 3.39
716PTPM 0.0078 0.0067 0.0050
T-RATIO 2.72 2.34 1.68
707R0CE 0.0029 0.0050 0.0059
T-RATIO 2.01 2.84 3.51
731CGEAR -0.00164 -0.00204
T-RATIO -2.03 -2.61
S 0.317 0.309 0.305 0.300 0.303
R-SQ 6.81 12.62 15.73 18.81 16.71
The regression equation is
SQRTfSURVEYS(A)) = 1.30 + 0 330 LOGLIST + 0.00511 716PTPM
+ 0.00482 707ROCE - 0.00172 731CGEAR
129 cases used 196 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io P
Constant 1.29946 0.04837 26.87 0.000
LOGLIST 0.3299 0 .1056 3.12 0.002
716PTPM 0.005112 0.002994 1.71 0.090
707R0CE 0.004816 0.001795 2.68 0.008
731CGEAR -0.0017202 0.0008267 -2.08 0.040
s = 0.3102 R- sq -  16.4% R-sq(adj) = 13.7%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 4 2.33778 0.58445 6.07 0.000
Error 124 11.93098 0.09622
Total 128 14.26876
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
LOGLIST 1 0.81952
716PTPM 1 0.78280
707R0CE 1 0.31891
731CGEAR 1 0.41655
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Table C-38 Stepwise regression of number of surveys in past five  
years I SURVEYS 1
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF LOGT(SURVEYS) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 
112
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 213 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1
CONSTANT 0.4643
LOGLIST 0.265
T-RATIO 2.87
S 0.247
R-SQ 6.99
The regression equation is
LOGT(SURVEYS) = 0.470 + 0.261 LOGLIST
133 cases used 192 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io  p
Constant 0.46952 0.02468 19.03 0.000
LOGLIST 0.26096 0.08436 3.09 0.002
s = 0.2485 R-sq = 6.8% R-sq(adj) = 6.1%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 0.59095 0.59095 9.57 0.002
Error 131 8.09063 0.06176
Total 132 8.68158
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Table C-39 Stepwise regression of index o f investor re la tions 
a c t iv ity  (ACTIVITY)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF ACTIVITY ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 47 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2
CONSTANT 11.75 14.43
LOGTRADF -3.1 -3.1
T-RATIO -2.39 -2.38
SQRTIG -0.168
T-RATIO -2.26
S 2.56 2.54
R-SQ 2.02 3.80
The regression equation is
ACTIVITY = 14.5 - 3.19 LOGTRADF -■ 0.173 SQRTIG
301 cases used 24 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant 14.546 1.180 12.32 0.000
LOGTRADF -3.187 1.282 -2.49 0.013
SQRTIG -0.17281 0.07303 -2.37 0.019
s = 2.550 R-sq = 3.8% R-sq(adj) = 3..2%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 2 77.077 38.539 5..93
Error 298 1937.661 6.502
Total 300 2014.738
P
0.003
1 2 1
278
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Table C-40 Stepwise regression of surveys in past 12m (SURVEYSfAU
with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF SQRT(SURVEYS(A)) ON 17
PREDICTORS,
WITH N = 114
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 211 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT 1.343 1.273 1.231 1.269 1.247
LOGLIST 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.37
T-RATIO 2.86 2.73 2.92 3.19 3.49
716PTPM 0.0078 0.0067 0.0050 0.0048
T-RATIO 2.72 2.34 1.68 1.64
707R0CE 0.0029 0.0050 0.0052
T-RATIO 2.01 2.84 2.98
731CGEAR -0.00164 -0.00167
T-RATIO -2.03 -2.09
LOGTRADF 0.50
T-RATIO 1.81
S 0.317 0.309 0.305 0.300 0.297
R-SQ 6.81 12.62 15.73 18.81 21.21
The regression equation is
SQRT(SURVEYS(A)) = 1.28 + 0. 339 LOGLIST
+ 0.00410 716PTPM + 0.00499 707R0CE
- 0.00173 731CGEAR + 0.427 LOGTRADF
127 cases used 198 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io P
Constant 1.28369 0.04774 26.89 0.000
LOGLIST 0.3392 0. 1035 3.28 0.001
716ADJ 0.004100 0.002904 1.41 0.161
707ROCE 0.004988 0.001733 2.88 0.005
731CGEAR -0.0017255 0.0007970 -2.16 0.032
LOGTRADF 0.4274 0. 2732 1.56 0.120
s = 0.2989 R-sq = 17.3% R-sq(adj) = 13.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 5 2.26772 0.45354 5.08 0.000
Error 121 10.81178 0.08935
Total 126 13.07950
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Table C-41 Stepwise regression of surveys more than 12m and up  to 5 
years ago (SURVEYS(B)l with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF LOGT(SURVEYS(B)) ON 17 PREDICTORS,
WITH N = 112
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 213 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1
CONSTANT 0.2964
LOGLIST 0.20
T-RATIO 1.62
S 0.323
R-SQ 2.34
The regression equation is
LOGT(SURVEYS(B)) = 0.289 + 0.169 LOGLIST
133 cases used 192 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io P
Constant 0.28945 0.03271 8.85 0.000
LOGLIST 0.1689 0.1118 1.51 0.133
s = 0.3294 R-sq = 1.7% R-sq(adj) = 1. 0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 0.2476 0.2476 2. 28 0.133
Error 131 14.2141 0.1085
Total 132 14.4617
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Table C-42 M ultip le  regression of number of surveys in past 12m 
fSURVEYS(A)) using a l l  independent variables
The regression equation is
SQRT(SURVEYS(A)) = 1.04 - 0.0343 LOGTAVMV + 0.352 LOGLIST
+0.639 LOGTRADF + 0.176 BETA +0.115 SQRTVAR
- 0.994 L0GTSRSK + 0.00519 707R0CE
- 0.00564 711TPM + 0.0133 716PTPM
- 0.00212 703R0SC - 0.00089 731CGEAR
- 0.0091 SQRTIG +0.346 SQRTBR - 0.469 L0GTAKE0 
+0.024 NEGRBFA% + 0.0192 SQRTOTSH
- 0.0392 N00FSSH + 0.0465 INDC2
+ 0.012 INDC3 - 0.048 INDC4
114 cases used 211 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- r a t io P
Constant 1.0436 0.8158 1.28 0.204
LOGTAVMV -0.03428 0.09326 -0.37 0.714
LOGLIST 0.3516 0.1659 2.12 0.037
LOGTRADF 0.6394 0.3601 1.78 0.079
BETA 0.1761 0.3295 0.53 0.594
SQRTVAR 0.1147 0.2178 0.53 0.600
L0GTSRSK -0.9940 0.9899 -1.00 0.318
707R0CE 0.005194 0.002521 2.06 0.042
711TPM -0.005643 0.005767 -0.98 0.330
716PTPM 0.013307 0.006972 1.91 0.059
703ROSC -0.002119 0.003243 -0.65 0.515
731CGEAR -0.000895 0.001020 -0.88 0.383
SQRTIG -0.00913 0.01372 -0.67 0.507
SQRTBR 0.3458 0.2333 1.48 0.142
L0GTAKE0 -0.4685 0.4128 -1.14 0.259
NEGRBFA% 0.0243 0.1037 0.23 0.815
SQRTOTSH 0.01922 0.03427 0.56 0.576
N00FSSH -0.03922 0.04805 -0.82 0.417
INDC2 0.04653 0.09218 0.50 0.615
INDC3 0.0121 0.1024 0.12 0.906
INDC4 -0.0477 0.1896 -0.25 0.802
s = 0.3057 R-sq = 28.2% R-sq(adj) = 12.8%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 20 3.41483 0.17074 1.83
Error 93 8.68906 0.09343
Total 113 12.10389
NOTE: INDC2, INDC3 & INDC4 are dummy variables denoting industria l 
c la ss ifica tio n , INDC1 is incorporated in the constant term
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Appendix D Tables of results on company meetings with analysts and
fund managers
D-l Does the Non-executive Chairman attend meetings?
D-2 Does the Chief Executive attend meetings?
D-3 Does the Managing D irector attend meetings?
D-4 Does the Finance D irector attend meetings?
D-5 Does the Marketing D irector attend meetings?
D-6 Does the Company Secretary attend meetings?
D-7 Does the Chief Accountant attend meetings?
D-8 Does the Investor Relations O ffice r attend meetings?
D-9 Does the Head of Public Relations attend meetings?
D-10 Does the External Financial Public Relations consultant
attend meetings?
D -ll Does the company keep a record of general (or group)
meetings?
D-12 Does the company keep a record of special (or ind iv idua l)
meetings?
D-13 Number of general meetings held in the past 12 months
D-14 Number of special meetings held in the past 12 months
D-15 Number of se ll-s ide  analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t  fo r
in v ita tio n  to meetings 
D-16 Number of buy-side analysts and fund managers on c ircu la tio n
l i s t  fo r  in v ita tio n  to meetings 
D-17 Number of se ll-s ide  analysts who have attended meetings in
past 12 months
D-18 Number of buy-side analysts and fund managers who have
attended meetings in past 12 months 
D-19 Number of stockbroking firms that have sent representatives
to meetings in the past 12 months 
D-20 Number of in s titu tio n a l investor organisations that have sent
representatives in the past 12 months 
D-21 Explanation of past performance
D-22 Explanation of accounting po lic ies
D-23 Additional breakdown of published figures by line  of business
D-24 Additional breakdown of published figures by geographical
area
D-25 Performance of recent acquisitions
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D-26 Outcome of completed research and development projects
D-27 Explanation of structure of balance sheet and gearing
D-28 F irs t announcement of major new projects and developments
D-29 Further explanation of major new projects and developments
that have already been announced 
D-30 F irs t announcement of new products
D-31 Further explanation of new products tha t have already been
announced
D-32 F irs t announcement of new contracts
D-33 Further explanation of new contracts that have already been
announced
D-34 Current state of order book
D-35 Prospects of current research and development projects
D-36 F irs t announcement of current research and development
projects
D-37 Further explanation of new research and development projects
that have already been announced 
D-38 F irs t announcement of p ro fits  forecast
D-39 Further explanation of p ro fits  forecast that has already been
made
D-40 Company strategy in the short term
D-41 Company strategy in the long term
D-42 Company strategy fo r pa rticu la r segments of the business
D-43 Company strategy on fu ture acquisitions
D-44 Company strategy on fu ture  disposals of segments of the
business
D-45 Long term investment plans
D-46 Cash flow s itua tion
D-47 Dividend policy
D-48 Descriptive s ta tis t ic s  fo r de ta ils  of meetings with analysts
D-49 Pearson and Spearman corre la tion between quantita tive  data on
analysts' meetings 
D-50 Pearson corre la tion between quantita tive  data on analysts'
meetings and continuous independent variables 
D-51 Spearman corre la tion between quantita tive  data on analysts'
meetings and continuous independent variables
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D-52 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of 
general meetings in the past 12m. and the independent 
categorical variables 
D-53 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
special meetings in the past 12m. and the independent 
categorical variables 
D-54 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
se ll-s ide  analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t  fo r  in v ita tio n  to 
meetings and the independent categorical variables 
D-55 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
buy-side analysts and fund managers on c ircu la tio n  l i s t  fo r 
in v ita tio n  to meetings and the independent categorical 
variables
D-56 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
se ll-s ide  analysts attending meetings in the past 12m. and 
the independent categorical variables 
D-57 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
buy-side analysts analysts and fund managers attending 
meetings in the past 12m. and the independent categorical 
variables
D-58 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
stock-broking firms attending meetings in the past 12m. and 
the independent categorical variables 
D-59 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
in s titu tio n a l investor organisations attending meetings in 
the past 12m. and the independent categorical variables 
D-60 Stepwise regression of number of general meetings (GENERALS)
D-61 M ultip le regression of number of general meetings (GENERALS)
using variables id e n tifie d  by stepwise regression 
D-62 Stepwise regression of number of special meetings (SPECIALS)
D-63 M ultip le  regression of number of special meetings (SPECIALS)
using variables id e n tifie d  by stepwise regression 
D-64 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s id e  analysts on
c ircu la tio n  l i s t
D-65 M ultip le  regression of the number of se ll-s ide  analysts on
c ircu la tio n  l i s t  (LIST(A)) using variables id e n tifie d  by 
stepwise regression
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D-66 Stepwise regression of number of buy-side analysts (LIST(B)) 
on c ircu la tion  l i s t  
D-67 M ultip le regression of number of buy-side analysts on
c ircu la tion  l i s t  (LIST(B)) using variables id e n tifie d  in 
stepwise regression 
D-68 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s id e  analysts attending
meetings (ANALYST(A))
D-69 M ultip le regression of number of se ll-s id e  analysts attending
meetings in past 12m (ANALYST(A)) using variables id e n tifie d  
in stepwise regression 
D-70 Stepwise regression of number of buy-side analysts attending
meetings (ANALYST(B))
D-71 M ultip le regression of number of buy-side analysts attending
meetings in past 12m (ANALYST(B)) using variable id e n tifie d  
by stepwise regression 
D-72 Stepwise regression of number of stock-broking firms
represented at meetings (FIRMS)
D-73 M ultip le  regression of number of stockbroking firms
represented at meetings (FIRMS) using variables id e n tifie d  by 
stepwise regression 
D-74 Stepwise regression of number of in s titu t io n a l investor
organisations represented at meetings (INVESTORS)
D-75 M ultip le regression of number of in s itu tio n a l investor
organisations represented at meetings (INVESTORS) using 
variables ide n tifie d  by stepwise regression 
D-76 Stepwise regression o f number of special meetings (SPECIALS)
with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2 
D-77 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s id e  analysts on
c ircu la tio n  l i s t  (LIST(A)) with c r i t ic a l  F value reduced to  2 
D-78 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s id e  analysts attending
meetings (ANALYSTS(A)) with c r i t ic a l  F value reduced to 2 
D-79 Stepwise regression of number of buy-side analysts attending
meetings (ANALYST(B)) w ith c r i t ic a l  F value reduced to 2 
D-80 Stepwise regression o f number of stock-broking firms
represented at meetings (FIRMS) with c r i t ic a l  F value reduced 
to 2
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0-81 Stepwise regression of number of in s titu t io n a l investor 
organisations represented at meetings (INVESTORS) with 
c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
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Table D-l Does the Non-executive Chairman attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 66 19.76
Yes 71 21.26
Not applicable 197 58.98
N= 334
*_ 3
Table D-2 Does the Chief Executive attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 10 2.99
Yes 280 83.83
Not applicable 44 13.17
N= 334
*= 3
Table D-3 Does the Managing Director attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 9 2.69
Yes 120 35.93
Not applicable 205 61.38
N= 334
= 3
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Table D-4 Does the Finance Director attend meetings?
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COUNT PERCENT
No 7 2.10
Yes 320 95.81
Not applicable 7 2.10
N= 334
*_ 3
Table D-5 Does the Marketing D irector attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 37 11.08
Yes 28 8.38
Not applicable 269 80.54
N= 334
*= 3
Table D-6 Does the Company Secretary attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 267 79.94
Yes 47 14.07
Not applicable 20 5.99
N= 334
* _ 3
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Table D-7 Does the Chief Accountant attend meetings?
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COUNT PERCENT
No 192 57.49
Yes 33 9.88
Not applicable 109 32.63
N= 334
*_ 3
Table D-8 Does the Investor Relations O ffice r attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 17 5.09
Yes 91 27.25
Not applicable 226 67.66
N= 334
*= 3
Table D-9 Does the Head of Public Relations attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 61 18.26
Yes 71 21.26
Not applicable 202 60.48
N= 334
*= 3
M a r s t o n , C-L. : 1993 Appendix D 133
Table D-10 Does the External Financial Public Relations consultant 
attend meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 161 48.20
Yes 104 31.14
Not applicable 69 20.66
N= 334
*_ 3
Table D - ll Does the company keep a record of general (or group) 
meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 135 41.16
Yes 188 57.32
Not applicable 4 1.22
Both yes and no 1 0.30
N- 328
*= 9
Table D-12 Does the company keep a record of special (or ind iv idua l) 
meetings?
COUNT PERCENT
No 164 50.31
Yes 160 49.08
Not applicable 1 0.31
Both yes and no 1 0.31
N= 326
*= 11
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Table D-13 Number of general meetings held in the past 12 months
COUNT PERCENT
0-5 189 63.85
6-10 73 24.66
11-20 23 7.77
21-30 8 2.70
31-50 3 1.01
N= 296
* _ 41
MEAN MEDIAN
6.220 4.000
Table D-14 Number of special meetings held in the past 12 months
COUNT PERCENT
0-5 38 13.57
6-10 58 20.71
11-20 74 26.43
21-30 37 13.21
31-50 53 18.93
51-100 17 6.07
101-125 3 1.07
N= 280
*_ 57
MEAN MEDIAN 
24.69 20.00
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Table D-15 Number of se ll-s ide  analysts on c ircu la tion  l i s t  fo r 
in v ita tio n  to meetings
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 56 20.74
11-20 81 30.00
21-30 59 21.85
31-40 33 12.22
41-50 20 7.41
51-100 20 7.41
101-120 1 0.37
N= 270
*= 67
MEAN MEDIAN 
26.50 20.00
Table D-16 Number of buv-side analysts and fund managers on 
c ircu la tion  l i s t  fo r in v ita tio n  to meetings
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 46 17.36
11-20 57 21.51
21-30 40 15.09
31-40 40 15.09
41-50 21 7.92
51-100 33 12.45
101-150 14 5.28
151-300 9 3.40
301-700 5 1.89
N= 265
*= 72
MEAN MEDIAN 
53.45 30.00
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Table D-17 Number of se ll-s ide  analysts who have attended meetings in 
past 12 months
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 67 24.19
11-20 94 33.94
21-30 51 18.41
31-40 41 14.80
41-50 8 2.89
51-100 14 5.05
101-150 2 0.72
N= 277
*_ 60
MEAN MEDIAN 
23.96 20.00
Table D-18 Number of buv-side analysts and fund managers who have 
attended meetings in past 12 months
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 59 21.38
11-20 65 23.55
21-30 50 18.12
31-40 17 6.16
41-50 25 9.06
51-100 43 15.58
101-150 9 3.26
151-300 6 2.17
301-450 2 0.72
N= 276
*_ 61
MEAN MEDIAN 
42.15 25.00
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Table D-19 Number of stockbroking firms that have sent 
representatives to meetings in the past 12 months
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 98 33.91
11-20 107 37.02
21-30 57 19.72
31-40 17 5.88
41-50 6 2.08
51-88 4 1.38
N= 289
*= 48
MEAN MEDIAN
17.779 15.000
Table D-20 Number of in s titu tio n a l investor organisations that have 
sent representatives in the past 12 months
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 71 26.01
11-20 74 27.11
21-30 48 17.58
31-40 26 9.52
41-50 23 8.42
51-100 22 8.06
101-250 9 3.30
N= 273
*_ 64
MEAN MEDIAN 
30.30 20.00
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Table D-21 Explanation of past performance
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(COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 4 1.20
Not at a l l 1 3 0.90
Minor importance 2 8 2.40
Moderate importance 3 47 14.11
High importance 4 2!71 81.38
N= 3.33
*= 4
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.7357 4.0000
Table D-22 Explanation of accounting po lic ies
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 :io 2.99
Not at a l l 1 12 3.59
Minor importance 2 123 36.83
Moderate importance 3 120 35.93
High importance 4 69 20.66
N= 334
*_ 3
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.6766 3.0000
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Appendix D 139
Table D-23 Additional breakdown of published figures bv line  of 
business
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 21 6.36
Not at a l l 1 62 18.79
Minor importance 2 40 12.12
Moderate importance 3 98 29.70
High importance 4 109 33.03
N= 330
*= 7
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.6424 3.0000
Table D-24 Additional breakdown of published figures bv geographical 
area
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 48 14.55
Not at a l l 1 87 26.36
Minor importance 2 73 22.12
Moderate importance 3 68 20.61
High importance 4 54 16.36
N= 330
*= 7
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.9788 2.0000
Marston, C.L- : 1993 Appendix D
Table D-25 Performance of recent acquisitions
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COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 51 15.45
Not at a ll 1 22 6.67
Minor importance 2 48 14.55
Moderate importance 3 111 33.64
High importance 4 98 29.70
N= 330
*_ 7
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.5545 3.0000
Table D-26 Outcome of completed research and development projects
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 133 40.55
Not at a ll 1 72 21.95
Minor importance 2 58 17.68
Moderate importance 3 37 11.28
High importance 4 28 8.54
N= 328
*_ 9
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.2530 1.0000
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Table D-27 Explanation of structure of balance sheet and gearing
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 6 1.81
Not at a l l 1 5 1.51
Minor importance 2 51 15.36
Moderate importance 3 94 28.31
High importance 4 176 53.01
N= 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.2922 4.0000
Table D-28 F irs t announcement of ma.ior new projects and developments
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 26 7.83
Not at a l l 1 47 14.16
Minor importance 2 40 12.05
Moderate importance 3 80 24.10
High importance 4 139 41.87
N= 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.7801 3.0000
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Table D-29 Further explanation of ma.ior new projects and developments 
that have already been announced
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 15 4.50
Not at a ll 1 25 7.51
Minor importance 2 44 13.21
Moderate importance 3 125 37.54
High importance 4 123 36.94
33 1 0.30
N= 333
*= 4
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.042 3.000
Table D-30 F irs t announcement of new products
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 117 35.35
Not at a ll 1 75 22.66
Minor importance 2 53 16.01
Moderate importance 3 52 15.71
High importance 4 34 10.27
N= 331
*_ 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.4290 1.0000
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Table D-31 Further explanation of new products that have already been 
announced
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 113 34.35
Not at a l l 1 46 13.98
Minor importance 2 85 25.84
Moderate importance 3 60 18.24
High importance 4 25 7.60
N= 329
*= 8
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.5076 2.0000
Table D-32 F irs t announcement of new contracts
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 92 27.71
Not at a l l 1 82 24.70
Minor importance 2 71 21.39
Moderate importance 3 45 13.55
High importance 4 42 12.65
N= 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.5873 1.0000
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Table D-33 Further explanation of new contracts tha t have already 
been announced
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 93 28.44
Not at a ll 1 67 20.49
Minor importance 2 83 25.38
Moderate importance 3 56 17.13
High importance 4 28 8.56
N= 327
* = 10
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.5688 2.0000
Table D-34 Current state of order book
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 124 37.46
Not at a ll 1 56 16.92
Minor importance 2 41 12.39
Moderate importance 3 68 20.54
High importance 4 42 12.69
N= 331
*= 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.5408 1.0000
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Table D-35 Prospects of current research and development projects
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 143 43.20
Not at a l l 1 69 20.85
Minor importance 2 66 19.94
Moderate importance 3 39 11.78
High importance 4 14 4.23
N= 331
*= 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.1299 1.0000
Table D-36 F irs t announcement of current research and development 
projects
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 149 45.29
Not at a l l 1 96 29.18
Minor importance 2 55 16.72
Moderate importance 3 15 4.56
High importance 4 14 4.26
N= 329
*= 8
MEAN MEDIAN 
0.9331 1.0000
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Table D-37 Further explanation of new research and development 
projects that have already been announced
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 145 44.07
Not at a l l 1 76 23.10
Minor importance 2 57 17.33
Moderate importance 3 38 11.55
High importance 4 13 3.95
N= 329
*= 8
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.0821 1.0000
Table D-38 F irs t announcement of p ro fits  forecast
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 73 22.12
Not at a l l 1 106 32.12
Minor importance 2 11 3.33
Moderate importance 3 23 6.97
High importance 4 117 35.45
N= 330
*= 7
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.0152 1.0000
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Table D-39 Further explanation of p ro fits  forecast tha t has already 
been made
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 77 23.26
Not at a l l 1 80 24.17
Minor importance 2 13 3.93
Moderate importance 3 49 14.80
High importance 4 112 33.84
N= 331
*= 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.1178 2.0000
Table D-40 Company strategy in the short term
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 3 0.91
Not at a l l 1 4 1.21
Minor importance 2 20 6.04
Moderate importance 3 100 30.21
High importance 4 204 61.63
N= 331
*= 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.5045 4.0000
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Table D-41 Company strategy in the long term
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 4 1.20
Not at a l l 1 4 1.20
Minor importance 2 8 2.40
Moderate importance 3 52 15.62
High importance 4 265 79.58
N= 333
*_ 4
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.7117 4.0000
Table D-42 Company strategy fo r pa rticu la r segments of the business
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 14 4.22
Not at a ll 1 7 2.11
Minor importance 2 30 9.04
Moderate importance 3 78 23.49
High importance 4 203 61.14
N= 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.3524 4.0000
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Table D-43 Company strategy on future acquisitions
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 16 4.82
Not at a l l 1 26 7.83
Minor importance 2 33 9.94
Moderate importance 3 102 30.72
High importance 4 155 46.69
N= 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.0663 3.0000
Table D-44 Company strategy on future disposals of segments o f the 
business
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 41 12.46
Not at a l l 1 48 14.59
Minor importance 2 54 16.41
Moderate importance 3 86 26.14
High importance 4 100 30.40
N= 329
*= 8
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.4742 3.0000
i
M a r s t o n , C.L. : 1993 Appendix D
Table D-45 Long term investment plans
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COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 23 7.01
Not at a l l 1 23 7.01
Minor importance 2 52 15.85
Moderate importance 3 109 33.23
High importance 4 121 36.89
N= 328
*_ 9
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.8598 3.0000
Table D-46 Cash flow s itua tion
COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 9 2.73
Not at a l l 1 14 4.24
Minor importance 2 28 8.48
Moderate importance 3 95 28.79
High importance 4 184 55.76
N= 330
*= 7
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.3061 4.0000
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Table D-47 Dividend policy
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COUNT PERCENT
Not applicable 0 5 1.52
Not at a ll 1 13 3.95
Minor importance 2 42 12.77
Moderate importance 3 101 30.70
High importance 4 168 51.06
N= 329
*_ 8
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.2584 4.0000
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N N* MEAN MEDIAN
GENERALS 285 40 6.319 4.000
L0GT(GENERALS) 285 40 0.7531 0.6990
SPECIALS 270 55 24.64 20.00
LOGT(SPECIALS) 270 55 1.2514 1.3222
LIST(A) 261 64 26.29 20.00
LOGT(LIST(A)) 261 64 1.3457 1.3222
LIST(B) 255 70 53.27 30.00
LOGT(LIST(B)) 255 70 1.4798 1.4914
ANALYST(A) 268 57 24.04 20.00
LOGT(ANALYST(A)) 268 57 1.2939 1.3222
ANALYST(B) 267 58 42.63 25.00
LOGT(ANALYST(B)) 267 58 1.4322 1.4150
FIRMS 279 46 17.692 15.000
SQRT(FIRMS) 279 46 4.1274 4.0000
INVESTORS 264 61 ' 30.49 20.00
LOGT(INVESTORS) 264 61 1.3056 1.3222
KEY :
TEST = M initab's corre la tion  tes t fo r normality
GENERALS = Number of general meetings in past 12m
SPECIALS = Number of special meetings in past 12m
LIST(A) = Number of se ll-s id e  analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t
LIST(B) = Number of buy-side analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t
ANALYST(A) = Number of se ll-s ide  analysts attending meetings in past
12m
ANALYST(B) = Number of buy-side analysts attending meetings in past 
12m
FIRMS = Number of stock-broking firms represented at meetings in 
past 12m
INVESTORS = Number of in s t it itu io n a l investors represented at 
meetings in past 12m
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Table D-48 (continued) Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  de ta ils  of meetings 
with analysts
TRMEAN STDEV SEMEAN
GENERALS
LOGT(GENERALS)
5.284
0.7387
7.016
0.2854
0.416
0.0169
SPECIALS
LOGT(SPECIALS)
21.85
1.2581
22.63
0.3888
1.38
0.0237
LIST(A)
LOGT(LIST(A))
24.86
1.3533
17.69
0.2951
1.10
0.0183
LIST(B)
LOGT(LIST(B))
39.93
1.4906
81.43
0.4793
5.10
0.0300
ANALYST(A)
LOGT(ANALYST(A))
22.15
1.3034
18.46
0.3202
1.13
0.0196
ANALYST(B)
LOGT(ANALYST(B))
35.24
1.4405
53.31
0.4365
3.26
0.0267
FIRMS
SQRT(FIRMS)
16.761
4.0884
11.719
1.2893
0.702
0.0772
INVESTORS 
L0GT(INVESTORS)
26.04
1.3252
33.31
0.4449
2.05
0.0274
KEY :
TEST
GENERALS
SPECIALS
LIST(A)
LIST(B)
ANALYST(A) =
12m
ANALYST(B) = 
12m 
FIRMS 
past 12m 
INVESTORS = 
meetings in
; M initab's corre la tion tes t fo r normality
* Number of general meetings in past 12m
s Number of special meetings in past 12m
> Number of se ll-s id e  analysts on c ircu la tion  l i s t
= Number of buy-side analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t  
; Number of se ll-s id e  analysts attending meetings in past
= Number of buy-side analysts attending meetings in past
= Number of stock-broking firms represented at meetings in
« Number of in s t it itu io n a l investors represented at 
past 12m
Table D-48 (continued) Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r de ta ils  of meetings 
with analysts
___________________ MIN MAX 01______ 03 TEST
GENERALS
LOGT(GENERALS)
0.000
0.0000
50.000
1.7076
2.000
0.4771
7.000
0.9031
0.801
0.984
SPECIALS
LOGT(SPECIALS)
0.00
0.0000
125.00
2.1004
10.00
1.0414
35.00
1.5563
0.904
0.995
LIST(A)
LOGT(LIST(A))
0.00
0.0000
120.00
2.0828
12.00
1.1139
35.00
1.5563
0.944
0.990
LIST(B)
LOGT(LIST(B))
0.00
0.0000
700.00
2.8457
16.00
1.2304
50.00
1.7076
0.727
0.978
ANALYST(A)
LOGT(ANALYST(A))
0.00
0.0000
150.00
2.1790
12.00
1.1139
30.00
1.4914
0.900
0.986
ANALYST(B)
LOGT(ANALYST(B))
0.00
0.0000
450.00
2.6542
12.00
1.1139
50.00
1.7076
0.790
0.988
FIRMS
SQRT(FIRMS)
0.000
1.0000
88.000
9.4340
9.000
3.1623
25.000
5.0990
0.944
0.991
INVESTORS 
L0GT(INVESTORS)
0.00
0.0000
250.00
2.3997
10.00
1.0414
38.75
1.5987
0.841
0.980
KEY :
TEST = M initab's
GENERALS = Number of
SPECIALS = Number of
LIST(A) = Number of
LIST(B) = Number of
ANALYST(A) = Number of
12m
ANALYST(B) = Number of
12m
FIRMS = Number of
past 12m
INVESTORS = Number of
meetings in past 12m
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Table D-49 Pearson and Spearman corre la tion  between Quantitative data 
on ana1vsts/ meetings
Raw data
GENERALS SPECIALS LIST(A) LIST(B)
SPECIALS 0.207
LIST(A) 0.236 0.469
LIST(B) 0.236 0.394 0.476
ANALYST(A) 0.280 0.467 0.819 0.429
ANALYST(B) 0.302 0.495 0.537 0.671
FIRMS 0.216 0.465 0.623 0.363
INVESTORS 0.317 0.440 0.485 0.635
ANALYST(A) ANALYST(B) FIRMS 
ANALYST(B) 0.566
FIRMS 0.645 0.462
INVESTORS 0.455 0.831 0.438
Transformed data
GENERALS SPECIALS LIST(A) LIST(B) 
SPECIALS 0.310
LIST(A) 0.164 0.378
LIST(B) 0.369 0.364 0.427
ANALYST(A) 0.241 0.455 0.863 0.479
ANALYST(B) 0.344 0.485 0.394 0.773
FIRMS 0.251 0.497 0.672 0.423
INVESTORS 0.318 0.462 0.382 0.712
ANALYST(A) ANALYST(B) FIRMS 
ANALYST(B) 0.513
FIRMS 0.694 0.496
INVESTORS 0.444 0.794 0.459
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Table D-49 (continued) Pearson and Spearman corre la tion  between 
quantita tive  data on analysts' meetings
Spearman rank corre la tion
GENERALS SPECIALS LIST(A) LIST(E
SPECIALS 0.299
LIST(A) 0.194 0.447
LIST(B) 0.401 0.426 0.518
ANALYST(A) 0.231 0.493 0.889 0.520
ANALYST(B) 0.395 0.523 0.458 0.799
FIRMS 0.225 0.520 0.737 0.471
INVESTORS 0.367 0.537 0.451 0.743
ANALYST(A) ANALYST(B) FIRMS
ANALYST(B) 0.559
FIRMS 0.794 0.520
INVESTORS 0.475 0.821 0.507
KEY :
GENERALS = Number of
SPECIALS = Number of
LIST(A) = Number of
LIST(B) = Number of
ANALYST(A) = Number of
12m
ANALYST(B) = Number of
12m
FIRMS = Number of
past 12m
INVESTORS = Number of
meetings in past 12m
ocK-oroKing rirms represented at meetings in 
 institituional investors represented at
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Table D-50 Pearson correlation between quantitative data on analysts'
meetings and continuous independent variables
__________________________ GENERALS SPECIALS LISTfAl LISTfRl
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.342** 0.247** 0.374** 0.332**
LOGTAVMV 0.266** 0.379** 0.576** 0.388**
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.465** 0.331** 0.466** 0.391**
LOGLIST 0.407** 0.413** 0.505** 0.430**
TRADFREQ -0.071 -0.209** -0.234** -0.120
LOGTRADF -0.097 -0.278** -0.329** -0.181**
RISK
BETA 0.026 0.100 0.186** 0.165**
VARIAB -0.077 0.026 -0.125* -0.044
SQRTVAR -0.077 0.013 -0.119 -0.038
SPECRISK -0.104 -0.027 -0.242** -0.119
LOGTSRSK -0.117 -0.084 -0.277** -0.123
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 0.034 -0.030 -0.144* -0.032
711TPM 0.077 -0.045 -0.006 0.025
716PTPM 0.072 -0.023 -0.033 0.015
703R0SC 0.087 0.008 -0.069 0.022
GEARING
731CGEAR -0.018 0.049 -0.016 -0.005
732IGEAR -0.030 -0.028 0.054 -0.056
SQRTIG -0.026 -0.029 0.050 -0.065
733BR -0.045 0.070 -0.000 0.032
SQRTBR -0.037 0.090 -0.002 0.051
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.019 -0.018 0.053 0.048
LOGTAKEO 0.014 -0.016 0.041 0.055
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.063 -0.162** -0.270** -0.136*
NEGRBFA% -0.104 -0.145* -0.316** -0.127*
TOTSSH -0.045 -0.229** -0.284** -0.170**
SQRTOTSH -0.037 -0.220** -0.305** -0.159*
NOOFSSH -0.096 -0.154* -0.297** -0.152*
Note:
** = S ign ifican t at at least the .01 level (two t a i l  te s t)
*  = S ign ifican t at at least the .05 level (two t a i l  te s t)
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Table D-50 (continued) Pearson corre la tion  between quantita tive  data
ANALYST!A1 ANALYST!B1 FIRMS INVESTORS
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.432** 0.449** 0.373** 0.448**
LOGTAVMV 0.637** 0.474** 0.588** 0.490**
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.461** 0.509** 0.339** 0.486**
LOGLIST 0.505** 0.521** 0.407** 0.479**
TRADFREQ -0.254** -0.140* -0.264** -0.181**
LOGTRADF -0.342** -0.205** -0.369** -0.251**
RISK
BETA 0.154* 0.157* 0.102 0.113
VARIAB -0.152* -0.062 -0.107 -0.094
SQRTVAR -0.148* -0.063 -0.109 -0.098
SPECRISK -0.259** -0.151* -0.173** -0.167**
LOGTSRSK -0.296** -0.189** -0.219** -0.209**
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -0.029 -0.043 -0.012 -0.043
711TPM -0.002 0.016 -0.027 -0.004
716PTPM -0.036 0.020 -0.026 0.002
703R0SC -0.024 0.014 -0.020 0.004
GEARING
731CGEAR 0.002 0.021 0.036 -0.031
732IGEAR 0.048 -0.050 0.022 -0.069
SQRTIG 0.040 -0.050 0.019 -0.064
733BR 0.024 0.018 -0.010 0.018
SQRTBR 0.047 0.039 0.000 0.034
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.067 -0.033 0.037 -0.005
LOGTAKEO 0.056 -0.033 0.027 -0.003
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.213** -0.150* -0.211** -0.170**
NEGRBFA% -0.285** -0.179** -0.250** -0.199**
TOTSSH -0.295** -0.177** -0.242** -0.191**
SQRTOTSH -0.316** -0.176** -0.251** -0.195**
NOOFSSH -0.309** -0.164** -0.280** -0.226**
KEY :
GENERALS - 
SPECIALS = 
LIST(A) 
LIST(B) 
ANALYST(A) ■ 
12m
ANALYST(B) - 
12m 
FIRMS 
past 12m 
INVESTORS = 
meetings in
Number of general meetings in past 12m 
Number of special meetings in past 12m 
Number of se ll-s id e  analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t  
Number of buy-side analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t
■ Number of se ll-s id e  analysts attending meetings in past
* Number of buy-side analysts attending meetings in past
■ Number of stock-broking firms represented at meetings in
* Number of in s t it itu io n a l investors represented at 
past 12m
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Table D-51 Spearman corre la tion  between quantita tive  data on 
analysts' meetings and continuous independent variables
GENERALS SPECIALS LIST(A) LISTfBl
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.268** 0.366** 0.588** 0.457**
MARKETABILITY
LISTING 0.288** 0.351** 0.379** 0.369**
TRADFREQ -0.167** -0.398** -0.479** -0.375**
RISK
BETA 0.024 0.099 0.179** 0.124*
VARIAB -0.100 -0.101 -0.138* -0.131*
SPECRISK -0.143* -0.183** -0.304** -0.250**
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE -0.007 -0.093 -0.147* -0.053
711TPM 0.066 -0.092 -0.088 -0.010
716PTPM 0.055 -0.136* -0.140* 0.022
703R0SC 0.025 -0.005 -0.059 0.011
GEARING
731CG 0.042 0.241** 0.153* 0.082
732IG 0.014 0.134* 0.127* -0.056
733BR 0.038 0.267** 0.204** 0.123*
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.055 0.015 0.029 0.037
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.102 -0.191** -0.306** -0.182**
TOTSSH -0.081 -0.213** -0.335** -0.258**
NOOFSSH -0.086 -0.149* -0.312** -0.232**
NOTE :
**  = S ign ifican t at at least the .01 level (two t a i l  te s t)
*  = S ign ifican t at at least the .05 level (two t a i l  te s t)
KEY :
GENERALS = Number of general meetings in past 12m
SPECIALS = Number of special meetings in past 12m
LIST(A) = Number of se ll-s id e  analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t
LIST(B) = Number of buy-side analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Appendix D 160
Table D-51 (continued) Spearman corre la tion  between quantita tive  data 
on analysts' meetings and continuous independent variables
______________ ANALYST!A1 ANALYST!B) FIRMS INVESTORS
SIZE
AVMV 0.684** 0.481** 0.677** 0.478**
MARKETABILITY
LISTING 0.430** 0.359** 0.413** 0.314**
TRADFRQ -0.547** -0.389** -0.547** -0.391**
RISK
BETA 0.189** 0.110 0.116 0.093
VARIAB -0.176** -0.165** -0.166** -0.194**
SPRISK -0.360** -0.299** -0.295** -0.307**
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE -0.152* -0.037 -0.154* -0.065
711TPM -0.066 0.034 -0.124 -0.003
716PTPM -0.159* 0.024 -0.189* -0.022
703R0SC -0.043 0.044 -0.058 0.043
GEARING
731CG 0.175** 0.144* 0.193** 0.111
732IG 0.159* 0.016 0.179** 0.022
733BR 0.274** 0.168** 0.253** 0.170**
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TOVER 0.050 0.012 0.020 0.047
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.306** -0.197** -0.266** -0.202**
TOTSSH -0.357** -0.206** -0.313** -0.186**
NOSSH -0.338** -0.184** -0.330** -0.203**
KEY :
ANALYST(A) = Number of se ll-s id e  analysts attending meetings in past 
12m
ANALYST(B) = Number of buy-side analysts attending meetings in past 
12m
FIRMS = Number of stock-broking firms represented at meetings in 
past 12m
INVESTORS = Number of in s t it itu io n a l investors represented at 
meetings in past 12m
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Table D-52 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
aeneral meetinas in the Dast 12m. and the indeDendent cateaorical
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H D*
OSEALIST 0 231 4.000 131.9 -4.71
1 54 8.000 190.6 4.71 22.66 0.000
TFCAT 0 184 5.000 152.6 2.81
1 100 4.000 123.9 -2.81 8.05 0.005
ALPHA 1 245 4.000 147.1 2.09
2 40 3.500 117.7 -2.09 4.46 0.035
4WAYINDC 1 92 4.000 127.9 -2.14
2 90 4.000 142.1 -0.12
3 71 5.000 169.4 3.11
4 32 3.500 130.5 -0.91 11.36 0.010
SSH(Y/N) 0 84 5.000 147.8 0.63
1 201 4.000 141.0 -0.63 0.41 0.524
Table D-53 Kruskal -Wallis tests of association between the number of
SDecial meetinas in the Dast 12m. and the indeDendent cateaorical
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 220 15.00 122.3 -5.82
1 50 37.50 193.5 5.82 34.04 0.000
TFCAT 0 170 25.00 157.3 6.34
1 98 10.00 94.9 -6.34 40.47 0.000
ALPHA 1 231 20.00 144.0 4.36
2 39 10.00 85.1 -4.36 19.06 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 86 19.00 128.5 -1.01
2 82 20.00 155.3 2.75
3 69 12.00 126.8 -1.08
4 33 18.00 123.0 -0.98 7.70 0.053
SSH(Y/N) 0 80 20.00 145.4 1.35
1 190 16.50 131.3 -1.35 1.84 0.175
* = p value adjusted for ties
M a r s t o n , C.L. : 1993 Appendix D 162
Table D-54 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
se ll-s id e  analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t  fo r in v ita tio n  to meetinas and
the independent cateaorical variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H D*
OSEALIST 0 206 20.00 116.6 -5.95
1 55 40.00 184.8 5.95 35.69 0.000
TFCAT 0 177 30.00 154.1 7.38
1 83 12.00 80.2 -7.38 54.93 0.000
ALPHA 1 229 25.00 140.3 5.34
2 32 10.00 64.2 -5.34 28.77 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 80 25.00 133.6 0.38
2 83 25.00 138.6 1.11
3 67 20.00 113.0 -2.27
4 31 25.00 142.8 0.93 5.56 0.136
SSH(Y/N) 0 72 30.00 157.7 3.53
1 189 20.00 120.8 -3.53 12.54 0.000
Table D-55 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of 
buv-side analysts and fund managers on c ircu la tion  l i s t  fo r  in v ita tio n  
to meetings and the independent categorical variables
/ARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 202 25.00 114.5 -5.72
1 53 50.00 179.6 5.72 32.90 0.000
TFCAT 0 172 40.00 145.2 5.56
1 82 20.00 90.4 -5.56 31.05 0.000
ALPHA 1 224 32.00 134.6 3.85
2 31 20.00 80.1 -3.85 14.94 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 78 20.00 115.4 -1.80
2 76 30.00 127.3 -0.11
3 71 40.00 146.8 2.52
4 30 30.00 118.1 -0.78 7.44 0.060
SSH(Y/N) 0 74 37.50 142.2 1.96
1 181 30.00 122.2 -1.96 3.88 0.049
* = p value adjusted for ties
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Table D-56 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
se ll-s id e  analysts attending meetings in the past 12m. and the 
independent categorical variables
/ARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 214 20.00 118.3 -6.80
1 54 40.00 198.6 6.80 46.67 0.000
TFCAT 0 174 25.00 163.7 8.59
1 93 10.00 78.5 -8.59 74.36 0.000
ALPHA 1 232 20.000 146.3 6.33
2 36 9.000 58.4 -6.33 40.40 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 82 20.00 132.7 -0.26
2 82 20.00 138.6 0.58
3 72 20.00 127.2 -0.93
4 32 20.00 145.0 0.81 1.51 0.681
SSH(Y/N) 0 77 25.00 160.8 3.53
1 191 20.00 123.9 -3.53 12.53 0.000
Table D-57 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of 
buy-side analysts analysts and fund managers attending meetings in the 
past 12m. and the independent categorical variables
/ARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 214 20.00 120.7 -5.67
1 53 58.00 187.9 5.67 32.36 0.000
TFCAT 0 172 30.00 154.3 6.16
1 93 17.00 93.6 -6.16 38.10 0.000
ALPHA 1 228 30.00 141.1 3.62
2 39 20.00 92.7 -3.62 13.14 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 82 20.00 123.3 -1.51
2 80 25.00 132.6 -0.19
3 75 30.00 146.8 1.69
4 30 30.00 135.1 0.08 3.68 0.299
SSH(Y/N) 0 79 30.00 145.7 1.60
1 188 25.00 129.1 -1.60 2.58 0.109
* = p value adjusted for ties
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Table D-58 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
stock-broking firms attending meetinas in the past 12m. and the 
independent categorical variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H d*
OSEALIST 0 227 12.00 124.3 -6.77
1 52 30.00 208.4 6.77 46.25 0.000
TFCAT 0 178 20.00 171.2 8.78
1 100 10.00 83.0 -8.78 77.69 0.000
ALPHA 1 235 20.000 154.5 7.26
2 43 6.000 57.7 -7.26 53.08 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 87 15.00 130.8 -1.28
2 85 18.00 148.9 1.22
3 73 15.00 133.3 -0.83
4 34 20.00 155.7 1.21 3.97 0.265
SSH(Y/N) 0 79 20.00 166.5 3.53
1 199 15.00 128.8 -3.53 12.57 0.000
fable D-59 Kruskal -Wallis tests of association between the number of
institutional investor organisations attending meetinas in the Dast
[2m. and the indeDendent cateaorical variables
(ARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 217 20.00 121.8 -4.87
1 47 40.00 181.7 4.87 23.84 0.000
TFCAT 0 170 30.00 152.0 5.77
1 93 15.00 95.4 -5.77 33.43 0.000
ALPHA 1 222 25.00 141.3 4.60
2 41 12.00 81.8 -4.60 21.29 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 84 20.00 130.1 -0.35
2 82 20.00 136.3 0.54
3 70 20.00 138.6 0.78
4 28 14.50 113.4 -1.40 2.50 0.475
SSH(Y/N) 0 72 20.00 142.1 1.32
1 191 20.00 128.2 -1.32 1.75 0.186
* = p value adjusted for ties
Table D-60 Stepwise regression of number of general meetings 
(GENERALS)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF GENERALS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 251 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 74 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1
CONSTANT 5.143
LOGLIST 12.0
T-RATIO 6.30
S 6.54
R-SQ 13.74
Table D-61 M ultip le  regression of number of general meetings 
(GENERALS) using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is 
GENERALS = 5.11 + 13.1 LOGLIST
285 cases used 40 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant 5.1109 0.4129 12.38 0.000
LOGLIST 13.088 1.744 7.51 0.000
s = 6.418 R-sq = 16.6% R-sq(adj) = 16.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 2320.3 2320.3 56.33 0.000
Error 283 11657.6 41.2
Total 284 13977.9
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Table D-62 Stepwise regression of number of special meetings 
(SPECIALS)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF SPECIALS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 235
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 90 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2
CONSTANT 21.03 24.11
LOGLIST 41.9 37.4
T-RATIO 6.67 5.99
LOGTRADF -42
T-RATIO -3.74
S 21.0 20.5
R-SQ 16.02 20.81
Table D-63 M ultip le  regression of number of special meetings 
(SPECIALS) using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
SPECIALS = 23.3 + 37 .2 LOGLIST - 39.9 LOGTRADF
268 cases used 57 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant 23.255 1.493 15.57 0.000
LOGLIST 37.191 5.632 6.60 0.000
LOGTRADF -39.86 10.69 -3.73 0.000
s = 19.83 R-sq = 20.8% R-sq(adj) = 2C1.2%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 2 27328 13664 34. 75 0.000
Error 265 104199 393
Total 267 131527
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Table D-64 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s ide  analysts on 
c ircu la tio n  l i s t
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF LIST(A) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 229
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 96 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5 6
CONSTANT -17.07 -31.87 -23.75 -14.42 -13.00 - 16.32
LOGTAVMV 17.2 17.2 13.8 12.2 10.0 11.5
T-RATIO 10.91 11.20 7.42 6.37 4.92 5.37
BETA 14.7 13.5 13.4 14.0 13.8
T-RATIO 3.52 3.28 3.32 3.50 3.50
LOGLIST 15.5 15.7 15.3 14.7
T-RATIO 3.04 3.13 3.10 2.99
SQRTOTSH -1.34 -1.53 -2.56
T-RATIO -3.01 -3.43 -3.88
NEGRBFA% -7.4 -7.4
T-RATIO -2.78 -2.80
NOOFSSH 2.2
T-RATIO 2.10
S 14.3 13.9 13.7 13.4 13.2 13.1
R-SQ 34.41 37.81 40.27 42.58 44.50 45.58
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Table D-65 M ultip le  regression of the number of se ll-s ide  analysts on
c ircu la tio n  l i s t  (LIST(Al) using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise 
regression
The regression equation is
LIST(A) = - 14.7 + 10.8 LOGTAVMV + 13.7 BETA + 17.8 LOGLIST 
- 2.31 SQRTOTSH - 6.21 NEGRBFA% +1.87 N00FSSH
252 cases used 73 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io P
Constant -14.661 6.674 -2.20 0.029
LOGTAVMV 10.767 2.032 5.30 0.000
BETA 13.669 3.884 3.52 0.001
LOGLIST 17.813 4.603 3.87 0.000
SQRTOTSH -2.3096 0.6183 -3.74 0.000
NEGRBFA% -6.214 2.538 -2.45 0.015
NOOFSSH 1.8712 0.9835 1.90 0.058
s = 13.24 R-sq = 45.8% R-sq(adj) =■ 44.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 6 36236.2 6039.4 34.45
Error 245 42949.4 175.3
Total 251 79185.6
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Table D-66 Stepwise regression of number of buv-side analysts 
(LISTfBU on c ircu la tio n  l i s t
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF LIST(B) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 222
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 103 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4
CONSTANT 37.38 - 27.59 -84.82 -12.26
LOGLIST 132 87 79 80
T-RATIO 6.39 3.38 3.12 3.17
LOGTAVMV 27.8 30.0 29.6
T-RATIO 2.90 3.14 3.13
BETA 52 59
T-RATIO 2.54 2.85
SQRTIG -4.9
T-RATIO -2.09
S 69.5 68.4 67.5 67.0
R-SQ 15.64 18.75 21.08 22.64
Table D-67 M ultip le  regression of number of buv-side analysts on 
c ircu la tio n  l i s t  (LIST(Bl) using variables id e n tifie d  in stepwise 
regression
The regression equation is
LIST(B) = - 27.9 + 81.8 LOGLIST + 31.6 LOGTAVMV +55.9 BETA
- 4.01 SQRTIG
232 cases used 93 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant -27.95 49.07 -0.57 0.570
LOGLIST 81.77 26.46 3.09 0.002
LOGTAVMV 31.574 9.778 3.23 0.001
BETA 55.88 21.99 2.54 0.012
SQRTIG -4.013 2.453 -1.64 0.103
s = 72.05 R-sq = 21.2% R-sq(adj) = 19.8%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 4 316888 79222 15.26 0.000
Error 227 1178486 5192
Total 231 1495374
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Table D-68 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s ide  analysts 
attending meetings (ANALYST(A)l
STEPWISE REGRESSION' OF ANALYSTS(A) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 236
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 89 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3
CONSTANT -25.43 -37.42 -30.69
LOGTAVMV 19.8 19.8 17.0
T-RATIO 12.67 12.83 8.91
BETA 12.1 11.2
T-RATIO 2.85 2.64
LOGLIST 12.9
T-RATIO 2.44
S 14.5 14.3 14.2
R-SQ 40.67 42.67 44.11
Table D-69 M ultip le regression of number of se ll-s id e  analysts 
attending meetings in past 12m (ANALYST(A)l using variables id e n tifie d  
in stepwise regression
The regression equation is
ANALYST(A) = - 28.8 + 16.3 LOGTAVMV + 14.3 LOGLIST + 10.4 BETA 
259 cases used 66 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- r a t io P
Constant -28.755 5.956 -4.83 0.000
LOGTAVMV 16.327 1.756 9.30 0.000
LOGLIST 14.273 4.844 2.95 0.004
BETA 10.352 4.063 2.55 0.011
s = 13.95 R-sq = 45.1% R-sq(adj) == 44.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 3 40795 13598 69.92
Error 255 49596 194
Total 258 90391
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Table D-70 Stepwise regression of number of buv-side analysts 
attending meetinas (ANALYST(B)l
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF ANALYST(B) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 234
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 91 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3
CONSTANT -54.79 -26.62 -51.98
LOGTAVMV 39.0 25.2 25.6
T-RATIO 8.39 4.48 4.57
LOGLIST 63 60
T-RATIO 4.06 3.87
BETA 25
T-RATIO 2.02
S 42.9 41.5 41.2
R-SQ 23.26 28.37 29.62
Table D-71 M u ltid e  rearession of number of buv-side analysts
attendina meetinas in past 12m (ANALYST(B)) usina variable id e n tifie d
bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
ANALYST(B) = - 47.3 + 22.6 LOGTAVMV +85.3 LOGLIST +25.3 BETA
256 cases used 69 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant -47.30 18.91 -2.50 0.013
LOGTAVMV 22.609 5.621 4.02 0.000
LOGLIST 85.31 15.72 5.43 0.000
BETA 25.28 13.14 1.92 0.056
s = 44.87 R-sq = 32.3% R-sq(adj) = 31.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 242368 80789 40.13 0.000
Error 252 507365 2013
Total 255 749733
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Appendix D 172
Table D-72 Stepwise regression of number of stock-broking firms 
represented at meetings (FIRMS)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF FIRMS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 247
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 78 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2
CONSTANT -10.108 -6.445
LOGTAVMV 11.1 10.0
T-RATIO 10.76 8.64
LOGTRADF -12.6
T-RATIO -2.22
S 9.62 9.54
R-SQ 32.11 33.46
Table D-73 M ultip le  regression of number of stockbrokinq firms 
represented at meetings (FIRMS) using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise 
regression
The regression equation is
FIRMS = - 7.28 +10 .3  LOGTAVMV - 12.7 LOGTRADF
278 cases used 47 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io P
Constant -7.279 2.861 -2.54 0.012
LOGTAVMV 10.260 1.054 9.73 0.000
LOGTRADF -12.658 5.519 -2.29 0.023
s = 9.437 R-sq = 35.8% R-sq(adj) = 3E>.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 2 13628.6 6814.3 76. 51 0.000
Error 275 24491.5 89.1
Total 277 38120.1
Marston, C-L. : 1993 Appendix D 173
Table D-74 Stepwise regression of number of in s titu t io n a l investor 
organisations represented at meetings (INVESTORS!
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF INVESTORS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 237
N(CASES WITH MISSING 0BS.) = 88 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2
CONSTANT -36.03 -22.97
LOGTAVMV 26.9 20.5
T-RATIO 8.87 5.68
LOGLIST 31
T-RATIO 3.10
S 27.3 26.8
R-SQ 25.06 28.02
Table D-75 M ultip le regression of number of in s itu tio n a l investor 
organisations represented at meetings (INVESTORS! using variables 
id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
INVESTORS = - 18.2 + 17.9 LOGTAVMV + 46.3 LOGLIST
264 cases used 61 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant -18.244 8.409 -2.17 0.031
LOGTAVMV 17.922 3.478 5.15 0.000
LOGLIST 46.322 9.798 4.73 0.000
s = 27.96 R-sq = 30.0% R-sq(adj) = 29.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS
Regression 2 87682 43841
Error 261 204110 782
Total 263 291792
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Table D-76 Stepwise regression of number of special meetings 
(SPECIALS) with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF SPECIALS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 235
N(CASES 'WITH MISSING OBS.) = 90 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5 6
CONSTANT 21.03 24.11 28.30 29.51 14.74 -16.20
LOGLIST 41.9 37.4 35.2 36.8 29.3 25.4
T-RATIO 6.67 5.99 5.54 5.79 3.79 3.21
LOGTRADF -42 -40 -43 -34 -24
T-RATIO -3.74 -3.54 -3.77 -2.78 -1.83
SQRTOTSH -1.10 -2.87 -3.09 -3.45
T-RATIO -1.67 -2.66 -2.86 -3.17
NOOFSSH 3.1 4.0 4.3
T-RATIO 2.06 2.52 2.69
LOGTAVMV 5.7 9.2
T-RATIO 1.71 2.45
SQRTVAR 3.9
T-RATIO 2.03
S 21.0 20.5 20.4 20.2 20.1 20.0
R-SQ 16.02 20.81 21.75 23.17 24.13 25.48
The regression equation is
SPECIALS = - 12.5 + 25.7 LOGLIST - 22.8 LOGTRADF - 3.15 SQRTOTSH
+3.85 NOOFSSH +8.38 LOGTAVMV +3.43 SQRTVAR
259 cases used 66 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io P
Constant -12.47 16.84 -0.74 0.459
LOGLIST 25.655 7.223 3.55 0.000
LOGTRADF -22.80 12.73 -1.79 0.074
SQRTOTSH -3.1521 0.9713 -3.25 0.001
NOOFSSH 3.852 1.444 2.67 0.008
LOGTAVMV 8.383 3.432 2.44 0.015
SQRTVAR 3.427 1.843 1.86 0.064
s = 19.64 R-sq = 25.2% R-sq(adj) = 23.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE
Regression
Error
Total
DF
6
252
258
SS
32837.9
97229.4
130067.3
MS
5473.0
385.8
F
14.18
P
0.000
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Table D-77 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s ide  analysts on 
c ircu la tio n  l i s t  (LIST(A)) with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF LIST(A) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 229
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 96 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4
CONSTANT -17.07 -31. 87 -23.75 - 14.42
LOGTAVMV 17.2 17.2 13.8 12.2
T-RATIO 10.91 11. 20 7.42 6.37
BETA 14.7 13.5 13.4
T-RATIO 3. 52 3.28 3.32
LOGLIST 15.5 15.7
T-RATIO 3.04 3.13
SQRTOTSH -1.34
T-RATIO -3.01
S 14.3 13 .9 13.7 13.4
R-SQ 34.41 37. 81 40.27 42.58
STEP 5 6 7 8
CONSTANT -13.00 - 16.32 -13.63 4.360
LOGTAVMV 10.0 11.5 11.3 11.5
T-RATIO 4.92 5.37 5.31 5.40
BETA 14.0 13.8 13.5 14.0
T-RATIO 3.50 3.50 3.41 3.55
LOGLIST 15.3 14.7 14.8 15.1
T-RATIO 3.10 2.99 3.04 3.12
SQRTOTSH -1.53 -2.56 -2.59 -2.58
T-RATIO -3.43 -3.88 -3.93 -3.95
NEGRBFA% -7.4 -7.4 -6.7 -6.6
T-RATIO -2.78 -2.80 -2.55 -2.51
NOOFSSH 2.2 2.1 2.2
T-RATIO 2.10 2.05 2.12
707ROCE -0.065 -0.081
T-RATIO -1.77 -2.15
SQRTBR -6.8
T-RATIO -1.74
S 13.2 13.1 13.1 13.0
R-SQ 44.50 45.58 46.34 47.07
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Table D-77 (continued) Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s ide  
analysts on c ircu la tio n  l i s t  (LIST(A)) with c r i t ic a l  F value reduced 
to 2
The regression equation is
LIST(A) = 1.6 + 11.2 LOGTAVMV + 13.8 BETA + 16.7 LOGLIST
- 2.42 SQRTOTSH - 5.58 NEGRBFA% + 1.86 NOOFSSH
- 0.0798 707ROCE - 5.44 SQRTBR
243 cases used 82 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io P
Constant 1.59 10.47 0.15 0.880
LOGTAVMV 11.241 2.083 5.40 0.000
BETA 13.786 3.918 3.52 0.001
LOGLIST 16.736 4.686 3.57 0.000
SQRTOTSH -2.4180 0.6193 -3.90 0.000
NEGRBFA% -5.577 2.589 -2.15 0.032
NOOFSSH 1.8632 0.9806 1.90 0.059
707R0CE -0.07977 0.03746 -2.13 0.034
SQRTBR -5.440 2.751 -1.98 0.049
s = 13.16 R-sq = 48.2% R-sq(adj) = 46.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 8 37733.1 4716.6 27.21 0.000
Error 234 40556.1 173.3
Total 242 78289.2
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Table D-78 Stepwise regression of number of se ll-s ide  analysts 
attending meetings (ANALYSTS(A) ) w ith c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF ANALYSTS(A) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 236 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 89 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5 6
CONSTANT -25.43 -37.42 -30.69 -25.04 -26.95 -26.92
LOGTAVMV
T-RATIO
19.8
12.67
19.8
12.83
17.0
8.91
15.9
8.00
17.2
8.26
16.0
7.30
BETA
T-RATIO
12.1
2.85
11.2
2.64
11.1
2.65
10.7
2.55
11.3
2.71
LOGLIST
T-RATIO
12.9
2.44
13.0
2.49
12.5
2.39
12.3
2.36
SQRTOTSH
T-RATIO
-0.82
-1.74
-2.02
-2.61
-2.08
-2.70
NOOFSSH
T-RATIO
2.2
1.95
2.2
1.94
NEGRBFA%
T-RATIO
-4.5
-1.65
S
R-SQ
14.5
40.67
14.3
42.67
14.2
44.11
14.1
44.83
14.0
45.73
14.0
46.37
The regression equation is
ANALYST(A) = - 24.0 + 15.2 LOGTAVMV + 10.7 BETA + 14.1 LOGLIST 
- 1.97 SQRTOTSH +1.89 NOOFSSH - 3.35 NEGRBFA%
259 cases used 66 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- r a t io p
Constant -23.989 6.678 -3.59 0.000
LOGTAVMV 15.169 2.042 7.43 0.000
BETA 10.667 4.042 2.64 0.009
LOGLIST 14.059 4.794 2.93 0.004
SQRTOTSH -1.9726 0.6961 -2.83 0.005
NOOFSSH 1.889 1.041 1.82 0.071
NEGRBFA% -3.347 2.570 -1.30 0.194
s = 13.78 R-sq = 47.1% R-sq(adj) == 45.8%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 6 42571.9 7095.3 37.39
Error 252 47818.6 189.8
Total 258 90390.6
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Table D-79 Stepwise regression of number of buv-side analysts 
attending meetings (ANALYST(B)l with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF ANALYST!B) ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 234
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 91 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT -54.79 -26.62 -51.98 -66.77 -31.37
LOGTAVMV 39.0 25.2 25.6 29.3 29.7
T-RATIO 8.39 4.48 4.57 4.81 4.89
LOGLIST 63 60 59 59
T-RATIO 4.06 3.87 3.80 3.85
BETA 25 25 28
T-RATIO 2.02 2.04 2.24
NOOFSSH 3.1 3.5
T-RATIO 1.54 1.73
SQRTIG -2.5
T-RATIO -1.67
S 42.9 41.5 41.2 41.1 40.9
R-SQ 23.26 28.37 29.62 30.34 31.18
The regression equation is
ANALYST(B) = - 24.6 + 28.7 LOGTAVMV + 59.7 LOGLIST + 25.1 BETA
+3.06 NOOFSSH - 2.59 SQRTIG
243 cases used 82 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io P
Constant -24.60 28 .95 -0.85 0.396
LOGTAVMV 28.732 5. 901 4.87 0.000
LOGLIST 59.72 14.97 3.99 0.000
BETA 25.10 12.20 2.06 0.041
NOOFSSH 3.064 1. 996 1.54 0.126
SQRTIG -2.593 1. 474 -1.76 0.080
s = 40.67 R-sq = 31.5% R-sq(adj) = 30.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 5 180173 36035 21. 79 0.000
Error 237 392009 1654
Total 242 572183
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Table D-80 Stepwise regression of number of stock-brokina firms 
represented at meetings (FIRMS) with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF FIRMS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 247
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 78 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT -10.108 -6.445 -6.279 -3.230 -16.917
LOGTAVMV 11.1 10.0 10.2 9.6 10.7
T-RATIO 10.76 8.64 8.83 7.97 7.85
LOGTRADF -12.6 -12.5 -12.4 -9.8
T-RATIO -2.22 -2.20 -2.20 -1.68
711TPM -0.050 -0.046 -0.045
T-RATIO -1.79 -1.65 -1.60
SQRTOTSH -0.46 -0.56
T-RATIO -1.52 -1.84
LOGTSRSK 8.1
T-RATIO 1.67
S 9.62 9.54 9.50 9.47 9.44
R-SQ 32.11 33.46 34.32 34.94 35.69
The regression equation is
FIRMS = - 16.6 + 10.7 LOGTAVMV - 9.65 LOGTRADF - 0.0442 711TPM
- 0.592 SQRTOTSH +7.93  LOGTSRSK
248 cases used 77 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - ra t io P
Constant -16.635 8.946 -1.86 0.064
LOGTAVMV 10.687 1.363 7.84 0.000
LOGTRADF -9.651 5.824 -1.66 0.099
711TPM -0.04423 0.02796 -1.58 0.115
SQRTOTSH -0.5923 0. 3048 -1.94 0.053
LOGTSRSK 7.933 4.812 1.65 0.101
s = 9.430 R-sq = 35.7% R-sq(adj) = 34.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 5 11946.0 2389 .2 26. 87 0.000
Error 242 21518.0 88 .9
Total 247 33464.0
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Table D-81 Stepwise regression of number of in s titu t io n a l investor
organisations represented at meetings (INVESTORS) with c r i t ic a l F 
value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF INVESTORS ON 17 PREDICTORS, 
WITH N = 237
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 88 N(ALL CASES) = 325 
STEP 1 2 3
CONSTANT -36.031 -22.973 -4.422
LOGTAVMV
T-RATIO
26.9
8.87
20.5
5.68
20.6
5.71
LOGLIST
T-RATIO
31
3.10
32
3.12
SQRTIG
T-RATIO
-1.17
-1.42
S 27.3 26.8 26.7
R-SQ 25.06 28.02 28.64
The regression equation is
INVESTORS = - 1.0 + 19.1 LOGTAVMV + 32.4 LOGLIST - 1.21 SQRTIG
253 cases used 72 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant -1.05 15.21 -0.07 0.945
LOGTAVMV 19.129 3.396 5.63 0.000
LOGLIST 32.413 9.583 3.38 0.001
SQRTIG -1.2099 0.8083 -1.50 0.136
s = 26.19 R-sq = 28.2% R-sq(adj) =- 27.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 3 67007 22336 32.57
Error 249 170744 686
Total 252 237752
M a r s t o n , C.L. : 1993 Appendix E 181
Appendix E Tables of resu lts  on telephone conversations, company
feedback on analysts' reports and mailing information
E-l Does company engage in telephone conversations with se ll-s ide
analysts?
E-2 Does company engage in telephone conversations with buy-side
analysts and fund managers?
E-3 Does the Chairman - Non-executive answer telephone enquiries
from analysts and fund managers?
E-4 Does the Chief Executive answer telephone enquiries from
analysts and fund managers?
E-5 Does the Managing D irector answer telephone enquiries from
analysts and fund managers?
E-6 Does the Finance D irector answer telephone enquiries from
analysts and fund managers?
E-7 Does the Marketing D irector answer telephone enquiries from
analysts and fund managers?
E-8 Does the Company Secretary answer telephone enquiries from
analysts and fund managers?
E-9 Does the Chief Accountant answer telephone enquiries from
analysts and fund managers?
E-10 Does the Investor Relations O ffice r answer telephone
enquiries from analysts and fund managers?
E - ll Does the Head of Public Relations answer telephone enquiries
from analysts and fund managers?
E-12 Does the External Financial Public Relations Consultant
answer telephone enquiries from analysts and fund managers?
E-13 Does the company keep a w ritten  record of the contents of
these telephone conversations?
E-14 No record is made
E-15 Number of reports produced by analysts in past 12 months
E-16 Number of reports passed to company fo r  comment in past 12
months
E-17 Analysts' reports are never received
E-18 Feedback is never provided
E-19 Factual errors re la ting  to published information are
corrected
E-20 Comments are offered on the accuracy of analysts' predictions
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E-21 Company policy when asked to comment on analysts' p ro f it
forecasts
E-22 I f  a forecast is reasonable no comment is made
E-23 I f  a forecast is reasonable the company confirms th is
E-24 I f  a forecast is not reasonable no comment is made
E-25 I f  a forecast is not reasonable the company informs the
analyst
E-26 An analyst w i l l  be given some guidance regarding the size and
direction  of the error in his forecast 
E-27 Does the company mail information to se ll-s ide  analysts?
E-28 Does the company mail information to buy-side analysts and
fund managers?
E-29 Number of firms of stockbrokers receiving mailed information
E-30 Number of in s titu tio n a l investor organisations receiving
mailed information 
E-31 Number of other organisations employing analysts receiving
mailed information 
E-32 Mailing of annual report
E-33 Mailing of interim  report
E-34 Mailing of quarterly reports
E-35 Mailing of Company News Service announcements
E-36 Mailing of takeover documents
E-37 Mailing of information brochures
E-38 Mailing of general press releases
E-39 Mailing of documents designed fo r  analysts
E-40 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  data on analysts' reports
E-41 Correlations between data on analysts' reports and size of
mailing l is ts
E-42 Pearson corre la tion  between data on analysts' reports and
continuous independent variables 
E-43 Spearman rank corre la tion  between data on analysts' reports
and continuous independent variables 
E-44 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
analysts' reports (REPORTS) produced in the past twelve 
months and the independent categorical variables 
E-45 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
analysts' reports passed to company fo r  comment (COMMENT) in
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the past twelve months and the independent categorical 
variables
E-46 Stepwise regression of number of analysts' reports produced 
in past 12m (REPORTS)
E-47 M ultip le  regression of number of reports (REPORTS) produced
in past 12m using variables id e n tifie d  by stepwise regression 
E-48 Stepwise regression of number of analysts' reports passed to
company fo r comment in past 12m (COMMENT)
E-49 M ultip le  regression of number of reports passed to company
fo r comment in the past 12m (COMMENT) using variables 
id e n tifie d  by stepwise regression 
E-50 Stepwise regression of number of analysts' reports produced
in past 12m (REPORTS) with c r i t ic a l  F value reduced to 2 
E-51 Stepwise regression of number of analysts' reports passed to
company fo r comment in past 12m (COMMENT) with c r i t ic a l  F 
value reduced to 2 
E-52 M ultip le  regression of number of reports (REPORTS) produced
in past 12m using a l l  independent variables 
E-53 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on mailing of information
to se ll-s ide  analysts (MAILING(A)) and the company specific  
independent continuous variables 
E-54 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on mailing of information
to buy-side analysts and fund managers (MAILING(B)) and the 
company specific  independent continuous variables 
E-55 Chi-square tests of association between mailing of
information to se ll-s id e  analysts (MAILING(A)) and the 
independent categorical variables 
E-56 Chi-square tests of association between mailing of
information to buy-side analysts and fund managers 
(MAILING(B)) and the independent categorical variables 
E-57 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  data on size of mailing l is ts
E-58 Pearson corre la tion of data on size of mailing l is ts  with
company specific  variables 
E-59 Spearman rank corre la tion  of data on size of mailing l is ts
with company specific  variables 
E-60 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
stockbrokers on the mailing l i s t  (BROKERS) and the 
independent categorical variables
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E-61 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
in s titu tio n a l investors on the mailing l i s t  (INSTINV) and the 
independent categorical variables 
E-62 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
other organisations on the mailing l i s t  (OTHER) and the 
independent categorical variables 
E-63 Stepwise regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing l i s t
(BROKERS)
E-64 M ultip le regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing l i s t
using variables id e n tifie d  by stepwise regression 
E-65 Stepwise regression of number of in s itu tio n a l investors on
mailing l i s t  (INSTINV)
E-66 M ultip le regression of number of in s itu tio n a l investors on
mailing l i s t  (INSTINV) using variables id e n tifie d  in stepwise 
regression
E-67 Stepwise regression of number of other organisations
employing analysts (OTHER)
E-68 M ultip le regression of number of other organisations
employing analysts (OTHER) on mailing l i s t  using variables 
id en tifie d  in the stepwise regression 
E-69 Stepwise regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing l i s t
(BROKERS) with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2 
E-70 Stepwise regression of number of other organisations
employing analysts (OTHER)
E-71 M ultip le regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing l i s t
(BROKERS) using a l l  variables
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Table E-l Does the company engage in telephone conversations with 
se ll-s ide  analysts?
COUNT PERCENT
No 5 1.50
Yes 328 98.50
N= 333
*= 4
Table E-2 Does the company engage in telephone conversations with 
buv-side analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 19 5.69
Yes 315 94.31
N= 334
*= 3
Table E-3 Does the Non-executive Chairman answer telephone enquiries 
from analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 111 33.43
Yes 24 7.23
Not applicable 197 59.34
N= 332
*= 5
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Table E-4 Does the Chief Executive answer telephone enquiries from 
analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 83 25.00
Yes 206 62.05
Not applicable 43 12.95
N= 332
*_ 5
Table E-5 Does the Managing D irector answer telephone enquiries from 
analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 48 14.46
Yes 79 23.80
Not applicable 205 61.75
N= 332
*= 5
Table E-6 Does the Finance D irector answer telephone enquiries from 
analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 24 7.23
Yes 302 90.96
Not applicable 6 1.81
N= 332
*_ 5
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Table E-7 Does the Marketing D irector answer telephone enquiries from 
analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 53 15.96
Yes 12 3.61
Not applicable 267 80.42
N= 332
*= 5
Table E-8 Does the Company Secretary answer telephone enquiries from 
analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 265 79.82
Yes 48 14.46
Not applicable 19 5.72
N- 332
*s= 5
Table E-9 Does the Chief Accountant answer telephone enquiries from 
analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 200 60.24
Yes 26 7.83
Not applicable 106 31.93
N= 332
*= 5
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Table E-10 Does the Investor Relations O ffice r answer telephone 
enquiries from analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 17 5.12
Yes 91 27.41
Not applicable 224 67.47
N= 332
*_ 5
Table E-11 Does the Head of Public Relations answer telephone 
enquiries from analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 66 19.88
Yes 65 19.58
Not applicable 201 60.54
N= 332
*= 5
Table E-12 Does the External Financial Public Relations Consultant 
answer telephone enquiries from analysts and fund managers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 183 55.12
Yes 80 24.10
Not applicable 69 20.78
N= 332
* _ 5
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Table E-13 Does the company keep a w ritten  record of the contents of 
these telephone conversations?
COUNT PERCENT
No 183 54.95
Yes 150 45.05
N= 333
*_ 4
Table E-14 No record is made of telephone conversations
COUNT PERCENT
No (record made) 134 40.24
Yes (no record) 199 59.76
N= 333
*= 4
Table E-15 Number of reports produced bv analysts in past 12 months
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 118 43.07
11-20 82 29.93
21-30 26 9.49
31-50 30 10.95
51-100 14 5.11
101-350 4 1.46
N= 274
*= 63
MEAN MEDIAN 
22.28 12.00
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Table E-16 Number of reports passed to company fo r comment in past 12 
months
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 217 76.14
11-20 44 15.44
21-50 24 8.42
N= 285
*_ 52
MEAN MEDIAN 
9.295 6.000
Table E-17 Analysts' reports are never received
COUNT PERCENT
No 333 99.11
Yes 3 0.89
N= 336
*= 1
Table E-18 Feedback is never provided
COUNT PERCENT
No 335 99.70
Yes 1 0.30
N= 336
*= 1
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Table E-19 Factual errors re la ting  to published information are 
corrected
COUNT PERCENT
No 20 5.95
Yes 316 94.05
N= 336
*= 1
Table E-20 Comments are offered on the accuracy of analysts7 
predictions
COUNT PERCENT
No 171 50.89
Yes 165 49.11
N= 336
*_ 1
Table E-21 Company po licy when asked to comment on analysts7 p ro f it  
forecasts
COUNT PERCENT
Company is never asked fo r 
comments 6 1.79
Comments are never made 70 20.83
Comments are made 260 77.38
N= 336
* _ 1
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Table E-22 I f  a forecast is reasonable no comment is made
COUNT PERCENT
No 239 71.34
Yes 96 28.66
N= 335
*= 2
Table E-23 I f  a forecast is reasonable the company confirms th is
COUNT PERCENT
No 253 75.52
Yes 82 24.48
N= 335
* _ 2
Table E-24 I f  a forecast is not reasonable no comment is made
COUNT PERCENT
No 331 98.81
Yes 4 1.19
N= 335
*= 2
Table E-25 I f  a forecast is not reasonable the company informs the 
analyst
COUNT PERCENT
No 187 55.82
Yes 148 44.18
N= 335
*_ 2
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Table E-26 An analyst w i l l  be given some guidance regarding the size 
and d irection of the error in his forecast
COUNT PERCENT
No 156 46.57
Yes 179 53.43
N= 335
*_ 2
Table E-27 Does the conroanv mail information to se ll-s ide  analysts?
COUNT PERCENT
No 53 15.73
Yes 284 84.27
N= 337
Table E-28 Does the companv mail information to buv-side analysts and
fund manaaers?
COUNT PERCENT
No 68 20.24
Yes 268 79.76
N= 336
*= 1
Table E-29 Number of firms of stockbrokers receiving mailed 
information
COUNT PERCENT
1-10 40 17.94
11-20 72 32.29
21-30 56 25.11
31-40 27 12.11
41-50 15 6.73
51-100 10 4.48
101-200 3 1.34
N= 223
*= 114
MEAN MEDIAN 
27.26 20.00
Table E-30 Number of in s titu tio n a l investor organisations receiving 
mailed information
COUNT PERCENT
0-10 37 17.96
11-20 41 19.90
21-30 26 12.62
31-40 19 9.22
41-50 23 11.17
51-100 33 16.02
101-200 16 7.77
201-700 9 4.37
701-4500 2 0.97
N= 206
*= 131
MEAN MEDIAN 
93.4 30.0
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Table E-31 Number of other organisations employing analysts receiving 
mailed information
COUNT PERCENT
0 168 79.25
1-10 16 7.55
11-20 13 6.13
21-50 8 3.77
51-400 7 3.30
N= 212
*= 125
MEAN MEDIAN 
8.88 0.00
Table E-32 Mailing of annual report
COUNT PERCENT
No 1 0.35
Yes 287 99.65
N= 288
*= 49
Table E-33 Mailing of interim  report
COUNT PERCENT
No 4 1.39
Yes 284 98.61
N= 288
*= 49
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Table E-34 Mailing of quarterly reports
196
COUNT PERCENT
No 274 95.14
Yes 14 4.86
N= 288
*= 49
Table E-35 Mailing of Company News Service announcements
COUNT PERCENT
No 82 28.47
Yes 206 71.53
N= 288
*= 49
Table E-36 Mailing of takeover documents
COUNT PERCENT
No 158 54.86
Yes 130 45.14
N= 288
*= 49
Table E-37 Mailing of information brochures
COUNT PERCENT
No 155 54.20
Yes 131 45.80
N= 286
*_ 51
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Table E-38 Mailing of general press releases
197
COUNT PERCENT
No 127 44.10
Yes 161 55.90
N= 288
*= 49
Table E-39 Mailing of documents designed fo r  analysts
COUNT PERCENT
No 220 76.39
Yes 68 23.61
N= 288
*= 49
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Table E-40 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  data on analysts' reports
N N* MEAN MEDIAN
REPORTS 265 60 22.26 12.00
COMMENT 276 49 9.417 6.000
LOGT(REPORTS) 265 60 1.1858 1.1139
L0GT(COMMENT) 276 49 0.9050 0.8451
TRMEAN STDEV SEMEAN
REPORTS 17.72 31.44 1.93
COMMENT 8.464 8.279 0.498
LOGT(REPORTS) 1.1723 0.3687 0.0226
L0GT(COMMENT) 0.9059 0.3140 0.0189
MIN MAX Q1
COO' TEST
REPORTS 0.00 350.00 6.00 25.00 0.715
COMMENT 0 . 0 0 0 50.000 4.000 10.000 0.899
L0GT
(REPORTS) .0000 2.5453 0.8451 1.4150 0.988
LOGT
(COMMENT) .0000 1.7076 0.6990 1.0414 0.991
KEY:
REPORTS = number of reports on company produced by se ll-s id e  analysts 
in past 12m
COMMENT = number of reports passed to company fo r  comment in past 12m 
TEST = M initab's corre la tion  tes t fo r  normality
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Table E-41 Correlations between data on analvsts/ reports and size of
mailing lists
Pearson corre la tion - raw data
COMMENT
BROKERS
INSTINV
OTHER
REPORTS
0.426
0.301
0.196
0.157
COMMENT
0.266
0.020
0.034
BROKERS
0.320
0.232
INSTINV
0.114
Pearson corre la tion - transformed data
COMMENT
BROKERS
INSTINV
OTHER
REPORTS
0.611
0.516
0.014
0.057
COMMENT
0.323
0.152
0.023
BROKERS
0.144
0.128
INSTINV
0.130
Spearman rank corre la tion
REPORTS COMMENT BROKERS INSTINV 
COMMENT 0.657
BROKERS 0.548 0.375
INSTINV 0.291 0.288 0.493
OTHER -0.038 0.007 0.058 0.142
KEY:
REPORTS = number of reports on company produced by se ll-s id e  analysts 
in past 12m
COMMENT = number of reports passed to company fo r comment in past 12m
BROKERS = number of stockbrokers on mailing l i s t
INSTINV = number of in s itu tio n a l investors on mailing l i s t
OTHER = number of other in s titu tio n s  employing analysts on mailing
l is t
Table E-42 Pearson correlation between data on analysts7 reports and
continuous independent variables
REPORTS COMMENT
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.335** 0.326**
LOGTAVMV 0.494** 0.477**
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.349** 0.278**
LOGLIST 0.404** 0.340**
TRADFREQ -0.153* -0.179**
LOGTRADF -0.219** -0.238**
RISK
BETA 0.012 0.021
VARIAB -0.211** -0.141*
SQRTVAR -0.215** -0.142*
SPECRISK -0.269** -0.189**
LOGTSRSK -0.319** -0.210**
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE -0.015 0.014
711TPM 0.030 -0.019
716PTPM -0.040 -0.023
703ROSC -0.033 -0.025
GEARING
731CGEAR 0.031 0.078
732IGEAR 0.003 -0.040
SQRTIG 0.012 -0.054
733BR 0.062 0.024
SQRTBR 0.077 0.030
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.085 0.055
LOGTAKEO 0.065 0.038
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.160** -0.142*
NEGRBFA% -0.283** -0.215**
TOTSSH -0.203** -0.229**
SQRTOTSH -0.201** -0.238**
NOOFSSH -0.232** -0.260**
KEY:
** = s ig n ifica n t at at least the .01 level ( tw o -ta il te s t) 
* = s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level (tw o -ta il te s t)
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Table E-43 Spearman rank corre la tion between data on analysts' 
reports and continuous independent variables
_______________REPORTS COMMENT
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.634** 0.462**
MARKETABILITY
LISTING 0.416** 0.328**
TRADFREQ -0.475** -0.342**
RISK
BETA 0.057 0.054
VARIAB -0.262** -0.096
SPECRISK -0.391** -0.170**
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -0.119 -0.035
711TPM 0.087 -0.017
716PTPM -0.058 -0.050
703ROSC -0.011 0.001
GEARING
731CG 0.112 0.089
732IG 0.115 0.087
733BR 0.223** 0.108
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.026 -0.023
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.348** -0.202**
TOTSSH -0.312** -0.215**
NOOFSSH -0.331** -0.233**
2 0 1
KEY:
** = s ig n ifica n t at at least the .01 level ( tw o -ta il te s t) 
* = s ig n ifica n t at the .05 level ( tw o -ta il te s t)
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Table E-44 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
analysts' reports (REPORTS) produced in the past twelve months and the 
independent categorical variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 211 11.00 117.3 -6.60
1 54 32.50 194.4 6.60 43.88 0.000
TFCAT 0 167 20.000 159.4 7.71
1 96 8.000 84.3 -7.71 59.87 0.000
ALPHA 1 226 15.000 142.3 5.11
2 38 6.000 73.9 -5.11 26.31 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 74 12.00 119.9 -1.73
2 85 12.00 128.8 -0.61
3 71 15.00 138.4 0.69
4 35 20.00 159.8 2.22 7.08 0.070
SSH(Y/N) 0 75 20.00 152.7 2.71
1 189 12.00 124.5 -2.71 7.41 0.007
Table E-45 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of 
analysts' reports passed to company fo r comment (COMMENT) in the past 
twelve months and the independent categorical variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE RANK Z VALUE_______ H n*
OSEALIST 0 224 6.000 126.3 -5.27
1 52 10.000 191.0 5.27 28.08 0.000
TFCAT 0 172 10.000 158.6 5.72
1 102 5.000 102.0 -5.72 33.05 0.000
ALPHA 1 232 6.000 145.7 3.71
2 43 4.000 96.7 -3.71 13.90 0.000
4WAYINDC 1 79 6.000 131.8 -0.88
2 89 6.000 144.3 0.84
3 71 6.000 148.0 1.16
4 37 5.000 120.6 -1.47 3.94 0.269
SSH(Y/N) 0 77 8.000 150.6 1.63
1 198 6.000 133.1 -1.63 2.69 0.101
KEY:
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table E-46 SteDwise rearession of number of analysts' reports
produced in past 12m (REPORTS)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF REPORTS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 227
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 98 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3
CONSTANT -26.43 -15.48 -15.86
LOGTAVMV 18.5 13.1 13.1
T-RATIO 10.56 6.10 6.15
LOGLIST 23.2 22.4
T-RATIO 4.03 3.94
LOGTAKEO 36
T-RATIO 2.55
S 15.5 15.0 14.8
R-SQ 33.14 37.66 39.43
Table E-47 M ultip le regression of number of reports (REPORTS) 
produced in past 12m using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
REPORTS = - 31.5 + 20.5 LOGTAVMV + 23.4 LOGLIST + 20.9 LOGTAKEO
265 cases used 60 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant -31.507 8.343 -3.78 0.000
LOGTAVMV 20.511 3.482 5.89 0.000
LOGLIST 23.369 9.524 2.45 0.015
LOGTAKEO 20.94 24.60 0.85 0.395
s = 27.13 R-sq = 26.3% R-sq(adj) = 25.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 68743 22914 31.12 0.000
Error 261 192150 736
Total 264 260893
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
LOGTAVMV 1 63636
LOGLIST 1 4572
LOGTAKEO 1 534
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Table E-48 Stepwise regression of number of analysts7 reports passed 
to company fo r comment in past 12m (COMMENT)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF COMMENT ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 239 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 86 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1
CONSTANT -6.524
LOGTAVMV 6.48
T-RATIO 8.49
S 6.76
R-SQ 23.32
Table E-49 M ultip le regression of number of reports passed to company 
fo r comment in the past 12m (COMMENT! using variables id e n tifie d  bv 
stepwise regression
The regression equation is 
COMMENT = - 7.10 + 6.64 LOGTAVMV
276 cases used 49 cases contain missing values
Predictor
Constant
LOGTAVMV
Coef Stdev 
-7.100 1.892 
6.6449 0.7406
t- ra t io
-3.75
8.97
P
0.000
0.000
S -  7.291 R-sq = 22.7% R-sq(adj) = 22.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE
Regression
Error
Total
DF SS 
1 4280.1
274 14567.0
275 18847.1
MS
4280.1
53.2
F
80.51
P
0.000
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Table E-50 Stepwise regression of number of analysts' reports 
produced in past 12m (REPORTS) with c r i t ic a l F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF REPORTS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 98 N(ALL CASES) = 325
= 227
STEP 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT -26.430 -15.477 -15.856 -9.027 -7.595
LOGTAVMV 18.5 13.1 13.1 11.8 10.0
T-RATIO 10.56 6.10 6.15 5.38 4.28
LOGLIST 23.2 22.4 22.7 22.6
T-RATIO 4.03 3.94 4.02 4.03
LOGTAKEO 36 34 33
T-RATIO 2.55 2.45 2.41
SQRTOTSH -1.01 -1.11
T-RATIO -1.99 -2.20
NEGRBFA% -6.2
T-RATIO -2.11
S 15.5 15.0 14.8 14.7 14.6
R-SQ 33.14 37.66 39.43 40.50 41.67
The regression equation is
REPORTS = - 25.7 + 17.4 LOGTAVMV + 24 .0 LOGLIST +20.3 LOGTAKEO
- 0.723 SQRTOTSH - 7.91 NEGRBFA%
264 cases used 61 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant -25.72 10.22 -2.52 0.012
LOGTAVMV 17.383 3.944 4.41 0.000
LOGLIST 24.020 9.540 2.52 0.012
LOGTAKEO 20.29 24.61 0.82 0.410
SQRTOTSH -0.7233 0.8273 -0.87 0.383
NEGRBFA% -7.908 5.040 -1.57 0.118
s = 27.13 R-sq = 27.1% R-sq(adj) =- 25.7%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 5 70662 14132 19.20
Error 258 189932 736
Total 263 260594
P
0.000
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Table E-51 Stepwise regression of number of analysts7 reports passed
to company fo r  comment in past 12m (COMMENT! with c r i t ic a l  F value 
reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF COMMENT ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 239 
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 86 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3
CONSTANT -6.524 -6.903 -4.327
LOGTAVMV
T-RATIO
6.48
8.49
6.52
8.59
6.07
7.59
731CGEAR
T-RATIO
0.0078
1.95
0.0072
1.80
SQRTOTSH
T-RATIO
-0.39
-1.73
S 6.76 6.73 6.70
R-SQ 23.32 24.53 25.49
The regression equation is
COMMENT = - 5.62 + 6.47 LOGTAVMV + 0.00713 731CGEAR 
- 0.299 SQRTOTSH
264 cases used 61 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io P
Constant -5.616 2.434 -2.31 0.022
LOGTAVMV 6.4718 0.7984 8.11 0.000
731CGEAR 0.007127 0.004319 1.65 0.100
SQRTOTSH -0.2991 0.2206 -1.36 0.176
s = 7.230 R-sq = 24.8% R-sq(adj) = 23.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 3 4485.8 1495.3 28.60 0.000
Error 260 13591.4 52.3
Total 263 18077.3
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Table E-52 M ultip le  regression of number of reports (REPORTS) 
produced in past 12m using a l l  independent variables
The regression equation is
REPORTS = 10.6 + 8.26 LOGTAVMV + 22.3 LOGLIST - 13.2 LOGTRADF
- 8.4 BETA +5.67 SQRTVAR - 33.2 LOGTSRSK
- 0.0050 707R0CE - 0.095 711TPM + 0.095 716PTPM
- 0.0003 703R0SC + 0.0058 731CGEAR - 0.334 SQRTIG 
+4.54 SQRTBR +30.4 LOGTAKEO - 6.02 NEGRBFA%
- 1.78 SQRTOTSH +1.39 NOOFSSH +1.53 INDC2 +3.98 INDC3 
+9.29 INDC4
227 cases used 98 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant 10.58 25.67 0.41 0.681
LOGTAVMV 8.259 3.262 2.53 0.012
LOGLIST 22.262 5.968 3.73 0.000
LOGTRADF -13.19 11.93 -1.11 0.270
BETA -8.41 10.23 -0.82 0.412
SQRTVAR 5.672 7.203 0.79 0.432
LOGTSRSK -33.18 34.89 -0.95 0.343
707ROCE -0.00496 0.03999 -0.12 0.901
711TPM -0.0950 0.1357 -0.70 0.484
716ADJ 0.0948 0.1503 0.63 0.529
703ROSC -0.00032 0.05181 -0.01 0.995
731CGEAR 0.00582 0.01292 0.45 0.653
SQRTIG -0.3339 0.5357 -0.62 0.534
SQRTBR 4.540 4.247 1.07 0.286
LOGTAKEO 30.44 14.19 2.15 0.033
NEGRBFA% -6.018 3.137 -1.92 0.056
SQRTOTSH -1.7786 0.9304 -1.91 0.057
NOOFSSH 1.393 1.326 1.05 0.295
INDC2 1.528 2.643 0.58 0.564
INDC3 3.975 2.871 1.38 0.168
INDC4 9.289 4.824 1.93 0.056
s = 14.76 R-sq = 44.4% R-sq(adj) = 39.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 20 35885 .3 1794.3 8.23
Error 206 44905 .7 218.0
Total 226 80791 .0
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Table E-53 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on mailing of 
information to se ll-s ide  analysts (MAILING(A)) and the company 
specific  independent continuous variables
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 52 124.1
1 273 322.3
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 52 0.00E+00
1 273 0.00E+00
TRADFREQ 0 51 2.00E-01
1 271 0.00E+00
RISK
BETA 0 50 0.9750
1 259 1.0300
VARIAB 0 50 33.75
1 259 33.40
SPECRISK 0 50 25.70
1 259 23.90
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 0 49 18.45
1 262 16.27
711TPM 0 47 10.22
1 248 12.60
716PTPM 0 47 6.670
1 262 8.350
703ROSC 0 49 11.40
1 268 12.90
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 49 30.27
1 263 30.59
732IGEAR 0 47 17.49
1 257 17.84
733BR 0 49 0.3600
1 269 0.4300
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 52 0.00E+00
1 273 0.00E+00
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 52 0.6000
1 272 0.3000
T0TSSH 0 52 14.95
1 272 12.98
NOOFSSH 0 52 1.500
1 272 1.000
0.000
0.022
0.000
0.054
0.933
0.254
0.413
0.053
0.320
0.983
0.405
0.872
0.114
0.100
173.0 0.88
160.5 -0.88 0.78 0.378
175.2 1.06
160.1 -1.06 1.16 0.281
176.8 1.20
159.8 -1.20 1.52 0.218
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE RANK Z VALUE______ H p
119.7 -3.63
171.3 3.63 13.16
144.5 -1.55
166.5 1.55 5.25
209.1 3.98
152.5 -3.98 21.51
132.7 -1.93
159.3 1.93 3.71
156.0 0.08
154.8 -0.08 0.01
168.2 1.14
152.4 -1.14 1.30
165.7 0.82
154.2 -0.82 0.67
125.9 -1.93
152.2 1.93 3.74
143.1 -1.00
157.1 1.00 0.99
158.7 -0.02
159.0 0.02 0.00
146.6 -0.83
158.3 0.83 0.70
154.4 0.16
152.2 -0.16 0.03
140.4 -1.58
163.0 1.58 2.50
169.4 0.54
161.8 -0.54 2.71
KEY: MAILING(A) coding of leve l, 0 = no mailing to se ll-s id e  analysts, 
1 = information is mailed to se ll-s ide  analysts 
* = p value adjusted fo r tie s
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Table E-54 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association on mailing of 
information to buv-side analysts and fund managers (MAILINGfB)l and 
the company specific  independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE RANK Z VALUE H P*
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 65 128.2 128.5 -3.27
1 259 322.6 171.0 3.27 10.69 0.001
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 65 O.OOE+OO 144.4 -1.74
1 259 O.OOE+OO 167.0 1.74 6.65 0.010
TRADFREQ 0 65 2.00E-01 197.7 3.57
1 256 O.OOE+OO 151.7 -3.57 17.24 0.000
RISK
BETA 0 64 0.9750 136.4 -1.83
1 244 1.0300 159.2 1.83 3.34 0.068
VARIAB 0 64 34.25 160.9 0.64
1 244 33.30 152.8 -0.64 0.42 0.519
SPECRISK 0 64 26.10 170.8 1.64
1 244 23.55 150.2 -1.64 2.70 0.101
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 0 62 18.35 162.0 0.64
1 248 16.33 153.9 -0.64 0.41 0.522
711TPM 0 59 11.01 130.2 -1.80
1 236 12.60 152.5 1.80 3.22 0.073
716PTPM 0 60 6.570 143.5 -1.11
1 249 8.350 157.8 1.11 1.23 0.268
703ROSC 0 62 11.32 155.3 -0.31
1 254 12.95 159.3 0.31 0.09 0.759
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 62 28.34 145.7 -1.01
1 249 30.89 158.6 1.01 1.01 0.315
732IGEAR 0 60 17.54 157.1 0.46
1 244 17.72 151.4 -0.46 0.21 0.649
733BR 0 62 0.3650 142.2 -1.61
1 255 0.4400 163.1 1.61 2.58 0.108
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 65 O.OOE+OO 166.4 0.38
1 259 O.OOE+OO 161.5 -0.38 1.32 0.250
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 65 0.5000 174.2 1.18
1 258 0.3050 158.9 -1.18 1.39 0.238
TOTSSH 0 65 15.00 174.5 1.21
1 258 12.95 158.8 -1.21 1.50 0.221
NOOFSSH 0 65 2.000 176.9 1.44
1 258 1.000 158.2 -1.44 2.20 0.139
KEY:MAILING(B) coding of leve l, 0 = no mailing to se ll-s id e  analysts, 
1 = information is mailed to se ll-s ide  analysts 
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table E-55 Chi-square tests of association between mailing of 
information to se ll-s id e  analysts (MAILING(A)l and the independent 
categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING(A) COLUMNS: QSEALIST
NO YES
0 0.86 -1.81
1 -0.38 0.79
CHI-SQUARE = 4.769 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILINGfA1 COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 -2.56 3.41
1 1.11 -1.48
CHI-SQUARE = 21.629 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL) 
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILINGfA1 COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
0 -0.97 2.35
1 0.42 -1.03
CHI-SQUARE = 7.700 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .01 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILINGfA) COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
0 0.67 0.04 -1.21 0.60
1 -0.29 -0.02 0.53 -0.26
CHI-SQUARE = 2.723 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILINGfA1 COLUMNS: SSHfY/N)
NO YES
0 -0.32 0.21
1 0.14 -0.09
CHI-SQUARE = 0.172 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
KEY:
MAILING(A) coding of rows, 0 = no mailing to se ll-s ide  analysts, 1 = 
information is mailed to se ll-s ide  analysts
Marston, C-L. : 1993 Appendix E 211
Table E-56 Chi-square tests of association between mailing of
information to buv-side analysts and fund managers (MAILINGfB)) and 
the independent categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING(B) COLUMNS: QSEALIST
NO YES
0 0.97 -2.03
1 -0.48 1.02
CHI-SQUARE = 6.316 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .02 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILING(B) COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 -2.25 2.99
1 1.13 -1.51
CHI-SQUARE = 17.601 WITH D.F. = 1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .001 LEVEL) 
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILINGS COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
0 -0.61 1.48
1 0.31 -0.74
CHI-SQUARE = 3.195 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILINGfB) COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
0 1.08 0.26 -2.16 0.99
1 -0.54 -0.13 1.08 -0.50
CHI-SQUARE = 8.582 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: MAILINGfB^ COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
NO YES
0 -0.48 0.31
1 0.24 -0.16
CHI-SQUARE = 0.416 WITH D.F. = 1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
KEY:
MAILING(B) coding of rows, 0 = no mailing to se ll-s id e  analysts, 1 = 
information is mailed to se ll-s id e  analysts
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Table E-57 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  data on size of mailing l is ts
N N* MEAN MEDIAN
BROKERS 215 110 26.91 20.00
INSTINV 198 127 94.9 30.0
OTHER 205 120 9.18 0.00
L0GT(BROKERS) 215 110 1.3290 1.3010
NEGR(INSTINV) 198 127 -0.1069 -0.0323
L0GT(OTHER) 205 120 0.2904 0.0000
TRMEAN STDEV SEMEAN
BROKERS 24.37 21.93 1.50
INSTINV 50.3 355.9 25.3
OTHER 2.87 37.11 2.59
L0GT(BROKERS) 1.3363 0.3062 0.0209
NEGR(INSTINV) -0.0626 0.2518 0.0179
L0GT(OTHER) 0.2118 0.5971 0.0417
MIN MAX Q1 Q3 TEST
BROKERS 1.00 200.00 15.00 30.00 0.828
INSTINV 0.0 4500.0 20.0 76.3 0.430
OTHER 0.00 400.00 0.00 0.00 0.682
L0GT(BROKERS) 0.0000 2.3010 1.1761 1.4771 0.988
NEGR(INSTINV) -1.0000 -0.0002 -0.0476 -0.0130 0.998
LOGT(OTHER) 0.0000 2.6031 0.0000 0.0000 0.985
KEY:
BROKERS = Number of stockbrokers receiving information from company by 
mail
INSTINV = Number of in s titu t io n a l investors receiving information from 
company by mail
OTHER = Number of other organisations receiving information from 
company by mail
TEST = M initab's corre la tion  te s t fo r  normality
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Table E-58 Pearson correlation of data on size of mailing lists with
BROKERS INSTINV OTHER
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.487** 0.186** 0.134
LOGTAVMV 0.528** 0.203** 0.156*
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0.636** 0.268** 0.318*’
LOGLIST 0.575** 0.269** 0.288*’
TRADFREQ -0.158* -0.052 -0.028
LOGTRADF -0.225** -0.076 -0.039
RISK
BETA 0.125 0.082 0.097
VARIAB -0.103 -0.058 -0.013
SQRTVAR -0.097 -0.053 -0.008
SPECRISK -0.191** -0.110 -0.063
LOGTSRSK -0.214** -0.123 -0.070
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -0.027 -0.010 -0.011
711TPM -0.101 -0.077 -0.001
716PTPM -0.118 -0.083 -0.033
703ROSC -0.051 -0.009 -0.024
GEARING
731CGEAR 0.069 0.014 -0.011
732IGEAR -0.031 -0.010 0.020
SQRTIG -0.058 -0.012 0.034
733BR 0.109 0.059 -0.007
SQRTBR 0.100 0.059 0.001
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.047 0.481** 0.020
LOGTAKEO 0.045 0.432** 0.027
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.208** -0.067 -0.064
NEGRBFA% -0.246** -0.132 -0.088
TOTSSH -0.242** -0.086 -0.088
SQRTOTSH -0.276** -0.078 -0.099
NOOFSSH -0.288** -0.067 -0.073
KEY:
**  = S ign ifican t at at least the .01 level (two t a i l  te s t) 
* = S ign ifican t at the .05 level (two t a i l  te s t)
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Table E-59 Spearman rank correlation of data on size of mailing lists
BROKERS INSTINV OTHER
SIZE
AV(MV) 0.565** 0.336** -0.031
MARKETABILITY
LISTING 0.456** 0.406** 0.041
TRADFREQ -0.428** -0.275** 0.062
RISK
BETA 0.163* 0.195** 0.101
VARIAB -0.105 -0.088 0.090
SPECRISK -0.242** -0.233** 0.066
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -0.058 0.021 -0.022
711TPM -0.123 -0.098 0.009
716PTPM -0.155* -0.071 -0.026
703ROSC -0.014 0.072 -0.034
GEARING
731CG 0.186** 0.094 0.003
732IG 0.135 0.002 0.068
733BR 0.258** 0.116 -0.020
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.104 0.050 0.034
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% -0.293** -0.151* -0.062
TOTSSH -0.323** -0.239** -0.003
NOOFSSH -0.344** -0.231** 0.042
KEY:
** = S ign ifican t at at least the .01 level (two t a i l  te s t) 
* = S ign ifican t at the .05 level (two t a i l  te s t)
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Table E-60
: 1 9 9 3  A p p e n d i x  E
Kruskal-Wallis tests
2 15
of association between the number of
stockbrokers on the mail ina l i s t (BROKERS! and the indeoendent
P*
cateaorical variables 
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE RANK Z VALUE H
OSEALIST 0 168 20.00 93.3 -6.57
1 47 35.00 160.7 6.57 43.67 0 . 0 0 0
TFCAT 0 147 25.00 124.1 6.05
1 66 14.00 68.8 -6.05 37.11 0 . 0 0 0
ALPHA 1 185 25.00 114.1 3.94
2 29 12.00 65.4 -3.94 15.70 0 . 0 0 0
4WAYINDC 1 64 20.00 102.2 -0.89
2 69 25.00 115.0 1.13
3 58 20.00 98.4 -1.38
4 24 27.50 126.6 1.55 5.01 0.172
SSH(Y/N) 0 60 30.00 129.9 3.30
1 154 20.00 98.8 -3.30 11.03 0.001
KEY:
* = p value adjusted for ties
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Table E-61 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
in s titu t io n a l investors on the mailing l i s t  (INSTINV) and the 
independent categorical variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 156 30.00 87.7 -5.57
1 42 85.00 143.2 5.57 31.22 0.000
TFCAT 0 133 50.00 109.2 3.82
1 63 20.00 76.0 -3.82 14.69 0.000
ALPHA 1 170 37.50 101.2 1.34
2 27 25.00 85.3 -1.34 1.81 0.179
4WAYINDC 1 56 30.00 87.9 -1.79
2 63 40.00 106.5 1.17
3 57 35.00 102.5 0.47
4 22 36.00 101.3 0.15 3.45 0.328
SSH(Y/N) 0 53 40.00 111.8 1.92
1 144 30.00 94.3 -1.92 3.70 0.055
KEY:
* = p value adjusted for ties
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Appendix E 217
Table E-62 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the number of
other organisations on the mailing l i s t  (OTHER! and the independent 
categorical variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE RANK Z VALUE H P*
OSEALIST 0 158 0.00E+00 102.5 -0.24
1 47 0.00E+00 104.8 0.24 0.11 0.738
TFCAT 0 141 0.00E+00 100.8 -0.63
1 63 0.00E+00 106.4 0.63 0.78 0.376
ALPHA 1 179 0.00E+00 103.8 0.49
2 26 0.00E+00 97.6 -0.49 0.48 0.488
4WAYINDC 1 64 0.00E+00 97.6 -0.88
2 60 0.00E+00 107.2 0.65
3 56 0.00E+00 107.0 0.59
4 25 0.00E+00 97.8 -0.47 2.55 0.467
SSH(Y/N) 0 61 0.00E+00 101.7 -0.21
1 144 0.00E+00 103.6 0.21 0.09 0.767
KEY:
* = p value adjusted for ties
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Table E-63 Stepwise regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing 
l i s t  (BROKERS!
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF BROKERS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 187
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 138 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4
CONSTANT 20.640 -6.839 4.341 4.522
LOGLIST 61.0 41.6 42.8 41.9
T-RATIO 9.91 5.57 5.79 5.72
LOGTAVMV 11.8 9.7 10.6
T-RATIO 4.22 3.40 3.70
SQRTOTSH -1.68 -1.44
T-RATIO -2.55 -2.18
716PTPM -0.28
T-RATIO -2.13
S 18.5 17.7 17.5 17.3
R-SQ 34.68 40.45 42.50 43.90
Table E-64 M ultip le  regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing 
l i s t  using variables id e n tifie d  bv stepwise regression
The regression equation is
BROKERS = 7.22 + 42.0 LOGLIST + 8.64 LOGTAVMV - 1.23 SQRTOTSH 
- 0.211 716PTPM
207 cases used 118 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant 7.222 7.363 0.98 0.328
LOGLIST 42.005 6.809 6.17 0.000
LOGTAVMV 8.637 2.587 3.34 0.001
SQRTOTSH -1.2265 0.6194 -1.98 0.049
716PTPM -0.2111 0.1244 -1.70 0.091
s = 17.05 R-sq = 41.2% R-sq(adj) =« 40.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 4 41056 10264 35.32
Error 202 58703 291
Total 206 99759
Marston, C.L. : 1993 Appendix E 219
Table E-65 Stepwise regression of number of in s itu tio n a l investors on 
mailing l i s t  (INSTINV)
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF INSTINV ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 170
N(CASES WITH MISSING 0BS.) = 155 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2
CONSTANT 60.52 25.20
LOGTAKEO 2599 2516
T-RATIO 6.87 6.86
LOGLIST 382
T-RATIO 3.52
S 336 326
R-SQ 21.92 27.30
Table E-66 M ultip le  regression of number of in s itu tio n a l investors on 
mailing l i s t  (INSTINV) using variables id e n tifie d  in stepwise 
regression
The regression equation is
INSTINV = 26.6 + 2251 LOGTAKEO + 385 LOGLIST
198 cases used 127 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io  p
Constant 26.63 24.41 1.09 0.277
LOGTAKEO 2251.4 330.8 6.81 0.000
LOGLIST 385.17 94.48 4.08 0.000
s = 309.7 R-sq = 25.1% R-sq(adj) = 24.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 2 6254428 3127214 32.61 0.000
Error 195 18702382 95910
Total 197 24956810
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Table E-67 Stepwise regression of number of other organisations 
employing analysts (OTHER) on mailing l i s t
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF OTHER ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 178
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 147 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1
CONSTANT 4.917
LOGLIST 28.6
T-RATIO 3.47
S 25.9
R-SQ 6.40
Table E-68 M ultip le  regression of number of other organisations 
employing analysts (OTHER) on mailing l i s t  using variables id e n tifie d  
in the stepwise regression
The regression equation is 
OTHER = 4.12 + 45.0 LOGLIST
205 cases used 120 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant 4.123 2.754 1.50 0.136
LOGLIST 45.01 10.51 4.28 0.000
s = 35.63 R-sq = 8.3% R-sq(adj) = 7.8%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 23269 23269 18.33 0.000
Error 203 257667 1269
Total 204 280936
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Table E-69 Stepwise regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing 
l i s t  (BROKERS! with c r i t ic a l  F value reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF BROKERS ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 187
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 138 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT 20.640 -6.839 4.341 4.522 22.575
LOGLIST
T-RATIO
61.0
9.91
41.6
5.57
42.8
5.79
41.9
5.72
42.1
5.77
LOGTAVMV
T-RATIO
11.8
4.22
9.7
3.40
10.6
3.70
10.8
3.78
SQRTOTSH
T-RATIO
-1.68
-2.55
-1.44
-2.18
-1.39
-2.11
716ADJ
T-RATIO
-0.28
-2.13
-0.29
-2.22
SQRTIG
T-RATIO
-1.18
-1.69
S
R-SQ
18.5
34.68
17.7
40.45
17.5
42.50
17.3
43.90
17.2
44.77
The regression equation is
BROKERS = 2 4 . 8 + 4 1 . 4  LOGLIST +9.46 LOGTAVMV - 1.19 SQRTOTSH 
- 0.249 716PTPM - 1.22 SQRTIG
201 cases used 124 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant 24.83 12.93 1.92 0.056
LOGLIST 41.377 7.002 5.91 0.000
LOGTAVMV 9.456 2.694 3.51 0.001
SQRTOTSH -1.1911 0.6231 -1.91 0.057
716PTPM -0.2492 0.1280 -1.95 0.053
SQRTIG -1.2180 0.6846 -1.78 0.077
s = 17.05 R-sq = 42.8% R-sq(adj) = 41.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F
Regression 5 42464.9 8493.0 29.23 0.000
Error 195 56666.3 290.6
Total 200 99131.2
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Table E-70 Stepwise regression of number of other organisations
employing analysts (OTHER) on mailing l i s t  with c r i t ic a l F value 
reduced to 2
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF OTHER ON 17 PREDICTORS, WITH N = 178
N(CASES WITH MISSING OBS.) = 147 N(ALL CASES) = 325
STEP 1 2
CONSTANT 4.917 -9.711
LOGLIST 28.6 27.8
T-RATIO 3.47 3.38
BETA 14.7
T-RATIO 1.71
S 25.9 25.7
R-SQ 6.40 7.94
The regression equation is
OTHER = - 8.3 + 44.5 LOGLIST + 12 .7 BETA
197 cases used 128 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t - r a t io  p
Constant -8.32 12.25 -0.68 0.498
LOGLIST 44.48 10.82 4.11 0.000
BETA 12.67 11.93 1.06 0.290
s = 36.29 R-sq = 8.9% R-sq(adj) = 7.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 2 24903 12451 9.46 0.000
Error 194 255423 1317
Total 196 280325
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Table E-71 M ultip le  regression of number of stockbrokers on mailing 
l i s t  (BROKERS) using a l l  variables
The regression equation is
BROKERS = 9.9 + 11.6 LOGTAVMV + 40. 2 LOGLIST + 5 . 9  LOGTRADF
- 2 . 9  BETA +7.31 SQRTVAR - 29.5 LOGTSRSK
+ 0.0190 707ROCE - 0.105 711TPM - 0.167 716PTPM
- 0.0772 703R0SC - 0.0123 731CGEAR - 1.32 SQRTIG
+5.03 SQRTBR - 21.4 LOGTAKEO - 2. 79 NEGRBFA%
- 2 . 6 0  SQRTOTSH +2.10 NOOFSSH + 1.53 INDC2
+ 3.12 INDC3 + 4.54 INDC4
187 cases used 138 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t- ra t io P
Constant 9.86 36.47 0.27 0.787
LOGTAVMV 11.575 4.213 2.75 0.007
LOGLIST 40.209 8.093 4.97 0.000
LOGTRADF 5.85 13.85 0.42 0.673
BETA -2.92 13.76 -0.21 0.832
SQRTVAR 7.308 9.496 0.77 0.443
LOGTSRSK -29.51 45.62 -0.65 0.519
707R0CE 0.01901 0.07402 0.26 0.798
711TPM -0.1049 0.1745 -0.60 0.549
716PTPM -0.1672 0.2437 -0.69 0.493
703R0SC -0.07716 0.07904 -0.98 0.330
731CGEAR -0.01227 0.04613 -0.27 0.791
SQRTIG -1.3165 0.7511 -1.75 0.082
SQRTBR 5.026 7.011 0.72 0.474
LOGTAKEO -21.38 19.57 -1.09 0.276
NEGRBFA% -2.793 4.294 -0.65 0.516
SQRTOTSH -2.600 1.224 -2.12 0.035
NOOFSSH 2.102 1.772 1.19 0.237
INDC2 1.530 3.549 0.43 0.667
INDC3 3.125 4.211 0.74 0.459
INDC4 4.537 8.107 0.56 0.576
s = 17.68 R-sq = 46 .6% R-sq(adj) = 40.2%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 20 45303 .8 2265.2 7.25 0.000
Error 166 51873 .2 312.5
Total 186 97177 .0
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Appendix F Tables o f resu lts  on close seasons and opinions on company 
re la tionsh ip  w ith analysts and fund managers
F-l Existence of po licy of p roh ib ition  or re s tr ic t io n  at certain 
times of the year 
F-2 Communication prohibited or re s tr ic te d  p r io r to annual
resu lts  announcement 
F-3 Communication prohibited or re s tric ted  p rio r to the interim
resu lts  announcement 
F-4 Communication prohibited or re s tric ted  p r io r to the quarterly
resu lts  announcement 
F-5 Number of days p ro h ib it io n /re s tr ic tio n  p r io r to annual
resu lts  announcement 
F-6 Number of days p ro h ib it io n /re s tr ic tio n  p rio r to interim
resu lts  announcement 
F-7 Number of days p ro h ib it io n /re s tr ic tio n  p r io r to quarterly
resu lts  announcement 
F-8 Rating of general q ua lity  of analysts' reports
F-9 Quality of analysis carried out by se ll-s id e  analysts
F-10 Quality of analysis carried out by buy-side analysts
F - l l  Company meetings with se ll-s ide  analysts are a valuable means
of communication 
F-12 Company telephone ca lls  with se ll-s id e  analysts are a
valuable means of communication 
F-13 My company would prefer not to hold se ll-s id e  analysts'
meetings
F-14 My company would prefer not to ta lk  to se ll-s id e  analysts on
the telephone
F-15 My company should not provide se ll-s ide  analysts with
guidance as to the accuracy of th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts 
F-16 Se ll-s ide  analysts pressurise my company fo r  information
F-17 S e ll-s ide  analysts are too concerned with short term p ro f it
opportunities
F-18 S e ll-s ide  analysts are not s u ff ic ie n tly  interested in the
long term prospects of my company 
F-19 Company meetings with buy-side analysts and fund managers are
a valuable means of communication
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F-20 Company telephone ca lls  with buy-side analysts and fund
managers are a valuable means of communication
F-21 My company would prefer not to hold meetings with buy-side
analysts and fund managers 
F-22 My company would prefer not to ta lk  to buy-side analysts and
fund managers on the telephone 
F-23 My company should not provide buy-side analysts and fund
managers with guidance as to fu ture p ro fits  
F-24 Buy-side analysts and fund managers pressurise my company fo r
information
F-25 Buy-side analysts and fund managers are too concerned with
short term p ro f it  opportunities 
F-26 Buy-side analysts and fund managers are not s u ff ic ie n t ly
interested in the long term prospects of my company 
F-27 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the existence of
a p roh ib ition  of communication (PROHIB) and the company
spec ific  independent continuous variables 
F-28 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the existence of
a re s tr ic t io n  of communication (RESTRICT) and the company 
spec ific  independent continuous variables 
F-29 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the existence of
a close season fo r  communications (SEASON) and the company 
spec ific  independent continuous variables 
F-30 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
period of p roh ib ition  of communication (PROHIB) and the 
independent categorical variables 
F-31 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
period o f re s tr ic t io n  of communication (RESTRICT) and the 
independent categorical variables 
F-32 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
close season fo r  communications (SEASON) and the company 
spec ific  independent continuous variables 
F-33 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  data on length of close season
F-34 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between length of close
season p rio r to annual resu lts  (ANNUAL) and independent 
categorical variables
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F-35 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between length of close
season p rio r to interim  results (INTERIM) and independent 
categorical variables 
F-36 Pearson corre la tion  between length of close seasons and
independent continuous variables 
F-37 Spearman rank corre la tion  between length of close seasons and
independent continuous variables 
F-38 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinion on
general qua lity  of analysts' reports (OPINION) and the 
company specific  independent continuous variables 
F-39 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinion on
q u a lity  of se ll-s id e  analysts' reports (SELLSIDE) and the 
company specific  independent continuous variables 
F-40 Chi-square tests of association between opinions on the
general qua lity  of analysts reports (OPINION) and the 
independent categorical variables 
F-41 Chi-square tests of association between opinions on the
q u a lity  of se ll-s id e  analysts reports (SELLSIDE) and the 
independent categorical variables 
F-42 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinions on s e ll-
side analysts and independent continuous variables 
F-43 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinions on buy-
side analysts and fund managers and independent continuous 
variables
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Table F-l Existence of po licy of p roh ib ition  or re s tr ic tio n  at 
certa in times of the year
COUNT PERCENT
Prohib ition 151 44.81
Restriction 177 52.52
No p ro h ib itio n /re s tr ic tio n 31 9.20
N = 337
Table F-2 Communication prohibited or re s tric ted  p rio r to annual 
results announcement
COUNT PERCENT
Yes 306 100.00
N = 306
*_ 31
Table F-3 Communication prohibited or res tric te d  p rio r to the interim  
results announcement
COUNT PERCENT
Yes 306 100.00
N = 306
*_ 31
Table F-4 Communication prohibited or re s tr ic te d  p rio r to the 
quarterly results announcement
COUNT PERCENT
No 2 0.65
Yes 17 5.56
N/A 287 93.79
N = 306
*_ 31
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Table F-5 Number of davs p ro h ib itio n /re s tr ic tio n  p rio r to annual 
resu lts  announcement
COUNT PERCENT
10-50 35 12.73
51-60 201 73.09
61-80 25 9.09
81-94 14 5.09
N - 275
* S B 62
MEAN MEDIAN 
59.164 60.000
Table F-6 Number of davs p ro h ib it io n /re s tr ic tio n  p r io r to interim  
results  announcement
COUNT PERCENT
10-50 65 23.90
51-60 193 70.96
61-80 11 4.04
81-90 3 1.10
N = 272
*= 65
MEAN MEDIAN 
54.485 60.000
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Table F-7 Number of davs p ro h ib it io n /re s tr ic tio n  p rio r to quarterly 
results  announcement
COUNT PERCENT
0-50 14 82.35
60 1 5.88
90 2 11.77
N = 17
*_ 320
MEAN MEDIAN
36.59 30 .00
Table F-8 Rating of general q u a lity  of analysts' reports
COUNT PERCENT
Very poor 1 0 0.00
Poor 2 13 3.93
Acceptable 3 172 51.96
Good 4 139 41.99
Very good 5 7 2.11
N = 331
*_ 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.4230 3.0000
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Table F-9 Quality of analysis carried out bv se ll-s ide  analysts
COUNT PERCENT
Very poor 1 1 0.42
Poor 2 16 6.67
Acceptable 3 115 47.92
Good 4 101 42.08
Very good 5 7 2.92
N = 240
*_ 97
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.4042 3.0000
Table F-10 Quality of analysis carried out bv buy-side analysts
COUNT PERCENT
Very poor 1 0 0.00
Poor 2 6 3.02
Acceptable 3 114 57.29
Good 4 74 37.19
Very good 5 5 2.51
N = 199
*= 138
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.3920 3.0000
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Table F - l l  Company meetings with se ll-s ide  analysts are a valuable 
means of communication
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 120 36.04
Agree 2 190 57.06
Uncertain 3 19 5.71
Disagree 4 4 1.20
N = 333
*= 4
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.7207 2.0000
Table F-12 Company telephone ca lls  with se ll-s ide  analysts are a 
valuable means o f communication
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 87 26.20
Agree 2 208 62.65
Uncertain 3 27 8.13
Disagree 4 9 2.71
Strongly disagree 5 1 0.30
N = 332
*= 5
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.8825 2.0000
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Table F-13 Mv company would prefer not to hold se ll-s id e  analysts' 
meetings
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 0 0.00
Agree 2 10 3.02
Uncertain 3 14 4.23
Disagree 4 196 59.21
Strongly disagree 5 111 33.53
N = 331
*= 6
MEAN MEDIAN 
4.2326 4.0000
Table F-14 Mv company would prefer not to ta lk  to se ll-s ide  analysts 
on the telephone
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 1 0.30
Agree 2 18 5.47
Uncertain 3 13 3.95
Disagree 4 197 59.88
Strongly disagree 5 100 30.40
N = 329
*= 8
MEAN MEDIAN 
4.1459 4.0000
Marston, C .L . : 1993 Appendix F 233
Table F-15 Mv company should not provide se ll-s ide  analysts with 
guidance as to the accuracy of th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 25 7.69
Agree 2 63 19.38
Uncertain 3 45 13.85
Disagree 4 159 48.92
Strongly disagree 5 33 10.15
N = 325
*= 12
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.3446 4.0000
Table F-16 S e ll-s ide  analysts pressurise mv company fo r  information
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 8 2.45
Agree 2 114 34.86
Uncertain 3 46 14.07
Disagree 4 141 43.12
Strongly disagree 5 18 5.50
N = 327
*= 10
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.1437 3.0000
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Table F-17 Sell-s ide  analysts are too concerned with short term 
p ro f it  opportunities
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 35 10.64
Agree 2 159 48.33
Uncertain 3 60 18.24
Disagree 4 70 21.28
Strongly disagree 5 5 1.52
N = 329
*= 8
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.5471 2.0000
Table F-18 Sell-s ide  analysts are not s u ff ic ie n tly  interested in the
l.Qng...tem,pr.Q.§Be.g,t§..Qf  mv company
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 19 5.79
Agree 2 111 33.84
Uncertain 3 64 19.51
Disagree 4 120 36.59
Strongly disagree 5 14 4.27
N * 328
*_ 9
MEAN MEDIAN 
2.9970 3.0000
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Table F-19 Company meetings with buv-side analysts and fund managers 
are a valuable means of communication
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 174 53.37
Agree 2 141 43.25
Uncertain 3 10 3.07
Disagree 4 0 0.00
Strongly disagree 5 1 0.31
N = 326
*_ 11
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.5061 1.0000
Table F-20 Company telephone ca lls  with buv-side analysts and fund 
managers are a valuable means of communication
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 88 26.99
Agree 2 184 56.44
Uncertain 3 40 12.27
Disagree 4 13 3.99
Strongly disagree 5 1 0.31
N = 326
*= 11
MEAN MEDIAN 
1.9417 2.0000
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Table F-21 Mv company would prefer not to hold meetings with buv-side 
analysts and fund managers
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 1 0.31
Agree 2 5 1.53
Uncertain 3 6 1.84
Disagree 4 157 48.16
Strongly disagree 5 157 48.16
N = 326
*= 11
MEAN MEDIAN 
4.4233 4.0000
Table F-22 Mv company would prefer not to ta lk  to buv-side analysts 
and fund managers on the telephone
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 3 0.93
Agree 2 21 6.50
Uncertain 3 21 6.50
Disagree 4 159 49.23
Strongly disagree 5 119 36.84
N = 323
*= 14
MEAN MEDIAN 
4.1455 4.0000
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Table F-23 Mv company should not provide buv-side analysts and fund 
managers with guidance as to fu ture  p ro fits
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 34 10.59
Agree 2 78 24.30
Uncertain 3 46 14.33
Disagree 4 134 41.74
Strongly disagree 5 29 9.03
N = 321
*_ 16
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.1433 4.0000
Table F-24 Buv-side analysts and fund managers pressurise mv company 
fo r information
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 2 0.62
Agree 2 45 13.89
Uncertain 3 41 12.65
Disagree 4 201 62.04
Strongly disagree 5 35 10.80
N = 324
*= 13
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.6852 4.0000
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Table F-25 Buv-side analysts and fund managers are too concerned with 
short term p ro f it  opportunities
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 11 3.37
Agree 2 57 17.48
Uncertain 3 83 25.46
Disagree 4 160 49.08
Strongly disagree 5 15 4.60
N = 326
*= 11
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.3405 4.0000
Table F-26 Buv-side analysts and fund managers are not s u ff ic ie n t ly  
interested in the Iona term prospects of mv company
COUNT PERCENT
Strongly agree 1 6 1.84
Agree 2 39 11.96
Uncertain 3 66 20.25
Disagree 4 186 57.06
Strongly disagree 5 29 8.90
N = 326
*_ 11
MEAN MEDIAN 
3.5920 4.0000
Marston, C.L. : Z993 Appendix F 239
Table F-27 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the existence
of a prohibition of communication (PR0HIB1 and the company specific
independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H p*
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 179 265.0 160.6 -0.50
1 146 259.5 165.9 0.50 0.25 0.614
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 179 0.Q0E+00 162.5 -0.11
1 146 0.00E+00 163.6 0.11 0.03 0.871
TRADFREQ 0 177 0.00E+00 160.6 -0.20
1 145 O.OOE+OO 162.6 0.20 0.05 0.819
RISK
BETA 0 167 1.030 155.7 0.16
1 142 1.030 154.1 -0.16 0.03 0.874
VARIAB 0 167 34.40 161.0 1.28
1 142 32.65 148.0 -1.28 1.63 0.203
SPECRISK 0 167 25.30 164.0 1.91
1 142 22.35 144.5 -1.91 3.66 0.056
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE 0 170 15.74 151.1 -1.06
1 141 17.59 161.9 1.06 1.12 0.289
711TPM 0 164 12.06 147.8 -0.04
1 131 12.01 148.2 0,04 0.00 0.965
716PTPM 0 172 8.045 156.8 0.41
1 137 8.500 152.7 -0.41 0.16 0.686
703R0SC 0 173 12.20 157.0 -0.42
1 144 13.40 161.4 0.42 0.18 0.674
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 170 26.27 144.9 -2.48
1 142 32.96 170.3 2.48 6.14 0.013
732IGEAR 0 169 17.15 148.1 -0.97
I 135 18.52 158.0 0.97 0.94 0.332
733BR 0 174 0.3650 149.5 -2.14
1 144 0.4800 171.6 2.14 4.58 0.033
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 179 0.00E+00 162.4 -0.12
1 146 0.00E+00 163.7 0.12 0.13 0.719
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 178 0.2850 158.7 -0.82
1 146 0.4000 167.2 0.82 0.67 0.415
TOTSSH 0 178 12.98 162.9 0.09
1 146 13.40 162.0 -0.09 0.01 0.928
NOOFSSH 0 178 1.000 160.2 -0.50
1 146 1.000 165.4 0.50 0.26 0.611
KEY:
PROHIB coding of levels, 0 * no p roh ib ition , 1 * yes - a p roh ib ition  
operates at certa in  times
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table F-28 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the existence
of a restriction of communication (RESTRICT) and the company specific
independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS 
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 151
MARKETABILITY
1 174
LISTINGS 0 151
1 174
TRADFREQ 0 149
RISK
1 173
BETA 0 146
1 163
VARIAB 0 146
1 163
SPECRISK 0 146
PROFITABILITY
1 163
707R0CE 0 144
1 167
711TPM 0 135
1 160
716PTPM 0 142
1 167
703R0SC 0 147
GEARING
1 170
731CGEAR 0 144
1 168
732IGEAR 0 139
1 165
733BR 0 147
1 171
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 151
1 174
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 150
1 174
TOTSSH 0 150
1 174
NOOFSSH 0 150
1 174
MEDIAN AVE. RANK
210.3 155.0
333.2 169.9
0.OOE+OO 155.8
0.OOE+OO 169.2
0.OOE+OO 172.0
0.OOE+OO 152.4
1.010 151.8
1.030 157.8
32.80 149.8
34.30 159.7
22.90 147.2
24.80 162.0
17.95 165.6
15.37 147.7
12.83 157.1
11.41 140.3
9.275 165.6
7.590 146.0
13.62 163.2
11.90 155.4
31.94 163.9
28.40 150.2
17.51 149.5
18.19 155.0
0.4500 162.2
0.3900 157.1
0.OOE+OO 163.5
0 .OOE+OO 162.6
0.4000 170.1
0.2750 155.9
14.59 165.3
11.84 160.1
2.000 169.4
1.000 156.5
Z VALUE H *p
-1.43
1.43 2.04 0.154
-1.29
1.29 3.62 0.057
1.88
-1.88 4.81 0.029
-0.59
0.59 0.35 0.557
-0.97
0.97 0.94 0.332
-1.45
1.45 2.09 0.148
1.75
-1.75 3.07 0.080
1.68
-1.68 2.82 0.093
1.92
-1.92 3.68 0.056
0.75
-0.75 0.57 0.451
1.34
-1.34 1.79 0.182
-0.54
0.54 0.29 0.588
0.49
-0.49 0.24 0.623
0.08
-0.08 0.06 0.803
1.36
-1.36 1.86 0.173
0.50
-0.50 0.26 0.610
1.24
-1.24 1.61 0.205
KEY:
RESTRICT coding of levels, 0 * no re s tr ic t io n , 1 = yes - a re s tr ic tio n  
operates at certa in  times
* * p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table F-29 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between the existence
of a close season fo r  communications (SEASON) and the company spec ific  
independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H p*  
SIZE
AV(MV) 0 298 303.35 168.1 3.28
1 27 98.80 106.2 -3.28 10.77 0.001
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 0 298 0.00E+00 165.7 1.73
1 27 0.00E+00 133.0 -1.73 6.57 0.011
TRADFREQ 0 296 0.00E+00 157.4 -2.67
1 26 1.00E-01 208.2 2.67 9.66 0.002
RISK
BETA 0 283 1.030 153.9 -0.74
1 26 1.080 167.5 0.74 0.55 0.457
VARIAB 0 283 33.10 151.4 -2.36
1 26 37.35 194.5 2.36 5.55 0.019
SPECRISK 0 283 23.60 151.2 -2.48
1 26 27.90 196.6 2.48 6.16 0.013
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 0 287 16.41 156.2 0.11
1 24 15.40 154.1 -0.11 0.01 0.915
711TPM 0 272 11.83 143.9 -2.84
1 23 19.90 196.5 2.84 8.06 0.005
716PTPM 0 285 8.060 150.4 -3.09
1 24 14.565 209.2 3.09 9.56 0.002
703R0SC 0 292 12.40 158.7 -0.20
1 25 13.80 162.6 0.20 0.04 0.839
GEARING
731CGEAR 0 288 30.86 159.2 1.86
1 24 19.15 123.5 -1.86 3.47 0.063
732IGEAR 0 281 18.04 155.3 1.95
1 23 11.39 118.2 -1.95 3.79 0.052
733BR 0 293 0.4300 162.5 2.01
1 25 0.2300 124.0 -2.01 4.05 0.044
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0 298 0.OOE+OO 163.5 0.35
1 27 0.OOE+OO 157.0 -0.35 1.13 0.289
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0 298 0.3000 160.6 -1.27
1 26 0.8200 184.8 1.27 1.61 0.205
TOTSSH 0 298 12.12 159.6 -1.90
1 26 20.65 196.1 1.90 3.72 0.054
NOOFSSH 0 298 1.000 159.9 -1.72
1 26 2.000 192.8 1.72 3.11 0.078
KEY:
SEASON coding o f levels, 0 = there is a close season, 1 = no close 
season
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
Marston, C.L. 1993 Appendix F 242
Table F-30 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
period of prohibition of communication (PROHIB) and the independent
categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: PRQHIB COLUMNS: QSEALIST
NO
0 0.00
1 - 0.00
YES
- 0.01
0.01
CHI-SQUARE = 0.000 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT) 
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: PRQHIB COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH
0.17
-0.18
LOW
- 0 . 2 2
0.24
CHI-SQUARE = 0.169 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT) 
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: PRQHIB COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA 
0 -0.18
1 0.20
BETA
0.43
0.47
CHI-SQUARE = 0.477 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
1
0 -1.77
1 1.96
2
0.34
-0.37
3
1.28
-1.42
4
0.33
-0.37
CHI-SQUARE = 11.142 WITH D..F. =3 (SIGNIFICANT AT
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: PROHIB COLUMNS: SSHfY/N)
NO
0 -0.16 
1 0.18
YES
0.11
-0.12
CHI-SQUARE = 0.085 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
KEY:
PROHIB coding o f levels, 0 -  no p roh ib ition , 1 = yes - a p roh ib ition  
operates at certa in  times
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Table F-31 Chi-sauare tests of association between the existence of a 
period of re s tr ic tio n  of communication (RESTRICT! and the independent 
categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: RESTRICT COLUMNS: QSEALIST
NO YES
0 0.62 -1.30
1 -0.58 1.21
CHI-SQUARE = 3.886 WITH D.F. =1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: RESTRICT COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 -1.06 1.41
1 0.98 -1.31
CHI-SQUARE = 5.776 WITH D.F. =1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .02 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: RESTRICT COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
0 -0.11 0.27
1 0.10 -0.25
CHI-SQUARE = 0.154 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: RESTRICT COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
0 1.41 -0.44 -1.45 0.57
1 -1.31 0.41 1.35 -0.53
CHI-SQUARE = 8.566 WITH D.F. -3 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: RESTRICT COLUMNS: SSHfY/Nl
NO YES
0 0.15 -0.10
1 -0.14 0.09
CHI-SQUARE = 0.062 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
KEY:
RESTRICT coding of levels, 0 = no re s tr ic t io n , 1 = yes - a re s tr ic t io n  
operates at certain times
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Table F-32 Chi-square tests of association between the existence of a
close season fo r  communications (SEASON) and the company specific  
independent continuous variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SEASON COLUMNS: QSEALIST
NO YES
0 -0.32 0.67
1 1.06 -2.23
CHI-SQUARE = 6.667 WITH D.F. =1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .01 LEVEL)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SEASON COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
0 0.55 -0.74
1 -1.87 2.49
CHI-SQUARE = 10.579 WITH D.F. =1 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .01 LEVEL) 
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SEASON COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
0 0.08 -0.19
1 -0.26 0.63
CHI-SQUARE = 0.509 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SEASON COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2  3 4
0 0.10 0.23 -0.00 -0.49
1 -0.35 -0.78 0.01 1.63
CHI-SQUARE = 3.670 WITH D.F. =3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS:_SEASON___ COLUMNS: SSH(Y/N)
NO YES
0 0.28 -0.18
1 -0.95 0.61
CHI-SQUARE = 1.389 WITH D.F. =1 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
KEY:
SEASON coding of levels, 0 = there is a close season, 1 = no close 
season
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Table F-33 Descriptive s ta t is t ic s  fo r  data on length o f close seasons
N N* MEAN MEDIAN TRMEAN STDEV
ANNUAL 269 56 59.063 60.000 59.230 12.509
INTERIM 266 59 54.391 60.000 54.963 12.499
SEMEAN MIN MAX Q1 Q3 TEST
ANNUAL 0.763 10.000 94.000 60.000 60.000 0.956
INTERIM 0.766 10.000 90.000 55.750 60.000 0.947
KEY:
ANNUAL - number of days fo r  which communication is  prohibited or
re s tr ic te d  p r io r to annual resu lts  announcement
INTERIM « number of days fo r  which communication is prohib ited or
re s tr ic te d  p r io r to  interim  resu lts  announcement
TEST = M initab's corre la tion  tes t fo r  normality
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Table F-34 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between length of close
season prior to annual results (ANNUAL) and independent categorical
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H d*
OSEALIST 0 212 60.00 139.4 1.78
1 57 60.00 118.7 -1.78 4.76 0.029
TFCAT 0 182 60.00 135.1 0.03
1 87 60.00 134.8 -0.03 0.00 0.969
ALPHA 1 234 60.00 137.4 1.31
2 35 60.00 119.0 -1.31 2.55 0.111
4WAYINDC 1 78 60.00 135.3 0.05
2 89 60.00 144.9 1.47
3 69 60.00 134,3 -0.08
4 33 60.00 108.9 -2.06 7.72 0.053
SSH(Y/N) 0 80 60.00 139.4 0.60
1 189 60.00 133.1 -0.60 0.54 0.463
KEY:
* * p value adjusted fo r  tie s
Table. F-35 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between length of close 
season p rio r to  interim  results  (INTERIM) and independent categorical 
variables
VARIABLE LEVEL MDBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H d*
OSEALIST 0 209 60.00 142.9 3.82
1 57 60.00 99.0 -3.82 21.05 0.000
TFCAT 0 180 60.00 129.9 -1.11
1 86 60.00 141.1 1.11 1.78 0.183
ALPHA 1 232 60.00 132.7 -0.46
2 34 60.00 139.1 0.46 0.30 0.583
4WAYINDC 1 76 60.00 133.8 0.04
2 89 60.00 139.8 0.94
3 69 60.00 140.0 0.82
4 32 58.00 101.4 -2.52 9.62 0.023
SSH(Y/N) 0 80 60.00 136.3 0.40
1 186 60.00 132.3 -0.40 0.23 0.635
KEY:
* « p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table F-36 Pearson corre la tion  between length of close seasons and 
independent continuous variables
ANNUAL INTERIM
SIZE
AV(MV) -0.201** -0.299**
LOGTAVMV -0.102 -0.232**
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS -0.137* -0.224**
LOGLIST -0.134* -0.262**
TRADFREQ -0.012 0.033
LOGTRADF -0.021 0.039
RISK
BETA 0.080 0.034
VARIAB 0.034 0.031
SQRTVAR 0.040 0.041
SPECRISK 0.022 0.037
LOGTSRSK 0.045 0.082
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 0.035 -0.029
711TPM -0.071 -0.060
716PTPM -0.032 -0.020
703R0SC -0.017 0.020
GEARING
731CGEAR 0.137* -0.125
732IGEAR 0.047 -0.022
SQRTIG 0.010 -0.042
733BR -0.024 0.001
SQRTBR -0.040 -0.026
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 0.045 0.004
LOGTAKEO 0.032 -0.002
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0.016 -0.008
NEGRBFA% 0.026 0.091
TOTSSH -0.139* -0.066
SQRTOTSH -0.119 -0.042
NOOFSSH -0.092 -0.023
KEY:
**  = S ign ifican t at at least the .01 level (two t a i l  te s t) 
*  = S ign ifican t at the .05 level (two t a i l  tes t)
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Table F-37 Spearman rank correlation between length of close seasons
and independent continuous variables
ANNUAL INTERIM
SIZE
AV(MV) -0.055 -0.159**
MARKETABILITY
LISTING -0.141* -0.283**
TRADFREQ -0.022 0.064
RISK
BETA 0.067 0.008
VARIAB 0.028 0.008
SPECRISK 0.027 0.037
PROFITABILITY
707ROCE -0.017 0.090
711TPM -0.068 0.027
716PTPM -0.034 0.104
703ROSC -0.035 0.066
GEARING
731CG 0.010 -0.102
732IG -0.010 -0.154*
733BR -0.064 -0.170**
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER -0.016 -0.041
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 0.052 0.084
TOTSSH -0.121* -0.058
NOOFSSH -0.068 -0.016
KEY:
** = S ign ificant at at least the .01 level (two t a i l  te s t) 
*  = S ign ifican t at the .05 level (two t a i l  te s t)
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Table F-38 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinion on 
general q u a lity  of analysts" reports (OPINION) and the company 
spec ific  independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H d*
SIZE
AV(MV) 2 12 156.25
3 167 285.00
4 133 262.20
5 7 71.60
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 2 12 0.00E+00
3 167 0.00E+00
4 133 0.OOE+OO
5 7 0.OOE+OO
TRADFREQ 2 12 0 .OOE+OO
3 165 0.OOE+OO
4 132 0.OOE+OO
5 7 3.00E-01
RISK
BETA 2 12 1.0950
3 159 1.0400
4 125 0.9800
5 7 1.1000
VARIAB 2 12 36.95
3 159 33.40
4 125 32.70
5 7 38.10
SPECRISK 2 12 26.90
3 159 24.00
4 125 23.50
5 7 27.90
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 2 12 14.86
3 159 16.79
4 127 16.32
5 7 11.60
711TPM 2 11 13.50
3 152 12.01
4 119 11.80
5 7 13.54
716PTPM 2 11 10.940
3 158 8.075
4 127 8.080
5 7 10.680
703ROSC 2 12 8.065
3 161 12.900
4 131 12.600
5 7 13.800
KEY:
OPINION coding of levels, 2 = poor, 
good
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
139.4 -0.79
162.2 0.44
164.6 0.75
56.4 -3.00 9.85 0.020
195.6 1.36
161.7 0.35
156.2 -0.63
130.5 -0.86 6.10 0.107
151.2 -0.28
159.5 0.21
153.4 -0.85
243.4 2.49 8.85 0.032
182.7 1.24
154.9 0.60
143.8 -1.37
180.5 0.87 3.49 0.323
188.0 1.45
155.6 0.76
141.0 -1.83
204.1 1.59 6.74 0.082
175.3 0.94
154.1 0.43
144.8 -1.19
193.2 1.26 3.32 0.345
150.3 -0.11
155.0 0.42
151.5 -0.25
138.4 -0.44 0.32 0.955
157.4 0.50
146.8 0.39
140.5 -0.77
162.4 0.56 0.96 0.810
161.2 0.35
153.8 0.36
147.0 -0.84
188.6 1.12 1.82 0.611
128.5 -1.08
158.9 0.59
155.3 -0.11
148.8 -0.21 1.34 0.720
acceptable, 4 = good, 5 = very
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Table F-38 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between
opinion on general Quality of analysts" reports (OPINION) and the
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H
GEARING
731CGEAR 2 12 32.90 162.2 0.35
3 159 31.43 155.8 0.48
4 128 29.17 150.1 -0.57
5 7 28.81 147.9 -0.17 0.44
732IGEAR 2 12 24.11 152.1 0.11
3 156 19.54 156.3 1.43
4 123 17.15 141.8 -1.30
5 7 12.19 128.7 -0.65 2.39
733BR 2 12 0.4450 145.7 -0.42
3 161 0.4400 157.7 0.24
4 132 0.4200 156.7 0.03
5 7 0.4000 145.2 -0.33 0.31
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 12 0 .00E+00 154.0 -0.23
3 167 0 .OOE+OO 161.6 0.33
4 133 0 .OOE+OO 158.8 -0.19
5 7 0 .OOE+OO 154.0 -0.17 1.42
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 2 12 3.3800 179.2 0.76
3 166 0.4250 159.6 0.03
4 133 0.2500 156.1 -0.55
5 7 4.5000 186.4 0.78 1.33
TOTSSH 2 12 10.71 147.0 -0.48
3 166 13.54 161.5 0.41
4 133 11.80 155.8 -0.61
5 7 19.10 203.6 1.28 2.18
NOOFSSH 2 12 1.000 155.9 -0.14
3 166 1.500 164.4 0.99
4 133 1.000 148.8 -1.76
5 7 3.000 253.0 2.72 10.02
0.932
0.496
0.958
0.700
0.722
0.537
0.019
Mar's t o n , C.L. : 1993 Appendix F 251
Table F-39 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinion on
quality of sell-side analysts' reports (SELLSIDE) and the company
specific independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H
SIZE
AV(MV) 2 17 126.80 97.4 -1.30
3 113 305.10 125.4 1.60
4 98 236.05 118.1 0.01
5 7 62.70 48.6 -2.74 10.18
MARKETABILITY
LISTINGS 2 17 0 .00E+00 122.2 0.26
3 113 0 .OOE+OO 122.9 1.06
4 98 0 .OOE+OO 113.3 -0.90
5 7 0 .00E+00 95.5 -0.89 4.01
TRADFREQ 2 17 0 .OOE+OO 122.4 0.34
3 112 0 .OOE+OO 113.1 -0.85
4 97 0 .OOE+OO 115.0 -0.39
5 7 3.00E-01 194.4 3.09 13.21
RISK
BETA 2 17 1.0200 114.0 0.10
3 108 1.0500 117.2 1.05
4 92 1.0300 108.1 -0.84
5 7 0.9200 93.4 -0.79 1.61
VARIAB 2 17 37.70 138.2 1.70
3 108 33.55 111.7 -0.19
4 92 34.25 108.6 -0.75
5 7 35.60 114.4 0.08 3.03
SPECRISK 2 17 31.20 137.1 1.63
3 108 24.35 109.8 -0.60
4 92 24.45 110.3 -0.42
5 7 27.90 122.9 0.43 2.93
PROFITABILITY
707R0CE 2 17 11.42 90.1 -1.56
3 109 16.87 116.7 0.60
4 94 15.83 113,1 -0.17
5 7 29.74 141.4 1.12 3.68
711TPM 2 15 14.22 110.8 0.18
3 104 11.78 107.0 -0.23
4 89 11.86 108.3 0.05
5 7 13.54 113.4 0.23 0.11
716PTPM 2 15 5.360 102.6 -0.55
3 108 8.070 111.6 0.02
4 92 8.295 110.8 -0.14
5 7 10.680 138.9 1.15 1.57
703ROSC 2 17 7.830 93.8 -1.37
3 110 12.350 115.9 0.19
4 95 12.400 115.5 0.10
5 7 20.300 146.1 1.26 3.31
0.017
0.262
0.004
0.657
0.388
0.403
0.298
0.990
0.667
0.346
KEY:
SELLSIDE coding of levels, 2 = very poor and poor, 3 * acceptable, 4 * 
good, 5 * very good
* * p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table F-39 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between
opinion on quality of sell-side analysts' reports (SELLSIDE) and the
company specific independent continuous variables
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE 1L
GEARING
731CGEAR 2 17 36.86 140.0 1.65
3 109 30.70 113.8 -0.16
4 95 30.27 112.0 -0.49
5 7 23.30 98.3 -0.66 3.11
732IGEAR 2 16 27.625 120.3 0.60
3 107 18.750 113.8 0,64
4 91 18.040 109.6 -0.28
5 7 6.090 65.0 -1.93 4.22
733BR 2 17 0.6100 146.6 2.00
3 110 0.4000 110.7 -1.05
4 96 0.4250 116.7 0.23
5 7 0.1300 98.9 -0.67 4.76
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
TAKEOVER 2 17 0 .00E+00 120.4 0.15
3 113 0 .OOE+OO 118.7 0.15
4 98 0 .OOE+OO 117.1 -0.17
5 7 0 .OOE+OO 113.5 -0.18 0.72
SHAREHOLDER DETAILS
BFA% 2 17 3.8000 126.0 0.54
3 112 0.7000 114.5 -0.65
4 98 0.4000 117.2 -0.06
5 7 4.5000 149.4 1.26 2.04
T0TSSH 2 17 15.12 117.1 -0.02
3 112 10.73 113.0 -0.98
4 98 14.90 121.1 0.69
5 7 15.00 140.5 0.91 1.62
NOOFSSH 2 17 2.000 124.4 0.44
3 112 1.000 115.1 -0.52
4 98 1.000 115.8 -0.32
5 7 3.000 162.5 1.79 3.64
0.376
0.240
0.191
0.869
0.564
0.655
0.303
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Table F-40 Chi-square tests of association between opinions on the
general quality of analysts' reports (OPINION! and the independent
categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: OPINION COLUMNS: OSEALIST
NO YES
2 -0.89 1.87
3 -0.18 0.38
4 0.35 -0.73
5 0.54 -1.14
CHI -SQUARE = 6. 686 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: OPINION COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
2 0.13 -0.18
3 -0.29 0.38
4 0.77 -1.02
5 -2.11 2.79
CHI--SQUARE = 14 .133 WITH D.F. = 3 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: OPINION COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
2 -0.07 0.17
3 0.13 -0.31
4 -0.03 0.08
5 -0.40 0.95
CHI --SQUARE = 1. 211 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: OPINION COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2 3 4
2 -0.82 0.71 -0.07 0.24
3 0.40 -0.53 0.54 -0.53
4 -0.51 0.72 -0.61 0.52
5 1.35 -1.46 0.13 0.01
CHI--SQUARE = 7. 617 WITH D.F. = 9 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: OPINION COLUMNS: SSH(Y/N)
NO YES
2 0.28 -0.18
3 -0.73 0.46
4 1.05 -0.67
5 -1.42 0.91
CHI -SQUARE = 5. 258 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
KEY:
OPINION coding of levels, 2 = poor, 3 = acceptable, 4 = good, 5 = very 
good
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Table F-41 Chi-souare tests of association between opinions on the
q u a lity  of se ll-s id e  analysts reports (SELLSIDE) and the independent 
categorical variables
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SELLSIDE COLUMNS: OSEALIST
NO YES
2 -0.20 0.41
3 -0.46 0.94
4 0.42 -0.87
5 0.56 -1.16
CHI -SQUARE = 3,.891 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SELLSIDE COLUMNS: TFCAT
HIGH LOW
2 -0.24 0.32
3 0.22 -0.29
4 0.43 -0.57
5 -2.11 2.78
CHI -SQUARE =12..993 WITH 3 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .01
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SELLSIDE COLUMNS: ALPHA
ALPHA BETA
2 0.10 -0.26
3 0.28 -0.70
4 -0.13 0.32
5 -0.82 2.03
CHI -SQUARE = 5.547 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SELLSIDE COLUMNS: 4WAY1NDC
1 2 3 4
2 -0.09 -0.72 0.47 0.68
3 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.13
4 -0.19 0.36 -0.28 0.09
5 0.58 -0.23 0.26 -0.91
CHI -SQUARE = 2.779 WITH D.F. = 9 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: SELLSIDE COLUMNS: SSH(Y/N)
NO YES
2 -0.21 0.12
3 0.15 -0.09
4 0.29 -0.17
5 -1.35 0.80
CHI -SQUARE = 2.667 WITH D.F. = 3 (NOT SIGNIFICANT)
KEY:
SELLSIDE coding of levels, 2 = very poor and poor, 3 = acceptable, 4 = 
good, 5 = very good
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Table F-42 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinions on
sell-side analysts and independent continuous variables
Opinion 2 - Company telephone conversations with se ll-s ide  analysts 
are a valuable means of communication
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H *p
AV(MV) 1 86 402.65 179.5 2.16
2 200 272.45 159.8 -0.31
3 25 207.50 148.7 -0.69
4&5 10 74.00 57.3 -3.59 16.39 0.001
TRADFREQ 1 86 0.00E+00 148.9 -1.31
2 198 0.00E+00 159.9 -0.03
3 25 0.00E+00 172.7 0.72
4&5 10 3.50E-01 225.8 2.29 9.24 0.027
732IGEAR 1 82 16.620 144.2 -0.77
2 184 19.360 158.8 2.09
3 24 13.420 138.5 -0.71
4&5 10 6.845 78.4 -2.67 9.48 0.024
Opinion 4 - My company would prefer not to ta lk  to s e ll- side analysts
on the telephone
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H *p
AV(MV) 1&2 19 74.60 105.9 -2.64
3 12 180.70 151.0 -0.35
4 188 272.45 158.8 -0.29
5 100 352.10 173.7 1.79 8.90 0.031
BFA% 1&2 19 5.4000 210.4 2.49
3 12 1.4200 195.8 1.39
4 187 0.3000 154.2 -1.22
5 100 0.2850 155.3 -0.55 8.53 0.037
Opinion 5 - My company should not provide se ll-s id e  analysts with
guidance as to the accuracy of th e ir  p ro fits  forecasts
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H *p
BETA 1 24 0.9600 130.3 -1.19
2 57 1.0700 177.6 2.62
3 40 1.0400 157.6 0.55
4 148 0.9750 138.1 -2.44
5 31 1.0900 166.3 1.07 11.15 0.025
KEY:
Coding of levels 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 « uncertain, 4 = 
disagree, 5 = strongly disagree
* = p value adjusted fo r ties
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Table F-42 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between
opinions and independent continuous variables
Opinion 6 - Se ll-s ide  analysts pressurise my company fo r information
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H p
AV(MV) 1 8 460.8 171.6 0.39
2 113 436.8 185.1 3.77
3 46 151.9 140.8 -1.46
4 132 155.4 140.1 -3.10
5 18 468.6 175.0 0.76 17.28 o.oo;
TRADFREQ 1 8 5.00E-02 177.8 0.62
2 113 0.00E+00 133.9 -3.51
3 46 0.00E+00 164.4 0.51
4 130 0.00E+00 176.4 3.01
5 18 0.00E+00 151.0 -0.34 18.82 0.00
BFA% 1 8 0.01000 90.8 -2.12
2 113 0.30000 161.1 0.37
3 46 0.84000 182.7 1.94
4 131 0.46000 156.0 -0.41
5 18 0.18500 128.7 -1.42 9.74 0.041
Opinion 7 - Se ll-s ide  analysts are too concerned with short term
p ro f it  opportunities
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H p
731CGEAR 1 33 38.10 193.5 2.71
2 152 29.99 153.2 -0.15
3 55 27.73 149.5 -0.42
5&4 67 29.60 140.0 -1.46 8.36 0.04i
733BR 1 33 0.6300 194.4 2.51
2 155 0.4400 158.8 0.35
3 56 0.3500 147.3 -0.89
5&4 69 0.4100 143.0 -1.45 7.99 0.04
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Table F-43 Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between opinions on 
buv-side analysts and fund managers and independent continuous 
variables
Opinion 1 - Company meetings with buy-side analysts and fund managers 
are a valuable means o f communication
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE , H *p
AV(MV) 1 168 379.2 171.7 2.85
2 136 214.1 143.3 -2.49
5&3 11 120.9 130.5 -1.02 8.31 0.016
LISTINGS 1 168 0.00E+00 166.5 1.78
2 136 0.00E+00 148.6 -1.59
5&3 11 0.00E+00 143.6 -0.53 6.82 0.033
TRADFREQ 1 166 0.00E+00 144.7 -2.47
2 136 0.00E+00 167.6 1.91
5&3 10 1.50E-01 202.1 1.63 10.21 0.006
716PTPM 1 162 8.295 149.7 -0.27
2 130 7.985 147.1 -0.68
58(3 9 20.290 230.3 2.78 7.77 0.021
731CGEAR 1 162 32.80 163.9 2.53
2 132 28.19 140.1 -2.07
58(3 9 14.02 111.8 -1.40 7.30 0.026
733BR 1 165 0.4400 162.7 1.61
2 135 0.4000 149.9 -0.89
58,3 9 0.1300 91.6 -2.16 6.20 0.046
Opinion 3 - My company would prefer not to hold meetings with buy-side
analysts and fund managers
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUE H *p
AV(MV) 1&2 6 152.6 103.2 -1.50
3 5 2265.8 187.2 0.71
4 151 194.1 140.2 -3.41
5 154 439.5 177.7 3.64 15.52 0.001
LISTINGS 1&2 6 0.00E+O0 128.5 -0.81
3 5 0.00E+00 198.7 0.99
4 151 0.00E+00 148.5 -1.86
5 154 0.00E+00 168.2 1.84 11.03 0.012
TRADFREQ 18(2 6 3.00E-01 214.0 1.56
3 5 0.00E+00 161.4 0.11
4 150 0.00E+00 169.3 2.30
5 152 0.00E+00 142.5 -2.76 12.34 0.007
KEY:
Coding of levels 1 = strongly agree, 2 «= agree, 3 -  uncertain, 4 = 
disagree, 5 = strongly disagree
* = p value adjusted fo r  tie s
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Table F-43 (continued) Kruskal-Wallis tests of association between
opinions on buy-side analysts and fund managers and independent
continuous variables
Opinion 4 - My company would prefer not to ta lk  to buy-side analysts 
and fund managers on the telephone
m irn i  Lem  m b s   median . ave t rank - I-V a u jl H
AV(MV) 1&2 23 97.80 108.2 -2.69
3 20 273.90 165.9 0.45
4 153 197.20 144.4 -2.41
5 117 452.60 181.6 3.71 18.46 0.000
Opinion 5 - My company should not provide buy- side analysts and fund
managers with guidance as to fu ture  p ro fits
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS , MEDIAN AVE, RANK Z VALUE H *P
711TPM 1 27 9.790 107.6 -2.32
2 68 12.625 144.8 0.26
3 40 17.965 180.9 3.19
4 122 11.515 135.2 -1.30
5 27 12.640 147.9 0.36 14.73 0.006
Opinion 6 - Buy-side analysts and fund managers pressurise my company 
fo r information
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE, RANK Z VALUE H
707ROCE 1&2 45 20.78 181.3 2.53
3 38 13.61 128.8 -1.68
4 186 16.17 146.9 -1.03
5 32 17.37 158.4 0.51 8.57 0.03i
Opinion 8 *• Buy-side analysts and fund managers are not s u ff ic ie n tly
interested in the long term prospects o f my company
VARIABLE LEVEL NOBS MEDIAN AVE. RANK Z VALUL H p
AV(MV) 1 6 126.7 99.8 -1.59
2 37 207.4 142.3 -1.15
3 65 160.2 135.9 -2.24
4 179 353.5 165.7 1.61
5 29 518.3 197.4 2.41 14.00 0.00!
LISTINGS 1 6 O.OOE+OO 128.5 -0.81
2 37 O.OOE+OO 162.4 0.28
3 65 0.00E+00 147.1 -1.13
4 179 O.OOE+OO 156.8 -0.38
5 29 0.00E+00 195.9 2.31 14.23 0.00
TRADFREQ 1 6 2.50E-01 234.3 2.11
2 36 O.OOE+OO 171.7 1.04
3 64 O.OOE+OO 171.3 1.42
4 178 O.OOE+OO 149.3 -1.72
5 29 O.OOE+OO 138.2 -1.17 12.88 0.01
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Table F-44 Chi-square te s t of association between opinion on s e ll-  
side analysts and in dus tria l c la ss ifica tio n
Opinion 4 - My company would prefer not to ta lk  to se ll-s ide  analysts 
on the telephone
STD RESIDUALS: ROWS: OPINION COLUMNS: 4WAYINDC
1 2 3 4
1&2 1.47 -0.37 -0.87 -0.38
3 -0.80 1.70 -1.77 1.05
4 1.11 -1.22 0.44 -0.38
5 -1.88 1.25 0.39 0.32
CHI-SQUARE = 19.363 WITH D.F. = 9 (SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL)
KEY:
OPINION coding of leve ls, 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = 
uncertain, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree
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Glossary
Abbreviations
4WAYINDC
703R0SC
707R0CE
711TPM
716PTPM
731CGEAR
732IGEAR
733BR
ALPHA
AV(MV)
BETA
BFA%
LISTINGS
LOGLIST
LOGTAKEO
LOGTAVMV
LOGTRADF
LOGTSRSK
NEGRBFA%
used fo r  independent variables
Four way in dus tria l c la ss ifica tio n  (1 = cap ita l, 2 = 
consumer, 3 = other, 4 = fin a n c ia l)
Return on shareholders' ca p ita l, Datastream company 
accounts item 703
Return on cap ita l employed, Datastream company 
accounts item 707
Trading p ro f it  margin, Datastream company accounts 
item 711
Pre-tax p ro f it  margin, Datastream company accounts 
item 716
Capital gearing, Datastream company accounts item 
731
Income gearing, Datastream company accounts item 732 
Borrowing ra tio , Datastream company accounts item 
733
Whether a stock was rated alpha or beta on the 
London Stock Exchange at 7th September 1991 
Average market value of quoted equity fo r  the year 
to 31st July 1991
Beta, the s e n s it iv ity  of the share price to general 
market movements, as calculated by London Business 
School Risk Measurement service July 1991 
Percentage of equity held by board, fam ily and 
associates as lis te d  in Crawford's D irectory of C ity 
Connections 1992
Number of overseas stock exchange lis tin g s  at 1st 
August 1991
Log base ten of (LISTINGS + 1)
Log base ten of (TAKEOVER + 1)
Log base ten of AV(MV)
Log base ten of (TRADFREQ + 1)
Log base ten of SPECRISK
Negative reciprocal of (BFA% + 1)
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NOOFSSH
OSEALIST
SPECRISK
SQRTBR
SQRTIG
SQRTOTSH
SQRTVAR
SSH(Y/N)
TAKEOVER
TFCAT
TOTSSH
TRADFREQ
VARIAB
Number of substantial shareholdings lis te d  in 
Crawford's D irectory of C ity Connections 1992 
Whether or not there were any overseas lis t in g s  at 1 
August 1991
Specific r is k , the r is k  o f non-market related 
fluc tua tions in the share price, as calculated by 
London Business School Risk Measurement service July 
1991
Square root of (733BR + 7)
Square root of (732IGEAR + 228)
Square root of (TOTSSH + 1)
Square root of VARIAB
Whether or not there were any substantial
shareholders (3% or more)
Number of takeovers in year to 31st July 1991 
Whether trading was FREQUENT (0 days between trades) 
or LESS FREQUENT (>0 days between trades)
Total percentage of equity held by substantial 
shareholders (holding 3% or more) as lis te d  in 
Crawford's D irectory of C ity Connections 1992 
Trading frequency (time between trades in days) as 
calculated by London Business School Risk 
Measurement service July 1991 
V a r ia b ility  (standard deviation) of the returns on 
the share as calculated by London Business School 
Risk Measurement service July 1991
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Abbreviations
%DIRINIR
ACTIVITY
ANALYST(A)
ANALYST(B)
ANNUAL
BROKERS
BUDGET
COMMENT
COSTS
DIRDAYS
FEEDBACK
FIRMS
GENERAL
GENERALS
INDEX
INSTINV
INTERIM
INVESTOR
IRCONS
IRDEPT
IROFFICER
IRSTAFF
used fo r  dependent variables
The percentage of the d irectora te  involved in 
managing or executing the IR programme 
Index of IR a c t iv ity  (see 10.3)
Number of se ll-s ide  analysts attending meetings in 
past 12m
Number of buy-side analysts and fund managers
attending meetings in past 12m
Number of days close season p rio r to annual results
announcement
Number of stockbrokers on company mailing l i s t
Annual budget a lloca tion  fo r  IR
Number of se ll-s id e  analysts' reports passed to
company fo r  comment in the past 12m
Cost of external IR consultant in past 12m
Director days devoted to IR
Rank importance of providing feedback on analysts' 
reports
Number of stockbroking firms represented at meetings 
in past 12m
Rank importance of holding general meetings
Number o f general meetings in past 12m
The index of d irec to r involvement in IR (see 9.3.1)
Number of in s titu t io n a l investors on company mailing
l i s t
Number of days close season p r io r to interim  results  
announcement
Number of in s titu t io n a l investor organisations 
represented at meetings in the past 12m 
Whether or not there was an external IR consultant 
Whether or not there was an IR department 
Whether there is a dedicated IR o ff ic e r , an IR 
o ff ic e r  with other duties or no IR o ff ic e r  
Whether s ta ff  working fo r  IR o ff ic e r  are dedicated 
to IR, th e ir  work involves other duties, or there 
are no s ta ff
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LIST(A)
LIST(B)
MAILING
MAILING(A)
MAILING(B)
OPINION
OTHER
PROHIB
REPORTS
RESTRICT
SEASON
SELLSIDE
SPECIAL 
SPECIALS 
SURVEYS 
SURVEYS(A) 
SURVEYS(B)
SURVEYS(Y/N) 
TELEPHONE
Number of se ll-s id e  analysts on company's 
c ircu la tio n  l i s t
Number of buy-side analysts and fund managers on 
company's c ircu la tio n  l i s t  
Rank importance o f mailing information 
Whether or not the company mailed information to 
se ll-s ide  analysts
Whether or not the company mailed information to 
buy-side analysts
Opinion of general q u a lity  of analysts' reports 
Number of other organisations employing analysts on 
company mailing l i s t
Whether or not a company operated a p roh ib ition  on 
communication in i ts  close season 
Number o f se ll-s id e  analysts' reports produced in 
the past 12m
Whether or not a company operated a re s tr ic tio n  on 
communication in i ts  close season 
Whether a company had a close season or not 
Opinion on q u a lity  o f analysis carried out by s e ll-  
side analysts
Rank importance of holding special meetings 
Number o f special meetings in past 12m 
SURVEYS(A) + SURVEYS(B)
Number of surveys of c ity  opinion in past 12m 
Number of surveys more than 12m ago, less than 5 
years ago
Whether or not any surveys had been commissioned 
Rank importance of telephone conversations
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Abbreviations used fo r  s ta t is t ic a l terms
Chi-square test tables
STD RESIDUALS Standardized residuals
Descriptive statistics tables
NOBS Number of observations
Q1 F irs t q u a rtile
Q2 Third q u a rtile
SEMEAN Standard error of the mean
STDEV Standard deviation
TEST M initab's corre la tion  tes t fo r normality
TRMEAN 5% trimmed mean
Kruskal-Wallis test tables
H The Kruskal-Wallis tes t s ta t is t ic
Z VALUE Indicates how the mean rank fo r  the group d iffe rs
from the mean rank fo r  a l l  the observations
Regression tables
Coef Coeffic ient
DF Degrees of freedom
F F -ra tio
MS MS error
R-SQ C oeffic ient of determination
R-SQ(ADJ) R-SQ adjusted fo r  degrees of freedom
S The estimated standard deviation about the
regression line  
SS Sum of squares
GLASGOW
v n iv e r s it t  
l ib r a r y
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